Order : 1. This petition is filed seeking quashing of certificate for recovery of possession dated 09.05.2017 and order of the Appellate Authority dated 26.02.2013. 2. The petitioner – Purshottam Lal Jagnani (now represented through legal representatives) by rent note dated 01.11.1971 was inducted as tenant by the respondent No.1 – Shri Thakur Ji Laxminath Ji Trust (for brevity ‘the Trust’). The rent of the shop was Rs.324/-, payable after interval of six months. The trust on 11.10.2002 issued a notice to the petitioner for vacating the premises. The Trust again gave a notice on 23.02.2006 for vacating the premises and terminating the tenancy with effect from 12.04.2006. On failure of the petitioner to vacate the premises, the application filed by petitioner for issuance of a certificate for recovery of possession and for payment of mesne profit was allowed on 26.02.2013. The appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed on 09.05.2017 and hence, the present petition. 3. The only one issue raised by learned senior counsel for the petitioner is that the corrigendum published in Rajasthan Gazette Extra-ordinary dated 02.02.2018 modifying the notification dated 14.09.2005 is not retrospective. The property of the trust till Feb. 2018 was not exempted from applicability of Chapter II and III of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (for brevity ‘the Act’) and the proceedings for eviction could have been undertaken only under the Act. Reliance is placed upon decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of The Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Vs. Gutta Mill Workers’ Union reported in AIR 1953 SC 95 ; Maharaja Shri Umaid Mills Ltd. Pali Vs. Industrial Tribunal Jaipur and Ors. reported in AIR 1954 Raj. 274 ; and Kapoorchand Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 1962 Rajasthan 258 4. As per contra, the plea now being raised was not raised before the Rent Tribunal. Further that the corrigendum was issued only to correct the typographical error. That the petitioner is not disputing that the Notification under Section 3 (viii) of the Act and the corrigendum is pertaining to the Trust. 5. The Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (for short ‘the Act’) received the assent of the President on 25.02.2003 and published in Rajasthan Gazette Extra-ordinary on 11.03.2003. Section 3 of the Act stipulates the premises to which Chapter II & III of the Act are not applicable. 5. The Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (for short ‘the Act’) received the assent of the President on 25.02.2003 and published in Rajasthan Gazette Extra-ordinary on 11.03.2003. Section 3 of the Act stipulates the premises to which Chapter II & III of the Act are not applicable. As per Section 3 (viii) of the Act, the premises belonging to religious, charitable or educational trust specified by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette are out of ambit of the Act. 6. The notification dated 14.09.2005 was issued under Section 3 (viii), that the Chapter II & III of the Act were not applicable to the properties owned by the Trust. The name of the Trust in the Notification was mentioned as “Thakur Shri Laxminath Ji Trust, Jhunjhunu” instead of “Shri Thakurji Laxminath Ji Trust, Jhunjhunu”. The error was rectified by the corrigendum published in Rajasthan Gazette Extra-ordinary dated 02.02.2018. 7. It is not the case set up by the petitioner that notification dated 14.09.2005 does not relate to trust or there exists another trust by the name mentioned in the notification dated 14.09.2005. 8. The contention that corrigendum dated 30.01.2018 is prospective and the non applicability of Chapter II and III of the Act shall be from 30.01.2018 has fallacy. The corrigendum issued is curative and shall relate back to the date of issuance of notification under Section 3(viii) of the Act. The consequence of acceptance of the argument would be that corrigendum issued to carry out correction in earlier notification shall grant a fresh exemption to trust from applicability of Chapter II and III of the Act. In other words, the corrigendum shall be a new notification which is against the explicit language used. 9. It would be fruitful to refer the following decision of the Supreme Court. In Government of India and Ors. vs. Indian Tobacco Association reported in (2005) 7 SCC 396 it was held:- “15.Had the intention of the Government of India been only to extend the said benefit only to the exporters from any other seaport, airport or inland container depot, recourse to the proviso appended to Sub-clause (iv) of Clause (2) of the notification dated 7.4.1997 could have been taken. But by reason of the notification dated 27.11.1997, one 'sea port' and 'six inland container depots' have been added. But by reason of the notification dated 27.11.1997, one 'sea port' and 'six inland container depots' have been added. The last two words in the category of seaport, namely, "Tuticorin and Vishakhapatnam" had been substituted by the words "Tuticorin, Vishakhapatnam and Kakinada. Similarly the last two words, namely, Ludhiana and Hyderabad" in the category of inland container depot had been substituted by the words "Ludhiana, Hyderabad, Nagpur, Agra, Faridabad, Jaipur, Guntur and Varanasi. It, therefore, cannot be said to be a case where some other seaports or inland container depots have been added for the purpose of extension of the benefit but the newly added seaports or inland container depots had been made a part of the original notification. The Union of India while making a subordinate legislation had advisedly used the word "substitution" in place of the word "addition". The object and purport of the subsequent notification issued by the Union of India was, thus, to grant the same benefit which had been granted to the exporters who were registered at the other seaports, airports or inland container depots as specified in the notification dated 7.4.1997 but also to those exporters, who had been exporting from such seaports or inland depots as specified in the amended notification dated 27.11.1997. If the Central Government intended to extend the benefit to the members of the respondent Association only with prospective effect, it could have said so explicitly. Such a benefit could also have been extended by taking recourse to the proviso appended to Sub-clause (iv) of Clause (2) of the notification dated 7.4.1997. It may, therefore, be safely concluded that by reason of the amended notification, the Central Government only intended to rectify a mistake and, thus, the same will have retrospective effect and retroactive operation.” In State of A.P. vs. A.P. State Wakf Board and ors. reported in AIR 2022 SC (Supp) 645 it was held:- “We would need to examine as to what is scope and meaning of the word "errata". "Errata" is a term of French origin which means a thing that should be corrected. It means a mistake in printing or writing. Reference may be made to a judgment reported as Parvati Devi v. State of U.P.(2007) 6 ALL LJ 50. "Errata" is a term of French origin which means a thing that should be corrected. It means a mistake in printing or writing. Reference may be made to a judgment reported as Parvati Devi v. State of U.P.(2007) 6 ALL LJ 50. It was held as under:- xxxxxxxxx In Judicial Dictionary by Justice L.P.Singh and Majumdar, 2nd Edition, page 552, while quoting the following passage in Assam Rajyik Udyog Karmi Sangha v. State of Assam, (1996) Gau. L.R. 236, (at page 241), the word "corrigendum" has been defined as follows: The dictionary meaning of the word "corrigendum" means things to be correct. It means there must be an error and there is a necessity to amend and rectify it. In the garb of corrigendum, a Rule cannot be altered and or changed, but that is what appears to have been done in the instant case. In order to alter or modify a Rule the same procedure adopted in making of the Rule have to be gone through. 24. The meaning and application of the word "corrigendum" has been considered by theCourts time and again. In Commissioner ofSales Tax, U.P. v. Dunlop India Ltd. (1994) 92 STC 571 , this Court held that corrigendum is issued to correct a mistake inthe notification, therefore, would relate back to the date of issuance of the original notification”. 25. In Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 765 , the Hon'ble SupremeCourt held that there is no bar on issuing thecorrigendum or 'more corrigenda' for correcting the arithmetical error. xxx xxx xxx 27. In view of the above, the legal position can be summarised that a corrigendum can be issued only to correct a typographical error or omission therein. However, it is meant only to correct typographical/ arithmetical mistake. It cannot have the effect of law nor it can take away the vested right of a person nor it can have the effect of nullifying the rights of persons conferred by the law. In Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit and Ors. Vs. Dr. Manu and Anr. reported in AIR 2023 SC 2645 it was held:- 9.2. From the aforesaid authorities, the following principles could be culled out: i) If a statute is curative or merely clarificatory of the previous law, retrospective operation thereof may be permitted. In Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit and Ors. Vs. Dr. Manu and Anr. reported in AIR 2023 SC 2645 it was held:- 9.2. From the aforesaid authorities, the following principles could be culled out: i) If a statute is curative or merely clarificatory of the previous law, retrospective operation thereof may be permitted. ii) In order for a subsequent order/provision/amendment to be considered as clarificatory of the previous law, the pre- amended law ought to have been vague or ambiguous. It is only when it would be impossible to reasonably interpret a provision unless an amendment is read into it, that the amendment is considered to be a clarification or a declaration of the previous law and therefore applied retrospectively. iii) An explanation/clarification may not expand or alter the scope of the original provision. iv) Merely because a provision is described as a clarification/explanation, the Court is not bound by the said statement in the statue itself, but must proceed to analyse the nature of the amendment and then conclude whether it is in reality a clarificatory or declaratory provision or whether it is a substantive amendment which is intended to change the law and which would apply prospectively. (emphasis) 10. Before concluding it would be fair to deal with the authorities relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner and which are not applicable in the facts of the present case. 10.1. The Supreme Court in the case of Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Vs. Gutta Mill Workers’ Union (supra) was dealing with an issue as to whether the Government of Uttar Pradesh had the power to post-facto extend the time for making the award. It was held under Section 3, 4 & 6 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, there was no such power. 10.2. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Maharaja Shri Umaid Mills Ltd., Pali Vs. Industrial Tribunal Jaipur and Ors. (supra) dealt with an issue of validity of the orders passed by the presiding officer of an Industrial Tribunal after the term had expired but by a subsequent notification, the condition of appointment was modified. It was held that the amendment shall not validate the proceedings undertaken by the Presiding Officer during the intervening period. 10.3. In the case of Kapoorchand Vs. It was held that the amendment shall not validate the proceedings undertaken by the Presiding Officer during the intervening period. 10.3. In the case of Kapoorchand Vs. State of Rajasthan (supra) the issue was that the Competent Officer for compulsorily retirement was the Government and without delegation of the power, the sub-ordinate Authority exercised the power. It was held that subsequent delegation of power shall not validate the compulsorily retirement orders already passed. 11. In view of above discussion, it is held that corrigendum was issued only for correcting the name and shall relate back to date of original notification. The writ petition is dismissed.