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2025 DIGILAW 1545 (TS)

Megavath Bansi Naik v. Syed Habeebuddin

2025-11-18

RENUKA YARA

body2025
JUDGMENT: RENUKA YARA, J. Heard Sri M. Anil Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant on admission. Perused the entire record. 2. The Second Appeal is preferred aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 30.07.2025 in A.S.No.9 of 2019 passed by the learned IV Additional District Judge, Nizamabad, (‘First Appellate Court’), wherein the appeal was dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree dated 11.03.2019 in O.S.No.92 of 2014 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Nizamabad, (‘Trial Court’). 3. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent herein filed suit in O.S.No.92 of 2014 seeking declaration of title, recovery of possession, damages and consequent relief of perpetual injunction, after delivery of possession against the appellant herein. In said suit, the respondent examined himself and another witness as P.Ws.1 and 2 and got marked Exs.A-1 to A-24. The appellant got examined D.Ws.1 to 4 and got marked Exs.B-1 to B-20. The learned Trial Court examined Exs.A-1 to A-20 and Exs.B-1 to B-17 and arrived at conclusion that the respondent is the original owner of the suit schedule property i.e., agricultural lands in Sy.No.36/69 admeasuring three acres and Sy.No.36/(Wet) (Paiki) admeasuring two acres eight guntas total five acres eight guntas situated at Fathenagar Village, Navipet Mandal, Nizamabad District. It is held by the Trial Court that as per Ex.A-1 final allotment issued by Fathenagar Co- operative Land Colonization Society for Ex-servicemen, the suit schedule property is allotted to the respondent for his services as Ex-servicemen on 29.01.1988. The name of the respondent is shown to be pattedar of suit schedule property in Ex.A-2 to A-11 pahanies and Ex.A-12 of the Encumbrance Certificate, whereas, the name of the appellant herein is shown as possessor in the pahanies. It is the specific case of the respondent that he has leased out the suit schedule property and therefore, the appellant came into possession of the property and therefore, with malafide intention filed suit for perpetual injunction and obtained decree in his favour to protect himself from dispossession. Therefore, suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession is sought. Since suit for declaration of title has been decreed declaring title, the appellant is directed to vacate the suit schedule property within two months from the date of judgment and decree of the Trial Court. 4. Therefore, suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession is sought. Since suit for declaration of title has been decreed declaring title, the appellant is directed to vacate the suit schedule property within two months from the date of judgment and decree of the Trial Court. 4. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the appellant preferred first appeal in A.S.No.9 of 2019 before the First Appellate Court. In the said first appeal, the documents of the appellant and the respondent were examined and held that the respondent was allotted total Ac.8-00 guntas of land in Sy.No.36/69 and 36/Paiki by Sainik Welfare Board Armed Head Quarters Society, Fathernagar, as he was an ex-serviceman. The said land was allotted in the year 1988. The appellant herein was inducted on the basis of the lease with respect to land to an extent of Ac.3-00 subject to payment of Rs.1,00,000/- for a period of three years, but the appellant did not pay the said amount. The appellant also obtained signatures of the respondent and his family members on stamp papers stating that it was for his safety. After completion of three years lease period, when the respondent approached the appellant to deliver the vacant possession of the land, the appellant demanded Rs.15,00,000/-. The documents adduced by the appellant show that he is possessor and the respondent is pattedar. After examining the oral and documentary evidence on record, the First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal holding that there is no evidence to support the contentions of the appellant that he purchased the suit schedule property from the respondent in the year 2004. It is categorically held that there is no document in favour of the appellant to show his title over the suit schedule property. 5. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the first appeal, the present Second Appeal is preferred raising the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the Courts below erred in law in holding that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property solely on the basis of pahanies and a society allotment letter, without any registered instrument conferring title as required under the Transfer of Property Act and Registration Act? 2. Whether the Courts below failed to consider the binding evidentiary value of Exs. 2. Whether the Courts below failed to consider the binding evidentiary value of Exs. B1 to B3 (Agreement of Sale and Receipts) duly signed by the plaintiff and his family members, acknowledging receipt of the entire sale consideration and delivery of possession, thereby rendering their findings vitiated? 3. Whether the Courts below erred in discarding Exs. Bl to B20, including land revenue receipts, crop loan records, and electricity bills in the appellant's name, which conclusively establish continuous possession and ownership of the defendant? 4. Whether the Courts below committed a legal error in holding that the suit is within limitation, though the alleged lease period expired in 2007 and the suit was filed only in 2014, beyond the period prescribed under Article 65 of the LIMITATION ACT , 1963? 5. Whether the finding that the defendant obtained the plaintiff's signatures for "safety" without proof of fraud or coercion is perverse and contrary to Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, which bar oral evidence against written documents? 6. Whether the Courts below failed to appreciate that the plaintiffs claim is hit by the doctrine of approbate and reprobate, having earlier admitted execution of documents and receipt of sale consideration? 7. Whether the Courts below failed to give due weight to the earlier decree in O.S. No. 124 of 2010 in favour of the appellant, confirming his possession over the same property, which operates as res judicata or, at the least, constitutes strong corroborative evidence? 8. Whether the Courts below misdirected themselves in ignoring that the alleged society allotment letter does not vest heritable or transferable ownership rights, and hence, the plaintiff had no title to claim declaration or recovery of possession? 9. Whether the Courts below erred in decreeing the suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession without framing the issue whether the agreement of sale executed by the appellant/defendant was obtained as a security for a loan, and without the plaintiff discharging his burden of proof to that effect? 10. Whether the Courts below ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence, and thereby rendered findings contrary to settled legal principles under Section 100 CPC? 11. Whether a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession is maintainable in the absence of any declaration that the appellant obtained the agreement of sale as a security for a loan? 12. Whether the Courts below ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence, and thereby rendered findings contrary to settled legal principles under Section 100 CPC? 11. Whether a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession is maintainable in the absence of any declaration that the appellant obtained the agreement of sale as a security for a loan? 12. Whether the respondent/plaintiff, being the alleged owner, could have filed a suit for declaration and recovery of possession instead of a suit for eviction? 13. Whether a decree for declaration of title and recovery of possession can be granted when the respondent/plaintiff admits having received a huge amount exceeding the market value of the suit schedule property? 14. Whether such admitted receipt of a large amount can legally be treated as a loan, in the absence of any proof to that effect? 6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Hemavathi v. V. Hombegowda , [ (2025) 5 SCC 442 ] held that High Court can entertain a regular second appeal purely on a ‘substantial’ question of law not even a question of law or a question of fact. Further, as per the judgment of this Court in Syed Abdul Quddus v. K. Vijaya Laxmi , [2024 SCC OnLine TS 186] , the Apex Court in Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki , (2007) 1 SCC 546 held that the High Court sitting in Second Appeal cannot examine the evidence once again as a third trial Court and the power under Section 100 CPC is very limited and it can be exercised only where a substantial question of law is raised and fell for consideration. 7. The substantial question of law No.1 is about the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court holding that respondent is absolute owner on the basis of pahanies and the allotment letter of the society without registered instrument. This question is frivolous and malafide as the respondent was ex-servicemen and after his retirement in recognition of his services Sainik Welfare Board has allotted him the suit schedule property. The allotment letter carries with it proof of title and there is no need for a registered document as to confer title when Sainik Welfare Board has allotted the suit schedule property. The said institution is not expected to register a sale deed, gift deed or allotment deed in favour of Ex-servicemen while allotting land. The allotment letter carries with it proof of title and there is no need for a registered document as to confer title when Sainik Welfare Board has allotted the suit schedule property. The said institution is not expected to register a sale deed, gift deed or allotment deed in favour of Ex-servicemen while allotting land. As per their procedure, an allotment letter is issued and the same is equivalent to a title deed. 8. The substantial question of law No.2 about evidentiary value of Exs.B-1 to B-3 (agreement of sale and receipts) has been considered by both Trial and First Appellate Courts and was discarded. The factual findings of both the Courts cannot be looked into by this Court as a third trial Court. 9. Similarly, substantial question of law No.3 about evidentiary value of Exs.B-1 to B-20 which include land revenue receipts, crop loan records and electricity bills which conclusively establish continuous ownership and possession of the appellant, is mala fide and misguiding to the extent that land revenue receipts, crop loan records and electricity bills could only demonstrate possession, but not title. There is absolutely no document in proof of title of the appellant except for unregistered agreement of sale dated 18.12.2004. As per Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited v. State of Haryana , [AIR 2012 SUPREME COURT 206] , Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held that no title can be transferred through unregistered agreement of sale. Therefore, the appellant herein cannot claim title. Further, possession of the appellant was never under the question, the same is admitted by respondent and therefore, when the suit for declaration of title was filed recovery of possession is also sought as consequential relief. Thus, substantial question of law No.3 is misguiding to the extent that Ex.B-1 to B-20 prove the ownership of the appellant, but not title. 10. The substantial question of law No.4 is about limitation to the effect that the lease period expired in the year 2007 and suit was filed 2014 beyond Article 65 of the LIMITATION ACT , 1963. This question does not stand to scrutiny as limitation period for a relief of declaration of title is 12 years. When the lease expired in the year 2007 and the suit is filed in the year 2014, the suit is well within limitation by almost five years and therefore, does not suffer with infirmity. 11. This question does not stand to scrutiny as limitation period for a relief of declaration of title is 12 years. When the lease expired in the year 2007 and the suit is filed in the year 2014, the suit is well within limitation by almost five years and therefore, does not suffer with infirmity. 11. With respect to substantial question of law Nos.5 and 6, the same are about allegations of fraud and coercion and findings thereof by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. Such issues have been considered by both the Courts and this Court under Section 100 of the C.P.C. cannot give an alternative view even if the same is possible. 12. With regard to substantial question of law No.7 i.e., about decree in O.S.No.124 of 2010 and whether the same operates as res judicata, the appellant has not understood about the concept of res judicata. The suit in O.S.No.124 of 2010 is filed by the appellant seeking perpetual injunction. The same cannot operate as res judicata for suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession when filed by the respondent. Only when the earlier suit is filed for declaration of title and recovery of possession, there can be any scope for application of concept of res judicata. In the instant case, reliefs sought and issues dealt with are different and therefore, there is no scope for application of concept of res judicata and there is no failure in giving weightage to the decree in O.S.No.124 of 2010. 13. The substantial questions of law Nos.8 and 9 with respect to rival titles of the respondent and the appellant have already been considered by both the Courts and there is no new issue much less substantial question of law to be considered by this Court. 14. The substantial questions of law Nos.10 to 14 are frivolous and unwarranted such that they cannot be taken up as substantial questions of law in a second appeal. Said questions are aimed at creating confusion without any substance, therefore cannot be considered. 15. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that there are no substantial questions of law, which are to be considered in this second appeal. In fact, the questions raised in the grounds of appeal of the present second appeal are blatant falsehoods aimed at misguiding the Court. 15. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that there are no substantial questions of law, which are to be considered in this second appeal. In fact, the questions raised in the grounds of appeal of the present second appeal are blatant falsehoods aimed at misguiding the Court. In the circumstances, there are no merits in the second appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed. 16. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed confirming the judgments and decrees of the both the Trial and First Appellate Courts in O.S.No.92 of 2014 dated 11.03.2019 and A.S.No.9 of 2019 dated 30.07.2025 respectively. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications, if any, pending shall stand closed.