JUDGMENT : Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. 1. At the outset, it is clarified that the present batch of special appeals arise from a similar set of facts and common issues emanating from the impugned order dated 21.05.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, it would be appropriate and in the interest of judicial propriety to adjudicate them analogously. 2. For the sake of convenience, D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1128/2024 is treated as the lead case in the present adjudication. The decision rendered therein shall govern and apply mutatis mutandis also to the instant D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1123/2024, D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1109/2024 and D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1105/2024. 3. D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1128/2024 has been preferred by the appellants under Rule 134 of the RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT RULES , 1951, read with Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking the following reliefs: “It is therefore, most respectfully prayed that this appeal may kindly be allowed, the impugned order of learned Single Judge dated 21.05.2024 passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 13771/2023 (Dr. Mohd. Sajid vs. State of Raj. & Ors.) may kindly be quashed and set aside and writ petition filed by the respondent/writ petitioner may kindly be ordered to be dismissed with cost. Any other appropriate order or direction, which this Hon’ble Court considers just and proper in the facts and circumstances of this case, may kindly be passed in favour of the appellants.” 4. The brief facts leading to the instant controversy are that the appellants issued Advertisement No. 04/2023 dated 13.07.2023, inviting applications for regular appointment by way of direct recruitment to 249 posts of Unani Medical Officers under the Rajasthan Ayurvedic, Unani, Homoeopathy and Naturopathy Service Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Rules of 1973’). 4.1 The respondents/writ petitioners were among the aspirants who had applied pursuant to the said advertisement. After the conduct of the selection process for the aforesaid posts, the appellants issued a provisional select list on 11.09.2023, followed by a final merit list on 22.09.2023, in respect of the advertised vacancies. In the said merit list, however, the candidature of the respondent/writ petitioners came to be excluded on the ground of them being over-aged. 4.2. After the conduct of the selection process for the aforesaid posts, the appellants issued a provisional select list on 11.09.2023, followed by a final merit list on 22.09.2023, in respect of the advertised vacancies. In the said merit list, however, the candidature of the respondent/writ petitioners came to be excluded on the ground of them being over-aged. 4.2. Aggrieved thereby, the respondents approached this Court by preferring Civil Writ Petitions, wherein they inter alia pleaded that they were registered Unani Medical Practitioner, appointed under the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), and have been continuously serving as temporary employees in the Medical and Health Department on the post of Unani Medical Officer. It was contended that by virtue of their service, they were entitled to age relaxation to the extent of the period of service rendered, subject to a maximum of 5 years, in terms of Clause 12 of the advertisement. In addition, being a member of the Other Backward Classes (Non-Creamy Layer), they were also entitled to relaxation under Rule 9(xi) of the Rules of 1973, as well as further relaxation under Rule 9(xii) of the said rules on account of non-holding of recruitment during the intervening years. 4.3. The case set up before the learned Single Judge was that the statutory framework under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1973, read with the Notification dated 23.09.2008, does not prohibit grant of cumulative relaxation. Therefore, the restrictive stipulation contained in the advertisement to the effect that the benefit of relaxation could not be availed cumulatively was de hors the Rules, and liable to be struck down. 4.4. The appellants, on the other hand, opposed the writ petition contending that the advertisement had been issued strictly in accordance with the applicable service rules, and that the age relaxation contemplated therein was intended to operate independently, without being cumulative. Reliance was placed on certain decisions of this Court, including Dr. Dayaram Saran & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition no. 13782/2023 decided by this Hon’ble Court on 27.09.2023 ) and Dhuleshwar Ghogra v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 16192/2022 decided by this Hon’ble Court on 19.05.2023 ), to submit that the matter stood covered against the writ petitioners. 4.5. Dayaram Saran & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition no. 13782/2023 decided by this Hon’ble Court on 27.09.2023 ) and Dhuleshwar Ghogra v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 16192/2022 decided by this Hon’ble Court on 19.05.2023 ), to submit that the matter stood covered against the writ petitioners. 4.5. The learned Single Judge, after considering the rival submissions, came to the conclusion that the Rules of 1973 and the subsequent Notification of 2008 admit of cumulative age relaxation, and that the contrary stipulation in the advertisement could not override the statutory framework. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed by quashing the impugned stipulation in the advertisement and directing the appellants to extend the benefit of cumulative relaxation to the writ petitioners and to reconsider their candidature accordingly. 5. Mr. Piyush Bhandari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that the learned Single Judge erred in interpreting the Rules of 1973 to permit cumulative age relaxation. According to the appellants, the true intent of the rule- making authority, as reflected in the advertisement as well as the consistent recruitment practice, was that age relaxation under different heads could be availed only independently and not cumulatively. 5.1. Learned counsel further submitted that once the writ petitioners had consciously applied under Advertisement No. 04/2023, they were bound by its terms and conditions. Having participated in the selection process with full knowledge, they could not subsequently challenge the stipulations of the advertisement merely because the outcome was not favourable to them. 5.2. Learned counsel also submitted that the writ petitioners were estopped, by the doctrine of estoppel and acquiescence, from questioning the validity of the advertisement after having participated in the recruitment process and having been declared ineligible on the ground of being over-aged. 5.3. Learned counsel submitted that the decisions of this Hon’ble Court in the cases of Dr. Dayaram Saran & Ors. (supra) and Dhuleshwar Ghogra (supra) clearly cover the present controversy, and the learned Single Judge failed to follow the ratio of the said judgments. 5.4. Learned counsel further submitted that age relaxation is in the nature of a concession or policy indulgence, and not a vested right of any candidate. Hence, the writ petitioners could not claim aggregation of multiple relaxations as a matter of legal entitlement. 5.5. 5.4. Learned counsel further submitted that age relaxation is in the nature of a concession or policy indulgence, and not a vested right of any candidate. Hence, the writ petitioners could not claim aggregation of multiple relaxations as a matter of legal entitlement. 5.5. Lastly, learned counsel submitted that acceptance of cumulative relaxation would open the floodgates for candidates far beyond the prescribed age limit to claim eligibility, thereby unsettling the level playing field in recruitment and defeating the very object of fixing an age criteria for direct recruitment. 6. Per contra, Mr. Dinesh Kumar Ojha, Mr. Mahendra Thanvi and Mr. Suniel Purohit, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, while opposing the aforesaid submissions made on behalf of the appellants, submitted that the advertisement No. 04/2023 in question, insofar as it restricted age relaxation to a non-cumulative basis, was contrary to the statutory framework under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1973. Since the Rules themselves contain no bar against grant of cumulative relaxation, the restriction in the advertisement was de hors the Rules and therefore was liable to be quashed. 6.1. It was further submitted that Rule 9 of the Rules of 1973, read with the Notification dated 23.09.2008 issued under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, explicitly contemplates additional relaxations in respect of categories such as OBC, SC/ST, women candidates, reservists, and candidates affected by non-holding of recruitment. These relaxations are to be granted cumulatively, and any contrary stipulation in the advertisement cannot override the statutory mandate. 6.2. It was also submitted that the respondents/writ petitioners, being contractual Unani Medical Officers serving continuously under the NRHM, were entitled to relaxation equal to their service period (subject to 5 years), in addition to the 5 years relaxation under Rule 9(xi) of the Rules of 1973 for OBC category candidates, and the 3 years relaxation under Rule 9(xii) of the said Rules for non-advertisement of vacancies. Denial of cumulative application would defeat the very object of these provisions. 6.3. It was further submitted that the State itself had consistently adopted the principle of cumulative relaxation in earlier recruitments, such as in 2013 for Unani Medical Officers, and again in 2023 for Nursing Officers and Pharmacists, where both service-based and category-based relaxations were extended cumulatively. Denial of cumulative application would defeat the very object of these provisions. 6.3. It was further submitted that the State itself had consistently adopted the principle of cumulative relaxation in earlier recruitments, such as in 2013 for Unani Medical Officers, and again in 2023 for Nursing Officers and Pharmacists, where both service-based and category-based relaxations were extended cumulatively. The State, having itself interpreted Rule 9 of the Rules of 1973 in this manner, is estopped from deviating without any amendment to the Rules. 6.4. It was also submitted that the judgments relied upon by the appellants, particularly Dhuleshwar Ghogra (Supra) and Dr. Dayaram Saran (Supra) , were distinguishable on facts. In those cases, Rule 265 of the Panchayati Raj Rules was under consideration, and the issue of relaxation on account of non- advertisement of posts was never examined. Thus, they could not govern the present controversy. 6.5. It was further submitted that reliance was instead placed on the Supreme Court judgments in Malik Mazhar Sultan v. UPSC (2006) 9 SCC 507 and Ashish Kumar v. State of U.P. , (2018) 3 SCC 55 , which clearly held that statutory rules prevail over any contrary condition in an advertisement. Where the Rules provide for cumulative relaxation, an advertisement cannot take away that benefit. 6.6. Lastly, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that exclusion of cumulative relaxation would amount to arbitrary discrimination under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, depriving experienced contractual doctors who have long served the State of their rightful opportunity for regularization. The learned Single Judge therefore correctly quashed the restrictive clause in the advertisement and directed cumulative relaxation to be applied. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the material available on record alongwith the judgments cited at the Bar. 7.1. At the outset, it must be noted that the power to prescribe qualifications, including the maximum age for entry into public service, lies within the domain of the rule-making authority. Article 309 of the Constitution of India authorizes the appropriate Legislature to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or a State. Rules framed under Article 309 are thus binding in nature, and unless shown to be ultra vires the Constitution or the parent enactment, they must be applied in their plain terms. 7.2. Article 309 of the Constitution of India authorizes the appropriate Legislature to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or a State. Rules framed under Article 309 are thus binding in nature, and unless shown to be ultra vires the Constitution or the parent enactment, they must be applied in their plain terms. 7.2. In the present case, Rule 9 of the Rules of 1973 prescribes the age criteria for direct recruitment, along with distinct relaxations for specific classes such as SC/ST candidates, women, widows, divorcees, ex-servicemen, contract employees, and postgraduates. Rule 9 of the Rules of 1973 (as amended) reads as under: “9. Age.— A candidate for direct recruitment to the post enumerated in the Schedule must have attained the age of 20 years and must not have attained the age of 45 years on the 1st day of January next following the last date fixed for receipt of application. Rule 9 of the Rules of 1973 (as amended) reads as under: “9. Age.— A candidate for direct recruitment to the post enumerated in the Schedule must have attained the age of 20 years and must not have attained the age of 45 years on the 1st day of January next following the last date fixed for receipt of application. Provided that— (i) the upper age limit mentioned above shall be relaxed— (a) by 5 years in the case of male candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes; (b) by 5 years in the case of women candidates belonging to the general category; and (c) by 10 years in the case of women candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and the Other Backward Classes; (ii) the upper age-limit shall be 50 years in the case of reservists, namely the Defence Service Personnel who were transferred to the Reserve; (iii) the upper age limit mentioned above shall not apply in the case of an ex-prisoner who had served under the Government on a substantive basis on any post before his conviction and was eligible for an appointment under these Rules; (iv) in the case of other ex-prisoners, the upper age limit mentioned above shall be relaxed by a period equal to the term of imprisonment served by him provided he was not overage before his conviction and was eligible for appointment under these Rules; (v) a person appointed temporarily to the post in the Service shall be deemed to be within the age-limit had he been within the age-limit when he was initially appointed even though he has crossed the age-limit when he appears finally before the Commission and shall be allowed up to two chances had he been eligible as such at the time of his initial appointment; (vi) the upper age-limit mentioned above shall be relaxed by a period equal to the service rendered in the National Cadet Corps in the case of Cadet Instructors and if the resultant age does not exceed the prescribed maximum age-limit by more than three years, such candidates shall be deemed to be within the prescribed age-limit; (vii) notwithstanding anything contained contrary in the Rules, in the case of persons serving in connection with the affairs of the State in substantive capacity, the upper age-limit shall be 40 years for direct recruitment to posts filled in by competitive examinations or in case of posts filled in through the Commission by interview. This relaxation shall not apply to urgent temporary appointments; (viii) the Released Emergency Commissioned Officers & Short Service Commissioned Officers after release from Army shall be deemed to be within the age-limit even though they have crossed the age-limit when they appear before Commission had they been eligible as such at the time of joining the Commission in the Army; (ix) there shall be no age limit in the case of widows and divorcee women. Explanation: In the case of a widow, she will have to furnish a certificate of death of her husband from the competent authority, and in the case of a divorcee, she will have to furnish the proof of divorce; (x) the upper age limit shall be relaxed by three years in the case of candidates holding a post-graduate degree in Ayurved; (xi) the upper age limit mentioned above shall be relaxed by 5 years in the case of candidates belonging to the Other Backward Classes; (xii) if a candidate would have been entitled in respect of his/her age for direct recruitment in any year in which no such recruitment was held, he/she shall be deemed to be eligible in the next following recruitment, if he/she is not overage by more than 3 years; (xiii) the upper age limit mentioned above, for the person who is continuously working on contract basis as Ayurved Chikitsadhikari, Homoeopathy Chikitsadhikari, Unani Chikitsadhikari in Government, Chief Minister BPL Jeevan Raksha Kosh, National Rural Health Mission shall be relaxed by the period equal to the service rendered by him subject to maximum of five years.” 7.3. A plain reading of Rule 9 of the Rules of 1973 makes it evident that the legislature has consciously and specifically enumerated distinct relaxations for different categories. Each of the provisos operates independently and caters to a particular class of candidates, having regard to the underlying object for which the relaxation is carved out. For instance, widows and divorcee women are completely exempted from the age bar; postgraduates are given a three-year relaxation; ex-servicemen and contract employees are given benefit of their rendered service, subject to ceiling. However, there is no indication that multiple relaxations may be aggregated unless so provided. The Rules, therefore, are silent on the cumulative or non-cumulative nature of age concessions. 7.4. However, there is no indication that multiple relaxations may be aggregated unless so provided. The Rules, therefore, are silent on the cumulative or non-cumulative nature of age concessions. 7.4. This Court observes that the submission of the respondents that in the absence of an express prohibition, cumulative relaxation should be permitted, cannot be accepted at the outset. Firstly, Rule 9 of the Rules of 1973 has been framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India and therefore has statutory force. As per the settled legal position, the Courts cannot add words or supply omissions to expand the scope of the Rule. Secondly, the principle of casus omissus is well-settled — where the Rule-maker has not provided for a situation, the Court cannot, under the guise of interpretation, legislate. 7.5. It is also deemed appropriate to recall the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court made in the case of Rachna v. Union of India , (2021) 5 SCC 638 at page 657, para 43, wherein it was held thus: “The horizontal reservation and relaxation… is a matter of governmental policy… It is not in the domain of the courts to embark upon an inquiry as to whether a particular public policy is wise and acceptable or whether better policy could be evolved. The Court can only interfere if the policy framed is absolutely capricious and non-informed by reasons, or totally arbitrary, offending the basic requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution.” Further, in para 45 at page 658, it was clarified that: “Judicial review of a policy decision and to issue mandamus to frame policy in a particular manner are absolutely different… It is within the realm of the executive to take a policy decision based on the prevailing circumstances for better administration… The court is called upon to consider the validity of a policy decision only when a challenge is made that such policy decision infringes fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution or any other statutory right.” Thus, while the Court can interpret and clarify the application of existing Rules, it cannot direct the State to legislate or frame policy in a particular manner. 7.6. Having regard to the above framework, this Court is of the considered view that the scheme of Rule 9 of the Rules of 1973 demonstrates a deliberate legislative design in carving out age relaxations category-wise. 7.6. Having regard to the above framework, this Court is of the considered view that the scheme of Rule 9 of the Rules of 1973 demonstrates a deliberate legislative design in carving out age relaxations category-wise. Article 309 of the Constitution of India empowers the rule-making authority to stipulate such conditions of eligibility as it may deem fit in public interest. Once the authority, acting under such constitutional mandate, has consciously provided differentiated relaxations with clear limits, the Court cannot, in exercise of interpretative power, either enlarge the scope or permit cumulative benefits in the absence of an express enabling provision. 7.7. The very object of distinct relaxations is to balance the considerations of equity and administrative efficiency for each class of candidates. For example, unlimited relaxation for widows and divorcees is premised on their peculiar social disadvantage; a capped relaxation for contract employees seeks to recognize service already rendered; a limited relaxation for postgraduates reflects the State’s policy to incentivize higher education without disturbing the overall age balance in service. To allow aggregation across these categories would dilute the carefully crafted scheme, leading to anomalous results unintended by the rule-making authority. 7.8. Moreover, the principle that separate relaxations cannot be clubbed unless specifically provided has been consistently recognized. In service jurisprudence, cumulative relaxation is treated as an exception and not the norm. The absence of any enabling clause in Rule 9 of the Rules of 1973 must, therefore, be construed as a conscious exclusion by the framers of the Rules. To read into it a right of cumulative relaxation would not only violate the settled doctrine of casus omissus but also amount to judicial legislation, which is impermissible. 7.9. In this backdrop, the plea advanced on behalf of the respondents, that cumulative relaxation must be inferred in the interest of fairness, is untenable. Fairness in recruitment is itself a product of adherence to the rule of law. Once the Rules of 1973, framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, prescribe distinct relaxations, fairness demands their uniform application to all candidates in that category, not their alteration through judicial innovation. Thus, the interpretation that emerges is that each relaxation carved out under Rule 9 operates within its own field and must be applied independently. Cumulative relaxation is impermissible unless expressly provided by the Rules themselves. 7.10. Thus, the interpretation that emerges is that each relaxation carved out under Rule 9 operates within its own field and must be applied independently. Cumulative relaxation is impermissible unless expressly provided by the Rules themselves. 7.10. At this stage, it is considered appropriate to make reference of the judgment of this Hon’ble Court rendered in the case of Alsa Ram Meghwal v. RPSC & Anr. ,(D.B. Civil Special Appeal (W) No. 1141/2008, decided on 29.04.2016) . In the said case, the Hon’ble Division Bench was confronted with a claim for cumulative relaxation by an in-service candidate who also belonged to a reserved category. The Court categorically rejected such claim, holding that once the Rules prescribe a distinct upper age limit for in-service candidates, the same is a substantive provision and not a relaxation, and that no further benefit can be superimposed thereupon under other clauses. 7.11. Furthermore, the Explanatory Note appended to the advertisement in Alsa Ram Meghwal (Supra) , which stipulated that if a candidate was entitled to relaxation under more than one category, he/she could avail benefit under only one clause. The Hon’ble Division Bench upheld the validity of such stipulation, observing that it was consistent with the scheme of the Rules and that permitting aggregation would amount to reading into the Rules what was never intended by the rule-making authority. 7.12. The principle emerging from Alsa Ram Meghwal (Supra) thus reinforces the position that each category of relaxation has an independent policy rationale, and that cumulative relaxation is not permissible unless expressly provided for either in the Rules or in the advertisement. 7.13. It is noteworthy that the aforesaid judgment was subsequently relied upon by the judgment of learned Single Judge in the case of Dhuleshwar Ghogra (Supra ) . In Dhuleshwar Ghogra (Supra) , the Court reiterated the principle that cumulative relaxation in age is impermissible under the Rules of 1973, and that each relaxation provision applies to a distinct class of candidates with its own policy objective. Thus, the present controversy stands squarely covered by the ratio of Alsa Ram Meghwal (Supra) as affirmed and applied in Dhuleshwar Ghogra (Supra) 7.13.1. In Dhuleshwar Ghogra (supra) , the learned Single Bench of this Court, by giving a concrete example, demonstrated the impractical outcome of permitting cumulative relaxations of the kind claimed in the present case. Thus, the present controversy stands squarely covered by the ratio of Alsa Ram Meghwal (Supra) as affirmed and applied in Dhuleshwar Ghogra (Supra) 7.13.1. In Dhuleshwar Ghogra (supra) , the learned Single Bench of this Court, by giving a concrete example, demonstrated the impractical outcome of permitting cumulative relaxations of the kind claimed in the present case. It was observed that such an interpretation would virtually nullify the prescribed upper age limit and lead to indefinite eligibility, which the Rule-making authority never intended. For ready reference, the relevant portion of the judgment in Dhuleshwar Ghogra (supra) is reproduced as under: “For example, if a Scheduled Caste woman candidate is working with the respondent-Department on contractual basis, then as per the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, she is required to be given relaxation in upper age limit of 18 years (10 yrs. for SC Category, 5 yrs. for working on contractual basis & 3 yrs. for not conducting recruitment) i.e. upto the age of 53 years (35 yrs. + 10 yrs. + 5 yrs. + 3 yrs.). The intention of the legislature is not to be taken in such a fashion that it breaches the basic and fundamental principle of consideration of the age as provided in the rule itself which clearly prescribes the age of a candidate to be considered between 18-35 years only and proviso provides for certain relaxations in certain conditions.” 7.14. It is of significance that in the instant case also advertisement pursuant to which the present selection process was initiated expressly stipulates that the benefit of age relaxation shall be non-cumulative. The relevant portion of the advertisement in question i.e. Advertisement No.04/2023 reads as follows :- fofHkUu oxksZ @vU; fof'k"B Jsf.k;ksa gsrq ns; vk;q lhek esa NwV ds izko/kku dz-la- vH;fFkZ;ksa dk oxZ ,oa vU; fof'k"B Jsf.k;ka vf/kdre vk;q esa ns; NwV 1- jktLFkku jkT; ds vuqlwfpr tkfr] vuqlwfpr tutkfr] fiNM+k oxZ ,oa vkfkFkZd :i ls detksj oxZ ds iq:’k vH;FkhZ Male candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled tribes, Other Backward Classes, Most Backward Classes of Rajasthan State and EWS. 5 o"kZ 2- LkkekU; oxZ dh efgyk Women Candidates belonging to General Category. 5 o"kZ 2- LkkekU; oxZ dh efgyk Women Candidates belonging to General Category. 5 o"kZ 3- jktLFkku jkT; ds vuqlwfpr tkfr] vuqlwfpr tutkfr] fiNM+k oxZ ,oa vkfkFkZd :i ls detksj oxZ dhs efgyk vH;FkhZ Women candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled tribes, Other Backward Classes, Most Backward Classes of Rajasthan State and EWS. 10 o"kZ 4- fo/kok ,oa fofNUu fookg ¼ifjR;Drk½ efgyk Widow and divorcee Women Explanation :- In the case of widow, she will have to furnish a certificate of death of her husband from the Competent Authority and in case of divorcee, she will have to furnish the proof of divorce. vf/kdre vk;q lhek ugha 5- fjtfofZLV vFkkZr izfrj{kk lsok ds deZpkjh ftudk fjtoZ esa lhekUrj.k dj fn;k x;k gks] ds ekeys esa mifjof.kZr mijh vk;q lhek 50 o"kZ gksxhA The upper age limit shall be 50 years in the case of reservists, namely the Defence Service personnel who were transferred in the Reserve. 6- mifjof.kZr mijh vk;q lhek ,sls HkwriwoZ dSnh ds ekeys esa ykxw ugha gksxh] tks viuh nks"kflf) ds iwoZ ljdkj ds v/khu fdlh in ij substantive rkSj ij lsok dj pqdk Fkk vkSj bu fu;eksa ds v/khu fu;qfdr dk ik= FkkA The upper age limit mentioned above shall not apply in the case of an ex-prisoner who had served under the Government on a substantive basis on any post before his conviction and was eligible for appointment under these Rules. 7- vU; HkwriwoZ dSnh tks nf.Mr gksus ls iwoZ vf/kdk;q dk ugha Fkk vkSj bu fu;eksa ds rgr fu;qfDr ds ;ksX; Fkk] ds ekeys esa dkjkokl esa O;rhr dh xbZ vof/k ds cjkcj mifjof.fkZr mijh vk;q lhek NwV esa gksxhA In the case of other ex-prisoners, the upper age limit mentioned above shall be relaxed by a period equal to the term of imprisonment served by him provided he was not over age before his conviction and was eligible for appointment under these Rules. 8- bl lsok ¼jktLFkku vk;qosZfnd] ;wukuh] gksE;ksiSfFkd ,oa Hkkjrh; fpfdRlk lsok fu;e] 1973½ ds fdlh in ij vLFkkbZ fu;qDr O;fDr ;fn izkjfEHkd fu;qfDr ds le; vk;q lhek esa Fks rks mUgsa vk;q lhek esa gh le>k tk;sxk] pkgs os MkS- loZiYyh jk/kkd`".ku jktLFkku vk;qosZn fo'ofo|ky;] tks/kiqj ds le{k vkf[kjh mifLFkfr ds le; mls ikj dj lds gksA vkSj ;fn os izkjfEHkd fu;qfDr ds le; bl izdkj ik= Fks rks mUgsa volj fn;s tkosaxsA A person appointed temporarily to the post in the service (The rajasthan ayurvedic, Unani, Homeopathy and naturopathy service Rules 1973) Shall be deemed to be within the age limit had when he was initially appointed even though he has crossed the age limit when he appears finally before the Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan Rajasthan Ayurveda University Jodhpur and shall be allowed upto two chances had he been eligible as such at the time of his initial appointment. 9- dSMsV vuqns'kdksa ds ekeys esa mifjof.kZr mijh vk;q lhek esa] muds }kjk jk"Vªh; dSMsV dksj esa dh xbZ lsok ds cjkcj dh dkykof/k dks f'kfFkZy fd;k tk;sxk ;fn ifjekf.kd vk;q fofgr vf/kdre vk;q lhek ls rhu o"kZ ls vf/kd u gks rks ,sls vH;FkhZ dks fofgr vk;q lhek esa le>k tk;sxkA That the upper age limit mentioned above, shall be relaxed by a period equal to the service rendered in the National Cadet Corpos in the case of Cadet Instructors and if the resultant age does not exceed the prescribed maximum age limit by more than three years, such candidates shall be deemed to be within the prescribed age limit. 10- fueqZDr vkikr deh'ku izkIr vf/kdkfj;ksa dks ,oa y?kq lsok deh'ku izkIr vf/kdkfj;ksa dks] lsuk ls fueqZDr gksus ds i'pkr tc os jktLFkku vk;qosZn fo'ofo|ky;] tks/kiqj ds le{k mifLFkr gks] vk;q lhek esa le>k tk;sxk pkgs mUgksaus vk;q lhek ikj dj yh gks ;fn os lsuk esa deh'ku xzg.k djus ds le; vk;q lhek dh n`f"V ls ik= FksA That the Released Emergency Commissioned Officers & Short Service Commissioned Officers after release from Army shall be deemed to be within the age-limit even though they have cross the age-limit when they appear before University had they been eligible as such at the time of their joining the Commission in the Army. 11- jktLFkku fnO;kaxtu vf/kdkj fu;e] 2018 ds vuqlkj fu%'kDrtu O;fDr;ksa ds fy;s mij mYysf[kr mijh vk;q lhek esa 05 o"kZ dh NwV ns; gksxhA According to the Rajasthan Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2018, the upper age limit mentioned above shall be relaxed by 05 years for persons with benchmarks disabilities. 12- tks O;fDr jkT; ljdkj] ,u-vkj-,p-,e eq[;ea=h ch-ih-,y- thou j{kk dks"k ds rgr ;wukuh fpfdRlkf/kdkfj;ks ds in ij yxkrkj dke dj jgk gS] dks dh xbZ lsok ds cjkcj vof/k esa mi;qZDr vf/kdre vk;q lhek esa NwV nh tk;sxh tks fd vf/kdre ikap o"kZ dh gksxhA The upper age limit mentioned above, for the person who is continuously working as Unani Chikitsadhikari in Government, Chief Minister BPS Jeeva Raksha Kosh, National Rural Health Mission shall be relaxed by the period equal to the service rendered by him subject to maximum five years. 13- ;wukuh esa Lukrdksrj mikf/k j[kus okys mEehnokjksa ds ekeys esa mijh vk;q lhek esa rhu o"kZ dh NwV nh tk;sxhA The upper age limit shall be relaxed by three years in the case of candidates holding post graduate Degree in Unani. 14- ¼v½ & dkfeZd foHkkx dh vf/klwpuk fnukad 23-09-2008 ds vuqlkj xr o’kksZ esa bu inksa ij HkrhZ ugha fd;s tkus ds dkj.k vf/kdre vk;q lhek es 03 o"kZ f'kfFkyrk fn;s tkus dk izko/kku gSA As per DOP Notification No.F.7(6) DOP/A-II/2008 Dated 23-09-08 “If a candidate would have been entitled in respect of his/her age for direct recruitment in any year in which no such recruitment was held, he she shall be deemed to be eligible in the next following recruitment, if he/she is not overage by more than 3 years.” mDr izko/kkuksa ds vUrxZr pwafd foHkkx }kjk o"kZ 2013 esa HkrhZ dh xbZ gS ftlesa vk;q x.kuk rRle; ds vk/kkj ij dh xbZ gS vr% vf/klwpuk fnukad 23-09-2008 ds dze esa fu;ekuqlkj vf/kdre vk;q lhek esa 03 o"kZ dh f'kfFkyrk ns; gksxhA 15- jktLFkku flfoy lsok ¼HkwriwoZ lSfudksa dk vkesyu½ fu;e] 1988 ds vuqlkj HkwriwoZ lSfudksa dks mijh vk;q lhek esa 05 o"kZ dh NwV ns; gksxh ijUrq ;g fd f'kfFkyhdj.k ds i'pkr ;fn vuqKs; vk;q 50 o"kZ ls vf/kd fudyrh gS rks rks mijh vk;q lhek 50 o"kZ ykxw gksxhA According to the Rajasthan Civil Services (Absorption of Ex-servicemen) Rules, 1988, relaxation in upper age limit shall be five years to Ex- servicemen. Provided that if permissible age after relaxation works out to be more than 50 years then upper age limit of 50 years will be applicable. Li"Vhdj.k %& dkfeZe ¼d&2½ foHkkx ds ifji= fnukad 22-08-2019 ds vuqlkj jktLFkku flfoy lsok ¼HkwriwoZ lSfudksa dk vkesyu½ fu;e] 1988 ;Fkkla'kksf/kr ds izko/kkuksa ds gksrs gq, Hkh fdlh HkrhZ ls lacf/kr lsok fu;eksa esa vk;q lac/kh tks f'kfFkyrk vU; yksd lsodksa@vH;fFkZ;ksa dks ns; gS] og HkwriwoZ lSfud dks Hkh ns; gksxh vFkkZr vk;q lac/kh f'kfFkfyrk ds lEca/k esa nksuksa fu;eksa esa tks Hkh fgrdj izko/kku gS]mmldk ykHk HkwriwoZ lSfudksa dks feysxkA uksV& 1- mi;qZDr of.kZr vk;q lhek esa NwV ds izko/kku valp;h -(non-cumulative) gS] vFkkZr vHk;fFkZ;ksa dks mi;qqZDr of.kZr fdlh Hkh ,d izko/kku dk vf/kdre vk;q lhek esa NwV dk ykHk fn;k tk;sxk] ,d ls vf/kd izko/kkuksa dks tksM+ dj vk;qlhek esa NwV dk ykHk ugha fn;k tk;sxkA 2- fo'ks"k ;ksX;tu dks mijh vk;q lhek es fu;ekuqlkj ns; NwV ds i'pkr vfrfjDr NwV ns; gksxhA 3- dkfeZd ¼d&2½ foHkkx ds ifji= fnukad 26-07-2017 ds vuqlkj ;fn fdlh vkjf{kr oxZ (SC/ST/BC/MBC/EWS) ds vH;FkhZ }kjk 'kqYd ds vfrfjDr mudks ns; fdlh vU; fj;k;r ¼tSls &vkqlhek vkfn½ dk ykHk fn;k tkrk gS rks mls vukjf{kr fjfdR;ksa ds izfr fopkfjr ugha fd;k tk;sxkA 4- jktLFkku lsok fu;e ds vuqlkj ljdkjh deZpkjh gsrq lsokfuo`fr dh vk;q 60 o"kZ fu/kkZfjr gSA blfy, fu;qfDr fnukad rd vH;FkhZ dh vk;q 60 o"kZ ls vf/kd ugha gksuh pkfg,A 5- vk;q lhek esa NwV ds izko/kku fgUnh o vaxzsth Hkk"kk esa vafdr fd;s x;s gSA fdlh izdkj ds fof/kd okn dh fLFkfr esa vaxzsth Hkk"kk esa vafdr izko/kku gh ekU; gksxsaA 7.14.1. This Court further observes that once such a condition is notified to all prospective applicants at the very threshold, it binds both the candidates as well as the recruiting authority, as participation in the process is premised on acceptance of those terms. It is a settled principle that conditions of recruitment specifically incorporated in the advertisement cannot be diluted or re-written by judicial interpretation, unless they are shown to be in direct conflict with the parent Rules or the Constitution. In the present case, the stipulation of non-cumulative relaxation is not only consistent with the scheme of Rule 9 of the Rules of 1973 but also reinforces the legislative intent that each category of relaxation operates independently. This leaves no scope to infer a right of cumulative benefit. 7.15. In the present case, the stipulation of non-cumulative relaxation is not only consistent with the scheme of Rule 9 of the Rules of 1973 but also reinforces the legislative intent that each category of relaxation operates independently. This leaves no scope to infer a right of cumulative benefit. 7.15. In this backdrop, the correct legal position can be summarized in the following manner: • If the Rule itself provides for cumulative relaxation, the same must be respected. • If the Rule prescribes non-cumulative relaxation, then the Rule will prevail. • If the Rule is silent, the advertisement will govern the recruitment (as in the present case). • If both the Rule and the advertisement are silent, the default position is that relaxation will be non- cumulative. • If the State intends to extend cumulative benefit, it must do so by express stipulation in the Rule or the advertisement. • Thus, if the Rule is speaking, the Rule will prevail; if silent, the advertisement will prevail. (“Rules of the game cannot be changed midway after the process of appointment to public post has already begun.”) 7.16. Tested on these touchstones, the respondents/writ petitioners cannot claim cumulative relaxation, as the Rules of 1973 are silent and the advertisement explicitly rules out such aggregation. Thus the binding terms of the advertisement cannot be disregarded and travelled beyond the governing framework. 7.17. Thus, in view of the foregoing discussion, this Court holds that the Rules of 1973 do not envisage cumulative age relaxation across different categories. Each relaxation under Rule 9 of the said Rules is to be applied independently within its own sphere. The express stipulation in the advertisement that relaxations shall be non-cumulative is consistent with the statutory framework and cannot be termed arbitrary or de hors the Rules. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was not justified in directing the appellants to extend cumulative relaxation to the respondents. 8. Consequently, the present special appeals are allowed , and accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 21.05.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge is quashed and set aside. All pending applications stand disposed of.