Order : PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J. 1. Heard Mr. K.K. Ambastha, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as Mr. Bhaiya Vishwajeet Kumar, learned counsel for the opposite party. 2. The instant civil revision is directed against judgment and decree dated 24.08.2011 (decree singed on 03.09.2011) passed by the Court of Sub-Judge-V, Hazaribagh in Eviction Suit No.11 of 1998 whereby and whereunder, the suit filed under Section 11(1)(c) and (e) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred as 'The Act of 1982') has been decreed in favour of plaintiff and the defendant/petitioners have been directed to vacate the suit premises within one month from the date of order and to handover the vacant possession of the same to the plaintiff, failing which, the plaintiff shall be entitled to evict the defendant from the suit premises through the process of the Court. 3. Factual matrix giving rise to this revision is that plaintiff purchased the suit property by registered sale deed No. 11835 dated 13/14.12.1994 from Sri Krishnan Jaiswal, Advocate, Hazaribagh, thereby acquired absolute ownership, right, title, interest and possession over the property. It is further alleged that before purchase of the suit property including the premises, the defendant was an existing tenant under the vendor of the plaintiff on a monthly rent of Rs.28/- payable according to the English calendar month and had paid rent until December 1994. The plaintiff asserts that the defendant was duly informed and acknowledged the change of ownership, thereby recognizing the plaintiff as his landlady, but failed to pay rent from January 1995 onward, thus becoming a defaulter. The plaintiff further claims bona fide personal necessity for the suit premises, stating the property is century-old, built with mud walls and local tiles, lacks basic amenities such as urinal and latrine and is in a dilapidated and unsafe condition, requiring complete reconstruction, which is not feasible without eviction. It is further alleged that the defendant has a separate residential house and is not residing in the said suit premises and initially sought time till 31.03.1995 to vacate, which was granted, followed by another extension till 30.06.1995 on compassionate grounds. However, the defendant neither vacated the premises nor paid the rent from January 1995. Hence, the suit was filed under Sections 11(1)(c) and (e) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982. 4. However, the defendant neither vacated the premises nor paid the rent from January 1995. Hence, the suit was filed under Sections 11(1)(c) and (e) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982. 4. The defendant appeared and filed his written statement and the plea of defendant in his written statement is that the suit filed by the plaintiff is false and was filed in conspiracy with Krishna Jaiswal to illegally take over the suit property. Defendant stated that the case should not proceed because an earlier case (Title Suit No. 113 of 1996) involving the same property and parties, is still pending in the Munsif Court, Hazaribagh. The defendant explained that Krishna Jaiswal was the original owner, had agreed to sell the house to defendant’s son, Ramendra Kumar Agrawal, in the year 1993 and even took an advance payment, with a written and notarized agreement. Despite repeated requests to finalize the sale, Krishna Jaiswal failed to execute the sale deed. Instead, he fraudulently executed a sale deed in favor of Rekha Jaiswal, his own relative, without informing the defendant or his son. The defendant pleaded that this sale deed is bogus, fraudulent and without consideration, made solely to defeat his son's legal right under the earlier agreement. The defendant also stated that he has been living in the house for a long time, paying rent to Krishna Jaiswal until 1995 and has maintained the property at his own cost. Since then, when rent payments were refused, he began depositing the rent in a bank. He has also denied any landlord- tenant relationship with Rekha Jaiswal who has no legal right or personal necessity for the house and has never occupied it. The defendant has also denied requesting any grace period or acknowledging her ownership and maintained that the suit has been falsely filed to illegally grab the property. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners assailing the impugned judgment and decree has vehemently argued that the suit of the plaintiff itself was misconceived and there was no specific pleading that the plaintiff requires the suit premises bonafidely and reasonably for her own use and occupation. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners assailing the impugned judgment and decree has vehemently argued that the suit of the plaintiff itself was misconceived and there was no specific pleading that the plaintiff requires the suit premises bonafidely and reasonably for her own use and occupation. The citation, i.e., 1991 B.B.C.J. page 544 relied upon by learned Trial Court, while deciding the suit, was also not applicable in the eviction suit in question in view of the fact that in the said ratio, it was the case when in a pending eviction suit, the plaintiff has sold the property to another person, who has filed the suit again/afresh against the tenant. The learned Trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the oral as well as documentary evidence relied upon by the parties and the issues involved in this case in right perspective. The findings recorded on issue of partial eviction is also misconceived and beyond the evidence available on record. Therefore, impugned judgment and decree is liable to be set aside, allowing this civil revision. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. Shehla Burney and Ors. vs. Syed Ali Mossa Raza (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors., reported in 2011 (3) Supreme 401 , wherein dealing with provisions of Order VII Rules 5 and 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was held that in a case where prayer is not made against a particular defendant, no relief possibly can be granted against him. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite party/plaintiff has vehemently opposed the aforesaid contentions raised on behalf of petitioners and submitted that the plaintiff has filed the suit under the provision of Section 11(1)(c) and (e) of the Act of 1982. Section 11(1) of the Act of 1982 reads as under :- "11. Eviction of tenants. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite party/plaintiff has vehemently opposed the aforesaid contentions raised on behalf of petitioners and submitted that the plaintiff has filed the suit under the provision of Section 11(1)(c) and (e) of the Act of 1982. Section 11(1) of the Act of 1982 reads as under :- "11. Eviction of tenants. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), and to those of Section 18, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except in execution of a decree passed by the Court on one or more of the following grounds:- (a) for breach of the conditions of the tenancy, or for sub-letting the building or any portion thereof without the consent of the landlord, or if he is an employee of the landlord occupying the building as an employee, on his ceasing to be in such employment; (b) where the condition of the building has materially deteriorated owing to acts of waste by, or negligence or default of the tenant or of any person residing with the tenant or for whose behaviour the tenant is responsible; (c) where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord: Provided that where the Court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation, the Court shall pass a decree accordingly, and fix proportionately fair rent for the portion in occupation of the tenant, which portion shall henceforth constitute the building within the meaning of clause (b) of Section 2 and the rent so fixed shall be deemed to be the fair rent fixed under section 5; Explanation I. - In this clause the word "landlord" shall not include an agent referred to in clause (f) of Section 2. Explanation II. Explanation II. - Where there are two or more premises let out by the landlord, it will be for the landlord to choose which one would be preferable to him and the tenant or tenants shall not be allowed to question such preference. (d) where the amount of two months rent, lawfully payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract or in the absence of such contract, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable or by not having been validly remitted or deposited in accordance with section 16; (e) in case of a tenant holding on a lease for a specified period, on the expiry of the period of the tenancy; and (f) the landlord requires the premises in order to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or the Municipality or Municipal Corporation or the Notified Area Committee or the Regional Development Authority or any other Authority within whose jurisdiction the building lies and such building work cannot be properly and fully carried out without the premises being vacated." 8. Learned counsel for the opposite party / plaintiff has further submitted that it is well settled law that a tenant takes a premises from the landlord to conduct his business or for the purpose of residence, it is always choice of landlord to choose premises for his business or residence. However, subject to condition that there is bonafide need and requirement for personal necessity. The law is well settled by catena of judgments that “the reasonable requirement of the landlord postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to mere desire and wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind, but not so as to meet even the genuine need as nothing but a desire.” The Hon’ble Apex Court has quoted the aforesaid view in the case of Pratap Rai Tanwani and Anr. vs. Uttam Chand & Anr., (2004) 8 SCC 490 . 9. Learned counsel for the opposite party/plaintiff has further submitted that it is also settled proposition of law that necessity need not be proved as a dire necessity. vs. Uttam Chand & Anr., (2004) 8 SCC 490 . 9. Learned counsel for the opposite party/plaintiff has further submitted that it is also settled proposition of law that necessity need not be proved as a dire necessity. There is no substance in the contention of the petitioner that as per mandatory provision and Order VII Rule 7 of the C.P.C, specific relief was not sought for rather in order to know the pith and substance of the case and the relief sought for the contents of entire plaint has to be taken into account. The petitioner (defendant) has never objected or asserted before the learned Trial Court that he has been surprised through the contents of plaint where relief is ambiguous. Therefore, aforesaid plea of the petitioner is not tenable at all. The suit of the opposite party has been decreed in the year 2011 although eviction suit was filed in the year 1998 but up till now, he has not tasted the fruit of the decree due to stay order passed in this revision. There is no merit in this revision, which is fit to be dismissed. 10. Learned counsel for the opposite party/plaintiff has also placed reliance upon the following reported judgments: (i) Mrs. Veena Rani & Ors. vs. Mrs. Ishrati Amanullah & Anr., reported in 1984 SCC On Line Patna 176 and AIR 1985 Patna 207; (ii) M/s Bihar Alloy Steels Limited Vs. Hari Shankar Worah (Properties) Ltd. & Anr., reported in 1987 PLJR 868. 11. I have gone through the impugned judgment and decree in the light of contentions raised on behalf of both the parties. 12. It appears that Eviction Suit No.11 of 1998 was filed by the plaintiff (opposite party herein), stating inter alia the plaintiff has bought the suit property in December 1994 which was owned and possessed by Sri Krishnan Jaiswal and became the legal owner. The defendant was already living there as a tenant, paying rent of Rs.28/- per month. After the sale, the defendant was told to pay rent to the new owner (the plaintiff), which he agreed to, but he stopped paying rent from January 1995. The plaintiff needs the house for her personal use. The building is very old and in dilapidated condition to live in. She wants to rebuild it, which is not possible while the tenant is still living there. The plaintiff needs the house for her personal use. The building is very old and in dilapidated condition to live in. She wants to rebuild it, which is not possible while the tenant is still living there. The defendant owns another house in the same town but does not live there. The defendant asked for more time to move out and was given extensions until June 1995 but still he did not vacate or pay rent. Thereafter, eviction suit was filed by plaintiff. 13. It further appears that the plea of defendant as per written statement is that the plaintiff has no bonafide requirement of the suit premises as she has house and there is sufficient place in her house where she lives with her husband and family and she never required the suit house and never demanded eviction of the defendant. The defendant has also denied of any knowledge of sale of the suit premises to the plaintiff. The defendant was never inducted as tenant by the plaintiff rather he was inducted as tenant by her vendor Sri Krishnan Jaiswal. He has also denied any payment of rent to the plaintiff at any point of time. However, it is admitted that he always paid rent earlier hand to hand but since 1979, the rent was sent through money order to Krishnan Jaiswal who always accepted it but since January 1995, he refused to grant any receipt, hence, the rent was being remitted through money orders, which was refused by the Krishnan Jaiswal with ulterior motive. Since, there is alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff, therefore, there is no need of eviction of the defendant from suit premises. The defendant never defaulted in payment of rent rather he and his son repair and renovate the suit premises and constructed urinal and latrine at his own cost. 14. It further appears that learned Trial Court, on the basis of pleadings of the parties, has settled following issues for adjudication :- (i) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? (ii) Whether there is cause of action for the suit? (iii) Whether there are relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties? (iv) Whether plaintiff has required the suit house bona-fidely for her personal use and occupation? (ii) Whether there is cause of action for the suit? (iii) Whether there are relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties? (iv) Whether plaintiff has required the suit house bona-fidely for her personal use and occupation? (v) Whether tenancy was for fixed term and defendant is liable to be evicted from the suit premises on the expiry of the fixed period? (vi) As to whether the need of plaintiff will be satisfied by partial eviction of the defendant from the suit premises? (vii) As to what relief or reliefs the plaintiff is entitled to? 15. The learned Trial Court after considering the pleadings of the parties as well as oral and documentary evidence adduced in this case and the law applicable in the factual position decided all the issues. To consider that whether learned Trial Court has rightly decided the case, three points is necessary to consider; (i) Whether there was relationship of landlord and tenant? (ii) Whether there was bonafide need or personal necessity of plaintiff? (iii) Whether need of plaintiff will be satisfied by partial eviction? 16. The petitioner has pointed out illegality or impropriety in the impugned order as regards relationship of landlady and tenant between the parties. On the issue whether there is relationship of landlord and tenant, it is found that the petitioners/defendant has taken plea that he was inducted by the vendor (Sri Krishnan Jaiswal) of the plaintiff over the suit premises and never attorned as tenant of the plaintiff and never paid rent to her. But it is found by learned Trial Court on the basis of evidences that vendor of plaintiff (Krishnan Jaiswal) and husband of plaintiff informed the defendant about the sale of suit premises and defendant attorn the plaintiff as landlady and promised to pay rent to her but defendant never paid rent to the plaintiff. Thus, it is clear that defendant has knowledged about the landlady. On the issue of attornment, in the case of Gopi vs. Ballabh Vyas, (2022) 19 SCC 204 , it is held in para No.32:- 32. Thus, it is clear that defendant has knowledged about the landlady. On the issue of attornment, in the case of Gopi vs. Ballabh Vyas, (2022) 19 SCC 204 , it is held in para No.32:- 32. In the light of the finding on the issue whether the respondents in RC No. 262 of 2008 were mala fide denying the title of the petitioner therein over the petition scheduled property, Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act would assume relevance in regard to the right of the petitioner in RC No. 262 of 2008 to seek eviction of the respondents therein, from the petition scheduled property. Admittedly, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants viz. late Shri Balraj, was the tenant in respect of the petition scheduled property under its original owner Smt Phool Kumari. A bare perusal of Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act would reveal that if a landlord transfers the property leased out or any part of it, the transferee, in the absence of any contract to the contrary, shall possess all the rights of the landlord. Hence, the impact of Ext. P-3, in the absence of any contract to the contrary, is that the respondent herein has stepped into the shoes of Smt Phool Kumari. In terms of Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act it is clear that attornment by the lessee is not necessary for the transfer of the property leased out to him. Thus, the inevitable consequence of transfer of a leased-out property by the landlord in accordance with law to a third party, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, is that the third party concerned would not only become its owner having title but also would step into the shoes of the vendor as the landlord in relation to the lease holder at the relevant point of time. In such circumstances, the findings of the courts below that there exists jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent and the appellants can only be held as the correct and lawful conclusion in the light of the evidence on record based on the legal position. 17. It is clear by well-established law that attornment is not necessary condition creating landlord and tenant relationship and transferee is entitled to sue on the personal necessity even in absence of attornment by tenant. 18. 17. It is clear by well-established law that attornment is not necessary condition creating landlord and tenant relationship and transferee is entitled to sue on the personal necessity even in absence of attornment by tenant. 18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Md. Ayub & Anr. vs. Mukesh Chand, (2012) 2 SCC 155 has discussed the concept of bonafide requirement of plaintiff with comparative hardship between the landlord and tenant. It has been held that landlord’s requirement need not be a dire necessity. The above principle of law was also propounded by the Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Mrs. Veena Rani (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner at para 11 of the said judgment. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that when the tenant did not make genuine effort to find out any alternative accommodation, even during the pendency, the tenant cannot claim hardship in future. 19. Partial Eviction: The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada vs. Govindram Ramgopal Mundada, (2003) 2 SCC 320 held as under:- “It is expected of the parties to raise necessary pleadings so as to enable the parties to adduce evidence and bring on record such relevant material as to enable the court forming an opinion on the issue as to comparative hardship and consistently with such finding whether partial eviction could meet the ends to justice. Even if no issue has been framed, the court may discharge its duty by taking into consideration such material as available on record.” The same principle has been propounded by the Hon’ble Patna High Court/Ranchi Bench in the case of M/s Bihar Alloy Steels Limited (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner at para No.14 of the said judgment. 20. In the instant case, the mere plea of petitioner/defendant that there is only one room in the suit premises and rests are in dilapidated condition, which is sufficient for use and occupation of the plaintiff, for which, defendant has not adduced any evidence, which has not been accepted by the learned Trial Court in view of reasonable and bonafide requirement of the plaintiff and on the principle that the tenant cannot dictate the landlady regarding use and occupation of her own premises in the manner desired by the tenant. As such, the petitioner/defendant himself in essence has not pleaded or proved any partial eviction to be sufficient. 21. In view of the aforesaid discussions and reasons, I find that learned counsel for the petitioner has miserably failed to point out any infirmity in the impugned judgment and decree suffering from non-consideration of material evidence or any error in arriving at right findings by the concerned Trial Court. Learned Trial Court appears to have considered all those above points as pointed out by the present petitioner in right perspective on the basis of materials evidence available on record. Therefore, the impugned judgment and decree does not require any interference by way of this revision. I do not find any merits in this revision, which stands dismissed. 22. Interim order, if any, passed in this case, stands vacated. 23. Pending I.As., if any, also stand dismissed. 24. Let a copy of this judgment along with Trial Court record be sent back to the concerned Trial Court for information and needful.