ORDER : 1. These two writ petitions raise an identical question relating to the validity of the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the Karnataka Housing Board (KHB) under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘LA Act, 1894’ for short). Since the nature of acquisition, the land involved, the publication of the declaration under Section 6 (1) and the contentions regarding limitation under Section 11A, are common, both petitions are taken up together and are disposed of by this common order. 2. The central issue for determination is “whether the award passed in each case was within the statutory period of two-y ears ‘from the last date of publication’ of the declaration under Section 6 (1), if not, whether the acquisition stands lapsed by operation of law under Section 11A of the LA Act, 1894.” Brief facts in W.P. 56476/2016: 3. The petitioners are owners of the converted residential properties forming part of developed land in Jigala/Lingapura Village, Kasaba Hobli, Anekal Taluk. The land had earlier been converted for non-agricultural residential use. A preliminary notification under Section 4 (1) was issued, followed by a declaration under Section 6 (1), which was published in Karnataka Gazette on 24.04.2008 and the corresponding newspaper publications were also issued. It is the case of the petitioners that no local publication was made in the Grama Panchayath or Chavadis. The award was passed on 05.05.2011. A notification under Section 16 (2) was later issued, and the compensation was deposited before the Reference Court in 2019. Facts in W.P. No.57600/2017: 4. The petitioners claim to be the residents of the same area and owners of the converted residential sites forming part of an approved layout. A preliminary notification under Section 4 (1) was issued, followed by a declaration under Section 6 (1), which was published in Karnataka Gazette on 09.11.2006. The declaration under Section 6 (1) was published in Vijaya Karnataka and Indusanje daily newspaper on 12.01.2007. The award was passed on 26.12.2008/11.02.2009 It is alleged that on 22.02.2012, 28.02.2012 and 12.04.2012, the RTI endorsements were issued stating that there were no records exist, evidencing publication. The award was passed on 05.05.2011. Section 16(2) notification was issued, and the compensation was deposited in 2019. 5. The award was passed on 26.12.2008/11.02.2009 It is alleged that on 22.02.2012, 28.02.2012 and 12.04.2012, the RTI endorsements were issued stating that there were no records exist, evidencing publication. The award was passed on 05.05.2011. Section 16(2) notification was issued, and the compensation was deposited in 2019. 5. Heard Smt. B.V. Vidyulatha, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Harisha A.S., learned counsel for respondent No.1, Sri H.L. Pradeep Kumar, learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3 in W.P. No.57600/2017 and Sri Venkatesh P. Dalwai, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Basavaraj Sabarad, learned senior counsel for Sri Ravindhra H.T., learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2 and Sri Harisha A.S., learned counsel for respondent No.3 in W.P. No.56476/2016. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P. No.57600/2017 submits that the award dated 05.05.2011 was passed beyond two-years from the last valid date of publication of the Section 6 (1) declaration which according to them is 05.07.2008, thereby rendering the entire acquisition automatically lapsed under Section 11A of the LA Act, 1894. It is contended that the alleged publication on 06.05.2009 in the Grama Panchayath and the Chavadi never took place, and reliance is placed upon the RTI replies from Bidaraguppe Panchayath and the Village Accountant, Jigalavruta confirming that no records exist, about the issuance of such publication. It is urged that the date of publication shown as ’06.05.2009’, was fabricated and inserted in the award with a mala fide intention to bring the award within two-years and thereby, avoid lapse. It is contended that the KHB has never taken possession, no mahazar was drawn, and the petitioners continue to remain in lawful possession. Hence, it is asserted that the acquisition has lapsed. 7. Learned senior counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2 submits the declaration under Section 6 (1) of the LA Act, 1894 was duly and validly published through all the statutorily mandated modes. It is contended that the final notification under Section 6 (1) was published in Vijay Karnataka daily newspaper and in the Indusanje daily newspaper on 12.01.2007. Further, the local publication was affected by affixture in chavadi of Lingapura Village on 15.02.2007 as well as in the chavadis of Marasur Village and Hinnakki Village and also on the notice boards of the Deputy Commissioner's Office, Assistant Commissioner's Office, Anekal Taluk, Sub-Registrar's Office, Anekal Taluk and Grama Panchayath Office on 25.01.2007. Further, the local publication was affected by affixture in chavadi of Lingapura Village on 15.02.2007 as well as in the chavadis of Marasur Village and Hinnakki Village and also on the notice boards of the Deputy Commissioner's Office, Assistant Commissioner's Office, Anekal Taluk, Sub-Registrar's Office, Anekal Taluk and Grama Panchayath Office on 25.01.2007. It is further stated that the declaration was affixed in the BDA's office on 27.01.2007. It is the submission that the award under Section 11 was passed on 26.12.2008, which is well within the two-year limitation when computed from the latest date of publication. A notification under Section 16(2) was thereafter published evidencing that possession was taken on 15.10.2011, and that the land in question has since been developed and sites allotted including formation of roads. Reliance is placed on the judgments on: i. Bihar State Housing Board Vs. State of Bihar and others , AIR 2003 SC 3817 (Bihar State Housing Board) ii. M. Nanjunda Reddy Vs. The State of Karnataka , W.P. No. 19807/2014 dated 19.08.2024 (M. Nanjunda Reddy) 8. To emphasize that the limitation period must be computed from the last date of publication of the declaration. Further, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Special Land Acquisition Officer and another Vs. Suresh Jugaraj and others , W.A. No. 952/2018 dated 19.04.2021 (Suresh Jugaraj), which holds that the gazette notification, paper publication and local publications are mandatory and that the relevant date is the latest of such publications. 9. On the issue of delay and laches, reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sawaran Lata and others Vs. State of Haryana and others , (2010) 4 SCC 532 (Sawaran Lata) to contend that belated challenges to acquisition proceedings must be rejected. As regards the plea of non-service of notice, they rely on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka and others Vs. Narasimhamurthy and others , (1995) 5 SCC 524 (Narasimhamurthy), holding that non-service of notice does not vitiate the acquisition. Further, reliance is placed in the case of M/s. Ahuja Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Karnataka and others , AIR 2003 SC 3519 (M/s. Ahuja Industries Ltd.,) to contend that the Collector/SLAO is not required to conduct a roving enquiry into title disputes at the acquisition stage. Further, reliance is placed in the case of M/s. Ahuja Industries Ltd. Vs. State of Karnataka and others , AIR 2003 SC 3519 (M/s. Ahuja Industries Ltd.,) to contend that the Collector/SLAO is not required to conduct a roving enquiry into title disputes at the acquisition stage. It is therefore asserted that the acquisition is valid, possession was taken and no lapse has occurred. 10. With regard to the contentions of the respondents’ concerning the local publication of Section 6(1) declaration in Jigla, Giddenahalli and Yedavanahalli Grama Panchayat offices and Village Chavadis, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that it is wholly unsubstantiated. They rely upon the endorsements dated 22.02.2012, 28.02.2012 and 12.04.2012 issued by the jurisdictional Grama Panchayat and Village Accountant, which categorically state that no record whatsoever exists regarding such publication. It is submitted that the respondents have not produced any corroborative proof that the declarations were ever affixed on or before 06.05.2009 and it is therefore contended that the valid date of publication must be treated as 05.07.2008 and not 06.05.2009, as asserted by the respondents. Consequently, under Section 11A of the LA Act, 1894, the award ought to have been passed on or before 04.07.2010. Instead, the award was passed only on 05.05.2011, i.e., well beyond the statutory two-year period, resulting in the acquisition automatically lapsing by operation of law. 11. It is further averred by the petitioners in W.P. No.57600/2017 that the subsequent deposit of compensation under Section 77 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (‘Act, 2013’ for short) on 18.06.2019 and the issuance of 16 (2) notification after the lapse cannot revive the acquisition, as the Act contains no mechanism for revival of a lapsed acquisition, except through a fresh notification. 12. Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Urban Improvement Trust Vs. Smt. Vidhya Devi and others, Civil Appeal No. 14473/2024 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12116/2010) wherein the Apex Court held that the right to property is not merely a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right, and the time is of the essence in the determination and payment of compensation. Delay would amount to a violation of Article 300A of the Constitution. 13. Delay would amount to a violation of Article 300A of the Constitution. 13. Further, reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ultra-Tech Cement Limited Vs. Mast Ram and others , 2024 SCC Online SC 2598 (Ultra-Tech Cement) and on Dahyabhai Ranchhoddas Dhobi and another Vs. State of Gujarat and others , AIR 2010 SC 3006 (Dahyabhai Ranchhoddas) to submit that the acts performed by the State after a statutory lapse cannot breath life into an illegal acquisition. 14. It is further submitted that the land in W.P. No.57600/2017 has been converted for non-agricultural residential use on 24.02.1996 and that any enquiry into the conversion or ownership was unnecessary. In the entire enquiry, only around 100 allottees were ever involved, demonstrating that the acquisition was unnecessary, arbitrary, and unsustainable. 15. Learned counsel appearing for the respondentS in W.P. No.57600/2013 reiterates the very stand taken by the learned senior counsel, submitting that the acquisition proceedings has been fully complied with in terms of statutory publication and procedural requirements. It is asserted that the KHB has produced a mahazar dated 06.05.2009 evidencing the local publication and affixture under Section 6 (1) declaration in the Village Chavadi and other public places, as mandated under the Act. On the strength of this mahazar, it is contended that 06.05.2009 must be treated as the ‘last date of publication’ for the purpose of computing the limitation under Section 11A and therefore, the award passed subsequently was within time and the acquisition did not lapse. In support of his submission, reliance is also placed on the decision of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others , (1996) 11 SCC 501 (Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay) to contend that once a due publication of the declaration is demonstrated and the possession is shown to have been taken as per the records, the acquisition stands protected and cannot be reopened on mere procedural allegations or technical grounds. It is submitted that the production of mahazar dated 06.05.2009, coupled with the legal principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment, completely negates the petitioners’ contention regarding non-publication and alleged lapse of acquisition. 16. It is submitted that the production of mahazar dated 06.05.2009, coupled with the legal principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment, completely negates the petitioners’ contention regarding non-publication and alleged lapse of acquisition. 16. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the points that arise for consideration are: “i. Whether the declaration under Section 6 (1) of the LA Act, 1894 was validly and duly published in three statutory modes, namely, the official gazette, newspaper and the local publication and what is the ‘last date of publication’ for the purpose of computing limitation under Section 11A? ii. Whether the publication allegedly affected at the Grama Panchayath offices and the Village Chavadies as claimed by the respondents and supported by the Mahazar dated 06.05.2009, is established through admissible and contemporaneous records or whether the RTI endorsements produced by the petitioners disprove such publications, are to be accepted? iii. Whether an award passed on 05.05.2011 in W.P. No.56476/2016 and on 11.02.2009/26.12.2008 in W.P. No.57600/2017 was within the mandatory period of two-years stipulated under Section 11A of the LA Act, 1894 or whether the acquisition stood lapsed by operation of law due to the expiry of the statutory period? iv. Whether the writ petitions suffer from delay and laches and if so, whether such delay is fatal in the context of an acquisition alleged to have lapsed by the operation of law under Section 11? v. Whether the petitioners are entitled to a declaration that acquisition has lapsed and consequently, whether the preliminary and final notification are liable to be quashed insofar as their sites are concerned?” 17. The undisputed facts are that the petitioners’ land/sites were included in the acquisition proceedings initiated by the KHB under the LA Act, 1894. A preliminary notification was issued under Section 4 (1) On 14.06.2006 in W.P. No.56476/2016 and 28.04.2005 in W.P. No.57600/2017, final notification on 15.03.2008 in W.P. No.56476/2016 and published in Official Gazette on 24.04.2008 in W.P. No.56476/2016 and the final notification on 12.01.2007 and 31.07.2007 in W.P. No.57600/2017, award was passed in W.P. No.56476/2016 on 05.05.2011 and on 26.12.2008/11.02.2009 in W.P. No.57600/2017. 18. The publication in the official gazette was carried out for Section 6(1) of the declaration in both writ petitions. RTI replies dated 22.02.2012, 28.02.2012 and 12.04.2012 from the Grama Panchayath and the Village Accountant, state that no record exists of local publication of the Section 6 (1) declaration. 18. The publication in the official gazette was carried out for Section 6(1) of the declaration in both writ petitions. RTI replies dated 22.02.2012, 28.02.2012 and 12.04.2012 from the Grama Panchayath and the Village Accountant, state that no record exists of local publication of the Section 6 (1) declaration. A mahazar was drawn claiming local publication and affixture. The petitioners’ lands have been converted to non-agricultural residential use and form part of an approved residential land. While the respondents rely upon the mahazar dated 06.05.2009, there is no supporting contemporary panchayat records to evidence the publication in the official gazette of publication at the Grama Panchayat, Chavadi and this is affirmed by the RTI replies, which record that no such publications have been issued, while the mahazar evidences publication and affixture on 06.05.2009. 19. The Apex Court, in the case of Kunwar Pal Singh (Dead) by LRs. Vs. State of U.P. and others , (2007) 5 SCC 85 (Kunwar Pal Singh), has held that the publication of notification under Sections 4 and 6 must satisfy all three modes prescribed: i. Gazette notification; ii. Publication in two newspapers iii. Public Notice/Local Proclamation. 20. The relevant date for computing limitation is the ‘latest of the three Publications’ and the State must prove that all the three mode's have been complied with. 21. In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and another vs. Makrand Singh and others , (1995) 2 SCC 497 , it is held that mere preparation or making a declaration is not sufficient. Publication in the official gazette completes the declaration. But the computation of limitation must consider all modes of publication including local notice. 22. In Dahyabhai Ranchhoddas’s case stated supra, the Apex Court held that the two-year period under Section 11A runs from the last date of publication of the declaration and if the award is not passed within two years, the acquisition automatically lapses and is held at paragraph No.14 as under: “14. In Eugenio Misquita and others vs. State of Goa and others, (1997) 8 SCC 47 , similar issue was considered by this Court. K. Venkataswami, J. speaking for the Bench has concluded as follows: (SCC pp. 52 & 57, paras 9-11 & 16-17) “9. xxx 17. In Eugenio Misquita and others vs. State of Goa and others, (1997) 8 SCC 47 , similar issue was considered by this Court. K. Venkataswami, J. speaking for the Bench has concluded as follows: (SCC pp. 52 & 57, paras 9-11 & 16-17) “9. xxx 17. In the light of the law laid down by this Court, we have no hesitation to hold that the declaration published under Section 6 of the Act was well within one year and the challenge to the same has been rightly rejected by the High Court. However, the view taken in the judgment of the High Court under appeal that the relevant date for reckoning the period of limitation will be the date of making of the declaration under Section 6, may not be correct. As held in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti case mere making of declaration is not enough. The making of declaration under Section 6 is complete for the purpose of clauses (i) and (ii) of the first proviso to Section 6(1) when it is published in the Official Gazette.” After holding so, since the Notification under Section 4 was lastly published on 06.08.1992 in the Official Gazette and declaration under Section 6 was published in the Gazette on 05.08.1993, this Court found that the same is well within one year and accordingly dismissed the appeal of the landowners.” 23. The Apex Court in the case of Smt. Vidhya Devi has held that the right of property is a human right. Delay in compensation or deficiency in publication amounts to violation of Article 300A and placing reliance on the Ultra-Tech Cement, held at paragraph Nos.69 and 70 as under : “69. This Court in the case of Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd. v. Mast Ram , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2598 has held that the right to property is to be considered not only a constitutional or statutory right but also a human right and therefore, time is of the essence in determination and payment of compensation by the State, otherwise there would be a breach of Article 300A of the Constitution. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced below: "46. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced below: "46. This Court has held in Dharnidhar Mishra (D) and Another v. State of Bihar and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 932 and State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404 that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right . This Court held in Tukaram Kana Joshi and Ors. thr. Power of Attorney Holder v. M.I.D.C. and Ors., (2013) 1 SCC 353 that in a welfare State, the statutory authorities are legally bound to pay adequate compensation and rehabilitate the persons whose lands are being acquired. The non-fulfilment of such obligations under the garb of industrial development, is not permissible for any welfare State as that would tantamount to uprooting a person and depriving them of their constitutional/human right. 47. That time is of the essence in determination and payment of compensation is also evident from this Court's judgment in Kukreja Construction Company & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2547 wherein it has been held that once the compensation has been determined, the same is payable immediately without a requirement of any representation or request by the landowners and a duty is cast on the State to pay such compensation to the land losers, otherwise there would be a breach of Article 300-A of the Constitution. 48. In the present case, the Government of Himachal Pradesh as a welfare State ought to have proactively intervened in the matter with a view to ensure that the requisite amount towards compensation is paid at the earliest. The State cannot abdicate its constitutional and statutory responsibility of payment of compensation by arguing that its role was limited to initiating acquisition proceedings under the MOU signed between the Appellant, JAL and itself. We find that the delay in the payment of compensation to the landowners after taking away ownership of the subject land from them is in contravention to the spirit of the constitutional scheme of Article 300A and the idea of a welfare State 49. Acquisition of land for public purpose is undertaken under the power of eminent domain of the government much against the wishes of the owners of the land which gets acquired. Acquisition of land for public purpose is undertaken under the power of eminent domain of the government much against the wishes of the owners of the land which gets acquired. When such a power is exercised, it is coupled with a bounden duty and obligation on the part of the government body to ensure that the owners whose lands get acquired are paid compensation/awarded amount as declared by the statutory award at the earliest. 70. This Court has also held in the case of N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15 SCC 517 that: "21. If a right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300 A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300 A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed . [See: Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627 ]" (Emphasis supplied) 24. The Gazette publication is not disputed. Both parties admit the gazette publication, and the multiple dates of newspaper publication are also admitted. The respondents rely solely on the mahazar dated 06.05.2009. However, the Grama Panchayath and the Village Accountant have issued RTI endorsements stating that no such record exists regarding the alleged publication. The respondents have not produced any panchayat register, dispatch register, official diary, or any contemporaneous record of publication. Therefore, the mahazar cannot override the official records, and the burden of proof mandated under Kunwar Pal Singh has not been discharged. 25. The last date of publication ‘must be taken as the date of newspaper/gazette notification, i.e., 05.07.2008’. Consequently, the mandatory period prescribed under Section 11A expired on 04.07.2010. As stated supra, the acquisition has lapsed. There is no material to the contrary, and the points framed for consideration are answered accordingly and this Court pass the following: ORDER: i. The writ petitions are allowed. ii. It is hereby declared that the acquisition proceedings initiated against the petitioners' lands have lapsed under Section 11A of the LA Act, 1894. Consequently, the preliminary and the final notification insofar as they relate to the petitioners’ property are quashed . Any subsequent proceedings are also set aside. iii. ii. It is hereby declared that the acquisition proceedings initiated against the petitioners' lands have lapsed under Section 11A of the LA Act, 1894. Consequently, the preliminary and the final notification insofar as they relate to the petitioners’ property are quashed . Any subsequent proceedings are also set aside. iii. Liberty is reserved to the respondents to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings, if so advised, in accordance with law.