JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned Counsel for the applicants, the learned APP for the Respondent-State and the learned Counsel for Respondent No.2 (first informant). 2. The applicants in this application are seeking quashing of the FIR No.132 of 2017 dated 15.03.2017, registered with Nigadi Police Station, Pune, for offences under Sections 420, 447 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). 3. On 20.12.2018, while issuing the notice, a Division Bench of this Court granted stay in terms of prayer clause (b), thereby staying all proceedings arising out of the said FIR. 4. The principal contention of the learned Counsel for the applicants is that even if the statement of the first informant (Respondent No.2) on the basis of which, the subject FIR has been registered, is accepted as it is, no criminal offence is made out, much less, offences registered against the applicants. It is submitted that Respondent No.2 has clearly raised a grievance purely of civil nature and it is sought to be given the colour of criminality by simply alleging that the applicants cheated Respondent No.2. It is submitted that, therefore, this case is clearly covered under Clause (1) of Paragraph No.102 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana & Ors V/s. Bhajanlal & Ors., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, On this basis, it is submitted that the present application deserves to be allowed. 5. On the other hand, the learned APP and the learned Counsel for Respondent No.2 submitted that the statement of Respondent No.2 does indicate her grievance as to the manner in which the applicants have deprived her of the property, which was purchased by her father under a registered sale deed. The details of the document were given in the statement of Respondent No.2, thereby indicating that the ingredients of the offences are made out. 6. It is submitted that although this Court had granted stay of further proceedings, charge-sheet came to be filed and in that light, this Court, by an order dated 25.04.2024 was constrained to issue notice of contempt to the concerned Investigating Officer as to how, charge-sheet came to be filed despite the clear order of interim stay issued by this Court. 7.
7. In response thereto, the Investigating Officer submitted a report to the Registrar (Judicial II) that in the light of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Private Limited & Anr. V/s. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2018) 16 SCC 299 an impression was gathered that the interim stay had expired after six months and in that context, the charge-sheet was placed before the Competent Court. 8. In the light of the fact that we are dealing with this application on its merits, the notice of contempt issued to the Investigating Officer is recalled. 9. We have considered the material on record. The entire grievance of Respondent No.2 from her statement that led to registration of the FIR was that, according to her, the document pertaining to the purchase of the subject land by her father came into her possession through her paternal aunt as her other relatives had expired. After the marriage of Respondent No.2, when she along with her husband further inquired into the matter on the basis of the aforesaid document, they realized that the applicants were wrongly in possession of the land and therefore, she was prompted to approach the applicants for ventilating her rights. It is claimed that on 10.03.2017, when Respondent No.2 along with her husband reached the subject land, the applicants obstructed them and claimed that they were the owners of the said land. 10. We are of the opinion that even if the entire statement of Respondent No.2 is accepted as it is, the dispute sought to be raised by Respondent No.2 is a purely civil dispute and therefore, there was no occasion for registration of the subject FIR. 11. The FIR was registered for offences under Sections 420 and 447 of the IPC. Ingredients of these offences are not made out from the statement and the grievance raised by Respondent No.2. There is nothing to indicate that the essential ingredient of the offence under Section 420 requiring dishonest intention of the accused right from the inception, is made out. As regards the offence under Section 447 of the IPC, which pertains to punishment for criminal trespass, definition of the offence of criminal trespass under Section 441 of the IPC shows that such an offence is committed when a person enters upon a property in possession of another.
As regards the offence under Section 447 of the IPC, which pertains to punishment for criminal trespass, definition of the offence of criminal trespass under Section 441 of the IPC shows that such an offence is committed when a person enters upon a property in possession of another. In the present matter, it is not even the case of Respondent No.2 that she was in possession of the subject land and that the applicants made an effort to trespass into the same. Therefore, the basic ingredients of the said offence are also not made out. 12. We find that this is a clear case of a purely civil dispute sought to be given the colour of criminality. 13. In the case of State of Haryana & Ors (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows : “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 14. We find substance in the contention raised on behalf of the applicants that their case is covered under Clause (1) of the above quoted Paragraph No.102 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana & Ors (supra). Hence, the application deserves to be allowed. 15. In view of the above, the application is allowed in terms of prayer clause (a). The subject FIR is quashed. As a consequence, the charge-sheet inadvertently filed by the Investigating Authority also stands quashed along with further proceedings, if any.