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2025 DIGILAW 1511 (TS)

Banoth Anil v. State represented by S. H. O

2025-11-14

N.TUKARAMJI

body2025
ORDER : N.Tukaramji, J. These Criminal Revision Cases are filed under Sections 438 and 442 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhitha, 2023 (“BNSS”) by the petitioners, assailing the common orders dated 17.10.2025 passed in Crl.M.P. Nos. 81 and 82 of 2024 in SC (POCSO) No. 200 of 2021 on the file of the learned Fast Track Special Sessions Judge for Expeditious Disposal of Cases of Rape and Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO Act, 2012)-cum-Principal Sessions Judge, Mahaboobabad. 2. As the issues raised in both revision petitions are interconnected and arise from the same factual matrix, they are being heard together and disposed of by this common order. 3.1. In Crl.M.P. No. 82 of 2024, the petitioners/accused Nos. 1 to 7 sought issuance of summons to the Head Masters/Principals of (i) Education Technology School, Thorrur; (ii) SLS Scholars School, Suryapet; (iii) PSR High School, Thorrur; and (iv) the Panchayat Secretary of Somarapukunta Thanda, Thorrur Mandal, for production of the school records pertaining to the date of birth of PW.2. 3.2. In Crl.M.P. No. 81 of 2024, the petitioners prayed for sending Ex. P-4 (the extract from the admission register) to the handwriting expert at TGFSL, Hyderabad, alleging that the year of birth of PW.2 had been altered from ‘2002’ to ‘2003.’ 4.1. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that these applications were filed at the stage of defence evidence. The prosecution has primarily relied on the Secondary School Certificate (SSC certificate) to establish the age of PW.2. The trial Court rejected the applications by invoking Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which accords precedence to the SSC certificate for the purpose of determining age. The petitioners contend, however, that a bona fide dispute exists because records from the earlier schools allegedly attended by PW.2 indicate a different date of birth, 25.07.2002, contradicting the prosecution’s version. Although PW.2 denied any such discrepancy during cross-examination, the certificates obtained by the petitioners from those schools prima facie show variations in her date of birth. 4.2. It is contended that age determination constitutes a foundational jurisdictional fact in proceedings under the POCSO Act, since the applicability of the statute hinges entirely upon the minority of the victim. Any denial of opportunity to the accused to adduce material evidence on such a pivotal issue, particularly at the defence stage, causes severe and irremediable prejudice. 4.2. It is contended that age determination constitutes a foundational jurisdictional fact in proceedings under the POCSO Act, since the applicability of the statute hinges entirely upon the minority of the victim. Any denial of opportunity to the accused to adduce material evidence on such a pivotal issue, particularly at the defence stage, causes severe and irremediable prejudice. Therefore, the petitioners argue that the trial Court ought to have exercised its discretion in favour of allowing the requested evidence. 5. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor contends that the prosecution has already produced the Secondary School Certificate, which, under Section 94(2)(i) of the JJ Act, 2015, is a statutorily recognised basis for age determination. Nevertheless, he fairly submits that if a legitimate dispute is raised, an opportunity may be afforded to the defence, leaving the ultimate determination to the trial Court. 6. The record has been perused and the submissions of both sides duly considered. 7. The petitioners seek two forms of relief: (i) summoning of the Head Masters/Principals of the schools previously attended by PW.2, and (ii) referring Ex. P-4 to the Forensic Science Laboratory for an expert opinion on the alleged interpolation. 8. Regarding the first request, the petitioners have placed prima facie material indicating a possible divergence between the date of birth recorded in earlier school registers and the Secondary School Certificate relied upon by the prosecution. PW.2 has admitted to having studied in the said institutions. The right of an accused to present defence evidence is an indispensable facet of the guarantee of a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. Courts have repeatedly recognised that even at an advanced stage of trial, additional evidence may be permitted if it aids in discovering the truth or prevents miscarriage of justice. In cases under the POCSO Act, as age determination is of decisive importance, even minor discrepancies assume significance because the minority of the victim is the very jurisdictional trigger for prosecution under the Act. Thus, where conflicting documentary evidence exists, the Court is duty-bound to permit the defence to test the veracity and authenticity of such records. The trial Court’s refusal to summon witnesses who may clarify these discrepancies falls short of the standard required for ensuring a fair trial. 9. Thus, where conflicting documentary evidence exists, the Court is duty-bound to permit the defence to test the veracity and authenticity of such records. The trial Court’s refusal to summon witnesses who may clarify these discrepancies falls short of the standard required for ensuring a fair trial. 9. The legal position on age determination has been authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263 , wherein the Court held that the procedure prescribed under the JJ Act for determining the age of a child in conflict with law applies pari passu to child victims as well. The JJ Act prescribes a hierarchy of documents for age determination, giving primacy to the Secondary School Certificate. However, Jarnail Singh recognises that where doubt arises or contradictory evidence exists, courts must conduct a careful inquiry. 10. In the present case, the alleged discrepancy of one year is not inconsequential it goes to the root of the prosecution’s case under the POCSO Act. In such circumstances, permitting the petitioners to summon relevant witnesses is not merely appropriate but necessary to satisfy the constitutional mandate of ensuring fairness and preventing miscarriage of justice. 11. For these reasons, the order dated 17.10.2025 in Crl.M.P. No. 82 of 2024 is set aside. The trial Court shall summon and examine the witnesses proposed by the petitioners at the earliest, adhering to a strict schedule, and both sides shall extend full cooperation to avoid unnecessary delay. 12. With respect to the second request, referring Ex. P-4 to the Forensic Science Laboratory, the petitioners argue that the alteration in the entry is visible to the naked eye. However, Ex. P-4 presently aligns with the entries in the Secondary School Certificate, which stands unrebutted at this stage. Until the petitioners produce contrary primary evidence by examining the authorities of the earlier schools, the necessity of FSL examination does not arise. Should the primary evidence adduced by the defence disclose substantive discrepancies, the trial Court may thereafter reconsider, in its discretion, whether expert opinion is warranted. Hence, the trial Court’s order in Crl.M.P. No. 81 of 2024 declining FSL referral calls for no interference. 13. In the result, Crl.R.C. No. 830 of 2025 is dismissed, while Crl.R.C. No. 831 of 2025 is allowed in the terms indicated above. All pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, stand closed.