JUDGMENT : Bipin Chander Negi, J. The cases, in the case at hand are being taken up together, as a common question arises for consideration with respect to applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (as amended by2019 Act). 2. Section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act reads as under: - 166. Application for compensation. (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of Section 165 may be made- (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be: Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application: Provided further that where a person accepts compensation under Section 164 in accordance with the procedure provided under section 149, his claims petition before the Claims Tribunal shall lapse. (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made, at the option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed: [***] (3) No application for compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident. (4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under Section 159 as an application for compensation under this Act. (4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under Section 159 as an application for compensation under this Act. (5) Notwithstanding anything in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, the right of a person to claim compensation for injury in an accident shall, upon the death of the person injured, survive to his legal representatives, irrespective of whether the cause of death is relatable to or had any nexus with the injury or not. 3. Accident in the lead case at hand i.e. had occurred on 11.06.2022. The claim petition, in the case at hand, had indisputably been filed after six months of the occurrence. Admittedly in the case at hand, the present petition arises out of an order passed in a proceeding before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT). The MACT is a creation of a statute. It is a Tribunal distinguishable from a Court. In this respect, it would be appropriate to refer to case reported as (2010) 11 SCC 1 titled Union of India vs. Madras Bar Association, relevant para whereof is reproduced hereinbelow:- “38. The term "courts" refers to places where justice is administered or refers to Judges who exercise judicial functions. Courts are established by the State for administration of justice that is for exercise of the judicial power of the State to maintain and uphold the rights, to punish wrongs and to adjudicate upon disputes. Tribunals on the other hand are special alternative institutional mechanisms, usually brought into existence by or under a statute to decide disputes arising with reference to that particular statute, or to determine controversies arising out of any administrative law. Courts refer to civil courts, criminal courts and the High Courts. Tribunals can be either private tribunals (Arbitral Tribunals), or tribunals constituted under the Constitution (Speaker or the Chairman acting under Para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule) or tribunals authorized by the Constitution (Administrative Tribunals under Article 323-A and tribunals for other matters under Article 323-B) or statutory tribunals which are created under a statute (Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Debt Recovery Tribunals and Consumer Fora). Some Tribunals are manned exclusively by Judicial Officers (Rent Tribunals, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals). Other statutory tribunals have judicial and technical members (Administrative Tribunals, TDSAT, Competition Appellate Tribunal, Consumer Fora, Cyber Appellate Tribunal, etc.).” 4. Some Tribunals are manned exclusively by Judicial Officers (Rent Tribunals, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals). Other statutory tribunals have judicial and technical members (Administrative Tribunals, TDSAT, Competition Appellate Tribunal, Consumer Fora, Cyber Appellate Tribunal, etc.).” 4. In this context, it will be also appropriate to refer to case reported as (1992) supplement 2 SCC 651 titled Kihoto Hollohan vs. Zachillhu and others, wherein, Hon’ble Justice Hidayatullah’s pronouncement on the difference between a Court and Tribunal in Harinagar Sugar Mills Limited vs. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala has been reproduced. Relevant extract thereof is being reproduced hereinbelow:- 98 ……………………. “By 'courts' is meant courts of civil judicature and by 'tribunals', those bodies of men who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. Among the powers of the State is included the power to decide such controversies. This is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State, and is aptly called the judicial power of the State. In the exercise of this power, a clear division is thus noticeable. Broadly speaking, certain special matters go before tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary courts of civil judicature. Their procedures may differ but the functions are not essentially different.” 5. The applicability of Limitation Act to Tribunals came up for consideration in case reported as (2015) 7 SCC 58 titled M.P. Steel Corporation vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, wherein it was held that on a plain reading of the Limitation Act, it becomes clear that suits, appeals and applications are only to be considered from the point of limitation, if they are filed in Courts and not in quasi-judicial bodies. Other than the aforesaid, in the same it has been held that the entirety of the Limitation Act including Section 29(2) thereof would apply to the three proceedings mentioned therein namely suits, appeals or applications, when filed in Court. Meaning thereby, Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to Tribunals. 7. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act reads as under:- “29. Savings. (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of1872). Meaning thereby, Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to Tribunals. 7. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act reads as under:- “29. Savings. (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of1872). (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. (3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law. (4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of "easement" in section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), may for the time being extend.” 8. From a perusal of the Motor Vehicles Act, especially Section 173 which deals with the filing of the appeals, it is evident that a period of limitation has been prescribed therein for filing an appeal. However, if there is a delay in filing of the appeal, then on showing sufficient cause, time to filing the appeal can be extended. 9. The second proviso to Section 173 provides for applicability of Section 5 i.e. condonation of delay on showing sufficient cause, however, no such provision exists in Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. From the aforesaid, it is evident that the applicability of Section 5 has been excluded by necessary implication insofar as Section 166(3) is concerned. A reference gainfully can be made in this respect to the judgment reported as 2004 (11) SCC 472 , titled Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. Vs. Custodian. From the aforesaid, it is evident that the applicability of Section 5 has been excluded by necessary implication insofar as Section 166(3) is concerned. A reference gainfully can be made in this respect to the judgment reported as 2004 (11) SCC 472 , titled Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. Vs. Custodian. The relevant extract is reproduced hereinbelow:- "17…… Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for the application of the provisions of Section 4 to Section 24 of the 1963 Act including Section 5, to any special or local law which prescribes a period of limitation in respect of any suit, appeal or application different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act. In other words, the general rule as far as special and local Acts are concerned, is that the specified provisions including Section 5 of the Limitation Act will apply provided the Special or Local Act provides a period of limitation different from that prescribed under the Limitation Act. There is an additional requirement viz that the Special/Local Act does not expressly exclude the application of the Limitation Act . It has been held in Union of India V. Popular Construction Co. that the word 'exclusion'also includes 'exclusion by necessary implication.' 10. In view of the aforesaid, petitions are allowed and impugned order permitting condonation of delay in filing the claim petition by the respondents-claimants and thereby entertaining complaints after the prescribed period in Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act as amended in 2019, is set aside and quashed. However, allowing of the present petitions would not preclude the respondents/claimants from proceeding further in accordance with law. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. Registry is directed to place the copy of this judgment in above mentioned cases also.