ORDER : NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J. Petitioner-Bhakta Mandali challenges proceedings dated 31.03.1990 issued by the 2 nd Respondent-Commissioner of Endowments, permitting the 4 th Respondent-Temple to enter into a compromise with private parties, namely the predecessors of Respondents 5 to 8, with the consequence that approximately 1,000 square yards of temple land would be parted with. Although the said proceedings were later cancelled by Government Memo dated 09.05.2002, that cancellation was set aside by this Court in Writ Petition No. 8707 of 2002, resulting in revival of the original compromise proceedings. The 4th Respondent-Temple is presently taking steps to implement them. During the pendency of the matter, Respondents 9 to 11 were impleaded as per orders dated 23.12.2024 in W.P.M.P. No. 41436 of 2014, and subsequently Respondents 12 to 14 were impleaded as per orders dated 08.04.2022 in I.A. No. 1 of 2018, all of whom have a stake in the property and are accordingly, affected parties whose presence was found necessary for proper adjudication. 2. The case of petitioner is that the proposed implementation of compromise sanctioned under Proceedings dated 31.03.1990 would inevitably lead to alienation of temple property which, according to petitioner, already stands declared by this Court in C.C.C.A. No. 36 of 1982 as belonging entirely to the 4 th Respondent-Temple to the extent of 2,700 square yards. Petitioner points out that civil appeal conclusively held that the entire 5 Bams of land, equal to 2,700 square yards is temple land and cannot be claimed or enjoyed by private individuals including unofficial respondents or their predecessors. 2.1. It is further stated, as on date, no litigation whatsoever is pending concerning the subject temple property. Petitioner specifically highlights that O.A. No. 36 of 1987 filed by the private parties was withdrawn on 23.03.1996, while C.C.C.A.No. 36 of 1982 filed before this Court was dismissed on 29.11.1995. Therefore, any compromise purportedly approved under Section 89 of Act 30 of 1987 cannot be implemented in the absence of a pending proceeding. Petitioner asserts that compromise has thus become infructuous in law and unenforceable. On this basis, petitioner states that present Writ Petition has been instituted solely to prevent execution of impugned proceedings dated 31.03.1990, which, if acted upon, would adversely affect temple property of considerable public importance. Petitioner asserts that compromise has thus become infructuous in law and unenforceable. On this basis, petitioner states that present Writ Petition has been instituted solely to prevent execution of impugned proceedings dated 31.03.1990, which, if acted upon, would adversely affect temple property of considerable public importance. It is emphasized that this writ is filed to protect, preserve and safeguard the sanctity and integrity of the temple lands belonging to the 4th Respondent-Institution. 2.2. Petitioner, in its affidavit, further states in detail that impugned proceedings were issued without recording any reasons whatsoever. According to petitioner, the 2 nd Respondent mechanically permitted a compromise touching valuable temple land without undertaking any independent verification, inquiry, or examination of the relevant records. It is asserted that proceedings were issued in a routine and mechanical fashion, contrary to the statutory duties of the Commissioner. Petitioner specifically contends that, while exercising power under Section 89 of Act 30 of 1987, the 2 nd Respondent failed to exercise due care, caution and diligence. The Commissioner erroneously proceeded on the assumption that extent of 5 Bams of land pertaining to temple is only 900 square yards. The correct extent of 5 Bams, as recognized in civil proceedings is 2,700 square yards. This fundamental error, according to petitioner, demonstrates total non-application of mind by the Commissioner approving an arrangement that directly affects the endowment property. 2.3. Petitioner further states that the compromise sanctioned by the impugned order is in direct conflict with the binding civil judgment rendered by this Court in C.C.C.A. No. 36 of 1982. In the said civil appeal, the rights of the parties were finally adjudicated and it was held that the entire 5 Bams of land equivalent to 2,700 square yards forms part of the temple property and consequently, no private party, including respondents, can claim any right, title or interest therein. It is asserted, impugned compromise, which proposes to part with about 1,000 square yards of such temple land, is inconsistent with and violative of the binding findings of this Court. It is also stated, Section 89 of Act 30 of 1987 contemplates approval of a compromise only when a suit, application, or appeal relating to the property of a religious institution is actually pending before a court or authority. Since no such proceeding is pending at present, the statutory requirement for invoking Section 89 is not satisfied. It is also stated, Section 89 of Act 30 of 1987 contemplates approval of a compromise only when a suit, application, or appeal relating to the property of a religious institution is actually pending before a court or authority. Since no such proceeding is pending at present, the statutory requirement for invoking Section 89 is not satisfied. Petitioner therefore, maintains that the impugned compromise cannot survive the finality attained in previous litigation and is legally inoperative. 2.4. Petitioner emphasizes that even assuming the compromise had any validity in 1990, it has become infructuous in view of the final civil adjudication and closure of all the related proceedings. Therefore, the compromise cannot be revived or implemented after the disputes stood settled before competent fora. Petitioner stresses that temple lands constitute public trust property meant for the benefit of devotees and for the performance of religious functions. It is asserted, such property cannot be alienated or parted with in favour of private individuals, particularly when such alienation is prohibited under law and inconsistent with the public purpose for which the temple exists. Petitioner specifically points out that implementation of compromise would cause an immediate loss of approximately 1,000 square yards of temple property resulting in prejudice to the temple and its beneficiaries. It is contended that permitting respondents to derive benefit from such a compromise would not only violate statutory protections but also undermine the interests of worshippers, devotees, and the general public. Petitioner therefore urges this Court to intervene, contending that impugned proceedings have serious public consequences and pose a threat to the integrity of the endowment. Petitioner states, Writ Petition has been filed bona fide and in the larger interest of the religious institution to prevent erosion or dissipation of its immovable properties. 3. Respondent No. 5 submits that the present Writ Petition is wholly not maintainable and amounts to abuse of process of law. It is stated, petitioner was constituted only in 2006 and that Writ Petition filed in 2009, suffers from gross and unexplained delay, having been instituted nearly 19 years after issuance of the impugned proceedings. According to him, such belated invocation of writ jurisdiction clearly reveals the mala fide intention of the petitioner. It is asserted that subject land originally belonged to Omkarnath Amba Prasad Brahmachari, who installed Hanuman idol and was performing daily rituals during his lifetime. According to him, such belated invocation of writ jurisdiction clearly reveals the mala fide intention of the petitioner. It is asserted that subject land originally belonged to Omkarnath Amba Prasad Brahmachari, who installed Hanuman idol and was performing daily rituals during his lifetime. It is contended, petitioner's assertion that land was granted to one Kolla Venkamma is false, incorrect and unsupported by any material. It is contended, there is no evidence on record to substantiate petitioner's claim that temple or the land was ever associated with Kolla Venkamma. 3.1. It is further contended that registration of the institution under the Endowments Act was undertaken solely to safeguard the temple and that inclusion of family's residential portion in the records of the endowment was an accidental and inadvertent mistake. This error came to light only when attempts were made to dispossess the family from their residential houses. It is also stated, the compromise forming the subject matter of the impugned proceedings was arrived at during a statutory inquiry conducted by the competent authorities. It is maintained that validity of the said compromise was already upheld by this Court in Writ Petition No. 6687 of 1990 and the subsequent order of this Court in Writ Petition No. 8707 of 2002 effectively directed implementation of the compromise, thereby giving it finality. 3.2. This respondent disputes petitioner's reliance on the judgment in C.C.C.A. No. 36 of 1982, contending that the said judgment was concerned only with determining whether the institution was a temple or a math. According to them, the said judgment did not determine the extent of 5 Bams of land nor did it examine the validity or effect of the compromise approved by the Commissioner on 31.03.1990. 4. Respondents 6 to 8 state that the earlier writ proceedings, including Writ Petition No. 6687 of 1990, have already upheld the impugned proceedings and that the present Writ Petition amounts to an impermissible attempt to reopen and re-agitate issues that have long attained finality. They contend that liberty granted in Writ Petition No. 8707 of 2002 was limited to enabling the parties to pursue remedies in accordance with law and did not, in any manner, permit filing of a fresh Writ Petition challenging the validity of the compromise proceedings that had already been upheld. They contend that liberty granted in Writ Petition No. 8707 of 2002 was limited to enabling the parties to pursue remedies in accordance with law and did not, in any manner, permit filing of a fresh Writ Petition challenging the validity of the compromise proceedings that had already been upheld. These respondents maintain that the land in question originally belonged to Brahmachari pursuant to a grant made in 1898 by H.E.H. the Nizam. They assert that petitioner's reliance on a grant allegedly made to Kolla Venkamma is wholly baseless, especially since no such documents were produced either by Venkamma's descendants or by petitioner in earlier proceedings. 4.1. Respondents 6 to 8 strongly deny petitioner's contention that 5 Bams of land correspond to a total of 2,700 square yards and assert that one Bam equals 180 square yards, therefore 5 Bams can only amount to 900 square yards. They contend that reference to 2.700 square yards in C.C.C.A. No. 36 of 1982 is an inadvertent observation made without any foundational pleadings or supporting evidence, and is therefore per incuriam and incapable of binding effect. 4.2. These respondents further submit that the compromise approved by the Commissioner is beneficial to the temple. They claim that they are offering 100 square yards of their own private land to the temple as part of the compromise and that petitioner's challenge is founded on incorrect assumptions and is detrimental to the interests of the religious institution. It is asserted, the questions relating to extent, title, and nature of the land cannot be reopened at this stage, particularly when multiple earlier proceedings have concluded and attained finality. They contend that the present Writ Petition is frivolous, vexatious and filed only with the intention of harassing respondents. 5. Heard Sri T. Suryakaran Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri K. Sita Ram, learned counsel for petitioner, learned Government Pleader for Endowments, Sri T. Sudhakar Reddy, learned counsel for Respondents 7, 8 and 12, Sri Prathap Narayan Sanghi, learned counsel for Respondent No.5 and Sri J.R. Manohan Rao, learned Standing Counsel for Endowments. 6. This Court has given its anxious consideration to the rival submissions made by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, examined the material placed on record and perused the earlier orders and civil proceedings that bear directly on the present controversy. 6. This Court has given its anxious consideration to the rival submissions made by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, examined the material placed on record and perused the earlier orders and civil proceedings that bear directly on the present controversy. The essential issue that falls for determination is whether the proceedings dated 31.03.1990 issued by the 2 nd respondent-Commissioner of Endowments, approving a compromise between the 4 th respondent-Temple and private individuals, can survive and be implemented in the present factual and legal scenario. 7. The first and foremost aspect that requires examination is the legal foundation of the impugned order. It is not in dispute that the Commissioner purported to exercise power under Section 89 of the A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987. The said provision obligates that a compromise involving an endowment can be entered into only when a suit, appeal, or proceeding concerning the endowment is pending before a competent forum. Only in such a situation does the Commissioner have jurisdiction to accord sanction for withdrawal, compromise or settlement of the pending dispute. It is an admitted position on record that as on the date of filing the present Writ Petition, no litigation whatsoever remained pending between the temple and private respondents: O.A. No. 36 of 1987 stood withdrawn on 23.03.1996, and C.C.C.A. No. 36 of 1982 had already been dismissed on 29.11.1995. The statutory condition precedent for invoking Section 89 , namely existence of a pending proceeding thus indisputably does not exist today. The logical and legal consequence is that compromise sanctioned under the impugned proceedings cannot be enforced after culmination of the foundational litigation. The compromise has therefore, become infructuous in law. 8. The second issue of significance concerns the effect of the civil court's final adjudication in C.C.C.A. No. 36 of 1982. That judgment in the said City Civil Court Appeal rendered by this Court, categorically holds that subject temple stands on an extent of 5 Bams of land, equivalent to 2,700 square yards and that such land belongs to the temple and cannot be claimed by the private parties who figured as appellants therein. Respondents contend that such findings are per incuriam. However, this Court finds no merit in that contention. Respondents contend that such findings are per incuriam. However, this Court finds no merit in that contention. A final judgment rendered by a competent civil Court binds the parties and the authorities alike, and such a pronouncement cannot be ignored or diluted in collateral proceedings unless it has been set aside or modified by a superior forum. No such material has been placed before this Court. The factual determination by the civil court therefore, continues to hold the field and conclusively settles the extent and ownership of the temple property. 9. Once the civil Court declared that the entire 2,700 square yards belongs to the temple, any administrative compromise that seeks to part with approximately 1,000 square yards in favour of private individuals would stand in direct conflict with that binding judicial determination. Respondents' plea that the civil judgment only addressed the nature of the institution and not the land extent, is contrary to the express findings recorded therein. This Court cannot permit an administrative order to operate in derogation of a final civil decree. 10. Respondents heavily rely upon the earlier writ proceedings in Writ Petition No. 6687 of 1990 and 8707 of 2002. However, a careful scrutiny reveals that neither of those writs examined the legality or enforceability of the compromise under Section 89 in the light of the subsequent withdrawal of O.A. No. 36 of 1987 or dismissal of C.C.C.A. No. 36 of 1982. Writ Petition No. 6687 of 1990 was confined to the challenge by a private individual without examining the larger statutory mandate or the later civil Court decree. Writ Petition No. 8707 of 2002 merely set aside the Government's cancellation of the compromise for want of procedure, while expressly granting liberty to the parties to pursue appropriate remedies. Thus, the present challenge is neither barred by res judicata nor the principles of finality. 11. This Court must also bear in mind the nature of the property involved. Temple properties constitute public trust assets which are vested in the deity and held by the managing authorities only in a fiduciary capacity. Alienation or compromise of such properties is subjected to stringent statutory control and judicial scrutiny. Any action that results in loss of valuable temple land, especially of the magnitude of 1,000 square yards, cannot be sustained unless permitted strictly in accordance with law and consistent with the interest of the institution. Alienation or compromise of such properties is subjected to stringent statutory control and judicial scrutiny. Any action that results in loss of valuable temple land, especially of the magnitude of 1,000 square yards, cannot be sustained unless permitted strictly in accordance with law and consistent with the interest of the institution. The impugned proceedings, viewed in this context, do not satisfy the statutory prescriptions nor do they promote the welfare of the institution. On the contrary, they undermine the integrity of the endowment and contradict a binding civil decree. 12. Respondents' objection on the ground of delay and petitioner's locus cannot be sustained. In matters concerning public religious institutions, the Court adopts a broad and liberal approach to locus, recognizing the right of devotees and public bodies to protect temple property. Delay, by itself, cannot defeat a writ seeking to prevent alienation of public trust land, particularly where impugned action is continuing or threatens irreparable loss to the institution. For all these reasons, this Court is of the considered opinion that impugned proceedings dated 31.03.1990 cannot be allowed to stand. They suffer from lack of jurisdiction, non-application of mind, incompatibility with statutory requirements and are contrary to a binding civil court judgment. Allowing their implementation would result in unlawful alienation of temple property and defeat the public purpose for which the endowment exists. 13. In the light of the foregoing discussion, this Court holds that proceedings dated 31.03.1990 issued by the 2 nd respondent cannot be sustained in law. The compromise sanctioned therein has become infructuous upon withdrawal of O.A. No. 36 of 1987 and dismissal of C.C.C.A. No. 36 of 1982, and its implementation after such final adjudication would run contrary to the statutory requirements of Section 89 of Act 30 of 1987. Further, the impugned order is inconsistent with the binding findings rendered by this Court in C.C.C.A. No. 36 of 1982 declaring that the entire extent of 5 Bams (2,700 square yards) belongs to the 4th respondent-Temple. Any attempt to part with a portion of such property under the guise of an outdated compromise would amount to an impermissible alienation of public trust property and cannot receive the approval of this Court. 14. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned proceedings dated 31.03.1990 is set aside. Respondents are restrained from acting upon or implementing the said proceedings in any manner. 14. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned proceedings dated 31.03.1990 is set aside. Respondents are restrained from acting upon or implementing the said proceedings in any manner. The 4 th respondent - Temple and the official respondents shall ensure that the entire extent of temple land, as adjudicated in C.C.C.A. No. 36 of 1982, is preserved and safeguarded strictly in accordance with law. No order as to costs. 15. Consequently, miscellaneous Applications, if any shall stand closed.