Order : (Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.) 1. This tax appeal preferred under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was admitted for hearing on 27-1-2025 by formulating a substantial question of law, which was modified on 14-2-2025, which reads as under: - “Whether the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal is justified in dismissing the appeal preferred by the appellant and affirming the order of Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) by holding that Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) has rightly dismissed the appeal of the appellant being barred by limitation, by recording a finding which is perverse to the record?” 2. In order to answer the aforesaid substantial question of law, following facts are required to be noticed: - 3. The Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise issued show cause notice to the appellant on 15-5-2017 and ultimately, after hearing the appellant, the Assistant Commissioner passed adjudication order on 5-12-2017. As per the provisions contained in Section 35(1) of the Central Excise Act, the order was required to be communicated by the Assistant Commissioner to the person aggrieved / appellant herein. According to the respondents herein, the said order was communicated to the appellant in original vide speed post / consignment No.EC080953003IN dispatched from their office on 15- 12-2017. However, it is the case of the appellant that the order of the Assistant Commissioner was actually received by him on 27-7- 2018 through e-mail and consequently, he preferred appeal before the Commissioner (Central Excise) on 25-9-2018 reciting that the order has been received by him on 27-7-2018. However, it is the case of the appellant that the order of the Assistant Commissioner was actually received by him on 27-7- 2018 through e-mail and consequently, he preferred appeal before the Commissioner (Central Excise) on 25-9-2018 reciting that the order has been received by him on 27-7-2018. However, by order dated 14-12-2018, the learned Commissioner (Central Excise) dismissed the appeal holding that the appeal is barred by limitation as it ought to have been preferred within 60 days from the date of communication of such order by speed post and feeling aggrieved against that order, the appellant herein preferred appeal under Section 35B of the Central Excise Act before the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) on 12-2-2019 which has also been dismissed by the said Tribunal holding that the Commissioner (Appeals) has rightly dismissed the appeal as there is no power conferred to the Commissioner (Appeals) to condone the delay of more than 30 days beyond 60 days during which the appeal was otherwise required to be filed relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and others , (2008) 3 SCC 70 . Assailing legality, validity and correctness of the judgment & order passed by the CESTAT affirming the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), this appeal has been preferred in which substantial question of law, as shown in the opening paragraph of this order, has already been formulated for consideration. 4. Mr. Adhiraj Surana, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/assessee, would submit that the Assistant Commissioner, Central Excise was required to communicate the order to the appellant by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 35(1) of the Central Excise Act and the mode of communication is provided in Section 37C. He would further submit that by virtue of Section 37C(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act, the order can also be served by speed post with proof of delivery as inserted in Section 37C(1)(a) with effect from 10-5-2013 and in the instant case, though the respondents have filed documents pursuant to the order of this Court that the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner was dispatched by speed post vide consignment No.EC080953003IN, but the said document clearly states that the status of delivery as appearing in Indiapost.gov.in says, “Consignment Details Not Found”. Once the order is received by e- mail on 27-7-2018, appeal has been filed on 25-9-2018 within the period of limitation, therefore, the appeal ought not to have been dismissed on the ground of being barred by limitation by the Commissioner (Appeals) and it ought not to have been affirmed by the CESTAT and both the authorities have concurrently erred in misapplying the period of limitation, as Section 35(1) of the Central Excise Act clearly provides that the order has to be communicated to the person aggrieved enabling him to avail the remedy available under the law of preferring appeal before the appellate authority i.e. the Commissioner (Appeals) within sixty days from the date of the communication to him of such decision or order. Section 37C of the Central Excise Act clearly provides that any decision or order passed under this Act or the rules made thereunder shall be served by speed post with proof of delivery, however, in the present case, though the order was sent to the appellant through speed post vide consignment No.EC080953003IN, but there is no proof of delivery, even there is a direction by this Court to produce the document showing communication of order which has not been produced which goes to show that the appellant was never communicated in compliance of Section 35(1) read with Section 37C(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act enabling him to prefer appeal. Therefore, the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as by the CESTAT holding the appeal to be barred by limitation deserves to be quashed by answering the substantial question of law in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue and decide the appeal afresh on its own merit in accordance with law. Mr. Surana would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Saral Wire Craft Private Limited v. Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise and Service Tax and others , (2015) 14 SCC 523 to buttress his submission. 5. Mr. Mr. Surana would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Saral Wire Craft Private Limited v. Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise and Service Tax and others , (2015) 14 SCC 523 to buttress his submission. 5. Mr. Maneesh Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the Revenue/respondents, would submit that the adjudication order dated 5-12- 2017 was dispatched on the same day by the authority vide speed post consignment No.EC080953003IN to the appellant’s address and by virtue of Section 37C(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act, tendering document by speed post is a valid service and as such, the Commissioner (Appeals) has rightly dismissed the appeal, which has been affirmed by the CESTAT by finding no jurisdictional error in the order. Therefore, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 7. In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be appropriate to notice Section 35(1) of the Central Excise Act, which states as under: - “35. Appeals to Commissioner (Appeals).—(1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act by a Central Excise Officer lower in rank than a Principal Commissioner of Central Excise or Commissioner of Central Excise may appeal to the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) [hereinafter in this Chapter referred to as the Commissioner (Appeals)] within sixty days from the date of the communication to him of such decision or order: Provided that the Commissioner (Appeals) may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of sixty days, allow it to be presented within a further period of thirty days.” 8. A careful perusal of Section 35(1) of the Central Excise Act would show that the Central Excise Officer is required to communicate the order to the person aggrieved for the purpose of providing a remedy to the person adversely affected by the order and thereby limitation would commence from the date of communication. A careful perusal of Section 35(1) of the Central Excise Act would show that the Central Excise Officer is required to communicate the order to the person aggrieved for the purpose of providing a remedy to the person adversely affected by the order and thereby limitation would commence from the date of communication. However, the word “communication” used in Section 35(1) has not been defined in the Central Excise Act or the rules made thereunder, therefore, the same deserves to be interpreted by applying the rule of contextual interpretation and keeping in view the language of the relevant provisions (see Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and others , (2010) 5 SCC 23 ). 9. The word “communication”, according to Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), means, information given; the sharing of knowledge by one with another; conference; consultation or bargaining preparatory to making a contract. A “communication” is ordinarily considered to be a deliberate interchange of thoughts or opinions between two or more persons, as distinguished from “res gestae” expressions which are spontaneously or instinctively provoked, or made while under such shock or excitement as to preclude the possibility of design. The ordinary meaning of communicate is to impart, confer or transmit information (see Union of India v. S.P. Singh , (2008) 5 SCC 438 ). 10. In the matter of Kubic Darusz v. Union of India and others , (1990) 1 SCC 568 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with communication of grounds of detention under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA Act), held that “communicate” is a strong word. It requires that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds should be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing in a language which he understands, so as to enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation. 11. In the matter of Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. M/s M.M. Rubber and Co., Tamil Nadu, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 471, their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with Section 35-E of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 held that if the intention is to provide a remedy to the person adversely affected, the statutory provision has to be so constituted that limitation commences from the date of communication of order, and observed in paragraph 18 as under: - “18. Thus if the intention or design of the statutory provision was to protect the interest of the person adversely affected, by providing a remedy against the order or decision any period of limitation prescribed with reference to invoking such remedy shall be read as commencing from the date of communication of the order. But if it is a limitation for a competent authority to make an order the date of exercise of that power and in the case of exercise of suo moto power over the subordinate authorities' orders, the date on which such power was exercised by making an order are the relevant dates for determining the limitation. The ratio of this distinction may also be founded on the principle that the government is bound by the proceedings of its officers but persons affected are not concluded by the decision.” 12. Similarly, in the matter of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Qimat Rai Gupta and others , (2007) 7 SCC 309 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that an order ordinarily would be presumed to have been made when it is signed. It is required to be communicated where communication thereof is a necessary ingredient for bringing an end result to a status or to provide a person an opportunity to take recourse to law if he is aggrieved thereby. Their Lordships further held that the word “made” occurring in Section 126(4) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 cannot be construed to mean that unless the order is communicated, it should be deemed to have not been made. 13. In the matter of D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India and another , (2003) 6 SCC 186 , the question before the Supreme Court was whether the limitation period for filing a review under Section 48AA of the Advocates Act, 1961, should commence from the date of the order or its communication. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court reasoned that the limitation period should start from the date of communication or knowledge of the order, aligning with principles of fairness and practicality. Their Lordships allowed the appeals, set aside the Bar Council’s orders, and restored the appellant’s (therein) enrollment as an advocate. Their Lordships further held in paragraph 14 as under:- “14. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court reasoned that the limitation period should start from the date of communication or knowledge of the order, aligning with principles of fairness and practicality. Their Lordships allowed the appeals, set aside the Bar Council’s orders, and restored the appellant’s (therein) enrollment as an advocate. Their Lordships further held in paragraph 14 as under:- “14. How can a person concerned or a person aggrieved be expected to exercise the right of review conferred by the provision unless the order is communicated to or is known to him either actually or constructively? The words “the date of that order”, therefore, mean and must be construed as meaning the date of communication or knowledge, actual or constructive, of the order sought to be reviewed.” 14. Coming to the facts of the case in light of the provisions contained in Section 35(1) of the Central Excise Act and the decisions rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in that regard, it is quite vivid that Section 35(1) mandates that the purpose of communication of order by the Central Excise Officer is for the purpose of enabling the person aggrieved to file appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) challenging the order so communicated and that period is also specifically provided to be 60 days from the date of communication of such decision to him by the Central Excise Officer, in this case, the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise and furthermore, power to condone the delay in filing the appeal has been restricted to the Commissioner (Appeals) by allowing the appeal to be filed within a further period of 30 days in addition to 60 days as specified in the proviso appended to Section 35(1). Therefore, considering the period of limitation to file appeal as 60 + 30 = 90 days, appeal can be preferred within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order. Therefore, the order has to be communicated and the person aggrieved must be communicated with the decision or order. In other words, the party affected by the order or decision must know it, actually or constructively, and the period of 60 days would start running from the date of communication. 15. Section 37C of the Central Excise Act provides the manner of service of decisions, orders, summons, etc., which states as under: - “37C. In other words, the party affected by the order or decision must know it, actually or constructively, and the period of 60 days would start running from the date of communication. 15. Section 37C of the Central Excise Act provides the manner of service of decisions, orders, summons, etc., which states as under: - “37C. Service of decisions, orders, summons, etc.—(1) Any decision or order passed or any summons or notice issued under this Act or the rules made thereunder, shall be served,— (a) by tendering the decision, order, summons or notice, or sending it by registered post with acknowledgment due or by speed post with proof of delivery or by courier approved by the Central Board of Excise and Customs constituted under the Central Boards of Revenue Act, 1963 (54 of 1963), to the person for whom it is intended or his authorised agent, if any; (b) if the decision, order, summons or notice cannot be served in the manner provided in clause (a), by affixing a copy thereof, to some conspicuous part of the factory or warehouse or other place of business or usual place of residence of the person for whom such decision, order, summons or notice, as the case may be, is intended; (c) if the decision, order, summons or notice cannot be served in the manner provided in clauses (a) and (b), by affixing a copy thereof on the notice board of the officer or authority who or which passed such decision or order or issued such summons or notice. (2) Every decision or order passed or any summons or notice issued under this Act or the rules made thereunder, shall be deemed to have been served on the date on which the decision, order, summons or notice is tendered or delivered by post or courier referred to in sub-section (1) or a copy thereof is affixed in the manner provided in sub-section (1).” 16. A careful perusal of Section 37C(1) of the Central Excise Act would show that any decision or order passed or any summons or notice issued under this Act or the rules made thereunder, shall be served, also by speed post with proof of delivery to the person for whom it is intended or his authorised agent, if any; if the decision, order, summons or notice cannot be served in the manner provided in clause (a), by affixing a copy thereof, to some conspicuous part of the factory or warehouse or other place of business or usual place of residence of the person for whom such decision, order, summons or notice, as the case may be, is intended; and if the decision, order, summons or notice cannot be served in the manner provided in clauses (a) and (b), by affixing a copy thereof on the notice board of the officer or authority who or which passed such decision or order or issued such summons or notice. Sub-section (2) of Section 37C provides that every decision or order passed or any summons or notice issued under this Act or the rules made thereunder, shall be deemed to have been served on the date on which the decision, order, summons or notice is tendered or delivered by post. 17. In this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court in Saral Wire Craft Private Limited (supra) may be noticed herein in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering the provisions contained in Section 37C of the Central Excise Act held that every effort must be taken to meaningfully and realistically serve the affected party so as not merely to ensure that he has knowledge thereof but also to enable him to initiate any permissible action. It has been observed by their Lordships as under: - “7. It is an anathema in law to decide a matter without due notice to the party concerned. Every effort must be taken to meaningfully and realistically serve the affected party so as not merely to ensure that he has knowledge thereof but also to enable him to initiate any permissible action. … 9. It is an anathema in law to decide a matter without due notice to the party concerned. Every effort must be taken to meaningfully and realistically serve the affected party so as not merely to ensure that he has knowledge thereof but also to enable him to initiate any permissible action. … 9. It is in these circumstances that we are of the clear conclusion that a miscarriage of justice has taken place, in that the authorities/courts below have failed to notice the specific language of Section 37-C(1)(a) of the Act which requires that an order must be tendered on the person concerned or his authorised agent, in other words, on no other person, to ensure efficaciousness. We must immediately recall the decision in Taylor v. Taylor , (1875) LR 1 Ch D 426 rendered venerable by virtue of its jural acceptance and applicable for over a century. It was approved by the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor , 1936 SCC OnLine PC 41 : (1935-36) 63 IA 372 : (1936) 44 LW 583 and was subsequently applied in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh , AIR 1954 SC 322 : 1954 Cri LJ 910 , State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh , AIR 1964 SC 358 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 263 (2) , Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala , (1999) 3 SCC 422 and more recently in Hussein Ghadially v. State of Gujarat , (2014) 8 SCC 425 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 26 . As observed by this Court in Babu Verghese (supra): (SCC p. 432, para 31) “31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all.” 18. As observed by this Court in Babu Verghese (supra): (SCC p. 432, para 31) “31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all.” 18. Reverting finally to the facts of the case in light of the provisions contained in Section 37C of the Central Excise Act, which provides the manner of serving the copy of decision or order, it is quite vivid that the purpose of communicating the order to the person aggrieved, in this case, the appellant herein / assessee, is for the purpose of enabling him to prefer an appeal against the adjudicating order before the Commissioner (Appeals), as only 60 days time has been provided from the date of communication to prefer appeal and the Commissioner (Appeals) is empowered only to condone the delay of further 30 days and thereby, after 90 days from the date of communication, no further jurisdiction has been conferred to the Commissioner (Appeals) to condone the delay. There is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act as held by the Supreme Court in Singh Enterprises (supra). Therefore, the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise was obliged to strictly comply the provisions contained in Section 35(1) read with Section 37C(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act and communicate the order to the person aggrieved, which, in the present case, is said to have been communicated to the appellant herein/assessee by speed post by dispatch/consignment No.EC080953003IN, but according to the document filed before this Court, the consignment is said to have been dispatched vide Speed Post/Consignment No.EC080953003IN on 15-12-2017, however, there is no proof of delivery in that regard, as record showing communication has been directed to be produced before this Court by order dated 14-2-2025. Even the communication dated 13-12-2018 between the Superintendent (Appeals), CGST & Central Excise, Raipur and the Assistant Commissioner, CGST & Central Excise, Division Korba, which is the document filed by the appellant/assessee before this Court on 18-2- 2025, would show that the consignment details are not found and is missing. Even the communication dated 13-12-2018 between the Superintendent (Appeals), CGST & Central Excise, Raipur and the Assistant Commissioner, CGST & Central Excise, Division Korba, which is the document filed by the appellant/assessee before this Court on 18-2- 2025, would show that the consignment details are not found and is missing. As such, there is no evidence on record to demonstrate the proof of delivery of the subject consignment that the appellant was communicated with the adjudication order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise as required under Section 35(1) read with Section 37C(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act which mandates that the order has to be served by speed post with proof of delivery. Therefore, as per showing of the appellant, once he is communicated with the copy of adjudication order by e-mail on 27-7-2018, he would be justified in preferring appeal on 25-9-2018 before the Commissioner (Appeals), which is within the period of limitation of 60 days from the date of communication of the order, as the appellant was actually communicated with the order on 27-7-2018. As such, the Commissioner (Appeals) has committed grave legal error in holding the appeal to be barred by limitation and that it has been filed beyond the period of 60 days from the date of communication of the order. The CESTAT has also committed legal error in perpetuating the illegality committed by the Commissioner (Appeals) by dismissing the appeal holding it to be barred by limitation by affirming the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals). 19. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and orders passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) affirmed by the CESTAT are hereby set aside. Conclusively, the substantial question of law is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The matter is remitted to the Commissioner (Appeals) for adjudicating the appeal on its own merit in accordance with law, expeditiously, as the appeal is old one and required to be decided expeditiously. No cost(s).