JUDGMENT : DEVASHIS BARUAH, J. 1. Heard Mr. A. Ganguly, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants in both the appeals and Mr. N. Hoque, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the private Respondents in the appeals and Mr. M. Sharma, the learned Standing counsel appearing on behalf of the Central Bank of India. 2. Both the appeals are taken up together for disposal taking into account that in both the appeals, the parities, issues which arise for consideration and the substantial questions of law so framed are one and the same. 3. In RSA No.260/2014 which is directed against the judgment and decree dated 12.06.2014 passed in Title Appeal No.15/2011 whereby the judgment and decree dated 24.10.2011 passed by the learned Munsiff No.1, Sonitpur at Tezpur (hereinafter referred to as “the learned Trial Court”) in Title Suit No. 18/2007 was upheld, this Court vide an order dated 06.04.2015 framed the following substantial question of law: “(1) Late Ripul Mushahary having submitted himself to the Hindu religious faith for solemnization of his marriage with the plaintiff/appellant as per the customs and traditions of the Hindu marriage, whether marriage of the plaintiff with her deceased husband can be said to be void on account of contravention of the provisions of Christian Marriage Act?” 4. In RSA No. 43/2015 which is directed against the judgment and decree dated 12.06.2014 in Title Appeal No. 14/2011 whereby the Appeal was dismissed thereby confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court dated 24.10.2011 in Title Suit No.28/2006, the learned Coordinate Bench of this Court vide an order dated 06.04.2015 had framed the following substantial questions of law: “(1) The suit having been instituted on the basis of permission obtained under Order I Rule 8 CPC from the Court whether the Courts below were justified in holding the plaintiff’s suit to be bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? (2) Late Ripul Mushahary having submitted himself to the Hindu religious faith for solemnization of his marriage with the plaintiff/appellant as per the customs and traditions of the Hindu marriage, whether marriage of the plaintiff with her deceased husband can be said to be void on account of contravention of the provisions of Christian Marriage Act?” 5. While hearing these appeals, this Court had framed an additional substantial question of law on 08.08.2023. While hearing these appeals, this Court had framed an additional substantial question of law on 08.08.2023. The said additional substantial question of law was reframed by an order dated 18.02.2025 taking into account the provisions of the Central Bank of India (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995 (for short ‘the Regulations of 1995’) as well as the Central Bank of India (Officers’) Service Regulations, 1979 (for short ‘the Regulations of 1979’). The reframed substantial question of law reads as under: “Whether the learned Courts below were justified in appropriating the entitlement for pension between the appellant No.2 and the respondent No.2, her mother and other sisters without taking into consideration the definition of “Family” defined in Regulation 2(o) read with Regulation 39 of the Regulations of 1995.” 6. The question therefore which arises before this Court at this stage of final hearing is as to whether the substantial questions of law so formulated are involved in the present appeals. 7. For that purpose, this Court finds it relevant to take note of the brief facts which led to the filing of the present appeals. 8. The Appellant No.1 herein had filed a suit which was registered and numbered as Title Suit No.28/2006. In the said suit, it was stated that one Shri Ripul Mushahary (since deceased) while posted at Lokhra as a cashier of the Central Bank of India (CBI) married the Appellant No.1 on 06.03.2000 at Sri Sri Kalia Gosain Than Namghar according to religious rites of the Satra in presence of the father of the Appellant No. 1 and local villagers and devotees of Sri Sri Kalia Gosain Satra. Late Ripul Musahary during his lifetime also opened a joint account in the Central Bank of India bearing Account No. 4815 wherein the Appellant No.1 was shown as the wife of Late Ripul Mushahary. Unfortunately, Late Ripul Mushahary expired on account of a road accident at Balipara on 19.01.2003. The CBI had issued a certificate dated 01.12.2003 admitting the declaration of the Appellant No. 1’s husband as regards the Appellant No.1’s marriage with him and opening of a joint account of the Appellant No.1 and her husband being Account No.4815 and the accident involving the death of Late Ripul Mushahary as stated. 9. The CBI had issued a certificate dated 01.12.2003 admitting the declaration of the Appellant No. 1’s husband as regards the Appellant No.1’s marriage with him and opening of a joint account of the Appellant No.1 and her husband being Account No.4815 and the accident involving the death of Late Ripul Mushahary as stated. 9. It is also pertinent to mention that out of the wedlock between the Appellant No.1 and Late Ripul Mushahary, a child was born on 18.06.2001 at E.M.M. Hospital & Research Center, Tezpur. The Appellant No.2 is the son of the Appellant No.1 and Late Ripul Musahary. The Respondent No.2 herein who is the sister of Late Ripul Mushahary wrote a letter on 27.06.2001 asking the Appellant No.1 to convert into Christianity and remarry as per the Catholic tradition. The dispute arose when the Appellant No.1 sought for the service benefits from the CBI and objection raised by the Respondent No.2 and under such circumstances, the Appellant No.1 filed a suit being Title Suit No.28/2006 seeking a mandatory injunction directing the CBI to settle and pay the family pension to the Appellant No.1 and Appellant No.2 who are the legal heirs of Late Ripul Mushahary. 10. It is relevant to take note of that the Respondent No.2 contested the said suit by raising various preliminary objections including the objection as regards non-joinder of necessary parties. The case of the Respondent No.2 in her written statement cum counterclaim filed in Title Suit No.28/2006 is that the Appellant No.1 was not the legally married wife of Late Ripul Mushahary and apart from denying the marriage which was solemnized with Late Ripul Mushahary on 06.03.2000 at Sri Sri Kalia Gosain Than Namghar. It was averred by the Respondent No.2 that both the Appellant No.1 as well as Late Ripul Mushahary were not followers of Satriya religion, custom or usage. It was also mentioned that Late Ripul Mushahary was a Scheduled Tribe and cannot adopt Satriya religion or custom stealthily without the knowledge of his family or socially and no proper adoption at all took place. It was also mentioned that the Appellant No.1 being an Ahom could not have adopted Satriya religion only for the purpose of marriage. It was also mentioned that Late Ripul Mushahary was a Scheduled Tribe and cannot adopt Satriya religion or custom stealthily without the knowledge of his family or socially and no proper adoption at all took place. It was also mentioned that the Appellant No.1 being an Ahom could not have adopted Satriya religion only for the purpose of marriage. The Respondent No.2 further averred that Late Ripul Mushahary was a Protestant Christian by religion and a marriage between a Christian and a non-Christian or between the Christians has to be solemnized according to Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 and any marriage solemnized otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act would be void in law. 11. In the counterclaim so filed by the Respondent No.2, it was stated that the Respondent No.2 along with her three sisters and mother were the legal heirs and successors of Late Ripul Mushahary and as such sought for appropriate declaration in that regard. By way of the counterclaim, the Respondent No.2 further sought for all the service benefits including provident fund, leave salary, job on compassionate ground, family pensionary benefits in favour of the Respondent No.2, her mother and her three sisters. 12. The records reveal that the counterclaim so filed by the Respondent No.2, her mother and her sisters was not accepted for which the Respondent No.2 along with her mother and three sisters jointly filed another suit being Title Suit No.18/2007 against the Central bank of India and the Appellant Nos.1 and 2 herein. 13. A perusal of Title Suit No.18/2007 shows that the claim made by the Respondent No.2, her sisters and her mother were similar to the counterclaim filed in Title Suit No.28/2006 and the reliefs so sought for were also the same. 14. The Appellants herein contested the said suit by filing the written statement stating inter alia that the Appellants were the legal heirs of Late Ripul Mushahary and were entitled to all the service benefits of Late Ripul Mushahary as was contended in Title Suit No. 28/2006. 15. In Title Suit No. 28/2006, the learned Trial Court framed six issues which being relevant are reproduced herein under: “1. Whether the suit is maintainable? 2. Whether the suit is bad for non-joined of necessary parties? 3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 4. Whether the plaintiff and Sri. 15. In Title Suit No. 28/2006, the learned Trial Court framed six issues which being relevant are reproduced herein under: “1. Whether the suit is maintainable? 2. Whether the suit is bad for non-joined of necessary parties? 3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 4. Whether the plaintiff and Sri. Rimun Sagar Musharay are the only legal heirs of the deceased of Ripul Mushahary? 5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to decree as prayed for? 6. To what relief/reliefs the parties are entitled to?” 16. On behalf of the Appellants herein, three witnesses were adduced and as many as 14 documents were exhibited. On behalf of the Respondent No.2 herein, three witnesses were examined and six documents were exhibited. 17. The learned Trial Court while deciding the Issue No.4 which pertains to as to whether the plaintiff and Sri Rimun Sagar Mushahary are the only legal heirs of the deceased Ripul Mushahary observed that the Appellant No.1 was not the legally married wife of Late Ripul Mushahary and as such, she is not the legal heir. However, after arriving at the finding of fact that the Appellant No.2 was the biological son of Late Ripul Mushahary, the learned Trial Court held that the Appellant No.2 was entitled to the share in the self earned properties including family pensionary benefits of Late Ripul Mushahary. Paragraph Nos. 19 and 20 of the judgment of the learned Trial Court being relevant are reproduced herein under: “19. In view of the detailed discussion in the issue No.1, 2 and 3, it is concluded that in the eye of law Srimati Rinti Mushahary is not the legally wedded wife of Ripul Mushahary. The minor child born out of long and continuous cohabitation is however entitled to rights over the self earned property of his father including share in the family pension. 20. The plaintiff had prayed for mandatory and permanent injunction against the defendant no.1 and 2. Considering the fact that the above issues are decided in negative against the plaintiff, I conclude that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief as prayed for.” 18. Now coming back to the Title Suit No.18/2007, the learned Trial Court in this suit framed as many as five issues which being relevant are reproduced herein under: “1. Whether the suit is maintainable? 2. Whether the plaintiffs are the only legal heirs of the deceased Ripul Mushahary? 3. Now coming back to the Title Suit No.18/2007, the learned Trial Court in this suit framed as many as five issues which being relevant are reproduced herein under: “1. Whether the suit is maintainable? 2. Whether the plaintiffs are the only legal heirs of the deceased Ripul Mushahary? 3. Whether defendant no.2 is the legally married wife of the deceased Ripul Mushahary and the defendant no.3 is the legitimate child of the deceased of Ripul Mushahary? 4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all the service benefits of late Ripul Mushahary? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitle for a decree as prayed for?” 19. On behalf of the plaintiffs in Title Suit No.18/2007, two witnesses were examined and six documents were exhibited. On behalf of the defendants in Title Suit No.18/2007 who were the Appellants in the present appeal, the Appellant No.1 was examined as the defendant witness and she exhibited as many as 14 documents. 20. The learned Trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 24.10.2011 also disposed of Title Suit No.18/2007 holding inter alia that the Appellant No.1 was not the legally wedded wife but Appellant No.2 was entitled to the share in the self earned properties including family pensionary benefits of the deceased Late Ripul Mushahary. The reliefs which were granted in favour of the plaintiff in Title Suit No.18/2007 by the learned Trial Court being relevant are reproduced herein under: “2. The plaintiff is entitled to following reliefs. a. Declaration that Nemshry Mushahary (mother), Rita Mushahary, Rahila Mushahary, Sulekha Mushahary, Kamala Mushahary and Nila Mushahary (all are sisters of deceased Ripul Mushahary) and Rimun Sagar Mushahary (son) are entitled to a decree for final settlement of dues accrued at the death of Ripul Mushahary @ Moshahary, Ex-Clerk under the branch Manager, Central Bank of India, Lokhra Branch, Balipara, district – Sonitpur, Assam. b. The defendant No.1 is directed to take into consideration the decision of this Court of law while disbursing the pension and other benefits. I clarify that defendant No.1 shall be governed by the relevant Pension Rules and must take into consideration the conclusions arrived at by this Court.” 21. Being aggrieved, two appeals were preferred by the Appellants herein which were registered and numbered as Title Appeal No.14/2011 and Title Appeal No.15/2011 before the Court of the Civil Judge at Tezpur (hereinafter referred to as “the learned First Appellate Court”). Being aggrieved, two appeals were preferred by the Appellants herein which were registered and numbered as Title Appeal No.14/2011 and Title Appeal No.15/2011 before the Court of the Civil Judge at Tezpur (hereinafter referred to as “the learned First Appellate Court”). Vide separate judgments dated 12.06.2014, the learned First Appellate Court dismissed both the Appeals thereby confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court in Title Suit No.28/2006 and Title Suit No.18/2007 which were both dated 24.10.2011. It is against these two judgments passed by the learned First Appellate Court, the present appeals have been filed. 22. This Court had duly heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties on the substantive questions of law which have been formulated by this Court. On 06.05.2015, the learned Coordinate Bench of this Court had formulated identical substantial questions of law in both the appeals. However, in RSA No.43/2015 as stated above, another substantial question of law was formulated. Let this Court therefore first look into as to whether the substantial question of law quoted herein under, which was framed on 06.04.2015 in RSA No.43/2015 is involved in the instant appeal. The said substantial question of law so formulated is as under: “(1) The suit having been instituted on the basis of permission obtained under Order I Rule 8 CPC from the Court whether the Courts below were justified in holding the plaintiff’s suit to be bad for non-joinder of necessary parties?” 23. This Court has duly taken note of the provisions of Order I Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “the Code”). A perusal of the said provision shows that where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit, one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the Court, sue or be sued, or may defend such suit on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so interested or the Court may direct that one or more of such persons may sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of all persons so interested. However, in order to take the benefit of the said permission or the direction passed by the Court in terms with Sub-Rule (1) of Order I Rule 8 of the Code, there is a requirement that the Court in every case where such a permission or direction is given, should give notice of the institution of the suit to all persons so interested, either by personal service, or where by reason of number of person or any other cause, such service is not reasonably practicable by public advertisement, as the Court in each case may direct. 24. In the instant proceedings, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants drew the attention of this Court to the order dated 24.01.2007 passed in Title Suit No.28/2006. A perusal of the said order so passed by the learned Trial Court does not show that the mandate of Sub- Rule (2) of Order I Rule 8 of the Code have been adhered to and under such circumstances, it is the opinion of this Court that the said substantial question of law so formulated by the learned Coordinate Bench of this Court on 06.04.2015 cannot be said to be involved in the present appeal. 25. Let this Court now take up the other substantial question of law which are common in both the appeals. The learned Coordinate Bench of this Court on 06.04.2015 formulated the following substantial question of law in both the Appeals: “(1) Late Ripul Mushahary having submitted himself to the Hindu religious faith for solemnization of his marriage with the plaintiff/appellant as per the customs and traditions of the Hindu marriage, whether marriage of the plaintiff with her deceased husband can be said to be void on account of contravention of the provisions of Christian Marriage Act.?” 26. This Court has duly taken note of the decision in respect to Issue No.4 in both the suits passed by the learned Trial Court as well as the learned First Appellate Court. It appears from the findings of facts as well as the observations made therein that the learned Trial Court as well as the learned First Appellate Court were swayed by the provisions of the Indian Christian Act, 1872 but without taking into consideration that the suits so filed by both the parties were in relation to the entitlement pertaining to the pensionary benefits of Late Ripul Mushahary upon his demise. Both the Courts below failed to take into consideration the Regulations of 1995 which were holding the field as regards the entitlement of the family pension and other benefits. Under such circumstances, it is therefore the opinion of this Court that the substantial question of law so formulated by the learned Coordinate Bench of this Court on 06.04.2015 is involved in the present appeal. 27. Let this Court now deal with the additional substantial question of law which was formulated by this Court vide the order dated 18.02.2025 which reads as under: “Whether the learned Courts below were justified in appropriating the entitlement for pension between the appellant No.2 and the respondent No.2, her mother and other sisters without taking into consideration the definition of “Family” defined in Regulation 2(o) read with Regulation 39 of the Regulations of 1995.” 28. It has been submitted at the Bar that the only entitlement which the Appellants or the Respondent No.2 herein would be entitled to, is the family pension inasmuch as, all other benefits have already been appropriated by the Central bank of India (CBI) towards certain dues payable against the loan taken by Late Ripul Mushahary during his lifetime. Under such circumstances, it is therefore essential to deal with the substantial question of law keeping in mind the aspect of family pension. 29. The Supreme Court in the case of Poonamal Vs. Union of India and others , (1985) 3 SCC 345 had the occasion to deal with the purpose for which the family pension is granted. Paragraph No.3 of the said judgment being relevant is reproduced herein under: “ 3. Family pension came to be conceptualised in the year 1950. When a Government servant dies in harness or soon after retirement, in the traditional Indian family on the death of the only earning member, the widow or the minor children were not only rendered orphans but faced more often destitution and starvation. Traditionally speaking the widow was hardly in a position to obtain gainful employment. She suffered the most inasmuch as she was deprived of the companionship of the husband and also became economically orphaned. As a measure of socio-economic justice family pension scheme was devised to help the widows tide over the crisis and till the minor children attain majority to extend them some succour. This appeared to be the underlying motivation in devising the family pension scheme. As a measure of socio-economic justice family pension scheme was devised to help the widows tide over the crisis and till the minor children attain majority to extend them some succour. This appeared to be the underlying motivation in devising the family pension scheme. It was liberalised from time to time. The liberalisation was however subject to the condition that the Government servant had in his lifetime agreed that he shall make a contribution of an amount equal to two months' emoluments or Rs 5000 whichever is less out of the death-cum-retirement gratuity. Those Government servants who did not accept this condition were denied the benefit of family pension scheme.” 30. A perusal of the above quoted paragraph would show that the family pension was devised as a means to help the dependents of the deceased Government servant to fight over the crisis and to extend them some succor. Therefore, the very definition of the term “family” has to be deemed to include only those persons who were dependents of the Government servant at the time of his death. The materials on record clearly show that both the appellants were dependents of Late Ripul Mushahary at the time of his death. 31. In the above perspective, let this Court now take note of the Regulations of 1995. Regulation 2(g) defines the term “Child” which being relevant is reproduced herein under: “ 2(g). “ Child ” means a child of the employee, who, if a son, is under twenty five years of age and if a daughter, is unmarried and is under twenty five years of age and the expression “children” shall be construed accordingly.” 32. The above quoted definition applied to the facts of the instant case would show that the Appellant No.2 who is admittedly the biological son of Late Ripul Mushahary would be considered as a child within the definition of Regulation 2(g) till he attains 25 five years of age. 33. Regulation 2(o) defines the term “Family” which being relevant is reproduced herein under: “2.(o). 33. Regulation 2(o) defines the term “Family” which being relevant is reproduced herein under: “2.(o). “ Family ” in relation to an employee means:- (a) wife in the case of a male employee or husband in the case of a female employee; (b) a judicially separated wife or husband, such separation not being granted on the ground of adultery and the person surviving was not held guilty of committing adultery; (c) son or daughter including widowed or divorced daughter till he or she attains the age of twenty-five years or upto his or her marriage or remarriage, whichever is earlier, including such son or daughter adopted legally. (d) parents who were wholly dependent on the employee when he/she was alive, provided the deceased employee had left behind neither a widow/widower nor a child.” 34. From a perusal of the above quoted provision, it would be seen that a wife of a male employee would come within the definition of “family”. Similarly, a son until he attains the age of 25 years would also come within the ambit of “family”. The mother would also come within the ambit of the “family” subject to the deceased not leaving behind a widow or a child. 35. Therefore, from the above definition, it is clear that Respondent No.2 or her sisters would not come within the meaning of the family as defined in Regulation 2(o) of the Regulations of 1995. The mother of the Respondent No.2 who is also the mother of Late Ripul Mushahary would have come had there been no widow or a son or a child of Late Ripul Mushahary. 36. The findings of fact categorically show that the Appellant No.2 is the biological son of Late Ripul Mushahary. The Regulations of 1995 also do not distinguish a child whether legitimate or illegitimate. Under such circumstances, as there is a child of Late Ripul Mushahary, the question of the mother of Late Ripul Mushahary coming within the ambit of the meaning of “family” as defined under 2(o) of the Regulations of 1995 does not arise. Under such circumstances, the additional substantial question of law which has been framed on 18.02.2025 is involved in the instant appeal. 37. This Court further finds it pertinent to observe that Regulation 2(o)(a) of the Regulation of 1995 categorically observes that a wife of a male employee would come within the ambit of a family. Under such circumstances, the additional substantial question of law which has been framed on 18.02.2025 is involved in the instant appeal. 37. This Court further finds it pertinent to observe that Regulation 2(o)(a) of the Regulation of 1995 categorically observes that a wife of a male employee would come within the ambit of a family. At this stage this Court finds it pertinent to take note of that the findings of facts so arrived at on the basis of evidence is clear to the effect that the Appellant No.1 cohabited with Late Ripul Mushahary and out of their wedlock, the Appellant No.2 was born. The learned Trial Court as well as the learned First Appellate Court went into the question as to whether the marriage was legally valid in terms with the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 but did not address the focal point of the dispute as to whether for the purpose of family pension, the Appellant No.1 would be entitled to the family pension. 38. In this regard this Court finds it relevant to take note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Shiramabai Vs. Record Officer for O.I.C. Records , (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1026 wherein the Supreme Court was dealing with the question as to whether a person who was married during the existence of a valid marriage and subsequent to the decree of dissolution of the previous marriage, would be entitled to the benefit of the family pension. The observations of the Supreme Court at paragraph Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 makes it very clear that there is a presumption in favour of a marriage when a man and a woman have continuously cohabited for long spell. It was further observed that when there are circumstances that weaken such presumption, Court ought not to ignore it. The burden lies heavily on the party who seeks to question the cohabitation and deprive the relationship of a legal sanctity. This Court finds it relevant to reproduce paragraph Nos. 14 to 23 of the said judgment herein under: “ 14. It is no longer res integra that if a man and woman cohabit as husband and wife for a long duration, one can draw a presumption in their favour that they were living together as a consequence of a valid marriage. 14 to 23 of the said judgment herein under: “ 14. It is no longer res integra that if a man and woman cohabit as husband and wife for a long duration, one can draw a presumption in their favour that they were living together as a consequence of a valid marriage. This presumption can be drawn under Section 114 of the EVIDENCE ACT that states as follows: “114. The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.” 15. In this above context, we may refer to Andrahennedige Dinohamy v. Wijetunge Liyanapatabendige Balahamy, where the Privy Council observed thus: “…..where a man and woman are proved to have lived together as man and wife, the law will presume, unless the contrary be clearly proved, that they were living together in consequence of a valid marriage and not in a state of concubinage. xxxxxxxxx “The parties lived together for twenty years in the same house, and eight children were born to them. The husband during his life recognized, by affectionate provisions, his wife and children. The evidence of the Registrar of the District shows that for a long course of years the parties were recognized as married citizens, and even the family functions and ceremonies, such as, in particular, the reception of the relations and other guests in the family house by Don Andris and Balahamy as host and hostess—all such functions were conducted on the footing alone that they were man and wife. No evidence whatsoever is afforded of repudiation of this relation by husband or wife or anybody.” 16. In Mohabbat Ali Khan v. Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, it was again observing by the Privy council that: “….The law presumes in favour of marriage and against concubinage when a man and a woman have cohabited continuously for a number of years……” 17. Similarly, in Badri Prasad v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, this Court held as follows: “…….A strong presumption arises in favour of wedlock where the partners have lived together for a long spell as husband and wife. Although the presumption is rebuttable, a heavy burden lies on him who seeks to deprive the relationship of legal origin. Similarly, in Badri Prasad v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, this Court held as follows: “…….A strong presumption arises in favour of wedlock where the partners have lived together for a long spell as husband and wife. Although the presumption is rebuttable, a heavy burden lies on him who seeks to deprive the relationship of legal origin. Law leans in favour of legitimacy and frowns upon bastardy…..” 18. In S.P.S. Balasubramanyam v. Suruttayan alias Andali Padayachi, this Court held as under: “4. What has been settled by this Court is that if a man and woman live together for long years as husband and wife then a presumption arises in law of legality of marriage existing between the two. But the presumption is rebuttable (See Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari). 19. It is true that there would be a presumption in favour of the wedlock if the partners lived together for a long spell as husband and wife, but, the said presumption is rebuttable though heavy onus is placed on the one who seeks to deprive the relationship of its legal origin to prove that no marriage had taken place (refer : Tulsa v. Durghatiya). 20. A similar view has been taken by this Court in Madan Mohan Singh v. Rajni Kant, Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (supra) and Dhannulal v. Ganeshram. 21. In the case of Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari alias Usha Rani (supra) this Court observed thus: “……Continuous cohabitation of man and woman as husband and wife and their treatment as such for a number of years may raise the presumption of marriage, but the presumption which may be drawn from long cohabitation is rebuttable and if there are circumstances which weaken and destroy that presumption, the court cannot ignore them.” 22. In KattukandiEdathilValsan's Case (supra), citing the abovesaid decisions and relying on Section 114 of the EVIDENCE ACT , this Court held in the facts of the said case that there was a presumption of the marriage between the parents of the plaintiffs on the ground of their long cohabitation status, entitling their offspring to claim their share in the suit schedule property. 23. It can be discerned from the aforesaid line of decisions that the law infers a presumption in favour of a marriage when a man and woman have continuously cohabitated for a long spell. 23. It can be discerned from the aforesaid line of decisions that the law infers a presumption in favour of a marriage when a man and woman have continuously cohabitated for a long spell. No doubt, the said presumption is rebuttable and can be rebutted by leading unimpeachable evidence. When there is any circumstance that weakens such a presumption, courts ought not to ignore the same. The burden lies heavily on the party who seeks to question the cohabitation and to deprive the relationship of a legal sanctity.” 39. In the instant case, it would be seen that the proved facts show that the Appellant No.1 married with Late Ripul Mushahary. However, both the learned Trial Court as well as the learned First Appellate Court rejected the marriage on the ground that it was not done so in terms with Section 4 of the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872. But the fact that the Appellant No.1 was married to Late Ripul Mushahary and out of their wedlock, a child was born is a fact which is apparent from the records. Under such circumstances, it is therefore the opinion of this Court that for the purpose of family pension, the Appellant No.1 can be deemed to be the wife of Late Ripul Mushahary and as such the Appellant No.1 along with the Appellant No.2 would be entitled to the family pension in terms with Chapter-VII of the Regulations of 1995. 40. Accordingly, this Court therefore disposes of both the appeals with the following observations and directions: (i) The judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court dated 12.06.2014 in Title Appeal No. 14/2011 and 12.06.2014 in Title Appeal No.15/2011 are set aside and quashed. (ii) The Appellants herein would be entitled to family pension in terms of Chapter-VII of the Central Bank of India (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995. (iii) The Central Bank of India, who is the Respondent No.1 in both the appeals are directed to do the needful in terms with the said Central Bank of India (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995. (iv) Both the appeals accordingly stands disposed of. 41. The Registry is directed to draw up a decree in terms with the observations and directions given in Paragraph No.40. 42. The Registry is directed to forthwith return the TCR to the learned Court below.