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2025 DIGILAW 1488 (TS)

State of Telangana v. Sarangi Balaraju

2025-11-13

J.SREENIVAS RAO

body2025
JUDGMENT : J. Sreenivas Rao, J. This criminal appeal has been filed aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned IX Additional District and Sessions Judge, Wanaparthy in S.C. No.467 of 2012, dated 06.03.2015, where under respondent/accused was acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’). 2. Heard Sri M.Vivekananda Reddy, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of appellant-State. In spite of service of notice, respondent has not chosen to enter appearance. 3. The case of prosecution in brief is that the deceased Laxmi was the daughter of PW.1 Balamma and sister of PW2 Suresh. She was married to the accused about six years prior to March, 2012. After the marriage they lead happy conjugal life for about three years and during that period the deceased gave birth to two sons. Subsequent to that the accused addicted to alcohol, started suspecting the fidelity of the deceased and tortured her for additional dowry. Unable to bear with the harassment of the accused, the deceased Laxmi was brought to Wanaparthy from Nagarkurnool by PW.1 and put her along with the accused in Wanaparthy in a rented accommodation in the locality in which PWs.1 and 2 are living. PW.1 also arranged a finance of Rs.10,000/- for the accused for his silver business with an advise to look after the family well and live peacefully. But the accused was not satisfied with the said amount and continued to torture the deceased in drunken condition asking to bring additional dowry of Rs.50,000/- from the mother for his silver business. Since the family of PWs.1 and 2 was not in a position to arrange additional dowry of Rs.50,000/- and the deceased Laxmi unable to bear with the torture of physical assault on her, she took pesticide poison to commit suicide and came to the house of PW.1 and seeing some froth from the mouth of the deceased, immediately she was taken to hospital by PWs.1 and 2 on 2.3.2012 and on the same day, deceased succumbed while undergoing treatment in the Government Hospital. Then PW.1 went to the police station on 3.3.2012 and presented complaint at about 12.30 ?.?. Basing on the said complaint, the present case was registered for the offence under Section 304-B of IPC. 4. Then PW.1 went to the police station on 3.3.2012 and presented complaint at about 12.30 ?.?. Basing on the said complaint, the present case was registered for the offence under Section 304-B of IPC. 4. On behalf of prosecution before the Court below, PWs.1 to 10 were examined and Ex.P1 to P6 were marked. On behalf of defence, no witnesses were examined and Ex.D1 was marked. The trial Court after taking into consideration of the oral and documentary evidence on record and after hearing the parties, acquitted respondent/accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of IPC. 5. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the State filed the present Appeal. 6.1. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused for the offence under Section 304-B of IPC by producing the oral and documentary evidence on record. The learned Sessions Judge without properly appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record erroneously acquitted the accused for the offence under Section 304-B of IPC. He further submitted that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have considered the evidence of PWs.1 to 4. PW.4 in his evidence specifically deposed that the accused used to come to the house in a drunken state of mind and beaten the deceased and when PW.4 tried to intervene to rescue the deceased, the accused questioned his propriety to intervene in the matter and that unable to bear the torture of the accused, the deceased committed suicide. 6.2. He further submitted that the learned Sessions Judged erred in coming to conclusion that the deceased died due to the harassment and cruelty at the instance of the accused, though the deceased committed suicide due to the harassment of the accused only. The impugned judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge is contrary to the settled principles of law and the same is liable to be set aside and therefore, the accused is liable to be convicted for the offence under Section 304-B of IPC. 7. Having considered the submissions made by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor and after perusal of the material available on record, it reveals that even according to the prosecution, the alleged incident was occurred on 02.03.2012, whereas the complaint under Ex.P1 was lodged on 03.03.2012 by PW.1, who is none other than the mother of the deceased. 7. Having considered the submissions made by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor and after perusal of the material available on record, it reveals that even according to the prosecution, the alleged incident was occurred on 02.03.2012, whereas the complaint under Ex.P1 was lodged on 03.03.2012 by PW.1, who is none other than the mother of the deceased. The record further reveals that according to PW.1, the deceased came to her house at 06-00 p.m. on 02.03.2012 and fell down and when the deceased was brought to the Government Hospital on the very same day, she died. However, PW.1 lodged the complaint on 03.03.2012 at 12-30 p.m. though the said hospital is very near to the police station, and therefore, there is a delay in lodging the complaint. PW.1 in her complaint under Ex.P1, dated 03.03.2012 stated that the marriage of the deceased with the accused took place about six years prior to the date of her evidence. PW.1 gave her evidence before the trial Court on 05.01.2015, and therefore, she should have deposed that the marriage of the deceased with the accused was took place eight years before the date of giving evidence. But she stated in her evidence that the marriage of the deceased with the accused was took place about six years ago. The learned Sessions Judge, after evaluating the evidence of PW.1, came to the conclusion that the marriage of the deceased with the accused was performed more than seven years earlier. Except the evidence of PW.1, there is no other direct evidence on record regarding the demand for additional dowry by the accused. PW.4 in his evidence has also not spoken that the accused harassed the deceased by demanding to bring additional dowry from her mother. 8. Taking into consideration the evidence available on record, the learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that there is no demand on the part of the accused to bring the additional dowry. To attract the ingredients for the offence under Section 304-B of IPC, soon before the death of the deceased, there is a demand for dowry either by the accused or any of his relative and the same has not been established by the prosecution. The evidence placed on record by the prosecution is only hearsay evidence on the said aspect and the same is not admissible under law. The evidence placed on record by the prosecution is only hearsay evidence on the said aspect and the same is not admissible under law. The learned Sessions Judge on the grounds of delay in lodging the complaint and the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt against the accused, rightly acquitted the accused for the offence under Section 304-B of IPC. 9. In cases of acquittal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravi Sharma v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and another, (2022) 8 Supreme Court Cases 536 , held that while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellate Court has to consider whether the trial Court’s view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial Court rendering acquittal. 10. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh , (2008) 10 SCC 450 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court after referring several Judgments regarding the settled principles of law and the powers of appellate Court in reversing the order of acquittal, held at para 70, as follows: “70. In the light of the above, the High Court and other appellate Courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of Judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court’s acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court’s acquittal if it has “very substantial and compelling reasons” for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have “very substantial and compelling reasons” to discard the trial court’s decision. “Very substantial and compelling reasons” exist when: i) The trial court’s conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong: ii) The trial court’s decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii) The trial court’s judgment is likely to result in “grave miscarriage of justice”; iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v) The trial court’s judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misreadthe material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive. 2. The appellate court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the trial court. 3. If two reasonable views can be reached one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction the High Courts/appellate courts must rule in favour of the accused.” 11. In view of several discrepancies and the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court supra, this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the case against the accused and the Court below has rightly acquitted the accused and there are no grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the learned Magistrate and the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 12. Accordingly, the criminal appeal is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.