ORDER : 1. The petitioner has approached this Court assailing the preliminary notification dated 08.09.1987 and the final notification dated 28.07.1990 issued for acquisition of land measuring 15 guntas in Sy. No. 3/2 of Arekere Village, Begur Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk. Brief facts. 2. The petitioner claims title over the land through his father, late Munipapaiah who was conferred occupancy rights under the Land Reforms Act. The entire 36 guntas in Sy. No. 3/2 was notified for acquisition in 1987-88 for formation of BTM 6th stage layout. The claim of the petitioner is that the BDA's endorsement dated 12.03.2014 (Annexure Q) confirms that no award has been passed, no possession has been taken and the land has not been utilized. After the demise of the petitioner's father, the petitioner succeeded to 15 guntas through a registered partition deed and continues to remain in uninterrupted physical possession. 3. Heard Sri Pramod N. Kathavi, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, the learned counsel for respondent No.1/BDA and the learned AGA for respondent No.2/State. 4. Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that the preliminary notification dated 08.09.1987 and the final notification dated 28.07.1990 has remained wholly unimplemented for more than three decades. He draws the attention of the Court to the endorsement dated 12.03.2014 issued by the BDA at Annexure Q wherein the BDA has categorically admitted that no award has been passed, no possession has been taken and the land has been utilized for the formation of the scheme. Relying upon the decision of this Court in Ravindra T. and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others , W.P. No. 55159/2014, dated 19.07.2022 (Ravindra) the learned Senior Counsel contends that mere dismissal of an earlier petition for want of relevant material does not operate as a res judicata nor can it be construed as a decision on merits. As held therein, unless and until the authority demonstrate substantial implementation of the scheme, the land owner continues to have a recurring cause of action to challenge the acquisition, and the earlier dismissal cannot defeat his statutory and constitutional rights. 5. As held therein, unless and until the authority demonstrate substantial implementation of the scheme, the land owner continues to have a recurring cause of action to challenge the acquisition, and the earlier dismissal cannot defeat his statutory and constitutional rights. 5. He places reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Offshore Holdings Private Limited vs. Bangalore Development Authority and Others, (2011) 3 SCC 139 (Offshore Holdings Private Limited) to contend that the land can be said to vest in the State Government only upon passing of the award and taking possession as contemplated under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In the absence of these essential steps, and particularly when the scheme itself has lapsed, the further operation of Section 36 sub-clause 3 of the BDA Act becomes inoperative, rendering the acquisition incapable of being enforced. On this foundation it is submitted that the acquisition has been abandoned by respondent no. 1 and therefore deserves to be quashed. 6. Learned Senior Counsel further relies on the Division Bench judgment in Bangalore Development Authority vs. State of Karnataka and Others , ILR 2018 KAR 2144 (BDA) wherein it has been held that even in the absence of statutory time limit, the power of acquisition must be exercised within a reasonable period. The Division Bench has clarified that an acquisition, once initiated, must be completed by passing the award, paying the compensation and taking possession within a reasonable time, failing which the proceedings cannot be permitted to linger indefinitely. Reference is also made to C. Jacob vs Secretary and Another , 2020 SCC Online Kar 308 (C.Jacob), wherein this Court held that if the BDA itself had not pursued the acquisition and has allowed that scheme to remain unimplemented, such amounts to abandonment of the acquisition entitling the land owner to seek quashing of the notification. Accordingly, it is submitted in view of the consistent judicial pronouncement and admitted position in the BDA’s endorsement itself, the acquisition initiated under the notifications dated 08.09.1987 and 28.07.1990 has lapsed, the scheme has never been implemented and the writ petition therefore deserves to be allowed. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 - BDA submits that the writ petition is barred by res judicata, as the petitioner's father had earlier filed WP 19796 of 1990, which was dismissed. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 - BDA submits that the writ petition is barred by res judicata, as the petitioner's father had earlier filed WP 19796 of 1990, which was dismissed. Further it is submitted that the petition suffers from delay and latches after having filed 35 years after the notification. It is further submitted that the petitioner is estopped from challenging the notification since he sought compensation through a letter. Further it is asserted that an award has been passed on 18.12.1995 and that the land is required for public purpose. The petitioner is entitled only for compensation and not restoration of land. 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the points that arise for consideration are : (i) Whether the writ petition filed earlier by the petitioner's father operates as a res judicata? (ii) Whether the scheme had lapsed in terms of Section 27 of the BDA Act? 9. This Court has carefully considered the contentions urged and perused the material on record. POINT No. (i) 10. The earlier writ petition was filed against the preliminary notification and the final notification by the father of the petitioner Munipapaiah contending that he was the lawful occupant/khatedar. The writ petition was challenged on the ground that acquisition was illegal, without jurisdiction, notices were not issued to the petitioner's father and the owner Halsuru Nanjappa and the petitioner further contended that the owner had no subsisting right after the Land Tribunal's order. Further on the ground that the scheme was not properly prepared or approved and that the petitioner's father's objections were not considered to the effect that they had built a house on the land. Hence the petitioner's father had sought for quashing of the acquisition notice dated 21.08.1980 and an order of restraint to BDA from dispossessing him. The said petition came to be dismissed on 24.09.1996. The earlier writ petition did not decide whether the scheme was implemented, whether the award was passed or possession was taken. Hence the dismissal of the earlier writ petition does not operate as a res judicata. 11. The writ petition filed by the petitioner's father was dismissed on 24.09.1996. From 1996 down to date for nearly 35 years there is no compliance with the scheme. Hence the dismissal of the earlier writ petition does not operate as a res judicata. 11. The writ petition filed by the petitioner's father was dismissed on 24.09.1996. From 1996 down to date for nearly 35 years there is no compliance with the scheme. When such is being the position, then the Court would be well within its power to exercise jurisdiction to declare the scheme has lapsed in terms of Section 27 of the BDA Act. Merely because writ petition was dismissed on the earlier occasion for want of relevant material or for any other reasons other than the scheme was not implemented, scheme lapsed, award was not passed or possession was not taken. The petitioners would have a continuous cause of action to adjudicate/agitate the issue as regards to the non-compliance of the scheme. The coordinate bench of this Court in Ravindra (supra) dealing with a similar issue has held at para No. 15 as under : “15. Answer to Point No.1: Whether a Writ Petition earlier filed contending that the Scheme had lapsed in terms of Section 27 of the BDA Act having been dismissed, can petitioner file another Writ Petition on similar as also on additional grounds? 15.1. It is not in dispute that the petitioners had filed a Writ Petition in W.P.No.19877/2007 contending that the Scheme had lapsed. This Court dismissed the said Writ Petition on 16.08.2010 on the ground that there are no relevant materials produced by the petitioner to point out substantial lapse of the Scheme. 15.2. Whether a Scheme has lapsed or not, in my considered opinion, is a continuing cause of action inasmuch as if a petition is filed for declaration that the Scheme has lapsed, at the end of 10 years, which came to be dismissed and another petition is filed at the end of 15 years placing on record that there is no substantial compliance with the Scheme, then this Court would be well within its powers to exercise jurisdiction to declare the Scheme has lapsed in terms of Section 27 of BDA Act. If however, the court were to come to a positive conclusion that the scheme has been implemented the same would constitute res judicata, since once a scheme is stated to have been substantially implemented no further proceeding could be filed stating that the scheme has not been substantially implemented. 15.3. If however, the court were to come to a positive conclusion that the scheme has been implemented the same would constitute res judicata, since once a scheme is stated to have been substantially implemented no further proceeding could be filed stating that the scheme has not been substantially implemented. 15.3. Merely because a Writ Petition was dismissed on an earlier occasion for lack of relevant material, in my considered opinion cannot amount to a decision having been rendered on merits, there being no finding as regards whether the scheme has been implemented or not, if implemented whether it is substantially implemented or not and as such the same would not disentitle the petitioners to raise the same issue once again since until and unless there is a substantial compliance of the Scheme, the petitioners would have a continuing cause of action to agitate the issue as regards the non-compliance with the Scheme. The situation is akin to a suit for injunction whenever there is any fresh cause of action to file a suit for injunction, the dismissal of an earlier suit would not come in the way of a fresh suit so long as the fresh suit is based on a fresh cause of action. This court in UFM Sudarshan Manjunath Hegde Vs. UFM Satyanarayan Govind Hegde in RSA No. 5125 of 2013 more particularly para 3 thereof has observed as follows: 3. It is needless to emphasize that the cause of action to file an injunction suit is a continuous cause of action. If at all the plaintiff were to establish that there is a subsequent interference he can file one more suit. 15.4. Hence, I answer Point No.1 by holding that the earlier Writ Petition filed in W.P.No.19877/2007 which came to be dismissed on 16.08.2010 on the ground that there are no relevant materials placed on record would not act as a res judicata and/or bar the petitioners from filing the present Writ Petition.” 12. The findings regarding the res judicata squarely applies to the present facts. As in the earlier writ petition, there was no determination whether the scheme was implemented and in the absence of the same, it cannot be a bar to a later challenge. Accordingly, point No. (i) is answered with emphatic ‘No’. Point No. (ii) 13. The Apex Court in the case of Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has observed at para Nos. Accordingly, point No. (i) is answered with emphatic ‘No’. Point No. (ii) 13. The Apex Court in the case of Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has observed at para Nos. 38 and 39 as under : “38. On a conjunctive reading of the provisions of Sections 27 and 36 of the State Act, it is clear that where a scheme lapses the acquisition may not. This, of course, will depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. Where, upon completion of the acquisition proceedings, the land has vested in the State Government in terms of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquisition would not lapse or terminate as a result of lapsing of the scheme under Section 27 of the BDA Act. An argument to the contrary cannot be accepted for the reason that on vesting, the land stands transferred and vested in the State/Authority free from all encumbrances and such status of the property is incapable of being altered by fiction of law either by the State Act or by the Central Act. Both these Acts do not contain any provision in terms of which property, once and absolutely, vested in the State can be reverted to the owner on any condition. There is no reversal of the title and possession of the State. However, this proceedings may not be true in cases where acquisition are still pending and land has not been vested in the Government in terms of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act. 39. What is meant by the language of Section 27 of the BDA Act, i.e. "provisions of Section 36 shall become inoperative", is that if the acquisition proceedings are pending and where the scheme has lapsed, further proceedings in terms of Section 36(3) of the BDA Act, i.e. with reference to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act shall become inoperative. Once the land which, upon its acquisition, has vested in the State and thereafter vested in the Authority in terms of Section 36(3); such vesting is incapable of being disturbed except in the case where the Government issues a notification for re-vesting the land in itself, or a Corporation, or a local Authority in cases where the land is not required by the Authority under the provisions of Section 37(3) of the BDA Act.” 14. The Apex Court observed that the land can stand vested in the Government only upon passing of notification under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and if the acquisition proceedings are pending and scheme has lapsed, further proceedings in terms of Section 36(3) of the BDA Act becomes inoperative. BDA's own endorsement dated 12.03.2014 admits, “no award passed, no possession taken and land was not utilized”. This unequivocal admission demolishes the BDA's plea of an award having been passed and non-passing of an award for more than 30 years is fatal. When notification is issued for acquisition, a scheme must be substantially implemented within 5 years of the final notification. Even after the lapse of more than 30 years there is zero implementation of the scheme. The power conferred on any authority is to be exercised reasonably and reasonable exercise of power includes exercise of the same within a reasonable period. It is settled law that in a statute where for exercise of power no time limit is fixed, it has to be exercised within a time which can be held to be reasonable. 15. The acquisition proceedings kept pending without any implementation is depriving the owners, the right of property under Article 300A of the Constitution. The final notification was issued way back in the year 1990. So far neither an award has been passed nor possession has been taken over by paying compensation. Hence the acquisition having been abandoned stands lapsed on account of omission on part of the BDA in respect of the petitioner's land. The Division Bench of this Court in BDA (supra) has held at para Nos. 5 and 8 as under : “5. It is no longer res-integra that power conferred on any authority be exercised reasonably and reasonable exercise of power includes exercise of the same within a reasonable period. An acquisition proceeding once initiated has to be completed by passing an award and paying compensation followed by taking over possession within a reasonable period. This has to be strictly followed even in the absence of any statutory limit prescribed for passing of award and completing the acquisition proceedings. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the judgment in the case of RAMCHAND & OTHERS vs. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS' The Apex Court has laid down in para 14 as under: "14. This has to be strictly followed even in the absence of any statutory limit prescribed for passing of award and completing the acquisition proceedings. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the judgment in the case of RAMCHAND & OTHERS vs. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS' The Apex Court has laid down in para 14 as under: "14. The Parliament has recognised and taken note of the inaction and non-exercise of the statutory power on the part of the authorities, enjoined by the provisions of the Act to complete the acquisition proceedings within a reasonable time and because of that now a time-limit has been fixed for making of the award, failing which the entire proceeding for acquisition shall lapse. But, can it be said that before the introduction of the aforesaid amendment in the Act, the authorities were at liberty to proceed with the acquisition proceedings, irrespective of any schedule or time-frame and to complete the same as and when they desired? It is settled that in a statute where for exercise of power no time-limit is fixed, it has to be exercised within a time which can be held to be reasonable…...” 8. In the present cases, though final notification was issued in the year 1971 so far, neither award has been passed nor possession has been taken over by paying compensation. Therefore, the acquiring body has neither exercised its powers in a reasonable manner nor has it completed the acquisition proceeding within a reasonable period. Hence, acquisition having been abandoned stands lapsed on account of omission and commission on the part of the CITB/BDA in respect of writ petitioners/respondents' herein in so far as the land is concerned.” 16. The Apex Court in C. Jacob has held at para Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 as under : 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Additional Land Acquisition Officer has issued an endorsement dated 24.08.2005 at Annexure-D stating that 3 acres 20 guntas of land in Sy. No.36/4 which was notified for acquisition for purpose of HBR I Stage Layout, and where final notification was issued on 09.1.1985, however award has not been made in view of the fact that there are unauthorized construction in the land in question. 4. No.36/4 which was notified for acquisition for purpose of HBR I Stage Layout, and where final notification was issued on 09.1.1985, however award has not been made in view of the fact that there are unauthorized construction in the land in question. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner further draws the attention of this Court to the statement of objections filed by the 2 nd respondent- BDA, where at para No. 5 it has beenstated that after the issuance of the final notification possession has not been taken nor award has been drawn with respect to the balance extent of land. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that under similar circumstances, in W.P. No. 3596- 97/2014, which was disposed of on 26.02.2014, this Court declared that the land having not been utilized for the purpose for which it was acquired and since no award had been passed, the acquisition proceedings could not be permitted to pursue. A Division Bench in the case of Bangalore Development Authority v. State of Karnataka, represented by Principal Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development, reported in ILR 2018 Kar 2144 noticed the decision of another Division Bench in the case of H.N. Shivanna v. The State of Karnataka, 2013 (4) KCCR 2793 . There, it was noticed that the Apex Court in the case of Ramchand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44 had held that two years is reasonable time within which a final declaration has to be issued, if there are no hurdles placed in the acquisition by the land owners or if there are no hurdles in law. Even in the absence of any such prescription expressly provided under the statute, having regard to the fact that the right to property is a constitutional right and the person whose land is sought to be acquired is entitled to compensation at the market rate, such a compensation has to be paid to him at the earliest and therefore, the power of acquisition should be exercised within a reasonable time so that the persons who lost the land are duly compensated at. the earliest point of time. However in that case, the Division Bench noticed that though the final notification was issued in the year 1971, neither the award was passed nor possession was taken by paying compensation. the earliest point of time. However in that case, the Division Bench noticed that though the final notification was issued in the year 1971, neither the award was passed nor possession was taken by paying compensation. Therefore, it was held that the acquiring body had neither exercised its power within a reasonable time nor has it completed acquisition proceedings within a reasonable period. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and it was declared that the acquisition proceedings in respect of the land in question has stood abandoned and consequently lapsed. 6. In the light of the above, this Court finds that the respondent-BDA has in fact admitted that the preliminary notification was issued on 27.06.1978 and final notification was issued on 09.01.1985 and thereafter no award has been passed nor possession of the land in question has been taken in accordance with law. In the endorsement dated 28.04.2005 nothing is stated regarding any impediment in passing the award or payment of compensation. Therefore, in the light of the decisions mentioned above and for the reasons stated therein, this court proceeds to pass the following: (i) The writ petition is allowed. (ii) It is hereby declared that the acquisition proceedings in respect of the land in question has stood abandoned and consequently lapsed.” 17. In view of the facts narrated above and the decisions, it can be safely gathered that the respondent No. 1 has abandoned the acquisition proceedings. Accordingly, this Court pass the following : ORDER: (i) The Writ Petition is allowed. (ii) It is hereby declared that the acquisition proceedings initiated has stood abandoned and consequently lapsed in so far as it relates to the petitioner’s land.