ORDER: NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO, J. This writ petition is filed aggrieved by the Award dated 12.03.2004 passed by the 1st respondent in I.D.No.113 of 2001. 2. Heard Sri G.Rajesh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri R.Anurag, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the 2 nd respondent. 3. The brief facts of the case are as follows :- (a) The petitioner was initially appointed as a Conductor on 20.12.1986 on daily wage basis and subsequently his services were regularized with effect from 15.07.1987. The petitioner claims to have performed his duties diligently for over 17 years, without any adverse remarks until the incident that led to his removal. (b) On 03.05.1999, while the petitioner was discharging his duties as a Conductor on Bus bearing No.AP-9Z-2826 on the route from Women’s College to Bacharam 'X' Road, a surprise check was conducted by the checking officials of the Divisional Enforcement Squad at Stage No.17/18, Bacharam 'X' Road and alleged that the petitioner was involved in cash and ticket irregularity and accordingly, a charge memo was issued to the petitioner on the same day. The petitioner submitted his explanation on 03.05.1999. Not satisfied with the explanation submitted by the petitioner, he was placed under suspension on 10.05.1999, and a charge- sheet was served on him on the same day framing the following charges :- “(i) Charge No.1: You have failed to complete ticket issues within one fare stage which constitutes misconduct in terms of Reg.28 (vi) (a) of APSRTC Employees Conduct Regulations, 1963. (ii) Charge No.2: You have collected the fare of Rs.2.50 E2 who boarded your bus at Kavadipally and bound for Bacharam X Road ex-stages 15 to 17/18 issued bearing ticket Nos.227/697224 of Rs.3.00 and 330/636196 of Rs.2.00 which was already sold in the trip from Banda Ravirala 16.10 hrs late departure 18.30 hrs operating to Abdullapuramettu and the same were already accounted din SR which shows respondent-issued which constitutes misconduct under Regulation 28(xxiii) of APSRTC Employees Conduct Regulations, 1963.” (c) The petitioner submitted explanation to the charge-sheet on 21.05.1999 denying the said charges. Thereafter, the 2 nd respondent ordered an enquiry. The Enquiry Officer submitted a report on 15.07.1999 holding that the petitioner was guilty of both the charges. The petitioner submitted his objections to the enquiry report on 27.03.1999, but the disciplinary authority issued a show-cause notice proposing removal from service. Thereafter, the 2 nd respondent ordered an enquiry. The Enquiry Officer submitted a report on 15.07.1999 holding that the petitioner was guilty of both the charges. The petitioner submitted his objections to the enquiry report on 27.03.1999, but the disciplinary authority issued a show-cause notice proposing removal from service. The petitioner again submitted a detailed explanation on 03.08.1999, denying all the allegations. Not satisfied with the explanation submitted by the petitioner, the disciplinary authority passed an order dated 07.08.1999, removing the petitioner from service. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed an appeal on 23.08.1999, which was rejected by the Appellate Authority on 29.09.1999. A review petition was also filed before the Regional Manager and the same was rejected on 18.07.2000. Aggrieved by the order dated 18.07.2000, the petitioner filed I.D.No.688 of 2000 before the Labour Court, which was later transferred to the Industrial Tribunal-I, Hyderabad, and renumbered as I.D.No.113 of 2001. The Tribunal vide its Award dated 12.03.2004 while setting aside the order of removal, directed reinstatement of the petitioner as a fresh conductor, without continuity of service and back wages. (d) Thereafter, the award was implemented, and the petitioner was reinstated into service afresh on 04.07.2004. However, aggrieved by the Award dated 12.03.2004 insofar as not granting continuity of service and back wages, the present writ petition is filed. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the Tribunal while setting aside the order of removal, ought to have directed the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service with continuity of service, attendant benefits and back wages. The Tribunal failed to provide any cogent reasons for reinstating the petitioner afresh instead of granting continuity of service, other benefits and back wages. Therefore, the Award passed by the Tribunal is wholly unjust and arbitrary. Therefore, appropriate orders be passed in the writ petition by granting the relief sought by the petitioner and allow the writ petition. 5. The respondent filed a counter affidavit stating as follows :- (a) The petitioner, who was working as a Conductor, committed serious cash and ticket irregularity on 03.05.1999 and therefore, he was issued charge-sheet and suspended w.e.f. 10.05.1999. An enquiry was conducted by the Chief Inspector (Enquiries), Hyderabad Division, who submitted his report on 15.07.1999. After considering the enquiry report and the petitioner’s submissions, a show cause notice for removal was issued to the petitioner on 28.07.1999. An enquiry was conducted by the Chief Inspector (Enquiries), Hyderabad Division, who submitted his report on 15.07.1999. After considering the enquiry report and the petitioner’s submissions, a show cause notice for removal was issued to the petitioner on 28.07.1999. Subsequently, the petitioner was removed from service vide order dated 07.08.1999. (b) The petitioner’s departmental appeal and revision petition were rejected by the appellate authority and the Regional Manager respectively. Thereafter, the petitioner raised I.D.No.688 of 2000 before the Labour Court-I, Hyderabad, which was transferred to the Industrial Tribunal-I/Hyderabad and numbered as I.D.No.113 of 2001. The Industrial Tribunal, by taking a lenient view by award dated 12.03.2004, set aside the removal order and directed reinstatement of the petitioner without continuity of service and without back wages. The petitioner was reinstated w.e.f. 07.07.2004 accordingly. (c) Since the petitioner was reinstated afresh, his seniority and service benefits are to be reckoned only from the date of reinstatement and not from the original appointment date. Moreover, the petitioner has approached this Court with a delay of nine years after the award of the Industrial Tribunal and therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents submits that since the petitioner committed serious cash and ticket irregularity on 03.05.1999, he was placed under suspension with effect from 10.05.1999 and after conducting a detailed enquiry, a show-cause notice of removal was issued to the petitioner on 28.07.1999. Thereafter, the 2 nd respondent passed the order dated 07.08.1999 imposing the punishment of removal from service and the same was confirmed by the appellate authority and the revisional authority. However, by award dated 12.03.2004, the Tribunal by taking a lenient view, set aside the removal order and directed reinstatement of the petitioner afresh without continuity of service and without back wages. Therefore, there are no merits in the writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. 7. This Court, having considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties, is of the considered view that a perusal of the record certain facts made it clear that the petitioner during his service, he was involved in various cash and ticket irregularity cases, for which, his increments were deferred for seven times, suspended three times, security deposit forfeited once and removed from service once. 8. 8. The above track record of the petitioner confirms that it is not a first case to consider his case. During his entire service, there are several irregularities and punishments were suffered by the petitioner. Even though, he doesn’t want to learn anything from his earlier mistakes and continued the same in the rest of his service also. As per the Tribunal Award, the allegations levelled against the petitioner are proved that he failed to give correct tickets and reissued used tickets. It is also established that the petitioner failed to complete the ticket issues within the fare stage. Ultimately, the Tribunal taken a lenient view and set aside the removal order dated 07.08.1999 and directed to reinstate the petitioner into service afresh without continuity of service and without back wages. The said award was passed by the Labour Court on 12.03.2004. After a lapse of nine years, the petitioner approached this Court questioning the award passed by the Tribunal. 9. In support of his contentions, learned Standing counsel for the 2 nd respondent relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in W.A.Nos.1660 of 2018 and 593 of 2016, dated 13.12.2021, wherein with regard to delay, while relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in KALWANT SINGH GILL Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB , [1991 Supp (1) SCC 504] the Full Bench held at para Nos.71 to 77 as follows :- 71. On the basis of the decisions of the Supreme Court, referred to above, the relevant considerations that may be taken into account in determining the issue of delay and laches may be summarized thus : (1) Though no period of limitation is prescribed for the writ Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or to file a writ petition, a person aggrieved should approach the Court without loss of time. In appropriate cases, where there is delay and the same has properly been explained with cogent reasons, Court may condone the delay as an exception to meet the ends of justice. In appropriate cases, where there is delay and the same has properly been explained with cogent reasons, Court may condone the delay as an exception to meet the ends of justice. But, it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. (2) Courts have evolved rules of self-imposed restraints or fetters where the High Court may not enquire into belated or stale claim and deny relief to a party if he is found guilty of laches. One who is tardy, not vigilant and does not seek intervention of the Court within a reasonable time from the date of accrual of cause of action or alleged violation of the constitutional, legal or other right, is not entitled to relief under Article 226. (3) No hard and fast rule can be laid down for universal application and every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (4) There is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its own facts. (5) There is no lower limit or upper limit and it will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose. (6) The principle on which the Court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because Court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners. (7) Where there is remiss or negligence on the part of a party approaching the Court for relief after an inordinate and unexplained delay, in such cases, it would not be proper to enforce the fundamental right. (7) Where there is remiss or negligence on the part of a party approaching the Court for relief after an inordinate and unexplained delay, in such cases, it would not be proper to enforce the fundamental right. As a general rule if there has been unreasonable delay the Court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party in exercise of the extraordinary power of mandamus. (8) There is no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction Court can take into account delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ Court. (9) Though the High Court in exercise of the power under Article 226 in its discretion grant relief in cases where the fundamental rights are violated, but, in such cases also, High Court, to meet the ends of justice, shall refuse to exercise its high prerogative jurisdiction in favour of a party who has been guilty of laches and where there are other relevant circumstances which indicate that it would be inappropriate to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction. (10) The maximum period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil Court must be brought may ordinarily taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. (11) If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Courts have applied the rule of delay with greater rigor in service matters. (12) The benefit of a judgment cannot be extended to a case automatically. The Court is entitled to take into consideration the fact as to whether the petitioner had chosen to sit over the matter and wake up after the decision of the Court if it is found that the petitioner approached the Court with unreasonable delay, the same may disentitle him to obtain a discretionary relief. Long delay disentitles a party to the discretionary relief under Articles 32 and 226 and persons who had slept over their rights for long and elected to wake up when they had the impetus from the judgment of similarly placed persons. Long delay disentitles a party to the discretionary relief under Articles 32 and 226 and persons who had slept over their rights for long and elected to wake up when they had the impetus from the judgment of similarly placed persons. (13) Where during the intervening period rights of third parties have crystallized, it would be inequitable to disturb those rights at the instance of a person who has approached the Court after long lapse of time and where there is no cogent explanation for the delay. (14) Where the appellate authority acting within its jurisdiction condoned the delay after being satisfied with the facts stated in relation thereto, the High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution should not ordinarily interfere with the order. 72. An analysis of the case law discussed above would amply make it clear that issue of a writ of a mandamus or certiorari is largely a matter of sound discretion and will not be granted if there is negligence or omission on the part of the person to assert his right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party. Therefore, burden lies on the workman who has to establish that in spite of his best efforts and diligence he was prevented from approaching the authority within the period of limitation provided for or the Writ Court within a reasonable period of time if the workman is not able to satisfactorily explain with cogent reasons for the delay he is not entitled to seek for condonation of the delay. It is true that the punishment imposed cannot be sustained in law because of the illegality crept in it in not conducting a prior enquiry. But, still the workman is under a statutory obligation to challenge the same within the time provided by the statutory rules or regulations or within a reasonable period of time before the writ Court if delay of 5 to 18 years is condoned for no reason or fault on the part of the authority, the proceedings which had attained finality are to be set aside. Setting aside of such order at a belated stage and allowing of a stale claim, may, as rightly held by the Division Bench in Esa Ali's case (supra), inspite the workman to seek for consequential benefits of promotion as well, in which event, the rights of the third parties would adversely be affected for no fault of theirs. A workman who is tardy and not diligent for years in availing a statutory remedy or in approaching the Court of law, in our view, cannot be encouraged or permitted to contend that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court the punishment cannot be sustained in law, therefore, delay to any extent is to be condoned automatically in exercise of the power conferred on the appellate or revisional authorities or by the writ Courts in exercise of the discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Courts can come to the aid of a person who is diligent and vigilant but unable to approach the authority or Court of law for redressal of his grievance in spite of his best efforts and reasons beyond his control but not to a person who is tardy and negligent or slept over the matter in availing the statutory or legal remedies. 73. No doubt in the present cases the punishment awarded cannot be sustained in law in view of the law aid down by the Supreme Court in Kulwant Singh Gill's case (supra) and in the light of the Regulations, but, a specific period having been prescribed in the Regulations of the Corporation, as stated earlier, the same need to be adhered to. The proviso under Regulation 23 empowers the appellate authority to entertain an appeal even after expiry of the period of limitation provided if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not submitting the appeal in time. A similar power may also be exercised under Regulation 29. If the authority is not satisfied with the explanation offered by the workman in challenging the orders of punishment, this Court, in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226, cannot interfere unless the conclusion arrived at by the authority that the explanation offered by the workman is not justified or germane or no prudent person would have come to such a conclusion. In appropriate cases where the appeal or revision is filed within a reasonable period of delay, it is always open to the appellate or revisional authority to condone the delay on valid explanation put forth by the workman in not approaching the authorities within the time specified, in which event, the writ Court should not interfere with the order. In our opinion, when Regulations provided a period of two months for filing an appeal and six months for a revision, delay of 5 to 18 years in approaching the authority would certainly be fatal to the case of a workman unless properly explained with cogent reasons. 74. It is true that in some cases where the delay is five years or so the Supreme Court inclined to condone the delay but under different circumstances when the fundamental rights are violated or where the delay is not directly attributable to the party seeking the relief or where the rights of the third parties are not intervened or in matters where seniority of employees is not finalized, the Court, would be justified to grant the relief; but not as a general rule of practice. Therefore, in our considered opinion, Kulwant Singh Gill's case (supra), does not confer or clothe an automatic right with the employee to challenge the order of the authority at any time or whenever he wishes. The principles laid down by the Apex Court governing the condonation of delay will certainly and equally have application even in cases where challenge is made to an order imposing the punishment contrary to the Regulations or the ratio in Kulwant Singh Gill's case (supra), where the employee had slept over the matter and had not chosen to challenge it within a reasonable period of time. It may also be noticed that in service matters, the Courts have applied the rule of delay with greater rigor. 75. We, therefore, agree with the view taken by the Division Bench in Sd. Esa Ali's case (supra). 76. We answer the reference accordingly. 77. As already noted, in some cases, it was urged that no orders are passed on the appeals or revisions filed by the petitioners. In the light of the conclusions drawn above, the writ appeal and the respective writ petitions are to be disposed of by the appropriate Benches. Esa Ali's case (supra). 76. We answer the reference accordingly. 77. As already noted, in some cases, it was urged that no orders are passed on the appeals or revisions filed by the petitioners. In the light of the conclusions drawn above, the writ appeal and the respective writ petitions are to be disposed of by the appropriate Benches. Registry may place the matters before the appropriate Benches for disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the principles laid down in this judgment." 10. With the above said observations of the Apex Court, it is clear that while condoning the delay under various circumstances, the Courts can follow the above observations and also observed that delay of five years or so, the Supreme Court inclined to condone the delay, but under different circumstances when the fundamental rights are violated or where the delay is not directly attributable to the party seeking the relief or where the rights of the third parties are not intervened or in matters where seniority of employees is not finalized, the Court, would be justified to grant the relief; but not as a general rule of practice. 11. In the case on hand, after passing the award by the Tribunal, the petitioner approached this Court after a lapse of nine years and the same cannot be considered and as per the above observations of the Apex Court, there is no violation of fundamental rights, there is no third party intervention and there is no affecting of seniority. So, the above said case is in favour of the respondent Corporation. 12. Accordingly, in view of the above observations of the Apex Court and the track record of the petitioner, his case cannot be considered on any angle and moreover, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition after a delay of nine years. Hence, this Court does not find any fault with the impugned award of the Tribunal and is not inclined to interfere with the same. 13. With the above said observations, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 14. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.