JUDGMENT : ANU SIVARAMAN, J. 'Fraus Omnia Vitiat, the maxim can be translated as fraud unravels all. The issue that we are called upon to consider in this batch of writ appeals is whether the maxim applies to the facts of the instant case. 2. Writ Appeals No.322/2023, 309/2023, 349/2023, 388/2023, 362/2023, 354/2023 are preferred against the common judgment dated 07.02.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petitions No.9482/2020 connected with Writ Petitions No.9179/2020, 9196/2020, 9203/2020, 9275/2020, 9502/2020, 9529/2020, 14796/2020, 10434/2021 (KLR-RES). Writ Appeal No.789/2023 is filed by respondents No.3, 4 and 5 in Writ Petition No.9179/2020 being aggrieved by the common judgment dated 07.02.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge inasmuch as it allows Writ Petition No.9179/2020 filed by Shri. K.R. Sudhir and Shri. A.Mahaboob Pasha. 3. We have heard Shri. D.R Ravishankar, learned senior counsel as instructed by Shri. Prashanth M.M, learned advocate and Shri. Narayanaswamy P.M, learned advocate; Shri. S.M. Chandrashekar, learned senior counsel as instructed by Shri. Chandrashekar Reddy R.A, learned advocate; Shri. Vinod Prasad, learned counsel; Shri. K.N Krishna Rao, learned counsel; Shri. S.H. Kazi, learned counsel; Shri. Chandrashekar Patil, learned counsel; Shri. Shamnaz Abubakar, learned counsel for Shri. Ponnanna M.B learned advocate and Shri. K. Lokesh, learned counsel along with Shri. Vijaya Kumar K, learned counsel appearing for the private parties. Shri. B.L. Sanjeev, learned counsel appearing for BWSSB. Shri. Kempanna, learned Additional Advocate General, Shri. Kiran V. Ron, learned Additional Advocate General along with Smt. Mamatha Shetty, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the State. 4. The learned Single Judge has succinctly stated the facts of the instant case. The basic facts are not in dispute. By virtue of a Notification issued under Section 1(4) of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954, the entire K.G. Chokkanahalli Village of Yelahanka Hobli stood vested in the State of Karnataka. The appellants herein contended that they had derived title over the respective properties which are the subject matter of these appeals from five orders of grant dated 15.02.1965, 17.10.1966, 30.07.1975, 31.09.1978 and 23.06.1984 or from purchases made from the grantees or their successors in interest under these grants. They also rely on the Sale Deed executed on 19.01.1920 by one Kollegal Sheebanna in favour of six persons, namely, Muninarasimha Reddy, Nadappa @ Nadukala, Narasimha Reddy, Anjani, Huchappa, Mudaiah and Munishamy. 5. They also rely on the Sale Deed executed on 19.01.1920 by one Kollegal Sheebanna in favour of six persons, namely, Muninarasimha Reddy, Nadappa @ Nadukala, Narasimha Reddy, Anjani, Huchappa, Mudaiah and Munishamy. 5. Relying on the orders of grant, rights in succession and Sale Deeds allegedly executed by the grantees, then successors in interest and further successive sale deeds, the writ petitioners sought mutation of the respective parcels of land in their favour. On 30.04.1996, the Tahasildar directed the names of the grantees under the alleged 1978 grant to be entered in column No.12(2). This Order was challenged by Krishnappa and Mariyappa before the Assistant Commissioner. By an order dated 08.08.1997, their appeal was allowed and the mutation was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Tahasildar. While so, on 17.08.2000, a direction was issued by the Special Officer to the Hon'ble Chief Minister to the Deputy Commissioner to conduct an enquiry regarding entries made in respect of Survey No.75/4. The Deputy Commissioner called for a report from the Tahasildar by communication dated 17.08.2000. The said report has been considered extensively at paragraphs No.50 to 54 of the judgment by the learned Single Judge. Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner invoked his power under 136(3) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 ('KLR Act' for short) and started an enquiry to examine the validity of the entries in the revenue records. A Public Interest Litigation had been filed as W.P.No.16775/2002, which was dismissed, observing that the dismissal would not preclude the authorities from acting in accordance with law. The Deputy Commissioner after holding an enquiry submitted a report which clearly indicated that no person had been registered as an occupant under the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954, in respect of the property comprised in Sy.No.75/4 and that the claims of the petitioners were unsupported except in case of 1984 grant. The Special Deputy Commissioner by Order dated 26.04.2004, directed the names of all other persons to be removed from the revenue entries and directed the Tahasildar to evict the unauthorized occupants. The said order and consequential orders were challenged in several writ petitions. Some were dismissed while other writ petitions were allowed, setting aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner and remanding the matter for a fresh consideration. 6. The said order and consequential orders were challenged in several writ petitions. Some were dismissed while other writ petitions were allowed, setting aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner and remanding the matter for a fresh consideration. 6. In the meanwhile, W.P.No.12768/2013 (KLR-RES-PIL) was filed in public interest and this Court, by an Order dated 24.06.2014, held that the Special Deputy Commissioner was at liberty to refer the records to Forensic Science Laboratory. Liberty was also reserved to the public interest litigants to challenge the order of the Deputy Commissioner in accordance with law. An order passed by the Deputy Commissioner on 30.08.2016, which was again challenged and the matter was remanded to the Deputy Commissioner for a fresh consideration. Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner referred the matter for a Forensic Examination and after obtaining a report dated 26.09.2019, he passed the impugned order dated 17.06.2020, which was challenged in the writ petitions. 7. It was the specific case of the State before the learned Single Judge that out of the total land available in the village, 291 acres and 7½ guntas was registered in the name of Kadim Tenants, 16 acres and 33 guntas in favour Minor Inamdars and 252 acres and 11½ guntas in favour of Inamdars under Section 9 making the total extent of land granted was 560 Acres and 12 guntas. It was specifically contended that there was no application made in respect of land bearing Sy.No.75/4 for regrant by any person and no order was passed registering anybody as an occupant in respect of the said survey number and the said land stood vested in the State. The land measuring 16 acres in Sy.No.75/4 was recorded in the preliminary register maintained in Form-1 with an entry in column No.9 as 'Gramastharu (Villagers) and in respect of column No.10 as belonging to the Villagers. 8. The learned Single Judge considered the findings of the Deputy Commissioner in extenso and found that there is no entry corresponding to the re-grant orders in the revenue records or the relevant registers and that there were no such grant or re-grant orders as claimed by the petitioners. It was also found that the re-grant orders were apparently made under the Mysore (Religious and Charitable) Inams Abolition Act, 1955 and not under the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954. It was also found that the re-grant orders were apparently made under the Mysore (Religious and Charitable) Inams Abolition Act, 1955 and not under the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954. It was further found that the Register No.8 maintained under Section 11 of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954, showing the details of assessment payable to the Government by kadim, permanent, quasi-permanent, minor inamdar etc, in every Taluk of a District does not contain any details as to the grants claimed by the Writ Petitioners. Further, the learned Single Judge found at paragraphs No.91 and 92 as follows:- "91. The Register, which is produced before this Court, also indicates the claims that were made by individuals and the survey numbers over which they had made a claim is also specified. An abstract of the claims made is also found at the end of the Register. This abstract indicates the claims made were decided in the following manner: 92. According to this extract, an extent of 291 Acres 07½ Guntas has been registered in favour of the Kadim Tenants while the remaining land has been registered in favour of the Minor Inamdars and Inamdars under Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act. Thus, the abstract of the Register, accounts for all the lands in Chokkanahalli village." 9. Further discrepancies with regard to the date, the entries, the signatures, the handwritings etc, were also found which had been specifically referred to by the learned Single Judge. Relying on these materials, the learned Single Judge found that the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner are liable to be upheld and no grounds were made out to interfere with the exercise of the power by the Deputy Commissioner only in W.P. No.9179/2020, it was found that there was an order of the Land Tribunal dated 23.06.1984 registering Zaibunnissa Sheriff as occupant in respect of 7 acres 4 guntas of land and that a proceeding under Section 136 (3) KLR Act could not be invoked against the present holders of the said land. The said Writ Petition was allowed and all other Writ Petitions were dismissed. 10. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants raises legal contentions with regard to the power of the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner to initiate action under Section 136(3) of the KLR Act. The said Writ Petition was allowed and all other Writ Petitions were dismissed. 10. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants raises legal contentions with regard to the power of the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner to initiate action under Section 136(3) of the KLR Act. It is contented that the orders of grant or re-grant as the case may be were those made in the years 1965, 1966, 1975, 1978 and 1984 and that the power granted for cancellation of the orders of grant cannot extend to a cancellation after such a long delay. It is submitted that there were registered sale deeds and Grant Certificates from the year 1920 onwards and that there was no sustainable ground on which the grants could have been challenged under Section 136(3) of the KLR Act. Referring to the provisions of the KLR Act, as well as the Inams Abolition Act, it is contended that once the grant orders have attained finality and have been acted upon by the grantees, their successors in interest and subsequent purchasers, there can be no exercise of the limited power under Section 136(3) of the KLR Act. It is submitted that the original residents of the property were in possession even before Annexure B sale deed dated 18.01.1920. Thereafter, grants and re- grants were made which have attained finality. Further sale deeds have also been executed and the subsequent purchasers are in possession of the property. It is therefore contended that there is no power to the Deputy Commissioner to cancel the grants in terms of the acts in question. 11. Further, it is contended that the wrong mentioning of the provisions under which the grants were made can, under no circumstance, be a ground to hold that the grant orders are fake. Further, in W.A.No.388/2023, it is contended that the finding recorded that the date on which the grant order was issued was a Sunday is factually incorrect and that the conclusions reached on the basis of such incorrect assumptions are liable to be set aside. 12. It is further contended that pursuant to the directions issued by this Court, the Deputy Commissioner had directed the Tahasildar, Yelahanka to refer the original documents to the Karnataka Government Forensic Laboratory, Bangalore. On 20.06.2019, certain documents including the Grant Certificates and the Registers were sent for a Forensic Report by the Tahasildar. 12. It is further contended that pursuant to the directions issued by this Court, the Deputy Commissioner had directed the Tahasildar, Yelahanka to refer the original documents to the Karnataka Government Forensic Laboratory, Bangalore. On 20.06.2019, certain documents including the Grant Certificates and the Registers were sent for a Forensic Report by the Tahasildar. On 06.09.2019, the Forensic Laboratory sent a communication to the Tahasildar that the original documents were not sent and the information sought is not specific. Thereafter, the documents were forwarded and report dated 26.09.2019 was forwarded by the Forensic Laboratory. It is submitted that the Forensic Report was inconclusive and could not have been the basis for any finding that the documents were fake. 13. Shri. D.R. Ravishankar, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant in Writ Appeal No.349/2023 has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of H.P v. Jai Lal and Others reported in (1999) 7 SCC 280. Relying on the judgment, it is contended that Expert Opinion cannot be relied on by the Court without the credentials of the Expert being proved and examined in the Court. 14. The contention raised is that even in case there is no time limit prescribed for the exercise of the power of review, such power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. When fraud is alleged, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable time after discovery of the fraud. 15. It is contended that the minor discrepancies in the dates mentioned cannot be a ground to hold that the persons who are in possession for decades are not entitled to have their names registered in the record of rights. The finding with regard to entering of date as that 17.10.1966, that is, the date of the second re-grant order is a Sunday, is a factual mistake. It is further contended that the findings in the Forensic Report are totally inconclusive and that there were no proper records made available for forensic examination. 16. The finding with regard to entering of date as that 17.10.1966, that is, the date of the second re-grant order is a Sunday, is a factual mistake. It is further contended that the findings in the Forensic Report are totally inconclusive and that there were no proper records made available for forensic examination. 16. Shri. K. Lokesh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in Writ Appeal No.362/2023 has placed reliance of the following decisions:- • Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District v. D. Narasinga Rao reported in (2015) 3 SCC 695 ; • Mohammed Kavi Mohammad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim reported in (1997) 6 SCC 71 ; • Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy reported in (2003) Supp 2 S.C.R. 698; and • Yogarani v. State by the Inspector of Police reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2609 17. The learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents submits that the entire factual aspects of the matter had been borne out from the reports submitted by the Deputy Commissioner, who had meticulously considered the entire records. It is contended that the learned Single Judge had also looked into the entire records which were produced before him and had come to the conclusion that there is no factual error in the report submitted by the Special Deputy Commissioner or the Orders passed by him. 18. It is submitted that the records would show that the applications allegedly made by the appellants to enter their name in the RTC in the years 1996, 1997 or thereafter, had not mentioned any re-grant order and that it was only on the claim that they are in possession of the property and cultivating the land that their name was sought to be recorded in the RTC. It is submitted that even when their names were entered in the RTC, it was entered only in column 12(2) of the RTC on the basis that they were cultivating the land for 25 years. It is contended that since the grant orders relied on are of the years 1965 to 1984, it is inconceivable as to why the persons who claim under those grant orders did not mention those orders in the applications to have their names recorded in the RTC many years thereafter. It is contended that since the grant orders relied on are of the years 1965 to 1984, it is inconceivable as to why the persons who claim under those grant orders did not mention those orders in the applications to have their names recorded in the RTC many years thereafter. It is submitted that therefore it is clear that even in the years 1996-1997 when the request for entering the names in the RTC was made there was no re-grant order in existence. 19. It is contended that requests were made long after the alleged grants seeking recording of the names in the RTC. The Tahasildar informed the Deputy Commissioner that there are no records for the re-grant. The Deputy Commissioner issued an order to mutate the property in the name of the appellants. Later, the said order was recalled. It is contended that the Special Deputy Commissioner was empowered to test the genuineness of the re-grant order and in case there is no such re-grant at all there is absolutely no error in the order of the Deputy Commissioner directing the cancellation of the revenue entries wrongly made on the basis of fake re-grant orders. 20. It is further contended that the land available for grant in Survey No.75/4 of K.G. Chokkanahalli Village was only 21 acres and 19 guntas, whereas, the 5 grants totalled to about 50 acres. It is submitted that the trial Court had also considered the issue and had recorded in the judgment, which is impugned in RFA No.229/2022 that the Sale Deed of the year 1920 has no connection with the suit schedule property, since even the survey number is not mentioned in the Sale Deed. It is submitted that the appellants in RFA No.229/2022 is fully bound by the finding of the trial Court. It is submitted that the appellants - Muniraja Reddy as well as Radha Krishna Reddy who claims through Muniraja Reddy are all bound by the findings of the trial Court. It is further submitted that the purchasers by the 1920 sale deed are six strangers who have no connection with each other. 21. With regard to W.A.No.789/2023, the learned Single Judge held that there was an order of the Land Tribunal in favour of the grantees and therefore the power under Section 136(3) of the KLR Act was not available to the Deputy Commissioner in the instant case. 21. With regard to W.A.No.789/2023, the learned Single Judge held that there was an order of the Land Tribunal in favour of the grantees and therefore the power under Section 136(3) of the KLR Act was not available to the Deputy Commissioner in the instant case. However, it is submitted that Annexure-A produced along with the writ petition would show that the re-grant was under the provisions of the Mysore (Religious and Charitable) Inams Abolition Act, 1955 and the contention of the applicant Zaibunnisa Sheriff, is that she is an Archak in the temple. Further, there are interpolations in the application for grant and the said grant is also clearly fraudulent. 22. Shri Kiran V. Ron, learned Additional Advocate General has relied on the following decisions:- • S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by Lrs. v. Jagannath (dead) by Lrs. and Others reported in (1994) 1 SCC 1 ; • Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav and Others v. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society and Others reported in (2013) 11 SCC 531; • Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others reported in (2010) 2 SCC 114 ; • K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited and Others reported in (2008) 12 SCC 481; • A.V. Papayya Sastry and Others v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others reported in (2007) 4 SCC 221 ; • Vishnu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1501; • A Kirshna Shenoy v. Ganga Devi and Others passed in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.8080/2019 dated 11.09.2023, and • Umadevi Nambiar v. Thamarasseri Roman Catholic Diocese reported in (2022) 7 SCC 90 . 23. The appellants in W.A.No.789/2023, who are the residents of the locality have filed the appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in as much as it allowed W.P.No.9179/2020 finding that the power under Section 136(3) of the KLR Act cannot be invoked by the Deputy Commissioner against an order of the Land Tribunal. 24. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants in the said appeal submits that it was on clear complaints raised with regard to fraudulent re-grants having been created by the appellants in the connected writ appeals that the inquiry had been conducted by the Deputy Commissioner. 24. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants in the said appeal submits that it was on clear complaints raised with regard to fraudulent re-grants having been created by the appellants in the connected writ appeals that the inquiry had been conducted by the Deputy Commissioner. It was clearly borne out in the enquiry that there were no such re-grant as claimed by the writ petitioners and this fact was verified by the learned Single Judge at the writ petition stage by examining the records which were made available. It is submitted that it is on being condensed of the fraudulent and fabricated nature of the grants that the learned Single Judge had dismissed the writ petitions. 25. We have considered the contentions advanced with reference to the pleadings and the materials on record. Section 1(4) of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 reads as follows:- " 1. Short title, extent, application and commencement. (1) x x x x x (2) x x x x x (3) x x x x x (4) This section and Sections 2, 27, 38 and 40 shall come into force at once and the rest of this Act shall come into force [in all minor inams in unalienated village, on such date as the Government may by notification, appoint, and in any inam village, on such date as the Government may, by notification, specify in respect of such inam village]." Section 2(5) of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 reads as follows:- "(5). "Inam" includes an inam village and minor inam;" Section 2(7) of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 reads as follows:- "(7). "Inam Village" means an alienated village whether Sarvamanya, Jodi or Khayamgutta or a portion of such village;" Section 3 of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 provided that when an notification under sub-section(4) of Section 1 has been published in the Karnataka Gazette, then notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, grant or other instrument, the land shall stand vested in the Government. Section 3 (1)(b) of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 provides that all rights, title and interest vesting in the inamdar including those in all communal lands, uncultivated lands, whether assessed or not shall cease and be vested absolutely in the State of Karnataka, free from all encumbrances. Section 3 (1)(b) of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 provides that all rights, title and interest vesting in the inamdar including those in all communal lands, uncultivated lands, whether assessed or not shall cease and be vested absolutely in the State of Karnataka, free from all encumbrances. Section 127 of the KLR Act provides for record of rights and the manner in which such records are to be maintained. Section 128 of the KLR Act provides that all acquisitions are to be reported and recorded in the record of rights. Section 129 of the KLR Act provides for registration of mutations and a register of disputed cases. Section 136(3) of the KLR Act reads as follows:- " 136. Appeal and revision. (1) x x x x x (2) x x x x x (3) The Deputy Commissioner may, on his own motion or on application of a party, call for and examine any records made under Section 127 and Section 129 and pass such orders as he may deem fit: Provided that no order shall be passed except after hearing the party who would be adversely affected by such order." 26. Having considered the contentions advanced, we notice that the learned Single Judge has considered the contentions advanced on all sides and has also taken note of the files as well as the materials on record. The learned Single Judge clearly finds that the sale deed of the year 1920 cannot be relied on to conclude that the title in the properties in question had passed on the basis of the same, since the land vested in the state thereafter and orders of grant after the vesting alone would confer title. Further, the contents of the Forensic Report as well as the Enquiry Report of the Deputy Commissioner are clearly referred to by the learned Single Judge, who comes to the conclusion that for the clear reasons recorded by him, the only logical conclusion would be that the re-grant orders are fraudulent and fake. 27. It is pertinent to note here that the fourth re- grant order which is relied on is one dated 31.09.1978. It is a Wonder of Sorts since the Caesarian Calendar does not have a 31 st day in September of any year. This fact is also noticed by the learned Single Judge. 28. 27. It is pertinent to note here that the fourth re- grant order which is relied on is one dated 31.09.1978. It is a Wonder of Sorts since the Caesarian Calendar does not have a 31 st day in September of any year. This fact is also noticed by the learned Single Judge. 28. We are of the opinion that the contentions with regard to the powers under Section 136(3) of the KLR Act and the presumption with regard to official acts under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam would all be applicable in normal cases and not in a case where allegations of fraud are raised and are substantiated by objective reports by the Revenue Authorities. 29. We notice that the entire extent of land stood vested in the State and it is only on the strength of re-grant orders that the petitioners could have claimed any right over any extent of land in the village in question. Further, Sections 4 and 5 of the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 provided for the registration of Kadim tenant and permanent tenant as occupants subject to the fulfillment of the conditions as contained in the said provisions. 30. As observed by the learned Single Judge, the name of the grantees or their successors-in-interest were not found in the revenue records from the date of their alleged grant and that the name of some of the parties only appeared in Column No.12(2) and not in Column No.9 and it is not the case of the parties that their names had been entered for several years in Column No.9. Thus, the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the revenue entries were not amenable for correction. 31. As regards the argument that the revenue authorities had no jurisdiction to examine whether the order was valid or whether it was genuine is concerned, the learned Single Judge has rightly observed that the very purpose of conferring power on the Deputy Commissioner under Section 136 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 is to ensure that if there is an oversight over the revenue entries and if it is found that there was no basis for the entry at all and the claim made for an entry was based on a fictitious order, it would be the obligation of the Deputy Commissioner to ensure that a fraudulent act is not corrected. 32. 32. As held by the Apex Court in K.D. Sharma 's case (supra), the Court defined 'fraud' as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. In fraud, one gains at the loss and cost of another. Even the most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. 33. As regards the argument that the exercise of the revisional power having not been exercised within a reasonable time, the impugned order could not be sustained, it is to be stated here that as held in Vishnu Vardhan 's case (supra), from the multiple decisions of this Court on 'fraud', what follows is that fraud and justice cannot dwell together, the legislature never intends to guard fraud, the question of limitation to exercise power does not arise, if fraud is proved, and even finality of litigation cannot be pressed into service to absurd limits when a fraud is unravelled. Thus, the said argument has rightly been dealt with by the learned Single Judge. 34. Thus, we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge has rightly observed that for a person to claim a right over land statutorily stood vested with the Government, an order passed under the statute is essential and if it is found that no proceeding or order had been passed in respect of the said land, the question of entertaining a claim would not arise. 35. The specific case of the State Government is that there were no orders of re-grant as claimed by the petitioners in the Writ Petitions before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge having considered the pleadings, the materials and the records produced, had come to a definite conclusion that the re-grant orders were concocted documents and that such re-grants had not taken place as claimed by the petitioners. The reasons for coming to this conclusion are also clearly stated in the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 36. Having considered the findings in the judgment qua the arguments placed before us, we are of the opinion that this is a fit case where the 'theory of fraud vitiating all proceedings' should be applied. The reasons for coming to this conclusion are also clearly stated in the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 36. Having considered the findings in the judgment qua the arguments placed before us, we are of the opinion that this is a fit case where the 'theory of fraud vitiating all proceedings' should be applied. The Apex Court considering in an almost identical situation in A.V. Papayya Sastry and Others v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others reported in (2007) 4 SCC 221 , has clearly held as under:- "21. Now, it is well-settled principle of law that if any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law. Before three centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed: “Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.” 22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order— by the first court or by the final court—has to be treated as nullity by every court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings. 23. In the leading case of Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley Lord Denning observed : (All ER p. 345 C) “No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud.” 24. In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith's Leading Cases, 13th Edn., p. 644, explaining the nature of fraud, de Grey, C.J. stated that though a judgment would be res judicata and not impeachable from within, it might be impeachable from without. In other words, though it is not permissible to show that the court was “mistaken”, it might be shown that it was “misled”. There is an essential distinction between mistake and trickery. The clear implication of the distinction is that an action to set aside a judgment cannot be brought on the ground that it has been decided wrongly, namely, that on the merits, the decision was one which should not have been rendered, but it can be set aside, if the court was imposed upon or tricked into giving the judgment. 25. 25. It has been said : fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant); or fraud and deceit ought to benefit none (fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent). 26. Fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. In fraud one gains at the loss of another. Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can be utilised as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants." In Dalip Singh 's case (supra), the Apex Court at paragraph No.2, stated as under:- " 2. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final." 37. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the learned Single Judge has taken painstaking efforts to go into the facts of each of the cases and has come to a clear and unequivocal conclusion that there were no grants as claimed by the petitioners. We find no sustainable grounds raised warranting interference in the judgment under appeal. 38. In Writ Petition No.9179/2020, the learned Single Judge considered the contentions and found that Zaibunnissa Sheriff was registered as an occupant by the Land Tribunal by its order dated 23.06.1984 and that the genuinity of the grant therefore, could not have been examined by the Special Deputy Commissioner. We notice that the Writ Petition was filed specifically stating that the petitioners derived right, title and interest from Zaibunnissa Sheriff. We notice that the Writ Petition was filed specifically stating that the petitioners derived right, title and interest from Zaibunnissa Sheriff. It is contended that the land measuring 7 acres 4 guntas in Sy.No.75/4 was an Inam land and Muniswamy Reddy was in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same. On 08.01.1981, Zaibunnissa Sheriff had purchased the land from Muniswamy Reddy. Further, she filed an application dated 30.03.1984 for re-grant of the land in her name and by Annexure-C, Order of the Land Tribunal dated 23.06.1984, she was registered as an occupant of the land. Further, Annexure-D was produced to show that an amount of Rs.1,638/- being the premium amount for the grant was paid by Zaibunnissa Sheriff on 26.06.1984. Thereafter, she immediately sold the land and successive sale deeds are produced to show the flow of title. The writ petitioners claim to be present owners of portions of the land. 39. The Special Deputy Commissioner specifically found that the Zaibunnissa Sheriff had allegedly made Annexure-A application under Mysore (Religious and Charitable) Inams Abolition Act, 1955, claiming to be the Archak of a Temple. However, the Special Deputy Commissioner found that in the said case also in column No.9 of the preliminary record there was a noting as 'Gomala'. Later, it was rounded off and shown as 'Gramastaru'. In the said case also, the Special Deputy Commissioner specifically finds that there are no entries in Form-8 Register and there are no records supporting the grant in favour of Zaibunnissa Sheriff. However, there is no contention raised, as in the other cases, that there is no order as such of the Land Tribunal on 23.06.1984. The impugned order also does not state that the order of the Land Tribunal is forged or fake. Since, Zaibunnissa Sheriff claimed only under the grant order passed by the Tribunal on 23.06.1984 and no contentions have been raised that there was no such order at all, the exercise under Section 136(3) of the KLR Act could not have been undertaken in the said case. However, the learned Single Judge did not express any opinion on the genuineness of the claim. Therefore, the State is at liberty to challenge the order dated 23.06.1984, in accordance with law, if such a course is permissible in law. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the maintainability of the challenge, if any. 40. However, the learned Single Judge did not express any opinion on the genuineness of the claim. Therefore, the State is at liberty to challenge the order dated 23.06.1984, in accordance with law, if such a course is permissible in law. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the maintainability of the challenge, if any. 40. We are therefore of the opinion that Writ Appeals No.322/2023, 309/2023, 349/2023, 388/2023, 362/2023 and 354/2023 are devoid of merits. The appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed. Writ Appeal No.789/2023 is disposed of with the observations as contained in paragraph No.39. The amount deposited by the BWSSB pursuant to the Interim Orders dated 04.07.2025, 24.07.2025 and 09.09.2025 shall be refunded to the BWSSB. All pending interlocutory applications shall stand dismissed in all the appeals.