JUDGMENT : MANOJ KUMAR GARG, J. 1. All the aforesaid matters, two criminal appeals and one revision petition, have arisen out of the common judgment dated 09.07.1997, passed by learned Session Judge, Pali, in Sessions Case No.78/1988 by which the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused Smt. Pyari from offence under Sections 147 , 148, 302/149, 323, 323/149 IPC and convicted the accused-appellant No.1 Bastiram for offence under Sections 302 & 323 IPC and accused-appellants No.2 to 4 namely Kalu, Champalal & Madan for offence under Section 323 IPC. 2. For offence under Section 323 IPC, the trial court sentenced the accused appellants with a fine of Rs.500/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo three months’ SI. 3. Whereas, for offence under Section 302 IPC, the learned trial court sentenced the accused-appellant No.1 Bastiram to undergo life imprisonment along with a fine of Rs.500/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo three months’ RI. 4. Since all the matters are arising out of the same judgment and order, therefore, they are being decided by this common order. 5. Criminal Appeal No.351/1997 has been filed by the accused-appellants against their conviction for offence under Section 302 & 323 IPC. Whereas, Revision Petition No.369/1997 by the father of the deceased- Chhatar Singh and Criminal Appeal No.51/1998 by the State have been preferred against the acquittal of the accused persons from offence under Section 302 /149 IPC and for awarding lesser sentence to the accused persons. 6. The brief facts necessary for adjudication of the present controversy are that on 23.07.1988, the complainant- Laxman Singh (PW-8) submitted a written report (Ex.P/10) at Police Station, Marwar Junction, stating that on 22.07.1988, at about 06:00 PM, when the deceased- Parbat Singh was proceeding towards his residence from the tea stall of Samarath Singh, the accused persons, armed with lathis, intercepted him and assaulted him. The complainant, along with other villagers namely Vijay Singh, Jai Singh, Ratan Singh, Bheru Singh and Chainaram rushed to rescue Parbat Singh, during which Ratan Singh also sustained injuries. Subsequently, the mother of the deceased and one Chail Singh reached the spot and attempted to rescue Parbat Singh; however, the accused persons inflicted injuries upon them as well. Thereafter, the accused persons fled from the scene. Subsequently, the mother of the deceased and one Chail Singh reached the spot and attempted to rescue Parbat Singh; however, the accused persons inflicted injuries upon them as well. Thereafter, the accused persons fled from the scene. Owing to the injuries sustained, Parbat Singh became unconscious and was immediately taken to Bangar Hospital, Pali, where he was admitted. Despite medical intervention, he succumbed to his injuries on 23.07.1988. 7. On the said report, Police registered the FIR and started investigation. During investigation, Police arrested the accused persons. On completion of investigation, police filed challan against the accused persons under Sections 147 , 148, 149, 302, 323 & 324 IPC. 8. Thereafter, learned Trial Court framed, read over and explained the charges for the offence under Sections 147 , 148, 302, 302/149, 323, 323/149 IPC to accused persons. They denied the charge and sought trial. 9. During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as 22 witnesses and also got exhibited relevant documents in support of its case. 10. The accused persons were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In defence, one witness- Dr. Hari Kishan Goyal was examined as DW-1 and seven documents were exhibited. 11. Learned trial Court, after hearing the arguments from both the sides, taking into consideration and appreciating the documentary evidence and the statements of witnesses, vide judgment dated 09.07.1997 acquitted the accused- Smt. Pyari from the offences under Sections 147 , 148, 302/149, 323, 323/149 IPC, however, convicted and sentenced the accused- appellant No.1- Bastiram for the offence under Sections 302 & 323 IPC and accused-appellants No.2 to 4 namely Kalu, Champalal & Madan respectively, for offence under Section 323 IPC, as aforesaid. Hence, the State and the father of the deceased are challenging the acquittal of the accused- Smt. Pyari as well as less sentence awarded to the accused-appellants and accused-appellants are challenging their conviction. 12. At the threshold, learned counsel appearing for the accused appellants (in Appeal No.351/1997) submits that the accused- appellants No. 2 to 4 namely Kalu, Champalal & Madan respectively have been convicted only for offence under Section 323 IPC and they have been awarded sentence of fine of Rs.500/-each for the said offence and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo three months’ SI. Counsel submits that the said amount of fine has already been deposited by the accused- appellants No.2 to 3. Counsel submits that the said amount of fine has already been deposited by the accused- appellants No.2 to 3. In such circumstances, counsel does not press the appeal No.351/1997 qua the accused-appellants No.2 to 4. 13. In view of submissions made, the criminal appeal No.351/1997 is hereby dismissed as not pressed qua accused- appellants No.2 to 4 namely Kalu, Champalal & Madan respectively. 14. So far as accused-appellant No.1- Bastiram, is concerned, learned counsel submits that the incident pertains to the year 1988. It is contended that the appellant inflicted only a single lathi blow upon the deceased- Parbat Singh, without any repetition. As per the testimony of Dr. D.R. Panwar (PW-20), the deceased sustained a solitary head injury caused by a lathi, and the cause of death was attributed to the said head injury. It is further urged that, during the scuffle, the accused party also sustained injuries, which fact stands corroborated by the deposition of Dr. Hari Kishan Goyal (DW-1). Specifically, accused Smt. Pyari suffered one injury, accused Madan sustained three injuries, and accused Champalal received two injuries. In these circumstances, it is argued, that the complainant party was the aggressor. Learned counsel further submits that the act attributed to appellant- Bastiram was not premeditated; rather, it was a spontaneous act committed in the heat of the moment under sudden provocation. There was no intention or motive on his part to cause the death of the deceased. Accordingly, it is prayed that appellant- Bastiram may not be held guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, but at the most be convicted for the offence under Section 304 PART II IPC. It is also urged that, since the incident dates back to 1988, and the appellant has already undergone a sentence of about one and a half years, coupled with the fact that he is presently around 68 years of age and is in poor health, the sentence awarded to him may be reduced to the period already undergone. Counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this High Court at Jaipur Bench in the case of Banwari Lal & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2025) 1 CriLR 170. 15. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor, along with the learned counsel representing the father of the deceased, Parbat Singh, vehemently opposed the submissions advanced by the counsel for the accused- Bastiram. Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2025) 1 CriLR 170. 15. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor, along with the learned counsel representing the father of the deceased, Parbat Singh, vehemently opposed the submissions advanced by the counsel for the accused- Bastiram. It was contended that the accused- Bastiram, had inflicted a fatal head injury upon the deceased- Parbat Singh, by means of a lathi, while the other accused persons, namely Smt. Pyari, Kalu, Champalal, and Madan, also caused injuries to the deceased as well as to other injured persons. Accordingly, it was urged that the learned trial court committed a grave error in acquitting the accused persons of the offence punishable under Section 302 /149 IPC. 16. We have considered the submissions of the counsel for the parties made at bar and perused the impugned judgment as well as record of the case. 17. Admittedly, the First Information Report lodged by the complainant, Laxman Singh (PW-8), contains a detailed and specific account of the incident, wherein it has been categorically stated that when the deceased- Parbat Singh, was proceeding towards his residence, the accused persons, armed with lathis, intercepted him and assaulted him. The fatal head injury, specifically attributed to the appellant No.1–Bastiram, ultimately resulted in the death of Parbat Singh. The medical evidence on record further corroborates this assertion, as it unequivocally indicates that the cause of death was the lathi blow inflicted on the head of the deceased. Thus, it stands established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant No.1– Bastiram was responsible for causing the death of Parbat Singh and thereby committed culpable homicide. The evidence clearly reflects that the fatal blow was the direct result of the act of appellant No.1 in striking the deceased on a vital part of the body, i.e., the head. It is significant to note that most of the independent witnesses, namely PW-1 Tej Singh, PW-2 Vijay Singh, PW-3 Lakha Ram, PW-4 Jai Singh, PW-9 Chainaram, PW-10 Bheru Singh, PW-14 Mangi Lal, PW-15 Ladu Ram, and PW-16 Varda Ram, were declared hostile. The remaining witnesses, PW-5 Sayar Kanwar (mother of the deceased), PW-6 Chhatar Singh (father of the deceased), PW-11 Chail Singh, and PW-12 Ratan Singh, are close relatives of the deceased, thereby reducing the evidentiary value of their testimonies to the extent that they cannot be considered wholly impartial. The remaining witnesses, PW-5 Sayar Kanwar (mother of the deceased), PW-6 Chhatar Singh (father of the deceased), PW-11 Chail Singh, and PW-12 Ratan Singh, are close relatives of the deceased, thereby reducing the evidentiary value of their testimonies to the extent that they cannot be considered wholly impartial. Thus, the case rests substantially on the FIR and medical evidence without strong corroboration from independent sources. It is, however, pertinent to consider the crucial question as to whether the appellant No.1 possessed the intention to cause the death of Parbat Singh, or whether he intended to cause such bodily injury which, in the ordinary course of nature, was likely to result in death, or at the very least, whether he acted with the conscious knowledge that striking a lathi blow on the head was imminently dangerous and, in all probability, would cause death or such bodily injury likely to cause death. 18. At the outset, it would apposite to deal with the relevant legal provisions, which reads as under:- "300. Murder--.Except in the case hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or-- Secondly--If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or-- Thirdly--If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or-- Fourthly--If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. Exception 1.--When culpable homicide is not murder.-- Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. ......x.....xx.....xx..... x.......... ......x.....xx.....xx..... x.......... ......x.....xx.....xx..... Exception 1.--When culpable homicide is not murder.-- Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. ......x.....xx.....xx..... x.......... ......x.....xx.....xx..... x.......... ......x.....xx.....xx..... x.......… Exception 4--Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Explanation--It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault. .......… 304, Part II. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years or with fine or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death; but without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death." 19. The ingredients constituting an offence under Section 304 PART II IPC are as follows: (i) he must commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder; (ii) the act must be done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death; (iii) but such act is done without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. 20. Therefore, under the provisions of Section 304 PART II of the IPC, an individual may be held liable for culpable homicide not amounting to murder when the act is committed with the knowledge that it is likely to result in death, yet without any intention to cause death or to inflict such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. The essential criterion for establishing an offence under this section is thus twofold: firstly, the presence of knowledge on the part of the accused that their conduct is likely to cause death or such bodily injury as could lead to death; and secondly, the absence of any intention to cause death. The essential criterion for establishing an offence under this section is thus twofold: firstly, the presence of knowledge on the part of the accused that their conduct is likely to cause death or such bodily injury as could lead to death; and secondly, the absence of any intention to cause death. Thus, core element of Section 304 PART II IPC is the mental state of the accused, specifically, the conscious awareness of the potential consequences of their act, without the accompanying intent to bring about death. 21. The reasoning underlying this legal framework is rooted in the principle of moral culpability and the recognition that an individual can be deemed criminally liable even if they did not aim to kill, but nonetheless engaged in conduct that foreseeably endangers life. Such an approach ensures that individuals cannot escape liability merely because they lacked the intent to kill, especially when their actions, by their very nature, posed a substantial risk of resulting in death. It emphasizes accountability for reckless or negligent conduct that, while not intended to cause death, nonetheless leads to fatal outcomes, thereby upholding the principles of justice and societal protection. 22. The thin line difference between the offence punishable under “ Section 302 ” and “Section 304” of IPC has been succinctly explained by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya reported in (1976) 4 SCC 382 in the following words: “12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, “culpable homicide” is genus and “murder” its specie. All “murder” is “culpable homicide” but not vice-versa. Speaking generally, “culpable homicide” sans “special characteristics of murder”, is “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, “culpable homicide of the first degree”. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as “murder”. The second may be termed as “culpable homicide of the second degree”. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is “culpable homicide of the third degree”. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304.” 23. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is “culpable homicide of the third degree”. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304.” 23. The difference was further elucidated in Rampal Singh v. State of U.P. , reported in (2012) 8 SCC 289 in the following words: “18. This Court in Vineet Kumar Chauhan v. State of U.P. [ (2007) 14 SCC 660 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 915] noticed that academic distinction between “murder” and “culpable homicide not amounting to murder” had vividly been brought out by this Court in State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya [ (1976) 4 SCC 382 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 659] where it was observed as under: (Vineet Kumar case [ (2007) 14 SCC 660 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 915], SCC pp. 665-66, para 16) “16. … that the safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of Sections 299 and 300 IPC is to keep in focus the key words used in various clauses of the said sections. Minutely comparing each of the clauses of Sections 299 and 300 IPC and drawing support from the decisions of this Court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1958 SC 465 : 1958 Cri LJ 818] and Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala [ AIR 1966 SC 1874 : 1966 Cri LJ 1509] , speaking for the Court, R.S. Sarkaria, J. neatly brought out the points of distinction between the two offences, which have been time and again reiterated. Having done so, the Court said that wherever the court is confronted with the question whether the offence is ‘murder’ or ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, on the facts of a case, it [would] be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof of such causal connection between the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to ‘culpable homicide’ as defined in Section 299. Proof of such causal connection between the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to ‘culpable homicide’ as defined in Section 299. … If the answer to this question is in the negative the offence would be ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, punishable under the First or the Second Part of Section Page 8 of 29 304, depending, respectively, on whether the second or the third clause of Section 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the case comes within any of the Exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, punishable under the First Part of Section 304 IPC. It was, however, clarified that these were only broad guidelines to facilitate the task of the court and not cast-iron imperative. 21. Sections 302 and 304 of the Code are primarily the punitive provisions. They declare what punishment a person would be liable to be awarded, if he commits either of the offences. An analysis of these two sections must be done having regard to what is common to the offences and what is special to each one of them. The offence of culpable homicide is thus an offence which may or may not be murder. If it is murder, then it is culpable homicide amounting to murder, for which punishment is prescribed in Section 302 of the Code. Section 304 deals with cases not covered by Section 302 and it divides the offence into two distinct classes, that is, (a) those in which the death is intentionally caused; and (b) those in which the death is caused unintentionally but knowingly. In the former case the sentence of imprisonment is compulsory and the maximum sentence admissible is imprisonment for life. In the latter case, imprisonment is only optional, and the maximum sentence only extends to imprisonment for 10 years. The first clause of Section 304 includes only those cases in which offence is really “murder”, but mitigated by the presence of circumstances recognised in the Exceptions to Section 300 of the Code, the second clause deals only with the cases in which the accused has no intention of injuring anyone in particular. The first clause of Section 304 includes only those cases in which offence is really “murder”, but mitigated by the presence of circumstances recognised in the Exceptions to Section 300 of the Code, the second clause deals only with the cases in which the accused has no intention of injuring anyone in particular. In this regard, we may also refer to the judgment of this Court in Fatta v. Emperor [AIR 1931 Lah 63], 1151. C. 476 (Refer: Penal Law of India by Dr Hari Singh Gour, Vol. 3, 2009.).” 24. In the case of Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja vs State Of A.P. reported in (2006) 11 SCC 444 , Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:- “Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters - plucking of a fruit, straying of a cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no pre- meditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302 , are not converted into offences punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under Section 302 . It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302 , are not converted into offences punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under Section 302 . The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any pre-meditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention.” 25. From the above extracts, it becomes evident that a key criterion in distinguishing whether a particular act constitutes “murder” or “culpable homicide not amounting to murder” punishable under Sections 302 and 304 IPC, respectively is the presence or absence of the offender’s intent. Specifically, if the offender possesses the intention to cause death or to inflict such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or alternatively, if they are consciously aware of the perilous nature of their conduct recognizing that their actions are so inherently dangerous that they will, in all likelihood, result in death or such injury the act is more appropriately classified as “murder” under Section 300 of the IPC. In such cases, the corresponding penal provision of Section 302 IPC, which prescribes the punishment for murder, would be applicable. In such cases, the corresponding penal provision of Section 302 IPC, which prescribes the punishment for murder, would be applicable. Conversely, if the intention to cause death or such grievous bodily injury is not clearly established the act should be categorized under the lesser offence of “culpable homicide not amounting to murder,” punishable under Section 304 IPC. This classification recognizes the gravity of the act but acknowledges the absence of the requisite mens rea (guilty mind) for murder. The reasoning behind this distinction is rooted in the principles of criminal law, which aim to attribute liability proportionate to the mental state and culpability of the offender. Intention and knowledge are fundamental elements that differentiate between degrees of criminal liability. When the offender intentionally commits an act with full awareness of its dangerous potential, it signifies a higher degree of moral culpability, warranting the harsher penalty prescribed for murder. Conversely, in cases where the offender’s conduct lacks such deliberate intent or conscious knowledge, the law considers the act less blameworthy, thereby justifying a comparatively lenient punishment under Section 304 IPC. This nuanced approach ensures that the legal response is both fair and proportionate to the offender’s mental state and the circumstances of the act. 26. Upon examination of the injury sustained by the deceased and the postmortem report Ex.P/21 indicates that he received only single injury on his head, which was identified as the fatal and the primary cause of death. 27. Furthermore, the circumstances under which the assault occurred, including the motivations behind causing the injury, there is no evidence to suggest that the assault was premeditated or carried out with a deliberate plan to kill the deceased. The absence of evidence indicating premeditation is a significant factor. 28. Considering the absence of proof of premeditation, including the lack of undue advantage or cruelty on the part of the appellant No.1 as well as the fact that the incident was occurred on spur of the moment, the act can be characterized as culpable homicide not amounting to murder, aligning with the provisions of Section 304 PART II of the IPC. This court is of the opinion that the actions of the accused demonstrated a reckless disregard for human life rather than an outright intention to murder. The nature and extent of the injuries, coupled with the circumstances of the incident, support this conclusion. 29. This court is of the opinion that the actions of the accused demonstrated a reckless disregard for human life rather than an outright intention to murder. The nature and extent of the injuries, coupled with the circumstances of the incident, support this conclusion. 29. In view of the aforesaid aspects and upon assessment of evidence as well as the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court and this High Court, we are of the considered opinion that the finding of guilt recorded by learned trial Court under Section 302 IPC is not sustainable in the eyes of law because there is a clear absence of pre-meditation or motive to kill deceased- Parbat Singh and it is a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Therefore, we are inclined to alter the conviction of the accused-appellant No.1 Bastiram from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 PART II , IPC. 30. Resultantly, the conviction and sentence passed against the accused appellant No.1 Bastiram for the offence under Section 302 IPC is quashed and set aside and the same is hereby altered to the offence punishable under Section 304 PART II , IPC. 31. However, considering the facts that the incident is related to the year 1988 and the accused-appellant No.1- Bastiram has remained in custody for more than one & half years and presently he is aged about 68 years and is not keeping good health, we think it proper to reduce the sentence of the accused-appellant Bastiram to the period already undergone by him, while increasing the fine amount. 32. Thus, while maintaining conviction of the appellant No.1 Bastiram offence under Section 304 PART II IPC, his sentence for the said offence is hereby reduced to the period already undergone by him. The fine amount is hereby increased from Rs.500/- to Rs.25,000/-. Out of which, Rs.20,000/- shall be disbursed in favour of the father of the deceased- Chhatar Singh. Two months’ time is granted to deposit the increased fine amount before the trial court. The fine amount, if any, already deposited by the appellant- Bastiram shall be adjusted. The appellant No.1 is on bail. He need not surrender. His bail bonds are cancelled. If the appellant No.1 fails to deposit the increased fine amount, he shall undergo the default sentence of three months’ SI. 33. Accordingly, the criminal appeal No.351/1997 preferred by the appellants is partly allowed qua appellant No.1- Bastiram. 34. The appellant No.1 is on bail. He need not surrender. His bail bonds are cancelled. If the appellant No.1 fails to deposit the increased fine amount, he shall undergo the default sentence of three months’ SI. 33. Accordingly, the criminal appeal No.351/1997 preferred by the appellants is partly allowed qua appellant No.1- Bastiram. 34. The criminal revision No.369/1997 preferred by the father of the deceased- Chhatar Singh and the criminal appeal No.51/1998 preferred by the State against the acquittal of accused persons from offence under Section 302 /149 IPC and for awarding lesser sentence are hereby dismissed having no substance. 35. The record of the trial court be sent back forthwith.