ORDER : Narsing Rao Nandikonda, J. This Civil Revision Petition is filed by the revision petitioner/JDR-2 under Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Peddapalli, in E.P.No.22 of 2010 in E.P.No.46 of 2001 in O.P.No.18 of 1989. 2. Heard Sri Vedula Venkata Ramana, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri P.Sri Harsha Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for Singareni Collieries Company Limited and Sri P.V.Srinivasa Rao, learned counsel for the respondents/decree holders representing M/s Bharadwaj Associates. 3. The main grievance of the revision petitioner before this Court is that the learned trial Court erred in allowing the decree holder to re-open the calculation of amounts and adjusting the amounts already paid from the date of taking possession of the land, whereas in this case, the possession was taken prior to 4(1)notification. 4. Further, the main grievance of the petitioner is that the learned Executing Court did not consider that the company had deposited the comprehensive amounts under the interim order, consisting of interest, costs and principal amounts stipulated under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and that the D.Hr is not entitled to reopen calculation memo from 05.01.1970 which is prior to 4(1) notification. 5. Brief facts of the case are that, the respondents/decree holders, whose land was acquired by the respondents, an award was passed on 20.02.1989 by the learned trial Court and the same was referred under the Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, wherein the reference Court enhanced the compensation of Rs.15,000/- per acre by its order and decree dated 31.01.1992. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has enhanced the compensation to Rs.24,000/- per acre by its judgment and decree dated 06.10.1998 in common judgment passed in A.S.No.1263 of 1990. 6. The respondent No.1/decree holder filed Execution Petition claiming Rs.21,41,939.43/-. It appears that pending the said Execution Petition, another Execution Petition No.22 of 2010, which is subject matter of the present revision petition was filed praying the Court, for attachment of Bank account of J.Dr’s shown in the schedule and by directing the manager concerned not to pay the amount pertaining to the said accounts and any other accounts to the J.Dr’s . and restraining them from withdrawing the said amounts until further orders of the Court under Order 21 Rule 30 and 46 of C.P.C. Being aggrieved by the said order passed by the trial Court. 7. The J.Dr.2 who is the Singareni Colleries Company Limited, filed the present revision contending that the learned judge without giving credit to the amounts deposited by the petitioner/J.Dr.2 adjusted the entire amounts under the heads of interest and costs without deducting from principal amount, which is not permitted under law and however contended that the petitioner has already deposited an amount of Rs.10,79,969/- on 21.06.2011 pursuant to the interim order granted in C.M.P.No.2342 of 2011 and the respondent No.1 is entitled only Rs.3,99,028/- as per the calculation memo filed in support of the counter affidavit and the respondent No. 1 liable to return the remaining amount of Rs.6,80,941/- and contended that the said calculation memo was not considered and did not gave any reasons much less valid reasons in the impugned order. 8. Further, it is argued and contended that 12% additional amount was considered by the trial Court from the date of taking possession of land, which is prior to 4(1) notification. 9. It is also further argued and contended that the learned Judge failed to notice Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ordain award of 12% additional amount per annum on the market value of the land from the date of publication of notification under section 4(1) of the Act, passed by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 of the Act till the date of taking possession of land by the Land Acquisition Officer, whichever is earlier. 10. 10. It is further contended that the learned Judge ought to have considered judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Siddappa Vasappa Kuri v. Special land Acquisition Officer , AIR 2001 S.C. 2591 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court declared the law relating to 12% additional amount under Section 23(1-A) and further contended that ignoring the said judgment, learned trial Court ordered the amount claimed by the D.Hr in E.P.no.22/2010 which is to be revised and it is further contended that the learned Judge ought not to have allowed 12% additional amount from the date of taking possession which is prior to date of 4(1) notification and it is also contended that the learned Judge did not consider the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Gurpreeth Singh v. Union of India , [ 2006 (8) SCC 457 ; 2006 (10) SCALE 393 ] pertaining to compensation and benefits stipulated in Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 11. It is also contended that learned Judge failed to notice that the decree holder wrongly calculated 12% additional amount from 05.01.1970, for which he is not entitled to as it pertains to a period prior to 4(1) notification and also calculated cumulative interest on the 12% additional amount year by year, by showing the 12 % additional amount for the first year 12 % on market value; for the second 24% on market value; for the third year 36% on market value, for the fourth year 48% on market value and have contended that the learned Judge have allowed cumulative interest as claimed by the D.Hr which is not provided in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and it is also contended that learned Judge directed to allow appropriation of amount deposited under interim orders firstly towards interest, costs and lastly principal, which is the subject matter under revision. 12. Having heard Sri Vedula Venkataramana , learned senior counsel for the revision petitioner virtually. Though the learned counsel for the respondent has reiterated and pointed out that learned Judge erred in calculating the interest and directed to recover amounts which D.Hr is not entitled and he also relied upon judgments cited in R.L.Jain (D) by LRS vs DDA and others, (2004) 4 SCC 79 Para 11. Though the learned counsel for the respondent has reiterated and pointed out that learned Judge erred in calculating the interest and directed to recover amounts which D.Hr is not entitled and he also relied upon judgments cited in R.L.Jain (D) by LRS vs DDA and others, (2004) 4 SCC 79 Para 11. In order to decide the question whether the provisions of Section 34 of the Act regarding payment of interest would be applicable to a case where possession has been taken over prior to issuance of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act it is necessary to have a look at the Scheme of the Land Acquisition Act. Acquisition means taking not by voluntary agreement but by authority of an Act of Parliament and by virtue of the compulsory powers thereby conferred. In case of acquisition the property is taken by the State permanently and the title to the property vests in the State. The Land Acquisition Act makes complete provision for acquiring title over the land, taking possession thereof and for payment of compensation to the land owner. Part II of the Act deals with acquisition and the heading of Section 4 is "Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon". Sub-section (1) of Section 4 provides that whenever it appears to the appropriate government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company, a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality. Sub-section (2) provides that thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer either generally or specially authorised by such Government in this behalf and for his servants and workmen, to enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in such locality, to dig or bore in the sub-soil and to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is adapted for such purpose etc. etc. This provision shows that the officers and servants and workmen of the government get the lawful authority to enter upon and survey the land and to do other works only after the preliminary notification under Section 4(1) has been published. etc. This provision shows that the officers and servants and workmen of the government get the lawful authority to enter upon and survey the land and to do other works only after the preliminary notification under Section 4(1) has been published. Section 5-A enables a person interested in any land which has been notified under Section 4 (1) to file objection against the acquisition of the land and also for hearing of the objection by the Collector. If the State Government is satisfied, after considering the report, that any particular land is needed for public purposes or for a company, it can make a declaration to that effect under Section 6 of the Act and the said declaration has to be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers and public notice of the substance of such declaration has to be given in the locality. Thereafter the Collector is required to issue notice to persons interested under Section 9 (1) of the Act stating that the Government intends to take possession of the land and that claims to compensation for all interests in such land may be made to him. Section 11 provides for making of an award by the Collector of the compensation which should be allowed for the land. Section 16 provides that when the Collector has made an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. This provision shows that possession of the land can be taken only after the Collector has made an award under Section 11. Section 17 is in the nature of an exception to Section 16 and it provides that in cases of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9 (1), take possession of any land needed for a public purpose and such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. The urgency provision contained in Section 17(1) can be invoked and possession can be taken over only after publication of notification under Section 9(1) which itself can be done after publication of notification under Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Act. The urgency provision contained in Section 17(1) can be invoked and possession can be taken over only after publication of notification under Section 9(1) which itself can be done after publication of notification under Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Act. Even here in view of sub-section (3-A) the Collector has to tender 80 per cent of the estimated amount of compensation to the persons interested entitled thereto before taking over possession. The scheme of the Act does not contemplate taking over of possession prior to the issuance of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and if possession is taken prior to the said notification it will de hors the Act. It is for this reason that both Sections 11(1) and 23(1) enjoin the determination of the market value of the land on the date of publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for the land acquired under the Act. These provisions show in unmistakable terms that publication of notification under Section 4(1) is the sine-qua-non for any proceedings under the Act Section 34 of the Act, on the basis whereof the appellant laid claim for interest, reads as under: "34. Payment of Interest When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited. Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry." Para 12: The expression "the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited" should not be read in isolation divorced from its context. The words "such possession" and "so taking possession" are important and have to be given meaning in the light of other provisions of the Act. "Such compensation" would mean the compensation determined in accordance with other provisions of the Act, namely, Sections 11 and 15 of the Act which by virtue of Section 23(1) mean market value of the land on the date of notification under Section 4(1) and other amounts like statutory sum under sub-section (1-A) and solatium under Sub-section (2) of Section 23. The heading of Part II of the Act is Acquisition and there is a sub-heading "Taking Possession" which contains Sections 16 and 17 of the Act. The words "so taking possession" would therefore mean taking possession in accordance with Sections 16 or 17 of the Act. These are the only two Sections in the Act which specifically deal with the subject of taking possession of the acquired land. Clearly the stage for taking possession under the aforesaid provisions would be reached only after publication of the notification under Sections 4(1) and 9(1) of the Act. If possession is taken prior to the issuance of the notification under Section 4(1) it would not be in accordance with Sections 16 or 17 and will be without any authority of law and consequently cannot be recognised for the purposes of the Act. For the parity of reasons the words "from the date on which he took possession of the land" occurring in Section 28 of the Act would also mean lawful taking of possession in accordance with Sections 16 or 17 of the Act. The words "so taking possession" can under no circumstances mean such dispossession of the owner of the land which has been done prior to publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act which is dehors the provisions of the Act. Para 17: Shri Dave learned counsel for the appellant has also placed strong reliance on Satinder Singh v. Umrao Singh and another AIR 1961 SC 908 wherein the question of payment of interest in the matter of award of compensation was considered by this Court. In this case the initial notification was issued under Section 4(1) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 but the proceedings for acquisition were completed under East Punjab Act No. 48 of 1948. In this case the initial notification was issued under Section 4(1) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 but the proceedings for acquisition were completed under East Punjab Act No. 48 of 1948. The High Court negatived the claim for interest on the ground that the 1948 Act made no provision for award of interest. After quoting with approval the following observations of Privy Council in Inglewood Pulp and Paper Co. Ltd. vs. New Brunswick Electric Power Commission AIR 1928 PC 287 : "upon the expropriation of land under statutory power, whether for the purpose of private gain or of good to the public at large, the owner is entitled to interest upon the principal sum awarded from the date when possession was taken, unless the statute clearly shows a contrary intention." the bench held as under : "…When a claim for payment of interest is made by a person whose immovable property has been acquired compulsorily he is not making claim for damages properly or technically so called; he is basing his claim on the general rule that if he is deprived of his land he should be put in possession of compensation immediately; if not, in lieu of possession taken by compulsory acquisition interest should be paid to him on the said amount of compensation. 17.1. The normal rule, therefore, is that if on account of acquisition of land a person is deprived of possession of his property he should be paid compensation immediately and if the same is not paid to him forthwith he would be entitled to interest thereon from the date of dispossession till the date of payment thereof. But here the land has been acquired only after the preliminary notification was issued on 9.9.1992 as earlier acquisition proceedings were declared to be null and void in the suit instituted by the land owner himself and consequently he was not entitled to compensation or interest thereon for the anterior period Gurpreet Singh v. Union of India , (2006) 8 Supreme Court Cases 457 Para 14: Now, we may consider the provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as, "the Code") that have relevance to the issue. The rule of appropriation in respect of amounts deposited in court or in respect of payment into court, is contained in Order XXIV of the Code at the pre decreetal stage and in Order XXI Rule 1 at the post decreetal stage. Though, we are not directly concerned with it, we may notice that special provisions relating to mortgages are found in Order XXXIV of the Code. Under Order XXIV Rule 1, a defendant in a suit for recovery of a debt may at any stage of the suit deposit in court such sum of money as he considers a satisfaction in full of the claim in the plaint. Rule 2 thereof provides for issue of notice of deposit to the plaintiff through the court and for payment out of the amounts to the plaintiff if he applies for the same. Rule 3 specifically states that no interest shall be allowed to the plaintiff on any sum deposited by the defendant from the date of such deposit, whether the sum deposited is in full discharge of the claim or it falls short thereof. Rule 4 enables the plaintiff to accept the deposit as satisfaction in part and allows him to pursue his suit for what he claims to be the balance due, subject to the consequences provided for therein regarding costs. It also deals with the procedure when the plaintiff accepts the payment in full satisfaction of his claim. Para 52: What is to happen when a part of the amount awarded by the reference court or by the appellate court is deposited pursuant to an interim order of the appellate court or of the further appellate court and the awardee is given the liberty to withdraw that amount? In such a case, the amount would be received by the decree holder on the strength of the interim order and the appropriation will be subject to the decision in the appeal or the further appeal and the direction, if any, contained therein. In such a case, if the appeal is disposed of in his favour, the decree holder would be entitled to appropriate the amount already received by him pursuant to the interim order first towards interest then towards costs and the balance towards principal as on date of the withdrawal of the amount and claim interest on the balance amount of enhanced compensation by levying execution. But on that part appropriated towards the principal, the interest would cease from the date on which the amount is received by the awardee. Of course, if while passing the interim order, the court had indicated as to how the deposited amount is to be appropriated, that direction will prevail and the appropriation could only be done on the basis of that direction. Para 54: One other question also was sought to be raised and answered by this Bench though not referred to it. Considering that the question arises in various cases pending in Courts all over the country, we permitted counsel to address us on that question. That question is whether in the light of the decision in Sunder (supra), the awardee/decree holder would be entitled to claim interest on solatium in execution though it is not specifically granted by the decree. It is well settled that an execution court cannot go behind the decree. If, therefore, the claim for interest on solatium had been made and the same has been negatived either expressly or by necessary implication by the judgment or decree of the reference court or of the appellate court, the execution court will have necessarily to reject the claim for interest on solatium based on Sunder (supra) on the ground that the execution court cannot go behind the decree. But if the award of the reference court or that of the appellate court does not specifically refer to the question of interest on solatium or in cases where claim had not been made and rejected either expressly or impliedly by the reference court or the appellate court, and merely interest on compensation is awarded, then it would be open to the execution court to apply the ratio of Sunder (supra) and say that the compensation awarded includes solatium and in such an event interest on the amount could be directed to be deposited in execution. Otherwise, not. We also clarify that such interest on solatium can be claimed only in pending executions and not in closed executions and the execution court will be entitled to permit its recovery from the date of the judgment in Sunder (September 19, 2001) and not for any prior period. We also clarify that this will not entail any re-appropriation or fresh appropriation by the decree-holder. We also clarify that this will not entail any re-appropriation or fresh appropriation by the decree-holder. This we have indicated by way of clarification also in exercise of our power under Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution of India with a view to avoid multiplicity of litigation on this question. Priya Vart and Another vs Union of India , (1995) 5 Supreme Court Cases 437 Para 6: It is contended that unamended Section 28 prescribes interest only at 6 per cent and the Court is entitled to award compound interest in view of the long delay in disposal of the matter. We find no force in this contention as well. When the statute prescribed interest @ 6 % per annum, it necessarily means only simple interest and not compound interest and pendency of proceedings is no ground to award compound interest and pendency of proceedings is no ground to award compound interest. When the Act prescribes payment of interest at a particular rate, it needs to be awarded at the rate prescribed and is no other way. Union of India v B.Mettu Rama Reddy (died) as per LRs. and others, 2014 (6) ALD 121 (DB) Para 11: The Land Acquisition Act itself, particularly Sections 23(1-A), 28 and 34 stipulate the time from which the benefits under those provisions are to be extended. The date and manner of taking of possession of the land assumes significance. In the instant case, the petitioner had the benefit of the possession of the land of the respondents without payment of any rent from 01-01-1966 onwards. The trial Court took that date into account and extended the benefit u/s 23(1A) of the Act from that date. However, if one goes by the language of the said provisions, it becomes evident that the starting point can be only the date of notification. Para 13: It may be true that 01-01-1966 cannot be treated as the date of taking possession under the Act. However, the respondents cannot be denied the benefit of the additional market value on the ground that the possession was taken before the date of notification itself. The Parliament did not contemplate a situation where the possession can be taken even before the notification u/s 4(1) of the Act was issued. However, the respondents cannot be denied the benefit of the additional market value on the ground that the possession was taken before the date of notification itself. The Parliament did not contemplate a situation where the possession can be taken even before the notification u/s 4(1) of the Act was issued. From the point of view of the Land Acquisition Act, the possession from the respondents can be said to have been taken u/s 16 only when the award is passed and it is thereafter that the land would vest in the Government. The only other contingency under which the land can vest in the Government is u/s 17 of the Act when urgency clause invoked. That did not happen in this case. The inescapable conclusion is that the additional compensation is payable from the date of respective notifications u/s 4(1) of the Act, till the date of the award. Special Deputy Collector railways v. Sanjay Kumar Pandey , 2019 SCC OnLine TS 2045 : (2020) 1 ALD 310 : (2020) 2 ALT 281 Para 51. “In Para 51 of Gurpreet Singh (2 Supra), it is made clear that when the JDr/State makes a deposit along with calculation awarded by Reference Court or by Appellate Court appropriating distinct sums towards various heads of compensation and the amount is received by the DHr, he cannot appropriate on his own volition as if JDr has not intimated. It further held that: ‘A re-appropriation by seeking to re-open the satisfaction already rendered might result in the interest being made payable even on that part of the principal amount that had already been deposited and received by the DHr and that would be in the realm of unjust enrichment.’” Para 52. “However in Para 36 of the judgment of Gurpreet Singh (2 Supra) it is also held: ‘36. Can a claimant or decree-holder who has received the entire amount awarded by the Reference Court or who had notice of the deposit of the entire amount so awarded, claim interest on the amount he has already received merely because the appellate court has enhanced the compensation and has made payable additional compensation? We have already referred to Order 21 and Order 24 of the Code to point out that such a blanket reopening of the transaction is not warranted even in respect of a money decree. We have already referred to Order 21 and Order 24 of the Code to point out that such a blanket reopening of the transaction is not warranted even in respect of a money decree. Section 28 of the Act indicates that the award of interest is confined to the excess compensation awarded and it is to be paid from the date of dispossession. This is in consonance with the position that a fresh reappropriation is not contemplated or warranted by the scheme of the Act. But if there is any shortfall at any stage, the claimant or decree-holder can seek to apply the rule of appropriation in respect of that amount, first towards interest and costs and then towards the principal, unless the decree otherwise directs.’ (emphasis supplied) Para 53. “So there is another important principle. i.e that if there is any shortfall at any stage, the claimant DHr can seek to apply the rule of appropriation in respect of that amount first towards interest and costs and then towards principal, unless the decree itself otherwise directs.” Para 54. “Thus, a conjoint reading of both the paragraphs of the judgment in Gurpreet Singh would make it clear that whenever there is any shortfall in a particular stage of the award, the DHr is entitled to appropriate that amount towards interest and costs and then towards principal.” Para 55. “The deposit made by the State along with calculation would be according to the distinct sums mentioned therein, only when there is no shortfall at a particular stage of the award. Otherwise, the recognition of the right of DHr to appropriate according to his volition in case of shortfall at particular stage of the award becomes otiose/redundant. This is the essential ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Gurpreet Singh (2 supra) and the same has to be understood in this way only.” Siddappa Vasappa Kuri and Another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Another , (2002) 1 Supreme Court Cases 142 Para 6: It is, as we see it, clear from Section 23(1-A) that the starting point for the purposes of calculating the amount to be awarded thereunder, at the rate of 12 per centum per annum on the market value, is the date of publication of the Section 4 notification. The terminal point for the purpose is either the date of the award or the date of taking possession, whichever is earlier. In the present case, possession of the land having been taken prior to the publication of the Section 4 notification, that terminal is not available. The only available terminal is the date of the award. The High Court, therefore, was in no error in holding that the appellants were entitled to the additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) for the period 8-3-1991 to 6-2-1993. Para 7: Section 23(1-A) admits of no meaning other than the meaning that we have placed upon it. There is no room here for any construction other than that given above. It is only where a provision is ambiguous that a construction that leads to a result that is more just can be adopted. Having regard to its clear terms, Section 23(1-A) must receive the only construction it can bear. We are of the view, therefore, that the law has been correctly laid down in the decision in Special Tahsildar (La), P.W.D Schemes, Vijayawada v. M.A Jabbar . (1995) 2 SCC 142 and that it has not been correctly laid down in Asstt. Commr., Gadag Sub-Division v. Mathapathi Basavannewwa (1995) 6 SCC 355 and, for that matter in State of H.P v. Dharam Das (1995) 5SCC 683. And he has contended and also stressed upon that the calculation which is made by the trial Court is incorrect and that the petitioners/JDr’s are not liable to pay the said amounts which is claimed in the Execution Petition. Though the learned senior counsel has pointed and contended that the prayer in the EP is in respect of seeking attachments of the bank accounts of the J.Dr’s which is shown in the schedule and also the main relief is seeking direction to the concerned manager not to pay amount pertaining to the said accounts and any other account to the J.Dr’s and restraining them from restoring the said amounts until further orders and he pointed out that all the claims which are made by the trial Court are proper and by applying the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Though the learned counsel for the revision petitioner herein stressed upon that the calculations which are made are not considered by the trial Court and do not gave any reason in the impugned order and he also contended that the trial Court did not consider their calculation memo filed before the Court, the petitioners/J.Dr’s has filed calculation memo to show that as per the decree of Reference Court, the balance amounts is arrived at Rs.21,59,938/- as on 21.06.2011 and it is contended that the J.Dr’s has deposited an excess amount of Rs.1,23,362/-. Whereas in the present revision petition it is contended that the J.Dr’s deposited an amount of Rs.10,79,969/- as on 21.06.2011 and the J.Dr’s has withdrawn the 50% of the EP amount i.e., Rs.10,79,969/- and contended that though the respondent No.1 is only entitled for Rs.3,99,028/- and the respondent No.1 is entitled for the return of remaining amount of Rs.6,89,941/- as there is no clarity in respect of the calculations which are made by the J.Dr’s . 13. Even otherwise, the learned senior counsel has argued and contended that the very scope of the EP No.22/2010 is only in respect of seeking attachments of the bank account of the J.Dr’s and the question of calculation does not arise in the present case and even in the revision there is no necessity to go into the said aspect. 14. Considering the entire judgment passed by the learned trial Court, it appears that learned Judge taking into consideration of judgments which are cited by the revision petitioner before this Court, which were also relied upon by revision petitioner before executing Court and executing Court after considering the law laid down there on in respect of the apportionment of the amounts which are deposited by the J.Dr’s and after considering the entire calculations of the both the parties the learned judge has passed the said order attaching the said bank accounts of the J.Dr’s and as rightly contended by the learned Senior counsel that the scope of the Civil Revision Petition is being limited, as such and considering the fact that the learned Judge having considered the calculation memo filed by the both the parties have rightly passed the order attaching the bank accounts of the J.Dr’s. 15. As such no error committed by the learned executing Court in passing the said order, I do not see any ground to interfere with the said order and if at all the petitioner/J.Dr’s has any such grievance regarding calculation memo and the calculation of amounts and the same may be assailed in the main E.P.No.46 of 2001, as the EP is still pending. If not, they may take appropriate steps for the same. 16. Hence, for the said reasons I do not see any grounds to interfere with the said orders passed by the executing Court and the Civil Revision Petition deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed.