JUDGMENT : MANOJ KUMAR GARG, J. 1. Instant criminal appeal has been filed under Section 378(3) and 378(1) Cr.P.C. by the appellant-State against the judgment dated 25.07.1992 passed by learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Nohar, District Sriganganagar in Sessions Case No.51/1987 and No.70/1987 by which the learned Trial Court acquitted respondent No.1-Brij Lal from the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 304-B & 302 IPC and respondents No.2-Meera, No.3-Hanuman Prasad & No.4-Savitri from the offences punishable under Sections 498-A & 304-B IPC. 2. The respondent No.2-Meera passed away on 28.05.2021 and vide order dated 17.09.2021 passed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, the present appeal qua respondent No.2-Meera has already been dismissed as abated. 3. Brief facts necessary to be noted for deciding the controversy are that on 07.05.1987 at about 08:00 AM, Smt. Madhu made a statement to the police wherein she stated that she had entered into matrimonial alliance with Respondent No. 1, Brij Lal, approximately four years prior. She further alleged that subsequent to the marriage, she was subjected to persistent harassment and cruelty by her husband, mother-in-law, and sister-in-law in connection with dowry demands. She specifically stated that her mother-in- law frequently taunted her, asserting that as she had only one son, the dowry provided by Smt. Madhu’s father was insufficient. The complainant further recounted that an altercation arose when her 18-month-old daughter misplaced a bottle of surma, which led to a quarrel initiated by the respondents. She narrated that on the preceding day, i.e., 06.05.1987, at around 2:00–2:30 PM, her mother-in- law left the house to attend a marriage ceremony, leaving her alone with Respondent No. 1, Brij Lal. At that time, Brij Lal allegedly bolted the door from inside. When she approached to drink water, he allegedly poured kerosene oil over her and, with the apparent intention to cause her death, set her ablaze using a matchstick. She further stated that she managed to douse the flames by pouring water over herself, after which Respondent No. 1 unlocked the door. Upon raising a hue and cry, neighbors, namely Rampratap Bhamu, Hari Singh, and others arrived at the scene. Thereafter, her mother-in-law and husband took her to the hospital for medical treatment. 4. On the said report, Police registered the FIR against the accused appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 307 and 498-A of IPC and started investigation. 5. Upon raising a hue and cry, neighbors, namely Rampratap Bhamu, Hari Singh, and others arrived at the scene. Thereafter, her mother-in-law and husband took her to the hospital for medical treatment. 4. On the said report, Police registered the FIR against the accused appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 307 and 498-A of IPC and started investigation. 5. On the same day i.e., 07.05.1987 at approximately 04:15 PM, the deceased- Madhu, made another statement before the Magistrate, wherein she stated that she had poured kerosene on herself and her husband thereafter ignited the fire using a matchstick. Subsequently, a third statement was also made by the deceased- Madhu at a later stage. On 29.06.1987, Madhu succumbed to burn injuries. 6. After thorough investigation, Police submitted a charge-sheet against all the four accused. Thereafter, learned Trial Court framed, read over and explained the charges for the offence under Sections 307, 498-A and 302 IPC to the accused respondents. They denied the charge and sought trial. 7. During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses and also got exhibited relevant documents in support of its case. 8. The accused respondents were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In defence, DW/1 to DW/5 were examined and also got exhibited relevant documents in support of its case. 9. Learned trial Court, after hearing the arguments from both the sides, taking into consideration and appreciating the documentary evidence and the statements of witnesses, vide judgment dated 25.07.1992 acquitted the accused-respondents from the offence as aforesaid. 10. Against the judgment of trial Court, the State preferred this appeal. 11. Learned counsel for the State submits that in the first dying declaration made by the deceased, she specifically alleged that the accused-respondents had subjected her to harassment on account of dowry demands and that her husband had poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze. Although the second and third dying declarations contain certain minor inconsistencies, it cannot be said that all the dying declarations are unreliable and ought to be discarded in their entirety. It is further contended that the Trial Court erroneously chose to rely solely on the second dying declaration while discarding the first one, which contains serious and specific allegations. Such selective reliance, it is argued, is wholly unjustified and contrary to settled principles of law. It is further contended that the Trial Court erroneously chose to rely solely on the second dying declaration while discarding the first one, which contains serious and specific allegations. Such selective reliance, it is argued, is wholly unjustified and contrary to settled principles of law. Therefore, the judgment rendered by the Trial Court is per se illegal and liable to be set aside. It is prayed that the accused-respondents be convicted and punished appropriately in accordance with law. 12. Per contra, learned counsel for the accused-respondents submits that the Trial Court has meticulously appreciated all aspects of the case, including the three dying declarations made by the deceased, as well as the letters allegedly written by the father-in-law of the deceased to her father. In these letters, it is purportedly stated that the deceased was involved in an illicit relationship with another individual and, therefore, she should be taken back to her parental home. It is further contended that the deceased- Smt. Madhu, had also written a letter wherein she assured that she would not engage in any such illicit relationship in the future. These documents, according to the learned counsel, clearly suggest that the deceased had committed suicide of her own volition. It is thus argued that the judgment passed by the Trial Court is well-reasoned and fully justified. Accordingly, it is prayed that the appeal be dismissed. 13. We have considered the submissions of the counsel for the parties made at bar and perused the impugned judgment as well as record of the case. 14. Admittedly, the alleged incident occurred on 07.05.1987. On the same day, the deceased- Madhu made an initial statement to the police, wherein she alleged that the accused appellant- Brij Lal, had bolted the door from inside. When she proceeded to drink water, he allegedly poured kerosene oil upon her and, with the apparent intent to cause her death, set her ablaze by igniting a matchstick. Subsequently, later on the same day, at approximately 04:15 PM, the deceased made a second statement before the Magistrate. In this version, she stated that she had poured kerosene on herself, and it was her husband who subsequently lit the fire using a matchstick. Subsequently, later on the same day, at approximately 04:15 PM, the deceased made a second statement before the Magistrate. In this version, she stated that she had poured kerosene on herself, and it was her husband who subsequently lit the fire using a matchstick. Further, on 13.05.1987, the deceased made a third statement before the police under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. (commonly referred to as the Titamba Bayan), wherein she made allegations only with respect to the harassment meted out by the accused-appellant and his family in relation to dowry demands. However, notably, she made no reference to the act of pouring kerosene or to the actual incident leading to the fire. 15. Before delving into the merits of the matter, it is essential to examine the legal principles governing cases involving multiple dying declarations. 16. Under the framework of criminal jurisprudence, a dying declaration is considered an exception to the rule against hearsay, founded upon the maxim ‘nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire’ which means “a man will not meet his Maker with a lie on his lips.” This principle is codified under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. However, as the dying declarations suffer from inherent weaknesses, such as the same being not made on oath nor in the presence of the accused nor it could be tested by the cross- examination, the law has been laid down that while scrutinizing the dying declarations meticulous circumspection is called for. While dealing with this aspect, in the case of Dandu Lakshmi Reddy vs. State of A.P. reported in AIR 1999 SC 3255 , the Supreme Court observed that a dying declaration must be sieved through the judicial cullender and if it passes through gauzes it can be made the basis of a conviction, otherwise not. In that case the Supreme Court has adopted two tests in order to satisfy the judicial conscience that the dying declaration contains nothing but truth; first test is to scrutinise whether there are inherent improbabilities in the version and the next test is whether there are any inherent contradictions therein. In that case the Supreme Court has adopted two tests in order to satisfy the judicial conscience that the dying declaration contains nothing but truth; first test is to scrutinise whether there are inherent improbabilities in the version and the next test is whether there are any inherent contradictions therein. While, dealing with the multiple dying declarations, the Supreme Court in the case of Sandeep vs State of Haryana reported in AIR 2015 SC (Cri.) 152 , observed that incompatibility or inconsistency between two dying declarations can be said to arise if the assertions in one dying declaration are so diametrically opposed to statements in the other version, both cannot stand together. Dealing with the said aspect, in the case of Lakhan vs. State of M.P. reported in 2010 (8) SCC 514 , the Supreme Court held as under: A dying declaration recorded by a competent Magistrate would stand on a much higher footing than the declaration recorded by officer of lower rank, for the reason that the competent Magistrate has no axe to grind against the person named in the dying declaration of the victim, however, circumstances showing anything to the contrary should not be there in the facts of the case. (vide Ravi Chander & Ors. v. State of Punjab, (1998) 9 SCC 303 ; Harjit Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1999) 6 SCC 545 ; Koli Chunilal Savji & Anr. v. State of Gujarat, (1999) 9 SCC 562 ; and Vikas & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 2 SCC 516 .). 17. This judgment was also referred to by this court recently in Makhan Singh v. State of Haryana reported in (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1019 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kamla v. State of Punjab reported in (1993) 1 SCC 1 (2-Judge Bench) has held: “5. It is well settled that dying declaration can form the sole basis of conviction provided that it is free from infirmities and satisfies various tests (vide Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay [ AIR 1958 SC 22 : 1958 SCR 552 : 1958 Cri LJ 106] ). The ratio laid down in this case has been referred to in a number of subsequent cases with approval. The ratio laid down in this case has been referred to in a number of subsequent cases with approval. It is also settled in all those cases that the statement should be consistent throughout if the deceased had several opportunities of making such dying declarations, that is to say, if there are more than one dying declaration, they should be consistent. If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without even any corroboration. In a case where there are more than one dying declaration if some inconsistencies are noticed between one and the other, the court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies namely whether they are material or not. In scrutinising the contents of various dying declarations, in such a situation, the court has to examine the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances.” 19. In the case of Amol Singh v. State of M.P. reported in (2008) 5 SCC 468 ( 2-Judge Bench), has observed that: “13. … However, if some inconsistencies are noticed between one dying declaration and the other, the court has to examine the nature of the inconsistencies, namely, whether they are material or not. While scrutinising the contents of various dying declarations, in such a situation, the court has to examine the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances.” 20. In the case of Ashabai v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2013) 2 SCC 224 , the court observed:- “15. When there are multiple dying declarations, each dying declaration has to be separately assessed and evaluated and assessed independently on its own merit as to its evidentiary value and one cannot be rejected because of certain variations in the other.” 21. In the case of Jagbir Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2019) 8 SCC 779 , the following principles were observed: “31. A survey of the decisions would show that the principles of declarations can be culled out as follows: …. 31.6. However, there may be cases where there are more than one dying declaration. If there are more than one dying declaration, the dying declarations may entirely agree with one another. There may be dying declarations where inconsistencies between the declarations emerge. The extent of the inconsistencies would then have to be considered by the court. 31.6. However, there may be cases where there are more than one dying declaration. If there are more than one dying declaration, the dying declarations may entirely agree with one another. There may be dying declarations where inconsistencies between the declarations emerge. The extent of the inconsistencies would then have to be considered by the court. The inconsistencies may turn out to be reconcilable. 31.7. In such cases, where the inconsistencies go to some matter of detail or description but is incriminatory in nature as far as the Accused is concerned, the court would look to the material on record to conclude as to which dying declaration is to be relied on unless it be shown that they are unreliable; 31.8. The third category of cases is that where there are more than one dying declaration and inconsistencies between the declarations are absolute and the dying declarations are irreconcilable being repugnant to one another. In a dying declaration, the Accused may not be blamed at all and the cause of death may be placed at the doorstep of an unfortunate accident. This may be followed up by another dying declaration which is diametrically opposed to the first dying declaration. In fact, in that scenario, it may not be a question of an inconsistent dying declaration buta dying declaration which is completely opposed to the dying declaration which is given earlier. There may be more than two.” 22. In the case of Uttam v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2022) 8 SCC 576 , this court observed: “15. In cases involving multiple dying declarations made by the deceased, the question that arises for consideration is as to which of the said dying declarations ought to be believed by the court and what would be the guiding factors for arriving at a just and lawful conclusion. The problem becomes all the more knotty when the dying declarations made by the deceased are found to be contradictory. Faced with such a situation, the court would be expected to carefully scrutinise the evidence to find out as to which of the dying declarations can be corroborated by other material evidence produced by the prosecution. The problem becomes all the more knotty when the dying declarations made by the deceased are found to be contradictory. Faced with such a situation, the court would be expected to carefully scrutinise the evidence to find out as to which of the dying declarations can be corroborated by other material evidence produced by the prosecution. Of equal significance is the condition of the deceased at the relevant point in time, the medical evidence brought on record that would indicate the physical and mental fitness of the deceased, the scope of the close relatives/family members having influenced/tutored the deceased and all the other attendant circumstances that would help the court in exercise of its discretion.” 23. In the case of Abhishek Sharma vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) reported in, after consider the various pronouncements of their court, the following principles emerge, for a Court to consider when dealing with a case involving multiple dying declarations: “9.1 The primary requirement for all dying declarations is that they should be voluntary and reliable and that such statements should be in a fit state of mind; 9.2 All dying declarations should be consistent. In other words, inconsistencies between such statements should be 'material' for its credibility to be shaken; 9.3 When inconsistencies are found between various dying declarations, other evidence available on record may be considered for the purposes of corroboration of the contents of dying declarations. 9.4 The statement treated as a dying declaration must be interpreted in light of surrounding facts and circumstances. 9.5 Each declaration must be scrutinized on its own merits. The court has to examine upon which of the statements reliance can be placed in order for the case to proceed further. 9.6 When there are inconsistencies, the statement that has been recorded by a Magistrate or like higher officer can be relied on, subject to the indispensable qualities of truthfulness and being free of suspicion. 9.7 In the presence of inconsistencies, the medical fitness of the person making such declaration, at the relevant time, assumes importance along with other factors such as the possibility of tutoring by relatives, etc.” 24. 9.7 In the presence of inconsistencies, the medical fitness of the person making such declaration, at the relevant time, assumes importance along with other factors such as the possibility of tutoring by relatives, etc.” 24. In view of the above, the law on the issue of dying declaration can be summarized to the effect that in case, the Court comes to the conclusion that the dying declaration is true and reliable, has been recorded by a person at a time when the deceased was fit physically and mentally to make the declaration and it has not been made under any tutoring/duress/prompting; it can be the sole basis for recording conviction. In such an eventuality no corroboration is required. In case, there are multiple dying declarations and there are inconsistencies between them, generally, the dying declaration recorded by the higher officer like a Magistrate can be relied upon, provided that there is no circumstance giving rise to any suspicion about its truthfulness. In the present matter, the deceased- Madhu made her second statement before a Magistrate on 07.05.1987, which ordinarily would carry greater probative value due to the impartial and official nature of the recording authority. However, the totality of facts and circumstances warrants closer scrutiny. It is an undisputed fact that the deceased succumbed to her injuries on 29.06.1987, i.e., more than one and a half months after the incident. The significant time lapse between the alleged act and the death of the deceased raises a substantial question as to the causal nexus between the conduct attributed to the accused and the eventual cause of death. Additionally, PW/1- Hari Singh and PW/2- Raj Kumar, who were independent witnesses, have already been declared hostile and after perusal of the statement of the PW/5- Sudesh, mother of the deceased, this court never feels her statement trustworthy. Likewise, major improvements have also arisen in the statements of other witnesses which are contradictory to each other. 25. Additionally, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Phoolchand Rathore reported in 2023 CriLR 724 , while observing that courts are generally reluctant to interfere with an order of acquittal, recognized that such interference is warranted when it becomes evident that the acquittal was based on an entirely flawed reasoning process, legally erroneous, and involved a perverse approach to the facts of the case. In such circumstances, where the order of acquittal has led to a grave and substantial miscarriage of justice, the Court may reverse the acquittal and convert it into a conviction. In support of this principle, the Court relied upon its prior judgments, emphasizing the exceptional nature of such interference to r ectify substantial errors in the acquittal order. these are:- 21. In State of M.P. & Others v. Paltan Mallah & Others, (2005) 3 SCC 169 , reiterating the same view it was observed: “8. … This being an appeal against acquittal, this Court would be slow in interfering with the findings of the High Court, unless there is perverse appreciation of the evidence which resulted in serious miscarriage of justice and if the High Court has taken a plausible view this Court would not be justified in interfering with the acquittal passed in favour of the accused and if two views are possible and the High Court had chosen one view which is just and reasonable, then also this Court would be reluctant to interfere with the judgment of the High Court.” 22. In a recent decision rendered by this Court in Basheera Begam v. Mohd. Ibrahim & Others, (2020) 11 SCC 174 , it was observed: “190. … Reversal of a judgment and order of conviction and acquittal of the accused should not ordinarily be interfered with unless such reversal/acquittal is vitiated by perversity. In other words, the court might reverse an order of acquittal if the court finds that no person properly instructed in law could have upon analysis of the evidence on record found the accused to be “not guilty”. …” 26. Similarly in the case of State of State of Uttrakhand Vs. Sanjay Ram Tamta , reported in (2025) 2 SCC (Cri) 159 ,' the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-- “6. Trite is the principle that the appellate courts would be slow in reversing an order of acquittal, especially since the presumption of innocence that is always available to the accused; as a basic principle of criminal jurisprudence, stands reinforced and reaffirmed by the acquittal and unless there are very substantive and compelling reasons to do so, there cannot be a reversal of an order of acquittal. Unless it is found that the findings are perverse and the only conclusion possible from the compelling evidence is of guilt; appellate courts will be slow to reverse an order of acquittal. 7. Recently, in Surender Singh Vs. State of Uttrakhand, one of us (B.R. Gavai, J.) referring to various binding precedents of this Court succinctly laid down the principle in the following manner in SCC para 24: 24 It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 27. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused-respondent for offence under Sections 302 , 304-B and 498-A IPC beyond all reasonable doubt. The appellant/State has failed to show any error of law or on facts on the basis of which interference can be made by this Court in the judgment under challenge. The judgment passed by the learned trial court is detailed, reasoned and perfectly justified and the same does not suffer from any infirmity and does not warrant any interference from this Court. 28. Hence, the criminal appeal preferred by the State is hereby dismissed. 29. The record of the court below be sent back forthwith.