JUDGMENT : PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J. 1. Heard the arguments of learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for the respondent. 2. The instant second appeal is preferred against the judgment and decree dated 29.09.2010 (decree signed on 20.10.2010) passed by learned Additional District Judge, FTC-V, Dhanbad in Title Appeal No.214 of 2009 whereby and whereunder the appellate court has affirmed the judgment and decree dated 11.09.2009 (decree signed on 17.09.2009) passed by Subordinate Judge-1st, Dhanbad in Title Suit No.52 of 2002 whereby the suit of the plaintiff was decreed. 3. Factual matrix giving rise to this appeal is that the plaintiff/respondent, Gopal Prasad was appointed on 02.08.1972 as loading clerk in Kenduadih colliery and subsequently promoted as loading inspector at Barari Coal Works. According to the plaintiff, his date of birth was mentioned as 06.02.1952 in Form ‘B’ register maintained by his employer, the defendant. The same date of birth is also mentioned in the identity card, which was entered on the basis of admit card issued for Higher Secondary School Examination Board in which the plaintiff had appeared. According to the plaintiff, his date of birth was manipulated by the defendants from 06.02.1952 to 31 years age on the date of joining i.e. 02.08.1972. The plaintiff raised dispute against recording his aforesaid age by the defendants. Accordingly, his age assessment was referred to the Apex Medical Board, which assessed the age of the plaintiff as 56 years on 05.03.1999. The plaintiff challenged the aforesaid age assessment by preferring a writ being CWJC No.2464 of 2000(R) before the Hon’ble High Court which was disposed of with the observation that the plaintiff may approach the civil court for declaration of the date of birth. Accordingly, the plaintiff instituted Title Suit No.52 of 2002 before the Civil Judge, Senior Division-1st , Dhanbad for a decree of declaration that the date of birth of the plaintiff is 06.02.1952 and the age assessment made by Apex Medical Board dated 05.03.1999 is inoperative and also for decree of permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from premature superannuating the plaintiff and also for other consequential relief and continuity in service and for the wages and monetary benefits. It was further stated that the plaintiff will superannuate on 06.02.2012 as per date of birth entered in the admit card issued by BSEB but the plaintiff was illegally superannuated on 05.03.2003. It was further stated that the plaintiff will superannuate on 06.02.2012 as per date of birth entered in the admit card issued by BSEB but the plaintiff was illegally superannuated on 05.03.2003. There is deliberate and substantial loss of employment of the plaintiff for about 9 years. 4. On the other hand, the case of the defendants/appellants as per their written statement is that the document shown by the plaintiff about his date of birth to be 06.02.1952 is neither authentic nor held reliable and acceptable in law and the suit is barred under Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. The plaintiff himself appeared before the Apex Medical Board and later on disputing the same on imaginary date of birth as such estopped from filing the suit. No certificate of matriculation and entry made in Form ‘B’ is correct and the plaintiff entered into service in the year 1972 and disclosed his age as 31 years, thus subsequent declaration of age at fag end of the service is not acceptable under law and age assessed as 56 years on 05.03.1999 by the Apex Medical Board is binding on the plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiff was superannuated from the service on 05.03.2003. The plaintiff has no legal right to challenge the constitution and outcome of Apex Medical Board. The plaintiff is not entitled to serve the company till 06.02.2012 and the Hon’ble Court, in the writ petition CWJC No.2464 of 2000(R), has simply made certain observations and no cause of action arose to the plaintiff to file suit. 5. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the main issues settled and decided by the learned trial court are as under; Issue No.4- Whether in view of the instruction No.76 of by bilateral NCWA-III between Union and company. The age assessed on 05.03.1999 by Apex Medical Board is illegal, void and inoperative? Issue No.5- Whether the date of birth of the plaintiff is 06.02.1952? Issue No.6-Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a declaratory decree and other relief/reliefs as claimed for? 6. Both the parties have adduced oral as well as documentary evidence. The documentary evidence relied upon by the plaintiff are as under:- Ext.1- Mark-sheet of BSEB. Ext.2-Scholl Leaving Certificate issued by G.R.M.V., School, Rafiganj, Gaya Ext.3-Identiy card of the plaintiff Ext.4-Photo copy of joint bipartite Committee for C.C.L. dated 25.04.1988. Ext.5-Letter dated 11/18.01.1989 written by Agent, Kenduadih Colliery Personal Manager, Kunstore Area. The documentary evidence relied upon by the plaintiff are as under:- Ext.1- Mark-sheet of BSEB. Ext.2-Scholl Leaving Certificate issued by G.R.M.V., School, Rafiganj, Gaya Ext.3-Identiy card of the plaintiff Ext.4-Photo copy of joint bipartite Committee for C.C.L. dated 25.04.1988. Ext.5-Letter dated 11/18.01.1989 written by Agent, Kenduadih Colliery Personal Manager, Kunstore Area. Ext.5/A-Letter dated 8/11.06.1992 issued by Deputy Chief Personal Manager to G.M. Personnel, BCCL. Ext.6-Letter dated 14.08.2000 to Chairman, BCCL. Ext.7-Service Record of the plaintiff Ext.8-Portest letter dated 04.08.1999 to Chief Enginner, Brari Coke Coal Plant. Ext.8/1-Letter dated 09.12.1999 to Chairman-cum-Managing Director, BCCL Ext.8/2-Represenation dated 11.06.1999 to Chairman-cum-Managing Director, BCCL. Ext.9-School Leaving Certificate dated 25.08.1971 Ext.10-Letter dated 20.05.1998 of Principal to Director, BCCL Ext.11-Letter No.6 dated 05.05.2004 of the In-charge, Principal G.R.M.V., Rafiganj, Gaya Ext.12–Sereial No. 24 of admission register, Rajkiya Madhya Vidhyla, Rafiqganj; Ext.13-Photo copy of Form ‘B’ register; Ext.14-C.C. of voter list; Ext.15-C.C. of order dated 27.02.2002 on CWJC No.2646 of 2000; Ext.16-Admit Card of BSEB. 7. On the other hand, apart from testimony of oral witnesses following documentary evidences have been adduced by the defendants:- Ext. A -Office order dated 17.03.1999; Ext.B- The report of Apex Medical Board; Ext.C-Last pay certificate of plaintiff. 8. Learned trial court taking into consideration the guideline propounded in the case of Kamta Pandey vs. M/s BCCL & Ors. reported in (2007) 3 JLJR 726 wherein it was held at para 10 as under:- “The main contention urged by the counsel for the petitioner is that as per Instruction No. 76 of the National Coal Wage Agreement III dated 25-4-1988, the date of birth of the existing employee must be determined only on the basis of the Matriculation Certificate issued by the Board and as such the said Matriculation Certificate, which has been issued in favour of the petitioner mentioning his date of birth as 1-7-1951, by the Bihar School Examination Board in the year 1968, obtained even before his appointment, has to be treated as authentic document and the date of birth as mentioned in the service register as 16-7-1948 is not correct one and it is wrongly mentioned as 23 years as on 16-7-1971 in the service register without any basis.” The learned trial court considering the documentary evidence adduced by the plaintiff held the date of birth of the plaintiff to be 06.02.1952. It was also held that the plaintiff cannot estop from challenging the age assessed by Apex Medical Board and is also entitled to be superannuated after completion of 60 years of service from the date of birth i.e. 06.02.1952 and also entitled for other monetary benefits from the date of retirement. Accordingly, decided the aforesaid issues in favor of the plaintiff and decreed the suit with all consequential benefits. 9. The defendants/respondent preferred Title Appeal No. 214 of 2009, which was also decided in favor of the plaintiff/defendants and decree passed in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed and the appeal was dismissed. 10. Being aggrieved with the judgment and decree passed by learned trial court, which was affirmed by appellate court, this appeal has been admitted on following substantial questions of law:- (i) Whether both the courts below have erred in allowing the reliefs of back wages and other monetary benefits in the light of the judgment reported in A.I.R. 1991 SC 1546? (ii) Whether the learned courts below have erred themselves in law in having failed to take into consideration that the jurisdiction of the civil court has been ousted under the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947? (iii) Whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly barred for enforcement of service conditions arising out of certified standing orders? An additional substantial question of law was further formulated vide order dated 04.08.2022; (iv) Whether the courts below erred in law by allowing the prayer of change of date of birth of respondent in the fag end of his service? 11. Learned counsel for the appellants elucidating the aforesaid substantial questions of law and comparing the judgments of Trial Court and First Appellate Court raised the first objection that the decree itself is nullity in as much as the dispute regarding terms and conditions of service of an employee falls under the provision of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 and there is absolute bar to the jurisdiction of Civil Court. The next point of argument is that prayer for change in the date of birth at fag end of the service is impermissible under law. The third objection is that the civil court has no jurisdiction to award consequential relief like retiral dues, back wages etc. 12. The next point of argument is that prayer for change in the date of birth at fag end of the service is impermissible under law. The third objection is that the civil court has no jurisdiction to award consequential relief like retiral dues, back wages etc. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon following reported judgments: (i) Milkhi Ram vs. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board, (2021) 10 SCC 752 . (ii) Ishar Singh vs National Fertilizers and Anr. (1991) Suppl (2) SCC cases 649 (iii) Bharat Coking Coal Limited and Ors. Vs. Shyam Kishore Singh (2020) 3 SCC 411 . 13. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff has vehemently opposed the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant and seriously objected against the substantial questions of law formulated in this case. It is submitted that the dispute about date of birth was raised at the first instance while considerable period of service of the plaintiff was remained. Ext. A relied upon by the respondent/defendant himself shows that there was direction to rectify the date of birth of the plaintiff in accordance with his School Leaving Certificate. The nature of dispute does not attract any Industrial Dispute within the provision of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. Therefore, under section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, the civil court has every jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit filed by the plaintiff. It cannot be said that the plaintiff has taken recourse of law at fag end of his service rather he agitated the matter about 10 -12 years prior to his purported date of retirement in the year 2001. The defendant/appellant filed Ext. B insisted his age at the time of joining on 02.08.1972 to be 31 years and on that basis, the plaintiff has to retire in the year 2001 but the defendant insisted upon medical examination report of the plaintiff whereby his age was assessed to be 56 years in the year 1999. Thereafter, he was superannuated in the month of March, 2003, which clearly indicates that Ext.B was even not relied upon by the defendant/appellant (herein). The school leaving certificate being most valuable document for assessment of age as relied upon by both the courts below cannot be doubted at all. Thereafter, he was superannuated in the month of March, 2003, which clearly indicates that Ext.B was even not relied upon by the defendant/appellant (herein). The school leaving certificate being most valuable document for assessment of age as relied upon by both the courts below cannot be doubted at all. It is further submitted that so far the consequential relief due to retirement of the plaintiff attaining the age of the retirement during pendency of this appeal and the power of civil court in this connection is concern, it has been clearly observed at para-6 of the case of Ishar Singh (Supra) as referred by the appellant that “It is unnecessary to go into other aspect, namely, whether residuary reliefs were available in the civil court in as much as the appellant has by now superannuated, even on the basis of the corrected record the only relief to which he is entitled is one of back wages. We do not think that is a relief which the civil court could have granted. On the basis of the rectification of the date of birth granted by the civil court, the appellant is entitled to work out his remedy in a different forum prescribed by law, but we find that the respondent is Public Sector Undertaking and it would do well in settling the claim of the appellant instead of driving him to a proceeding under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act.” 14. I have gone through the judgments passed by the Trial Court as well as First Appellate Court in the light of issues involved in this case as well as the certain substantial questions of law formulated for hearing of the appeal and the rival contentions of learned counsel for both parties. It is admitted position that the plaintiff/respondent was an employee of appellant/defendant and the plaintiff was appointed on 02.08.1972. On the date of appointment, no document regarding age of the plaintiff was asked by the defendant rather his age was mentioned, in Form ‘B’ register prepared under section 48 of the Mines Act, as 31 years on 02.08.1972. It also appears that over the Form ‘B’ the plaintiff has put his signature in the relevant column. It may be called as admission on the part of the plaintiff but cannot be said with all certainty to be voluntary one. It further appears that vide Ext. It also appears that over the Form ‘B’ the plaintiff has put his signature in the relevant column. It may be called as admission on the part of the plaintiff but cannot be said with all certainty to be voluntary one. It further appears that vide Ext. 13 and Ext.5, letter dated 11.01.1989 written by Kenduadih Colliery to Personal Manager of Kunstore Area-8. It has been informed that in the Form ‘B’ register, the age of the plaintiff has been recorded as 31 years as on the date of appointment. However, after transfer, he submitted admit card of Bihar School Examination Board requesting for correction of his date of birth as 06.02.1952. 15. Further, vide Ext. 5/1 relied upon by the respondent/plaintiff himself which is letter dated 11.06.1992 written by Deputy Chief Personal manager, Kunstore Area to the General Manager, Personal, BCCL, Koyla Bhawan suggest to rectify the Form ‘B’ by entering date of birth as 06.02.1952 as per the representation of the plaintiff, Gopal Prasad. Thereafter, instead of date of birth, verification of documents submitted by plaintiff in proof of his medical board was constituted for age determination of the plaintiff, which assessed the age of the plaintiff to be 56 years on 05.03.1999 (Ext.B). Accordingly, all concerns were directed to accept the above medical board report and entered the date of birth of the plaintiff as 05.03.1943. Again, the representation submitted by the plaintiff showing his board examination certificate, admit card and school leaving certificate etc. were not considered then he filed CWJC No.2464 of 2000(R) wherein the Hon’ble High Court directed the plaintiff to get the declaration from competent civil court about the age that was the main reason for filing this Title Suit No.52 of 2002 before the trial court. During pendency of the suit, the plaintiff was superannuated on the basis of report of Apex Medical Board (Ext.B) on 05.03.2003. As regards declaration about date of birth of the plaintiff/respondent, there is concrete findings of both the courts below based upon the cogent and reliable documentary evidence, which were not considered by the defendant authorities in spite of raising even before a decade of retirement of the plaintiff. As regards declaration about date of birth of the plaintiff/respondent, there is concrete findings of both the courts below based upon the cogent and reliable documentary evidence, which were not considered by the defendant authorities in spite of raising even before a decade of retirement of the plaintiff. The insistence of the appellants/defendants on their own entry of the age of the plaintiff, at the time of his joining in the register B and subsequently on assessment of age by medical board constituted under the direction of the defendant authorities have no precedence over the certificates of Higher Secondary School Examination Board as relied upon the plaintiff. Therefore, the date of birth declared by the competent civil court cannot be displaced by the defendants. The nature of dispute from beginning to the end does not involve any Industrial Dispute as defined under Industrial Dispute Act. So far the contention of the appellant that on the basis of rectification of date of birth declared by the civil court, the remedy of back wages cannot be given in concern, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ishar Singh(supra) observed that since the respondent is a Public Sector Undertaking and it would do well in settling claim of the appellant instead of driving him to a proceeding under section 33 (C)(2) of Industrial Dispute Act. In the instant case also, the appellant/defendant is M/s Bharat Coke Coal Limited, a Public Sector Undertaking. Therefore, obliged to take necessary steps for consequential relief for back wages till the period of retirement and after consequential benefits on the basis of age of the plaintiff assessed by the competent civil court i.e. 06.02.1952. 16. In view of the above discussions and reasons, I find no merits in this appeal and the substantial questions of law along with points of arguments raised on behalf of the appellant. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. 17. The appellant is directed to settle the claim of the plaintiff/respondent on the basis of his date of birth to be 06.02.1952, all the consequential reliefs of back wages and other monetary entitlements preferably within 9 months from the date of this judgment. 18. Pending I.A(s), if any, is also disposed of accordingly. 19. Let the copy of this judgment along with Trial Court Records be sent back to the court concerned for information and needful.