JUDGMENT : 1. This is an appeal filed by the state against acquittal. Having obtained leave, the appeal was preferred under section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Code). 2. There were three accused in C.C. No.209 of 2008 on the files of the Court of Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Kottayam. They were charged for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13 (1)(d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) and Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ( IPC ). After a full-fledged trial, the Special Court acquitted the accused as per the judgment dated 16.08.2014. The said judgment is under challenge in this appeal. 3. Heard the learned Special Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3. After the impugned judgment, accused Nos.1 and 2 expired and therefore the appeal as against them stands abated. 4. Heard the learned Special Public Prosecutor (Vigilance) on admission. 5. The charge was based on the allegation that in order to release the vehicle bearing Reg.No.KL-3A-5346 belonging to PW1, which was seized for transporting barks of trees in ten gunny bags, demanded and received Rs.18,000/- as bribe. It was alleged that accused No.1, who was working as Forester and accused No.3, who was working as Forest Ranger Officer, Kumily, demanded and obtained bribe through accused No.2. 6. On the side of the prosecution, PWs.1 to 12 were examined and Exts.P1 to P28 were marked. It is seen that when questioned under Section 313(1)(b) of the Code all the accused denied the incriminating circumstances appeared against them in evidence. Accused Nos.1 and 3 had filed written statements as well. On the side of the accused, DWs.1 and 2 were examined and Exts.D1 to D6 were marked. The trial court, after considering the said evidence, concluded that there was total lack of evidence in order to prove that any of the accused demanded or received bribe. 7. PW1 was the owner of the jeep from whom bribe was allegedly collected. PW3 is a politician, who intervened in the incident and facilitated payment of bribe. The trial court found that the evidence of PWs.1 and 3 were totally inconsistent inasmuch as the receipt of bribe by the accused is concerned. As far as the demand of bribe, it was held that there was practically no evidence against accused Nos.1 and 3. PW3 is a politician, who intervened in the incident and facilitated payment of bribe. The trial court found that the evidence of PWs.1 and 3 were totally inconsistent inasmuch as the receipt of bribe by the accused is concerned. As far as the demand of bribe, it was held that there was practically no evidence against accused Nos.1 and 3. Even regarding the amount of bribe said to have been paid also, there was no consistency in their evidence. Accordingly, it was held that the prosecution failed to prove the charge. 8. The learned Special Public Prosecutor took me through the judgment. It is pointed out that insofar as the payment of money is concerned, there is evidence and the discrepancy pointed out in the impugned judgment are insufficient to discard the evidence altogether. Accordingly, it is submitted that a re-appreciation of evidence is warranted in this case and the appeal deserves admission. 9. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), AIR 2023 SC 330 settled the law concerning the elements required to be proved to establish offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act as well as the nature and quantum of evidence that enable to enter a finding against the accused. Paragraph No.68 in the decision is extracted below: “68. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under: (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind: (i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. (ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13(1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13(1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13(1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. (f) In the event the complainant turns ‘hostile’, or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. (g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.” Thus, it is trite that a charge under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act can be sustained only if the prosecution is able to prove demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. When accused Nos.1 and 2 are no more, the overt act of accused No.3, who is respondent No.3, may require anxious consideration. Of course, conspiracy is also alleged and if the prosecution is able to establish demand and acceptance of bribe by other accused and the same was in consequence of an understanding between all the accused, a charge may sustain. 10. As stated, evidence of PWs.1 and 3 alone is available to prove the demand and acceptance of bribe. PW1 did not say anything about the demand by accused No.1 or 3. But PW3 stated that accused No.1 demanded payment of bribe and accordingly the payment was effected. Even PW3 did not say any overt act on the part of accused No.3. Other than the evidence of these two witnesses no evidence; either documentary or oral, was brought on record to show that accused No.3 acted illegally in the matter of releasing the vehicle. As pointed out by the trial court, delay was occurred in releasing the vehicle only on account of non-production of documents showing ownership of PW1 to the vehicle. 11. Unless there is tangible evidence to show that accused No.3 acted illegally in that matter or that there was a demand from his part for illegal gratification, there cannot be a finding that he involved in a conspiracy, based on which illegal gratification was demanded and accepted. There is total lack of evidence to prove that respondent No.3/accused No.3 had made a demand for bribe or accepted. Also, there is no evidence to show that he involved in a conspiracy for obtaining bribe. Therefore, the finding entered into by the Special Court, which resulted in acquittal of accused No.3 cannot be said to be against evidence. Hence, I am of the view that there is no prima facie ground to hold that appreciation of evidence is wrong and the appeal, which is one against acquittal, requires consideration in detail. 12. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed summarily.