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2025 DIGILAW 1545 (JHR)

Shanti Devi W/o Braj Nandan Prasad Singh v. State of Jharkhand

2025-07-24

ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY

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JUDGMENT : ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY, J. Heard the parties. 2. This Writ Petition (C) under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed with the prayer firstly, for issuance of an appropriate writ (s)/order (s)/direction (s) for quashing the order dated 11.09.2004 passed by Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi in S.A.R. Case No.15/2001-02/T.R. No.441/03-04, secondly, for quashing the order dated 23.06.2006 passed by Additional Collector, Ranchi in S.A.R. Appeal No.106R-15/04-05 and thirdly for quashing the order dated 19.05.2015 passed by the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi in S.A.R. Revision No.57 of 06-07 whereunder respectively the application under Section 71 A of the C.N.T. Act for restoration of the said Khata No.17 and plot no.211 was allowed and the appeal and revision therefrom were dismissed. 3. The case of the petitioner in brief is that the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, in charge used to realize Chaparbandi land revenue for the entire land in question vide case no.276/55-56; as the same was converted way back in the year 1945 by the then land lord. It is the further case of the petitioner that on 16.12.1964, the recorded tenants sold the land in favour of the vendor of the petitioner namely Ponpat Lal Daya Bhai Tank, by registered sale deed and the property was mutated by the Circle Officer, Ranchi. It is the further case of the petitioner that the petitioner purchased only 4 katha of land by registered sale deed on 16.07.1991 from Ponpat Lal Daya Bhai Tank and petitioner is paying holding Tax to the Ranchi Municipal Corporation. The ancestor of the respondents namely Zethu Munda filed S.A.R. Case No.15-2001-02 which was allowed in terms of the order dated 11.09.2004. The petitioner filed S.A.R Appeal No.106R-15/2004-05 but the same was dismissed vide order dated 23.06.2006, thereafter, the petitioner filed S.A.R. Revision No.57 of 06-07 but the same was also dismissed on 19.05.2015. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Revisional Court failed to take into consideration the fact, that in the recital made in page 2 of the sale deed dated 16.02.1964, the land has been described as Chaparbandi land and this an admission on the part of the ancestors of the respondents, which is binding upon the respondents. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Revisional Court failed to take into consideration the fact, that in the recital made in page 2 of the sale deed dated 16.02.1964, the land has been described as Chaparbandi land and this an admission on the part of the ancestors of the respondents, which is binding upon the respondents. It is next submitted that the Revisional Authority failed to take into consideration the fact that the transfer which was made in the year 1964 was brought into challenge for the first time in the year 2001-02 after a lapse of 37 years, which is barred by limitation. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the order passed by a co-ordinate bench of this Court, in the case of Chaitu Oraon vs. State of Jharkhand in W.P.(S). No.3472 of 2001 dated 26.03.2004, wherein it was observed that the limitation for filing an application under Section 71A of the C.N.T., Act is 30 years. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relies upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Situ Sahu and Others vs. State of Jharkhand and others reported in (2004) 8 SCC 340 , paragraph-11 of which reads as under:- “11. We are, therefore, of the view that the use of the words “at any time” in Section 71-A is evidence of the legislative intent to give sufficient flexibility to the Deputy Commissioner to implement the socio-economic policy of the Act viz. to prevent inroads upon the rights of the ignorant, illiterate and backward citizens. Thus, where the Deputy Commissioner chooses to exercise his power under Section 71- A it would be futile to contend that the period of limitation under the Limitation Act has expired. The period of limitation under the Limitation Act is intended to bar suits brought in civil courts where the party himself chooses to exercise his right of seeking restoration of immovable property. But, where, for socio-economic reasons, the party may not even be aware of his own rights, the legislature has stepped in by making an officer of the State responsible for doing social justice by clothing him with sufficient power. However, even such power cannot be exercised after an unreasonably long time during which third- party interests might have come into effect. However, even such power cannot be exercised after an unreasonably long time during which third- party interests might have come into effect. Thus, the test is not whether the period of limitation prescribed in the Act of 1963 had expired, but whether the power under Section 71-A was sought to be exercised after unreasonable delay.” (Emphasis supplied) and submits that by applying the said observation made in paragraph-11, in the facts of that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India was not satisfied in the facts of that case, that the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation has exercised his power under Section 71A within a reasonable period of time; as the lapse of 40 years is certainly not a reasonable time, for exercising the power even if it is not hedged in by a period of limitation. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner next by drawing the attention of this Court to the Supplementary Affidavit dated 29.06.2024 submits that the photograph of the building of the petitioner has also been annexed therewith, hence, it is submitted that the prayer as prayed for in this writ petition be allowed. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the State and the learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand vehemently opposes the prayer of the petitioner made in this writ petition. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the State that the undisputed facts remains that the disputed land stands recorded in the name of Mundla Munda and others as Kaymi in the Revisional Survey Record of Rights and the nature of land has been mentioned in the Khatian as ‘Khera Garha’, so the undisputed facts remains that the land in question originally belonged to the members of the tribal community. It is next submitted that from the evidence put forth by the parties before the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi, it appears that the petitioner of the said case was dispossessed from the disputed land within a maximum period of 24 to 25 years, prior to that, the petitioner before the said Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi used to cultivate the land and thus, the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi has rightly come to the conclusion that the disputed land belongs to the Adivasi Khata and the opposite party is in illegal possession over the land in dispute, in contravention of the provisions of C.N.T., Act and has rightly passed the order for eviction of the writ petitioner, who was the opposite party before the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi. It is next submitted that there is no material available in the record which will suggest that any substantial structure existed prior to promulgation of the Bihar Schedule Areas Regulation, 1969. It is next submitted that there is no material available in the record which will suggest that any substantial structure existed prior to promulgation of the Bihar Schedule Areas Regulation, 1969. It is then submitted by the learned counsel for the State that in view of bar imposed by Section 46(1) of the C.N.T., Act 1908 which came into force by Section 14 of C.N.T. (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Bihar Act of 25 of 1947), the alleged sale made by the ancestors of the private respondents of this writ petition to Ponpat Lal Daya Bhai Tank is not valid to any extent and in view of Section 46(3) of the C.N.T., Act, 1908, the said transfer being in contravention of Section 46(1) of the C.N.T. Act shall not in any way be recognized as valid by any Court inter alia in exercise of revenue jurisdiction, so the documents of sale being invalid, the contents thereof is obviously not admissible in evidence; more so when there is ample evidence, that has come through the oral testimony of the witnesses examined before the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi; but the petitioner before the Special Officer were in possession of the disputed land at the most 24-25 years before filing of the eviction petition and on the basis of which evidence, the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi has come to the definite finding that the petitioners before the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi who were the private respondents of this writ petition were dispossessed within a maximum period of 24-25 years and the said finding of fact of the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi was never even challenged before the Appellate Court rather the main ground, the writ petitioner agitated before the Appellate Court being the Additional Collector was that of the petition filed by the petitioner before the Special Officer was barred by res judicata in view of the order passed by the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi in S.A.R. Case No.466/1994-95, but the petitioner could not produce the any authentic copy of the said order claimed to have been passed by the writ petitioner and it was also contended by him that because of which the S.A.R. Case No.15/2001-02 was barred by res judicata. It is next submitted that even before the Revisional Court, the finding of facts of the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi that the writ petitioners before the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi being the private respondents of this writ petition were dispossessed within a maximum period of 24-25 years was also not challenged or agitated and the bone of contention of the writ petitioner before the Revisional Authority was that the disputed land being a Chaparbandi land, the restriction under Section 46(1) of the C.N.T., Act, 1908 was not attracted, but the Revisional Court keeping in view the fact that the original certified copy of the register of Jamabandi bears the narration that “vajriye sada hukumnama tarikh 03.05.1945”, but did not show the words “chapperbandi bandobasti” as claimed by the writ petitioner on the basis of an unauthentic copy, hence, the said contention of the writ petitioner did not find favour with the Revisional Court, therefore, in the revisional court dismissed the revision. It is lastly submitted that there is no illegality in the order dated 19.05.2015 passed by the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi in S.A.R. Revision No.57 of 06-07 nor there is any illegality committed by the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi or Additional Collector whose respective impugned orders have culminated in the said S.A.R. Revision No.57 of 06-07. Therefore, it is submitted that this W.P. (C), being without any merit, be dismissed. 8. Having heard the rival submissions made at the Bar and after carefully going through the materials available in the record, it is pertinent to mention here that the undisputed facts remains that the disputed land stood recorded in the name of Mundla Munda as Kaymi in the Revisional Survey Record of Rights, the undisputed facts remains that the private respondents of this writ petition are the descendants of Mundla Munda and they are the members of the scheduled tribes. 9. 9. So far as the contention of the petitioner that vide case no.276/1955-56, the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, In Charge realized Chaparbandi land for the entire land in question is concerned; for cogent reasons, the Revisional Authority being the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi has not accepted the said contention of the petitioner as the petitioner only filed a photo copy of the certified copy of the case no.276/1955-56; whereas the original certified copy of the register of Jamabandi which was also placed before the Revisional Court; did not contain the words “chapperbandi bandobasti”. 10. So far as the contention of the writ petitioner that an admission has been made by the ancestor of the private respondents, in the sale deed dated 16.02.1964 that the land sold is ‘Chaparbandi’ and the same amounts to an admission is concerned, in view of Section 46(1) of the C.N.T. Act, 1908, undisputedly, the said transfer was made in contravention of Section 46(1) of the C.N.T. Act, 1908, so such transfer could not have been recognized as valid inter alia in exercise of revenue jurisdiction by the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi, Additional Collector, Ranchi or the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi, in view of Section 46(3) of the C.N.T. Act, 1908. The undisputed facts remains that Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi on the basis of the evidence put forth by the parties came to the conclusion that, the petitioner before it was dispossessed from disputed land within the maximum period of 24-25 years. The Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi took into consideration the entire evidence put forth before him such finding of fact of the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi, as already discussed above was never challenged before the Appellate Authority specifically nor the same was agitated before the Revisional Authority, the order of whom is impugned in this writ petition. As the finding of fact has been arrived at by the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi by taking into consideration all the evidence put forth before it and such finding of fact has not been agitated before any statutory superior authority, this Court is of the considered view that it will be improper for this Court to take a piecemeal evidence sought to be relied upon by this Court to upset the finding of facts arrived at by the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi. 11. 11. So far as the order of the co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Chaitu Oraon vs. State of Jharkhand (Supra) regarding period of limitation is concerned, the same is no more relevant in view of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Situ Sahu and Others vs. State of Jharkhand and others (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has laid down the law that the test is not whether the period of limitation described by the Limitation Act, 1963 has expired but whether the power under Section 71A was sought to be exercised after unreasonable delay. 12. It is not the case of the writ petitioner that the private respondents who were the petitioners before the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi were aware about their own rights, but still they did not take any steps, so the condition precedent to quantify the unreasonable delay which is not to be applied, where for socio economic reasons, the party may not even be aware of his own rights, has failed to be established by the petitioner, for the purpose of taking the plea that the power under Section 71A was exercised after unreasonable delay. Be that as if may, here since, as already indicated above the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi has come to a definite finding that the private respondents of this writ petition were dispossessed within a maximum period of 24-25 years obviously from the date of filing of the said petition under section 71A of the CNT Act and prior to that they were cultivating the disputed land; the same rules out the land being a Chaparbandi land, hence, this Court do not find any illegality in the impugned orders passed by the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi in S.A.R. Revision No.57 of 06-07 dated 19.05.2015, the order dated 23.06.2006 passed by the Additional Collector, Ranchi in S.A.R. Appeal No.106R-15/04-05 or the order dated 11.09.2004 passed by the Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi in S.A.R. Case No.15/2001-02/T.R. No.441/03-04. Therefore, this writ petition being without any merit, is dismissed.