ORDER : This Crl.M.C. under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'Cr.P.C.' hereinafter) has been filed by the petitioners, who are accused Nos.1 to 3 in C.C.No.2698/2021, arising out of Crime No.291/2021 of Varkala Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent/defacto complainant. Also heard the learned Public Prosecutor in detail. Perused the case diary and the statement of the witnesses. Perused the decision of the Apex Court in xxxx v. xxxx in Crl.Appeal No.416/2020 dated 24.04.2020 placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 3. In this matter, as on 29.01.2021, FIR was registered on the allegation that accused Nos.1 to 3, who are the husband and parents of the husband, committed offence punishable under Section 498A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC' hereinafter). The allegation in the FIR is to the effect that the 1st accused, who married the defacto complainant on 22.04.2011, while the defacto complainant was staying along with the 1st accused and her parents at the matrimonial home subjected her to cruelty on the allegation that she did not have required beauty and also the dowry given was insufficient. Demand for Rs.10 lakh as dowry is another allegation. Later, the husband went to Sharjah and when the defacto complainant joined him in Sharjah, there the cruelty had been continued. On investigation, final report filed alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC by accused Nos.1 to 3. 4. While assailing the final report, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners mainly contending that the ingredients to attract offence under Section 498A are not made out in the instant case. It is further submitted that in this matter, the First Information Statement (FIS) is the one and only statement given by the defacto complainant. On perusal of the same, the allegation in the first part is that, at the time of marriage on 22.04.2011, the parents of the defacto complainant had given 100 sovereigns of gold ornaments and on the date of the marriage itself, those gold ornaments were taken away by the father, mother and sister-in-law of the 1st accused. On perusal of the same, the allegation in the first part is that, at the time of marriage on 22.04.2011, the parents of the defacto complainant had given 100 sovereigns of gold ornaments and on the date of the marriage itself, those gold ornaments were taken away by the father, mother and sister-in-law of the 1st accused. Again, there is allegation that later the parents of the 1st accused used to say stabby words to the effect that the defacto complainant did not have sufficient beauty, and the money and gold ornaments given were insufficient, and also the 1st accused could have obtained a beautiful wife. The further allegation is that they also demanded Rs.10 lakh more as dowry, and if not, the 1st accused would marry another lady. There is further allegation that demanding more dowry, the defacto complainant was subjected to mental and physical harassment. 5. The second part of the FIS would recite, in continuation of the earlier versions that, after three months, the 1st accused went abroad. The further allegation is that during January, 2016, the 1st accused went abroad and hesitated to return, and the defacto complainant and her child along with her mother, went to gulf. When the 1st accused neglected her, she lodged a complaint before the Indian Association, Sharjah and also lodged a complaint before the Family Court, Shariah, Sharjah. At present, the defacto complainant has been admittedly residing at the house in Cherunniyoor, in view of the protection order granted by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Paravur. 6. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the allegations against accused Nos.2 and 3 are immediately after the marriage in the year 2011 and prior to 2016. Therefore, the first part of the allegation specifically against the petitioners is barred by limitation. In support of his contention, the learned counsel placed decision in xxxx's case (supra) with reference to paragraphs 12 and 13, where the Apex Court held as under; 12. After considering the decisions of this Court rendered in Vanka Radhamanohari v. Vanka Venkata Reddy (1993) 3 SCC 4 and Arun Vyas v. Anita Vyas (1999) 4 SCC 690 , and the decisions of the High Court of Delhi in Asha Ahuja v. Rajesh Ahuja 2003 (68) DRJ 437 and S. K. Bhalla v. State of NCT of Delhi 2010 SCC OnLine Del 4384, the High Court held as under: “……….. 11. As noted above, the allegations of the complainant are of harassment by the petitioners No. 1 and 2 i.e. the husband and the mother-in-law. Admittedly the respondent No.2 and petitioner No.1 are living separately since June 10, 2009 and there is no material to show that due to reconciliatory measures or for what reason the respondent No.2 failed to file the complaint on which the afore-noted FIR was registered till 28th January, 2013, i.e. beyond the period of limitation of three years. Thus there being no justification for the delay in filing the complaint beyond the period of limitation and there being no allegation that the physical and mental harassment continued against respondent No.2 beyond June 10, 2009, petitioners No.1 and 2 are not liable to be proceeded under Section 498-A IPC. However, as noted above, Section 406 IPC is a continuing offence and every day of non-return of the stridhan articles would give fresh cause of action. Admittedly, after the registration of the FIR petitioner No.1 sought to return certain stridhan articles thereby fortifying the claim of breach of trust. However, one of the necessary ingredients for offence punishable under Section 406 IPC is entrustment and the complainant alleges entrustment of stridhan articles to petitioner No.2 and not petitioner No.1. 12. Thus, this Court finds no ground to quash the FIR in question against petitioner No.2 for offence punishable under Section 406 IPC or the proceedings thereto.” 13. As regards, the finding recorded by the High Court in respect of complaint/FIR filed under Section 498A IPC, we are of the firm opinion that the same does not call for interference. In the facts of this case, it is clear that the FIR filed in this regard in 2015 was time barred, having been filed much more than three years after the separation of xxxx (husband) and xxxx (wife) and the filing of the divorce petition by the husband, both in 2009. In the facts of the case, the reasons given by the High Court for quashing the proceedings under section 498A IPC are justified and do not call for interference by this Court. 7. In the facts of the case, the reasons given by the High Court for quashing the proceedings under section 498A IPC are justified and do not call for interference by this Court. 7. In the said case, the Apex Court quashed the FIR registered for the offence under Section 498A of IPC, finding that the complaint was barred by limitation and the FIR for the offence under Section 406 of IPC for want of prosecution materials to substantiate the said offence, prima facie. 8. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the defacto complainant that in the first part of the complaint, there are allegations as discussed hereinabove, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Therefore, the same itself would make the offence, prima facie, warranting trial. It is also pointed out that though the occurrence after 2016 happened in Sharjah, the same is continuation of the earlier allegations. Therefore, the complaint is not barred by limitation. In response to the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the allegations prior to 2016 are beyond the period of three years and therefore cognizance for the said allegations barred by limitation, the learned counsel for the defacto complainant argued that the allegations are continuous in between 2011 to 2021, therefore, limitation doesn't arise. 9. The learned Public Prosecutor also supported the argument of the learned counsel for the defacto complainant. 10. In the instant case, the one and only statement recorded as that of the defacto complainant is dated 29.01.2021, in fact, the same led to registration of the FIR. In the FIR, it is pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the occurrence is generally classified into two parts, one prior to January, 2016 and the other after January, 2016 till 2021. 11. Section 468 of Cr.P.C. deals with bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation and it has been provided as under; (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. 11. Section 468 of Cr.P.C. deals with bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation and it has been provided as under; (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be— (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. (3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment. 12. Section 469 Cr.P.C. deals with commencement of the period of limitation and the same reads as under; (1) The period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence,— (a) on the date of the offence; or (b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or (c) where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier. (2) In computing the said period, the day from which such period is to be computed shall be excluded. 13. Reading Sections 468 and 469, it appears that as per Section 468(2)(c), the period of limitation in respect of offences is three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. 14. Section 498A is an offence for which the punishment provided is a term which may extend to three years, and shall also liable to fine. Therefore, Section 468(2(c) has application, when the offence alleged is one under Section 498A of IPC. 15. 14. Section 498A is an offence for which the punishment provided is a term which may extend to three years, and shall also liable to fine. Therefore, Section 468(2(c) has application, when the offence alleged is one under Section 498A of IPC. 15. Section 469(1)(a) provides that the period of limitation in relation to an offence shall commence on the date of the offence, subject to the conditions provided in Section 469(1)(b) and (c) and (2). 16. On reading the FIS, it is clear that the first part of the allegations against accused Nos.1 to 3 are in between 2011 to 2015 and second part of the allegations after 2016 specifically raised against the 1st accused alone; and the same are occurrences in Sharjah and not in India. It is a settled law that, in order to proceed with the trial of the offence committed outside India, sanction as provided under Section 188 of Cr.P.C. is mandatory. 17. In the decision reported in [ 2024 KHC 482 ] : [2024 LiveLaw (Ker) 358] Darvin Dominic v. State of Kerala, this Court considered the impact of Section 188 Cr.P.C. and in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11, this Court summarised the legal principle as under; 9. Reading Section 188 Cr.P.C., it provides that when an offence is committed outside India- (a) by a citizen of India, whether on the high seas or elsewhere; or (b) by a person, not being the citizen, on any ship or aircraft registered in India, the offender may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it had been committed at any place within India at which he may be found. Proviso to Section 188 Cr.P.C. stipulates that no such offence shall be inquired into or tried in India except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. 10. In a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Sartaj Khan . tate of Uttarakhand (2022 LiveLaw (SC) 321, 2022 (2) : KHC 846 : 2023 Cr.LJ. 441 held that if the offence was not committed in its entirety, outside India, the matter would not come within the scope of Section 188 Cr.P.C. and there is no necessity of any sanction as mandated by the proviso to Section 188. 11. tate of Uttarakhand (2022 LiveLaw (SC) 321, 2022 (2) : KHC 846 : 2023 Cr.LJ. 441 held that if the offence was not committed in its entirety, outside India, the matter would not come within the scope of Section 188 Cr.P.C. and there is no necessity of any sanction as mandated by the proviso to Section 188. 11. Thus, while analysing what are the cases for which proviso to Section 188 of Cr.P.C. would apply, it is held that when an offence is committed outside India- (a) by a citizen of India, whether on the high seas or elsewhere; or (b) by a person, not being the citizen, on any ship or aircraft registered in India, the offender may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it had been committed at any place within India at which he may be found, where proviso to Section 188 of Cr.P.C. would apply and in such cases, previous sanction of the Central Government is necessary. At the same time, if part of the overt acts or at least one instance among the overt acts alleged to be committed in India, sanction under Section 188 of Cr.P.C. is not necessary in such cases. 18. So, in cases where part of the overt acts, or at least one instance among the overt acts alleged to be committed in India, sanction under Section 188 of Cr.P.C. is not necessary in such cases. In the instant case, reading the FIS, which would throw light on the prosecution allegations, as already pointed out, the allegations generally seen raised in the first instance in between 22.04.2011 till the end of the year 2015 and the second part alleged against the 1st accused/1st petitioner starts from January, 2016 and upto 2021. Insofar as the allegations against 2nd and 3rd accused are concerned, no allegations starting from January, 2016 could be gathered in a case where this FIR was lodged on 29.01.2021, after a period of three years from the last occurrence. Thus it emerges that the cognizance of the offence under Section 498A against 2nd and 3rd accused is barred by limitation. Therefore, the quashment prayer at their instance would succeed. 19. Thus it emerges that the cognizance of the offence under Section 498A against 2nd and 3rd accused is barred by limitation. Therefore, the quashment prayer at their instance would succeed. 19. Coming to the allegation against the 1st accused, it seems that from the very beginning, starting from the date of the marriage, there were allegations against the 1st accused and the allegations in between 22.04.2011 till January, 2016 occurred in India, while the remaining portion after January, 2016 occurred in Sharjah. Therefore, the allegations against the 1st accused are continuing and the last allegation was raised within three years and therefore, it could not be held that cognizance against the 1st accused/1st petitioner is barred by limitation in view of the bar under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. In similar way, when the allegations against the 1st accused/1st petitioner are taken together, the first part occurred in India and the later part occurred in Sharjah. Therefore, sanction under Section 188 of Cr.P.C. also not required. Since the overt acts taken together would justify prima facie commission of offence under Section 498A by the 1st accused, quashment on merits at his instance also is liable to fail. 20. In view of the said finding, it is held that the quashment prayer at the instance of accused Nos.2 and 3 is liable to succeed and the same at the option of the 1st petitioner/1st accused is liable to fail. 21. In the result, this Crl.M.C. stands allowed in part. The proceedings against accused Nos.2 and 3 stand quashed while quashment sought for by the 1st petitioner/1st accused stands dismissed, directing him to face trial and raise his contentions before the trial court. 22. The interim stay in this matter stands vacated. Registry shall forward a copy of this order to the trial court for information and further steps.