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2025 DIGILAW 156 (ALL)

Sabooj v. State of U. P.

2025-01-31

J.J.MUNIR

body2025
JUDGMENT : J.J. Munir, J. 1. Heard Mr. R.S. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioners in support of this petition at great length and Mr. Sharad Chandra Upadhyay, learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents. 2. It appears that in a revision arising out of a title matter under Section 48 (3) of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gorakhpur, gave ample opportunities to the learned counsel for the petitioners to argue the matter, but he did not. 10th July, 2015 was fixed for hearing and the learned counsel for the revisionists appeared to advance his submissions, but learned counsel for the petitioners here, who were opposite parties to the revision, sought time. The matter was adjourned to 24th October, 2015 in order to enable the petitioners' counsel to advance his submissions. Prior to these proceedings, learned counsel for the parties were given opportunity to put in their written submissions, which the learned counsel for the revisionists before the Deputy Director of Consolidation availed, but not the learned counsel for the petitioners. 3. After affording adequate opportunity of hearing, when learned counsel for the petitioner did not advance his submissions, the Deputy Director of Consolidation proceeded to decide the revision, allowing it with an order of remand to the Settlement Officer of Consolidation to hear the appeal afresh. 4. This order was passed on 2nd May, 2018. A restoration application was filed by the petitioner on 23rd January, 2019 along with an application for condonation of delay. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gorakhpur, after taking into account the conduct of the petitioner including the learned counsel, which was indeed dilatory, declined to accept the prayer for condonation of delay. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that the junior of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner was unwell during the said period of time. He has invited the Court's attention to some medical records relating to Mr. Lallu Prasad Chaudhary, Advocate issued by a certain M.M. Nursing Home, Gorakhpur, which show that the learned counsel was a patient of hydrocele. There is another medical record, a discharge summary from the Ramakrishna Mission Sevashram Vivekananda Polyclinic & Institute of Medical Sciences, Department of Neurosurgery, Lucknow, which shows that the junior to the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Lallu Prasad Chaudhary, Advocate issued by a certain M.M. Nursing Home, Gorakhpur, which show that the learned counsel was a patient of hydrocele. There is another medical record, a discharge summary from the Ramakrishna Mission Sevashram Vivekananda Polyclinic & Institute of Medical Sciences, Department of Neurosurgery, Lucknow, which shows that the junior to the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Vivekanand, Advocate was unwell and admitted to the said hospital on 8th October, 2018 and discharged on 17th October, 2018 after a surgery. Page No. 71 is the discharge summary relating to the petitioner's counsel's junior Mr. Vivekanand, which shows that he was admitted to the Sanjay Gandhi Post Graduate Institute of Medical Sciences, Raebareli Road, Lucknow on 29th November, 2018 and discharged on 01st January, 2019 with a diagnosis of Posterior 3rd Ventricle Region Tumor Ependynome with HCP with No Neurological deficit (101.02). The petitioner's counsel Mr. Lallu Prasad Chaudhary is not his own junior. It does not appear that Mr. Lallu Prasad Chaudhary was admitted for any medical attention. All that appears is that he is a patient of hydrocele, which is a common ailment and not a very life-threatening condition. While the Court may have sympathy with the learned counsel as he was in some difficulties, proceedings of a case cannot be permitted to be adjourned by relying upon a medical problem of learned counsel. 6. We have reached a stage in the march of our society where criticism of Courts for delays has almost become a national past-time. Courts have to deliver in these difficult times and live up to the expectations of a society, which has not invested much in Courts, particularly, in terms of the quality of men and women sent forth to join the Bar. In these circumstances, courtesies that were earlier extended to the Bar may no longer be feasible. In consequence, if a litigant suffers because of the inability of the Court to extend courtesies to members of the Bar for their personal difficulties, it is an imperative or evil that cannot be eschewed. Therefore, for the personal difficulties of counsel, except in rare and exceptional cases, causes cannot be adjourned. 7. In consequence, if a litigant suffers because of the inability of the Court to extend courtesies to members of the Bar for their personal difficulties, it is an imperative or evil that cannot be eschewed. Therefore, for the personal difficulties of counsel, except in rare and exceptional cases, causes cannot be adjourned. 7. It is the demand of time and the burden of this new outlook in the society that has to be borne both by the members of legal profession and the litigants themselves, who are part of the society, that holds the Courts accountable for delays. As we have already remarked, proceedings in the revision show that ample opportunity was given to the petitioner to advance his submissions, which was not availed by the learned counsel. If indeed there was some difficulty with the learned counsel for the revisionists on account of medical problems, he had to make alternative arrangement, an accepted practice with the Bar. 8. It is also to be noticed that so far as hearing of the revision on merits is concerned, ample opportunity was given to the petitioner, as would appear from the remarks in the judgment and order dated 02nd May, 2018. The petitioners' counsel never availed it. In a situation like this, if at all a restoration application had to be filed, it has to be done with utmost promptitude and not with delay. The restoration application here was filed with a delay of eight months. This Court is convinced that the Revisional Court, in declining to condone the delay of eight months in filing the restoration application by the petitioner, did not commit any manifest error of law. The discretion not to find it sufficient cause was exercised on valid considerations and for sound reasons. 9. We do not find it to be a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. This petition fails and is dismissed summarily.