JUDGMENT : J. Sreenivas Rao, J. This criminal appeal has been filed aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned VII Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar in S.C. No.860 of 2015, dated 16.05.2017, where under respondent No.1/accused No.1 was acquitted for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 379, 435 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’) and Section 25(1)(A) of the Arms Act, 1959 and respondent No.2/accused No.2 was acquitted for the offence under Section 435 of IPC. 2. Heard Sri M.Vivekananda Reddy, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of appellant-State. No representation on behalf of the respondents/accused Nos.1 and 2 in the morning session and in the afternoon session either physically or virtually. 3. The case of prosecution in brief is that on 14.11.2014 at 22-20 hours Sri Kancharla Sainath Reddy, PC-4070 lodged a complaint in which he stated that on 14.11.2014 at 8-20 PM they saw a person moving on a numberless PULSAR motor cycle near More Supermarket side, Snehapuri Colony, wearing a helmet, and on suspicion, he and LW2 B. Jagan Mohan, PC 5736 followed him and passed on information to LW3 E.Prasad Reddy, PC 4935. Immediately LW3 joined them and LW1 and LW2 waylaid accused No.1 by stopping numberless motorcycle and when tried to catch him, accused No.1 took out the knife and threatening LW1 and LW2 not to approach accused No.1 and in the meantime LW3 caught hold the accused No.1 from backside. But accused No.1 managed to release from LW3 and stabbed LW3 on his left shoulder causing severe bleeding injury and accused No.1 took the Karizma motorcycle and fled away from the scene. Accused Nos.1 and 2 took the stolen vehicle to an isolated area beside Shiva Goshala, at the outskirts of Palmakula Village and burnt away the stolen vehicle. Basing on the said complaint, the present case was registered for the offence under Section 304-B of IPC. After completion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer filed charge sheet against the accused Nos.1 and 2 for the aforesaid offences. 4. On behalf of prosecution before the Court below, PWs.1 to 11 were examined and Ex.P1 to P10 were marked. On behalf of defence, no witnesses were examined, however, Exs.D1 to D5 were marked. After completion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer filed charge sheet against the accused Nos.1 and 2 for the aforesaid offences. 4. On behalf of prosecution before the Court below, PWs.1 to 11 were examined and Ex.P1 to P10 were marked. On behalf of defence, no witnesses were examined, however, Exs.D1 to D5 were marked. The trial Court after taking into consideration the oral and documentary evidence on record and after hearing the parties, acquitted respondents for the offences with which they were charged. 5. Aggrieved by the above said judgment, the State filed the present Appeal. 6. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused Nos.1 and 2 for the aforesaid offences by producing the oral and documentary evidence on record. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge without properly appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record erroneously acquitted the accused Nos.1 and 2. He further submitted that PW.3, who is the injured person, specifically stated in his evidence that when he tried to caught hold accused No.1 from back side, he hit him with knife on his left shoulder and he fled away by taking Karizma motorcycle of PW.1. In the absence of any contrary evidence, the learned Assistant Sessions Judge disbelieved the evidence of PW.3 and acquitted the accused persons. The impugned judgment passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge is contrary to law and the same is liable to be set aside. Therefore, accused Nos.1 and 2 are liable to be convicted for the offences with which they were charged. 7. Having considered the submissions made by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor and after perusal of the impugned judgment, it reveals that basing upon the complaint lodged by PW.1 dated 14.11.2014, the present crime was registered. Even according to the allegations made in the complaint, accused No.1 moving on a numberless motorcycle and when LWs.1 and 2 tried to stop him, he took the knife and threatened them and in the meantime, LW.3 caught hold accused No.1 from back side, but accused No.1 managed to release from LW.3 and stabbed LW.3 on his left shoulder causing severe bleeding injury and accused No.1 took the Karizma motorcycle of PW.1 and fled away from the scene. Even according to prosecution, the incident took place on 14.11.2014 and accused Nos.1 and 2 were apprehended by PW.10 on 1.12.2014 i.e. nearly after one month. Even according to prosecution, the incident took place on 14.11.2014 and accused Nos.1 and 2 were apprehended by PW.10 on 1.12.2014 i.e. nearly after one month. On behalf of prosecution, PWs.1 to 11 were examined and Exs.P1 to P10 were marked. On behalf of defence, Exs.D1 to D5 were marked. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge after evaluating the oral and documentary evidence available on record has come to conclusion that the police have not seized the pulsar motorcycle from the scene. Admittedly, even according to the evidence of PW.3, accused No.1 left the pulsar motorcycle at the scene and left the scene on Karizma motorcycle of PW.1. Even according to PW.1, accused No.1 stabbed LW.3 and left the scene on Karizma motorcycle and the Pulsar motorcycle was not seized by the police. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge while relying upon the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Gurbachan Singh vs. State of Bihar with Raj Pal Sharma vs. State of Bihar , 1995 Supp(1) SCC 80 and C.Muniappan and others vs. State of Tamil Nadu , AIR 2010 SC 3718 , specifically held that the test identification parade is very important. In the case on hand, PW.11 in his evidence has specifically admitted that he has not conducted the test identification parade to identify the suspect involved on the date of offence. 8. Insofar as the other allegation levelled against accused No.1 for the offence under Section 25(1)(A) of the Arms Act is concerned, the prosecution has not taken any prior sanction, as required under Section 39 of the Arms Act to invoke Section 25(1)(A) of the Arms Act. Further the learned Assistant Sessions Judge relied upon the principle laid down by the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Ahmed Bin Salam and others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh , 2013(2) ALD (Cri) 75 , wherein it was held that the sanction under Section 39 of the Act to invoke the offence under Section 25(1)(A) of the Arms Act is mandatory. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge has rightly come to conclusion that the prosecution has miserably failed to connect the accused persons with this crime. 9. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge has rightly come to conclusion that the prosecution has miserably failed to connect the accused persons with this crime. 9. In cases of acquittal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravi Sharma v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and another , [(2022) 8 Supreme Court Cases 536] , held that while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellate Court has to consider whether the trial Court’s view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial Court rendering acquittal. 10. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh , (2008) 10 SCC 450 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court after referring several Judgments regarding the settled principles of law and the powers of appellate Court in reversing the order of acquittal, held at para 70, as follows: “70. In the light of the above, the High Court and other appellate Courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of Judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court’s acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court’s acquittal if it has “very substantial and compelling reasons” for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have “very substantial and compelling reasons” to discard the trial court’s decision. “Very substantial and compelling reasons” exist when: i) The trial court’s conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong: ii) The trial court’s decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii) The trial court’s judgment is likely to result in “grave miscarriage of justice”; iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v) The trial court’s judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive. 2. The appellate court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the trial court. 3. vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive. 2. The appellate court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the trial court. 3. If two reasonable views can be reached one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction the High Courts/appellate courts must rule in favour of the accused.” 11. In view of several discrepancies and the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court supra, this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the case against the accused Nos.1 and 2 and the Court below has rightly acquitted the accused and there are no grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge and the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 12. Accordingly, the criminal appeal is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.