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2025 DIGILAW 1513 (RAJ)

Haider Khan S/o Kasam Khan v. State of Rajasthan

2025-09-03

SANDEEP SHAH

body2025
Order : SANDEEP SHAH, J. 1. The present appeal has been filed by the appellants challenging the judgment dated 30.10.2004, passed in Special Case No.13/2004 by the learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases, Sirohi, whereby, the appellants were convicted and sentenced for the offences as under:- Offences under Sections Sentence Fine In default of payment of fine 447 of IPC 15 days’ simple imprisonment 3 (1) (iv), SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989 6 months’ rigorous imprisonment 500/- 15 days simple imprison ment 2. Brief facts of the case are that P.W.-6 Prega Ram lodged a typed report at police station Abu Road regarding the agricultural land situated near Mahaveer Talkies, Christian Kabristan being Khasra No. 227 measuring 1 Bigha and 2 Biswa stating that on 19.8.2003, all the appellants entered in the said land and constructed iron shed on it. Upon asking them to remove, the quarrel started. When the incident was going on, Mahendra Heeragar and Gopal Koli were present on the spot. Subsequently, on this report, a case under Section 3(1) (iv) of SC/ST Act’ & Section 447 IPC was registered. The police after investigation, filed the charge-sheet. The learned Trial Court, after conclusion of the trial vide impugned judgment convicted and sentenced the appellants as stated above. Hence, the present appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the judgment impugned be quashed and set aside, as the same has been passed without considering the evidence available on record and without considering the fact that the appellants have failed to show any violation of the provisions of the SC/ST Act, and further, that there was no trespass committed by the appellants to warrant conviction. He further submits that there was an inordinate delay in lodging the FIR, which itself casts a shadow of doubt with regard to the version of the prosecution. Not only this, the learned court below has failed to consider the documents placed on record by the defence to fortify the fact that the land does not belong to the complainant, and therefore, the offence under Section 447 of IPC and Section 3(1)(iv) of the SC/ST Act is not made out. Not only this, the learned court below has failed to consider the documents placed on record by the defence to fortify the fact that the land does not belong to the complainant, and therefore, the offence under Section 447 of IPC and Section 3(1)(iv) of the SC/ST Act is not made out. He further submits that during the course of pendency of the appeal, the parties have entered into a compromise on 06.09.2024, and the same has been placed on record, which has been verified by the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court. He asserts that, as per the terms of the compromise, the complainant himself has given his consent for allowing the appeal. He, therefore, submits that the impugned judgment dated 30.10.2004, passed by the learned Special Judge, SC/ST Act Cases, Sirohi, deserves to be quashed and set aside, and the accused-appellants be acquitted of the offences in question. 4. Sh. Prashant Tatia, learned counsel for the complainant, fortifies the fact that a compromise has been entered into between the parties and asserts that he has no objection if the appeal is allowed on the basis of the said compromise. 5. Learned Public Prosecutor submits that, though the offence under Section 447 of the I.P.C. is compoundable, the offence under Section 3(1)(iv) of the SC/ST Act is not compoundable. However, he further submits that since the parties have entered into a compromise, there is no impediment in allowing the appeal, and the factum of compromise can be considered even at this stage. 6. Heard the counsel for parties and perused the material available on record. 7. Though the offence under Section 447 of IPC is a compoundable one as per Section 320 of Cr.P.C., the offence under Section 3(1) (iv) of the SC/ST Act is non-compoundable in nature. For ready reference, Section 447 of IPC and Section 3 (1) (iv) of the SC/ST Act read as under : “ Section 447 of IPC : Punishment for criminal trespass.— Whoever commits criminal trespass shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. ” Section 3(1) (iv) SC/ST Act “ 3. Punishment for offences of atrocities 1. Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. iv. ” Section 3(1) (iv) SC/ST Act “ 3. Punishment for offences of atrocities 1. Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. iv. wrongfully occupies or cultivates any land owned by, or allotted to, or notified by any competent authority to be allotted to, a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or gets the land allotted to him transferred; shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five years and with fine.” 8. However, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ramawatar v. State of Madhya Pradesh , reported in (2022) 13 SCC 635 has held as under: “ 10. So far as the first question is concerned, it would be ad rem to outrightly refer to the recent decision of this Court in the case of Ramgopal & Anr v. The State of Madhya Pradesh5, wherein, a two-Judge Bench of this Court consisting of two of us (N.V. Ramana, CJI & Surya Kant, J) was confronted with an identical question. Answering in the affirmative, it has been clarified that the jurisdiction of a Court under Section 320 Cr.P.C cannot be construed as a proscription against the invocation of inherent powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution nor on the powers of the High Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It was further held that the touchstone for exercising the extra- ordinary powers under Article 142 or Section 482 Cr.P.C., would be to do complete justice. Therefore, this Court or the High Court, as the case may be, after having given due regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that the victim/complainant has willingly entered into a settlement/compromise, can quash proceedings in exercise of their respective constitutional/inherent powers. 11. The Court in Ramgopal (Supra) further postulated that criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offences or offences which are predominantly of a private nature, could be set aside at any stage of the proceedings, including at the appellate level. 11. The Court in Ramgopal (Supra) further postulated that criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offences or offences which are predominantly of a private nature, could be set aside at any stage of the proceedings, including at the appellate level. The Court, however, being conscious of the fact that unscrupulous offenders may attempt to escape their criminal liabilities by securing a compromise through brute force, threats, bribes, or other such unethical and illegal means, cautioned that in cases where a settlement is struck post-conviction, the Courts should, inter-alia, carefully examine the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, as well as, the conduct of the accused before and after the incident in question. While concluding, the Court also formulated certain guidelines and held: “19… Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.” [Emphasis Applied] 12. In view of the settled proposition of law, we affirm the decision of this Court in Ramgopal (Supra) and re-iterate that the powers of this Court under Article 142 can be invoked to quash a criminal proceeding on the basis of a voluntary compromise between the complainant/victim and the accused. 19. We may hasten to add that in cases such as the present, the Courts ought to be even more vigilant to ensure that the complainant-victim has entered into the compromise on the volition of his/her free will and not on account of any duress. It cannot be understated that since members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe belong to the weaker sections of our country, they are more prone to acts of coercion, and therefore ought to be accorded a higher level of protection. If the Courts find even a hint of compulsion or force, no relief can be given to the accused party. What factors the Courts should consider, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 20. If the Courts find even a hint of compulsion or force, no relief can be given to the accused party. What factors the Courts should consider, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 20. Having considered the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case in light of the afore-stated principles, as well as having meditated on the application for compromise, we are inclined to invoke the powers under Article 142 and quash the instant Criminal proceedings with the sole objective of doing complete justice between the parties before us. We say so for the reasons that: 20.1 Firstly, the very purpose behind Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST is to deter caste-based insults and intimidations when they are used with the intention of demeaning a victim on account of he/she belonging to the Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe community. In the present case, the record manifests that there was an undeniable pre-existing civil dispute between the parties. The case of the Appellant, from the very beginning, has been that the alleged abuses were uttered solely on account of frustration and anger over the pending dispute. Thus, the genesis of the deprecated incident was the afore-stated civil/property dispute. Considering this aspect, we are of the opinion that it would not be incorrect to categorise the occurrence as one being overarchingly private in nature, having only subtle undertones of criminality, even though the provisions of a special statute have been attracted in the present case. 20.2 Secondly, the offence in question, for which the Appellant has been convicted, does not appear to exhibit his mental depravity. The aim of the SC/ST Act is to protect members of the downtrodden classes from atrocious acts of the upper strata of the society. It appears to us that although the Appellant may not belong to the same caste as the Complainant, he too belongs to the relatively weaker/backward section of the society and is certainly not in any better economic or social position when compared to the victim. Despite the rampant prevalence of segregation in Indian villages whereby members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe community are forced to restrict their quartes only to certain areas, it is seen that in the present case, the Appellant and the Complainant lived in adjoining houses. Despite the rampant prevalence of segregation in Indian villages whereby members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe community are forced to restrict their quartes only to certain areas, it is seen that in the present case, the Appellant and the Complainant lived in adjoining houses. Therefore, keeping in mind the socio-economic status of the Appellant, we are of the opinion that the overriding objective of the SC/ST Act would not be overwhelmed if the present proceedings are quashed. 20.3 Thirdly, the incident occurred way back in the year 1994. Nothing on record indicates that either before or after the purported compromise, any untoward incident had transpired between the parties. The State Counsel has also not brought to our attention any other occurrence that would lead us to believe that the Appellant is either a repeat offender or is unremorseful about what transpired. 20.4 Fourthly, the Complainant has, on her own free will, without any compulsion, entered into a compromise and wishes to drop the present criminal proceedings against the accused. 20.5 Fifthly, given the nature of the offence, it is immaterial that the trial against the Appellant had been concluded. 20.6 Sixthly, the Appellant and the Complainant parties are residents of the same village and live in very close proximity to each other. We have no reason to doubt that the parties themselves have voluntarily settled their differences. Therefore, in order to avoid the revival of healed wounds, and to advance peace and harmony, it will be prudent to effectuate the present settlement. 21. Consequently, and for the aforementioned reasons, we find it appropriate to invoke our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and quash the criminal proceedings to do complete justice between the parties. As a sequel thereto, judgment and orders passed by the Trial Court and the High Court are set aside. Bail bonds, if any, are discharged. The appeal is allowed in above terms.” 9. Even this Court in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.6131/2022 (Raghuvir Singh & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan) decided on 11.10.2022, while relying on the judgment in the case of Ramawatar (supra) passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, had quashed the proceedings under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) of SC/ST Act based upon compromise. 10. Even this Court in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.6131/2022 (Raghuvir Singh & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan) decided on 11.10.2022, while relying on the judgment in the case of Ramawatar (supra) passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, had quashed the proceedings under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) of SC/ST Act based upon compromise. 10. On the basis of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court is of the opinion that no fruitful purpose would be served in continuation of the criminal proceedings against the appellants because the parties have entered into a compromise. 11. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed on the basis of compromise. The judgment of conviction dated 30.10.2004 passed by the learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases, Sirohi, is hereby quashed and set aside. The appellants are acquitted from the offences under Section 447 IPC and Section 3 (1) (iv) of the SC/ST Act. They are on bail. They need not surrender. Their bail bonds stand discharged.