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2025 DIGILAW 1563 (RAJ)

Chhabila Ram S/o Ami Lal v. State of Rajasthan

2025-09-10

MANOJ KUMAR GARG, RAVI CHIRANIA

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JUDGMENT : Manoj Kumar Garg, J. 1. Instant criminal appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment dated 05.06.2013 passed by learned Special Additional District and Sessions Judge (Women Atrocities and Dowry Cases), Sriganganagar in Sessions Case No.56/2012 by which the learned Trial Court convicted the appellant for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment alongwith a fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default of payment of fine, further to undergo three months’ simple imprisonment. 2. Brief facts necessary to be noted for deciding the controversy are that on 08.04.2012 at about 09:30 AM, Shri Krishna Kumar Pareek, ASI, Police Station- Anoopgarh recorded the statement of Smt. Meera who was admitted at C.H.C. Anoopgarh. She alleged that she had entered into matrimony with the appellant sixteen years prior, and during their wedlock, they were blessed with two sons. She further stated that her husband is an alcoholic and frequently engages in quarrels with her without any apparent reason. She recounted that on the preceding night, her husband, in an intoxicated state, quarreled with her. Early in the morning at around 8:00 AM, he again began arguing with her and threatened to abandon her and marry another woman. He also threatened to set her on fire, instructing her to pour oil on herself, implying that he would ignite her. In response, deceased- Meera poured kerosene on her body. Her husband, with the apparent intention of causing her death, subsequently set her on fire using a matchstick. At that moment, the appellant’s elder son, Manoj Kumar, intervened and extinguished the flames. 3. On the said report, Police registered the FIR against the accused appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 307 & 324 IPC and started investigation. 4. Subsequently, the deceased- Meera, was referred to PBM Hospital in Bikaner. She was discharged from there on 17.05.2012 and subsequently referred to a hospital in Jaipur. However, on 30.05.2012, she was admitted to SMS Hospital, Jaipur. Tragically, she succumbed and passed away on the following day, 31.05.2012. Following these events, the police added the charge of offence under Section 302 of IPC against the accused appellant. Upon completion of the investigation, the police filed a challan against the accused-appellant. 5. Thereafter, learned Trial Court framed, read over and explained the charges for the offence under Section 302 IPC to the accused appellant. Following these events, the police added the charge of offence under Section 302 of IPC against the accused appellant. Upon completion of the investigation, the police filed a challan against the accused-appellant. 5. Thereafter, learned Trial Court framed, read over and explained the charges for the offence under Section 302 IPC to the accused appellant. He denied the charge and sought trial. 6. During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as eight witnesses and also got exhibited relevant documents in support of its case. 7. The accused appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In defence, two witnesses were examined and relevant documents were exhibited. 8. Learned trial Court, after hearing the arguments from both the sides, taking into consideration and appreciating the documentary evidence and the statements of witnesses, vide judgment dated 05.06.2013 convicted and sentenced the accused- appellant for the offence as aforesaid. Hence, this criminal appeal. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that there are significant contradictions in the testimonies of the deceased- Meera, as well as her son, PW/4– Manoj Kumar, and the Investigating Officer, PW/7– Krishna Kumar Pareek. He contends that the incident in question occurred on 08.04.2012, after which the deceased was referred to PBM Hospital, Bikaner, from where she was discharged on 17.05.2012. Subsequently, she remained at her residence, until she was suddenly admitted to SMS Hospital, Jaipur, on 30.05.2012. The following day, i.e., 31.05.2012, she succumbed to her injuries. Counsel further argues that the negligence in medical treatment contributed to her death, as she had sustained burns covering approximately 50-55% of her body, injuries which she could have survived had proper medical care been provided. He alleges that due to negligent treatment and the lack of appropriate medical attention, coupled with the alleged negligence of her family members, she ultimately lost her life. Additionally, counsel references the statement of DW/1– Krishna, a neighbor of the deceased, who testified that she heard screams coming from Meera’s residence. Upon investigation, she observed Meera burning inside her house, which was locked from the inside. She recounted that she entered the house through the terrace and was able to open the door, at which point PW/4- Manoj Kumar also arrived. Upon investigation, she observed Meera burning inside her house, which was locked from the inside. She recounted that she entered the house through the terrace and was able to open the door, at which point PW/4- Manoj Kumar also arrived. DW/1- Krishna further stated that at the time of the incident, Meera was alone at her residence and that she appeared to have set herself on fire voluntarily, suggesting that the story of self-immolation might be fabricated. Furthermore, counsel emphasizes that the deceased’s own statement indicated that she poured kerosene on her body and subsequently ignited the fire using a matchstick. This statement implies that the deceased intended to commit self- harm, possibly as a result of grave and sudden provocation. Accordingly, he prays that accused-appellant should not be held guilty for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and instead his conviction may be upheld for the offence under Section 304- I of IPC. 10. Per-contra, the learned Public Prosecutor has opposed the prayer made by counsel for the appellant and submits that, based on the dying declaration of the deceased- Meera, as well as the testimony of PW/4- Manoj Kumar, son of the deceased, it is established that following their marriage, the accused- appellant subjected deceased- Meera to repeated instances of physical assault and harassment while in an intoxicated state. On the day of the incident, the accused-appellant engaged in a quarrel with the deceased and subsequently set her on fire. Therefore, the conviction under Section 302 of IPC by the trial Court is thoroughly justified. Consequently, the appeal should be dismissed. 11. We have considered the submissions of the counsel for the parties made at bar and perused the impugned judgment as well as record of the case. 12. Admittedly, the deceased- Meera had entered into matrimony with the accused- appellant approximately sixteen years prior, and during the subsistence of their wedlock, two sons were born to them. In her statement, she disclosed that her husband was addicted to alcohol and would frequently quarrel with her without any justifiable cause. She recounted that on the night preceding the incident, her husband, in a state of intoxication, engaged in a quarrel with her. On the following morning, at around 8:00 AM, he again initiated an altercation, wherein he threatened to abandon her and marry another woman. She recounted that on the night preceding the incident, her husband, in a state of intoxication, engaged in a quarrel with her. On the following morning, at around 8:00 AM, he again initiated an altercation, wherein he threatened to abandon her and marry another woman. He further threatened to set her ablaze, instructing her to pour oil on herself, while insinuating that he would ignite her. In consequence, the deceased- Meera poured kerosene over her body, whereupon the appellant allegedly set her on fire by igniting a matchstick. Thereafter, deceased- Meera was referred to PBM Hospital, Bikaner, from where she was discharged on 17.05.2012 and directed to seek further treatment at Jaipur. However, instead of being admitted immediately, she returned home and was later admitted to SMS Hospital, Jaipur on 30.05.2012, where she succumbed to her injuries the following day, i.e., 31.05.2012. 13. The core question before this Court is whether the conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC can be legally sustained. For this purpose, the Court has meticulously examined the testimonies of the material witnesses and the documentary evidence available on record. 14. According to the deceased’s own statement (Ex.P/6), she admitted that she herself poured kerosene on her body, and thereafter, the appellant ignited the fire using a matchstick. In contrast, PW/4- Manoj Kumar, the son of the deceased, deposed that his father was habitually addicted to liquor, frequently quarreled with his mother, and on the date of the incident, poured kerosene on her body himself. He further stated that although his mother was referred to SMS Hospital, Jaipur, she initially returned home, and only when her condition deteriorated, she was admitted to SMS Hospital on 30.05.2012. 15. The medical evidence further reflects inconsistencies. PW/2 Dr. Prem Agarwal (Govt. Hospital, Sriganganagar), who first treated Meera, stated that at the time of admission she was fit for conversation and not in a critical condition, though she was subsequently referred to PBM Hospital. PW/3 Dr. Ashok Parmar (PBM Hospital, Bikaner) also deposed that Meera was discharged on 17.05.2012 with instructions to seek further treatment in Jaipur. However, she went home instead of being admitted at Jaipur, and only upon deterioration of her condition was she taken to SMS Hospital on 30.05.2012. PW/8 Dr. Dhruv Singh (SMS Hospital, Jaipur) testified that at the time of her admission she was 50–55% burnt and in a grave condition. However, she went home instead of being admitted at Jaipur, and only upon deterioration of her condition was she taken to SMS Hospital on 30.05.2012. PW/8 Dr. Dhruv Singh (SMS Hospital, Jaipur) testified that at the time of her admission she was 50–55% burnt and in a grave condition. 16. On the other hand, independent witness DW/1- Krishna, a neighbour of the deceased and accused-appellant, categorically stated that she heard the cries of the deceased from inside the house. On inquiry, she discovered the door locked from inside. She then accessed the house from the roof and opened the door, following which PW/4- Manoj Kumar, son of the deceased and other neighbours entered and observed that deceased- Meera had set herself on fire. This witness further asserted that at the time of the incident, the deceased- Meera was alone in her house and appeared to have immolated herself voluntarily, thereby casting grave doubt upon the prosecution’s version. 17. In view of these facts, even if the deceased- Meera’s statement (Ex.P/6) is taken at face value, there is no cogent or convincing evidence to sustain a conviction for the offence of murder under Section 302 IPC. The contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the absence of clear and direct evidence of the appellant’s intentional and culpable conduct, and the possibility of self-immolation significantly weaken the prosecution case. 18. It is pertinent to note that for an act to amount to “murder” within the meaning of Section 300 IPC, it must be established that the act was done with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or with the knowledge that the act was so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death. In the present case, the material on record does not unequivocally prove such intention or knowledge on the part of the appellant. At best, the circumstances suggest a quarrel arising out of domestic discord, coupled with the deceased’s own act of pouring kerosene on herself, possibly driven by emotional or psychological distress. Thus, in the absence of conclusive proof of homicidal intent or deliberate instigation, the case does not fulfill the strict ingredients of murder under Section 302 IPC, depending upon the appreciation of evidence which reads as under:- "300. Thus, in the absence of conclusive proof of homicidal intent or deliberate instigation, the case does not fulfill the strict ingredients of murder under Section 302 IPC, depending upon the appreciation of evidence which reads as under:- "300. Murder--.Except in the case hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or-- Secondly--If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or-- Thirdly--If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or-- Fourthly--If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. Exception 1.--When culpable homicide is not murder.-- Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. ......x.....xx.....xx..... x.......... ......x.....xx.....xx..... x.......... ......x.....xx.....xx..... x.......… Exception 4--Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Explanation--It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault. .........." 19. The thin line difference between the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC or Section 304 PART I , IPC has been explained by the Hon’ble Apex Court in various authoritative pronouncements:- 20. In the case of Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja vs State Of A.P. reported in (2006) 11 SCC 444 , Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:- “Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters - plucking of a fruit, straying of a cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no pre-meditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302 , are not converted into offences punishable under Section 304 PART I /II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under Section 302 . The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances : (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any pre-meditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention.” 21. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention.” 21. In the case of Ajit Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in (2011) 9 SCC 462 , while altering the conviction of the accused from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 PART I , IPC, Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “20. In order to hold whether an offence would fall under Section 302 . or Section 304 Part 1 IPC, the courts have to be extremely cautious in examining whether the same falls under Section 300 IPC which states whether a culpable homicide is murder, or would it fall under its five Exceptions which lay down when culpable homicide is not murder and in this category further b lays down that culpable homicide is not murder if the offender whilst deprived of the power of self-control by giving sudden provocation causes the death of the person who gave the provocation, or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. 21. While examining the case of the appellant in the light of the settled legal position that culpable homicide would not amount to murder if the c offender was deprived of the power of self-control on account of grave and sudden provocation, I am of the view that the appellant's case will have to be treated to be a case falling under the Fourth Exception of Section 300 and hence would be a case under Section 304 PART I of the Penal Code for more than one reason deduced from the evidence on record. 22. In the first place, the deceased Laxmi Devi had been cutting grass for d fodder in the field of the appellant Ajit Singh and when Ajit Singh reprimanded the deceased and her companion not to spoil his kinnu crop, the deceased started an altercation with the appellant and abused him which provoked the appellant Ajit Singh to order his companion Anil Kumar (since acquitted) to bring kassi (spade) which instruction was carried out by Anil Kumar and thereafter Ajit Singh inflicted two blows on the deceased Laxmi Devi. However, she did not die instantly and was taken to the hospital where she underwent treatment for four days and finally succumbed to the injuries. However, she did not die instantly and was taken to the hospital where she underwent treatment for four days and finally succumbed to the injuries. From this it can be safely inferred that although the appellant Ajit Singh had the intention and knowledge to cause grievous injury on the deceased which could have resulted into the death of the deceased, yet it cannot be inferred without doubt that the intention of the appellant Ajit Singh was necessarily to cause death and not merely to cause grievous hurt as he did not inflict repeated blows on the deceased and the deceased in fact had survived for four days after the assault. In addition to this, it has also come in evidence that PW 6 informant had chased the appellant but the appellant did not pursue by entering into further scuffle with the prosecution party. Besides this, the case of the prosecution regarding common intention to commit murder already g stands negatived by the High Court vide the impugned judgment and order as the plea of common intention to commit murder is no longer existing since the co-accused Anil Kumar was acquitted of the charge under Sections 302 /34 IPC by the High Court. Thus, the common intention to kill the deceased will have to be treated as missing in the prosecution case and only individual liability of the appellant giving fatal blows will determine whether the charge would be sustained under Section 302 IPC or would it fall under Section 304 PART I IPC. 23. On an analysis of the case of the prosecution in the light of the evidence on record, I am clearly of the view that the appellant's conviction and sentence under Section 302 IPC cannot be sustained but considering the intensity and gravity of the assault which led finally to the death of the victim Laxmi Devi he would certainly be held guilty under Section 304 Part 1 IPC and hence I deem it just and appropriate to set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 IPC and the same is altered to his conviction under Section 304 PART I IPC. Accordingly, the sentence of life imprisonment shall be reduced to a period of ten years under Section 304 PART I IPC. Thus, the appeal stands partly allowed to this extent.” 22. Accordingly, the sentence of life imprisonment shall be reduced to a period of ten years under Section 304 PART I IPC. Thus, the appeal stands partly allowed to this extent.” 22. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a recent judgment in the case of Goverdhan vs State of Chhatisgarh reported in (2025) 3 SCC 378 , has observed as under:- “116. It is also noticeable that the circumstances under which the assault took place and the reason for causing the injuries by the appellants and the motive behind their assault has not come out clearly. Even the sole eyewitness, Lata Bai (PW 10), the mother of the deceased testified that her son was having visiting terms with the accused persons as they were residing in the same locality and she cannot tell why the quarrel occurred suddenly. It has not been established clearly that it was premeditated and the assault was pre-planned with the intention to kill the deceased. Any prior enmity between the appellants and the deceased has not been established. Thus, the motive for committing the crime has not been clearly established and proved. 117. However, it is established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants had caused the death of the deceased fully knowing that the bodily injuries caused by the appellants were likely to cause death as the appellants were armed with deadly weapons, we are inclined to convert the conviction of the appellants from Section 302 IPC to Part I of Section 304IPC. Accordingly, we convict the appellants under Part I of Section 304 IPC.” 23.Upon perusal of the injury report (Ex. P/2), it is revealed that the injuries sustained by the deceased were opined to be simple in nature, whereas the post-mortem report (Ex. P/13) records that shock and extensive burn injuries were the primary causes of death. 24. Furthermore, the circumstances under which the assault occurred, including the motivations behind causing the injuries, there is no evidence to suggest that the assault was premeditated or carried out with a deliberate plan to kill the deceased. The absence of evidence indicating premeditation is a significant factor. 24. Furthermore, the circumstances under which the assault occurred, including the motivations behind causing the injuries, there is no evidence to suggest that the assault was premeditated or carried out with a deliberate plan to kill the deceased. The absence of evidence indicating premeditation is a significant factor. Considering the absence of proof of premeditation, including the lack of undue advantage or cruelty on the part of the appellant, as well as the fact that the assault was the result of a sudden altercation between the parties, the act can be characterized as culpable homicide not amounting to murder, aligning with the provisions of Section 304 PART I of the IPC. This court is of the opinion that the actions of the accused demonstrated a reckless disregard for human life rather than an outright intention to murder. The nature and extent of the injuries, coupled with the circumstances of the incident, support this conclusion. 25. In view of the aforesaid aspects and upon assessment of evidence, we are of the considered opinion that it is improbable to believe that the accused appellant intentionally and with deliberate motive caused the death of the deceased. Furthermore, the circumstances and the nature of the incident do not substantiate the claim of deliberate homicide. The evidence suggests that the act may have been unintentional or a result of unforeseen circumstances, rather than a calculated efforts to cause death. Therefore, based on these considerations this Court finds it difficult to ascribe full culpability to the accused appellant for causing the death intentionally and the finding of guilt recorded by learned trial Court under Section 302 IPC is not sustainable in the eyes of law because there is a clear absence of pre-meditation or motive to kill deceased- Meera and it is a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Therefore, we are inclined to accept the prayer of accused appellant to alter the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 PART I , IPC. 26. Resultantly, the conviction and sentences passed against the accused appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC is quashed and set aside and hereby altered to the offence punishable under Section 304 PART I , IPC. To that extent, the impugned judgment dated 05.06.2013, passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge (Women Atrocities and Dowry Cases), Sriganganagar in Sessions Case No. 56/2012 is hereby modified. 27. To that extent, the impugned judgment dated 05.06.2013, passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge (Women Atrocities and Dowry Cases), Sriganganagar in Sessions Case No. 56/2012 is hereby modified. 27. However, considering the fact that the appellant has already undergone the incarnation for more than thirteen years including the remission and the appellant is still in judicial custody since his arrest. Thus, while maintaining conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 304 PART I IPC, his sentence for the said offence is hereby reduced to the period already undergone by him. The fine amount is hereby waived, if not deposited. The appellant is in jail. He be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 28. Resultantly, the criminal appeal is partly allowed. 29. The record of the trial court be sent back forthwith. 30. A copy of this order be communicated to the accused-appellant.