JUDGMENT: J. SREENIVAS RAO, J. This Criminal Appeal has been filed aggrieved by the judgment passed by the Special Court for the Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishments Act, Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial Court’) in Calendar Case No.3 of 2003, dated 19.02.2008, where under respondents/accused Nos.1, 3, 7 and 9 were acquitted for the offences under Sections 420 and 406 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE , 1860 (for short ‘IPC’) and Section 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishments Act (for short ‘the Act’). 2. Heard Sri M.Vivekananda Reddy, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of appellant-State and Sri C.Sharan Reddy, learned counsel, representing Ms.D.Sangeetha Reddy, learned counsel for respondents/accused Nos.1, 3, 7 and 9. 3.1 The case of prosecution in brief is that accused No.1 floated Asmitha Finance and Leasing Limited with himself as Managing Director and accused Nos.3 to 9 as Directors and incorporated the same on 4.7.1994 and that during the year 1996, accused No.1 also included accused No.10 as one of the Directors. Accused No.1 is son of accused No.2. Accused Nos.3 to 9 are close relatives of accused No.1. Accused No.1 floated another eleven companies namely 1) Asmitha Finance and Investments, 2) Asmitha Power Systems Pvt. Ltd., 3) Asrutha Meridian Estates Pvt. Ltd., 4)Asmitha Housing Development Corporation Pvt. Ltd., 5) Asmitha Cements Ltd., 6) Asmitha Hotels and Resorts Pvt. Ltd., 7) Asmitha Communications Ltd., 8) Asmitha Hi- Tech Bus Services 9) Asmitha Car Finance 10) Nagarjuna Enterprises and 11) NESCON Group Construction, Finance Service and Industrial Services. 3.2 It is further case of prosecution that accused No.1 collected deposits from several public on interest and that the company paid interest up to June, 1997 regularly and thereafter, committed default in payment of interest as well as in repayment of deposit amounts. Thus, the accused Nos.1 to 10 are liable for the offences under Sections 420 , 406, 467 and 471 r/w 34 of IPC and Section 5 of the Act. 4. The case against accused Nos.1 to 10 was took cognizance and numbered as C.C. No.2 of 2000. Since accused Nos.1, 3, 7 and 9 were absconding, the case against them was split up and numbered as C.C. No.11 of 2002, subsequently it was renumbered as C.C. No.3 of 2003. 5. 4. The case against accused Nos.1 to 10 was took cognizance and numbered as C.C. No.2 of 2000. Since accused Nos.1, 3, 7 and 9 were absconding, the case against them was split up and numbered as C.C. No.11 of 2002, subsequently it was renumbered as C.C. No.3 of 2003. 5. In C.C. No.3 of 2003, on behalf of prosecution before the Court below, PWs.1 to 7 were examined and Ex.P1 to P54 and M.Os.1 to 13 were marked. On behalf of defence, no witnesses were examined, and no documents were marked. The trial Court after taking into consideration the oral and documentary evidence on record and after hearing the parties, has acquitted respondents/accused Nos.1, 3, 7 and 9 for the aforesaid offences. 6. Aggrieved by the above said judgment, the State filed the present Appeal. 7. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted that the trial Court without properly appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record erroneously acquitted the respondents, though the prosecution has proved the case. He further submitted that the trial Court without discussing the oral testimony of PWs.1 to 5 and interpreting the documents only, acquitted the respondents. The FDRs and other documents issued in respect of PWs.1 to 5 are signed by the respondents and the said incriminating evidence against the respondents was not in dispute. PWs.1 to 5 in their evidence categorically deposed before the trial Court that they have deposited the amounts with the respondents on their demand but they have not paid the money. Hence, the ingredients for the offence under Section 5 of the Act are attracted, however, the trial Court without taking into consideration the testimony of PWs.1 to 5 acquitted the respondents. Hence, the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court is contrary to law and the same is liable to be set aside and the respondents are liable to be convicted for the offences with which they were charged. 8. Hence, the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court is contrary to law and the same is liable to be set aside and the respondents are liable to be convicted for the offences with which they were charged. 8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents submitted that the trial Court took the case on file and numbered as C.C. No. 2 of 2000 against accused Nos.1 to 10, however, since the accused Nos.1, 3, 7 and 9 were absconding, the case against them was split up and numbered as C.C. No.11 of 2002, subsequently it was renumbered as C.C. No.3 of 2003 and the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, disposed of the case against the accused Nos.2, 4 to 6, 8 and 10, acquitted them vide judgment dated 10.03.2006. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the State had approached this Court and filed Criminal Appeal along with condonation of delay of 500 days in presenting the Appeal vide Crl.A.M.P.No.2198 of 2007 and this Court dismissed the condonation of delay application on 08.12.2017. Consequently, dismissed the Criminal Appeal (SR) No.24009 of 2007 and the order passed by this Court has become final. He further submitted that even on merits also, there are no grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court on the ground that the trial Court after evaluating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, has rightly acquitted the respondents by giving cogent evidence. Hence, the present Criminal Appeal filed by the State is also liable to be dismissed. 9. Having considered the submissions made by the respective parties and after perusal of the impugned judgment, it reveals that the very same charges are levelled against the respondents and other accused Nos.2, 4 to 6, 8 and 10. The case against accused Nos.2, 4 to 6, 8 and 10 was split up and numbered as C.C. No.2 of 2000 and the trial Court acquitted accused Nos.2, 4 to 6, 8 and 10 vide judgment dated 10.03.2006. In the present case, the trial Court acquitted the respondents vide judgment dated 19.02.2008 in C.C. No.3 of 2003. The allegations and charges levelled against the respondents in the present Appeal as well as against accused Nos.2, 4 to 6, 8 and 10 in C.C.No.2 of 2000 are one and the same and the evidence adduced by the prosecution is also one and the same. The allegations and charges levelled against the respondents in the present Appeal as well as against accused Nos.2, 4 to 6, 8 and 10 in C.C.No.2 of 2000 are one and the same and the evidence adduced by the prosecution is also one and the same. The judgment passed by the trial Court in C.C.No.2 of 2000 was confirmed by this Court in Criminal Appeal (SR) No.24009 of 2007, while dismissing the condonation of delay of 512 days in presenting the Appeal and consequently, dismissed the main Appeal. 10. The trial Court has given specific finding in para Nos.9 to 11 of the judgment and come to conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt against the respondents for the offences with which they were charged. 11. In cases of acquittal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravi Sharma v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and another, (2022) 8 Supreme Court Cases 536 , held that while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellate Court has to consider whether the trial Court’s view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial Court rendering acquittal. 12. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh , (2008) 10 SCC 450 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court after referring several Judgments regarding the settled principles of law and the powers of appellate Court in reversing the order of acquittal, held at para 70, as follows: “70. In the light of the above, the High Court and other appellate Courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of Judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court’s acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court’s acquittal if it has “very substantial and compelling reasons” for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have “very substantial and compelling reasons” to discard the trial court’s decision. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court’s acquittal if it has “very substantial and compelling reasons” for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have “very substantial and compelling reasons” to discard the trial court’s decision. “Very substantial and compelling reasons” exist when: i) The trial court’s conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong: ii) The trial court’s decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii) The trial court’s judgment is likely to result in “grave miscarriage of justice”; iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v) The trial court’s judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive. 2. The appellate court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the trial court. 3. If two reasonable views can be reached one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction the High Courts/appellate courts must rule in favour of the accused.” 13. In view of several discrepancies and the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court supra, this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the case against the respondents and the Court below has rightly acquitted the respondents and there are no grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge and the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 14. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.