JUDGMENT : Rajesh Mazumdar, J. Heard Mr. M. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. K.K. Parasar, learned CGC for the respondent No. 1, 2 & 3; Mr. H.K Hazarika, learned Government Advocate for the respondent No.4 and Ms. R. Hussain, learned Standing counsel, NCB for the respondent No.5. 2. By filing this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has assailed the detention order bearing F. No. U-11011/23/2025- PITNDPS dated 13.05.2025 issued by the Joint Secretary, (PITNDPS) Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India, thereby ordering detention of the petitioner, namely, Eusuf Ali @ Yusub Ali under PITNDPS Act on the ground stated therein as well as all orders consequential thereto. 3. Facts which are not undisputed : (i) The petitioner was arrested on 02/01/2024 in connection with NCB Crime No. 17/2023 under section 21(C)/29 NDPS Act. On 03/01/2024, the petitioner was shown arrested in connection with NCB Crime No. 18/2023. The charge-sheet in the first case i.e. NCB Crime No. 17/2023 was filed on 06/04/2024 and the charge-sheet in the second case was filed on 22/04/2024. Both the cases are now pending trial before the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge No.02, Kamrup (M) at Guwahati. (ii) The petitioner had filed B.A No. 1019/2024 in this Court praying for bail in connection with NCB Crime No. 17/2023 and had filed B.A No. 1014/2024 in connection with NCB Guwahati Crime No. 18/2023. (iii) Both the Bail Applications were taken up on 02/05/2024 and were disposed in view of the fact that the charge-sheet had already been submitted with respect of each of the cases. The petitioner was accordingly granted liber- ty to approach the Trial court seeking regular bail with further directions that the such applications would be considered by the learned Trial Court in accordance with law. (iv) On 14/05/2025, the petitioner filed B.A No. 1205/2025 in connection with NDPS Case No. 129/2024 corresponding to NCB Crime No. 17/2023 and B.A No.1364/2025 on 28/05/2025 in connection with NDPS Case No. 140/2024 corresponding to NCB Crime No. 18/2023. (v) While the aforesaid Bail Applications were pending before this Court, on 13/05/2025, the respondent No. 2 passed the impugned detention order No. F.No.-U-11011/23/2025-PITNDPS, issued by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance Department of revenue (PITNDPS Unit). (v) While the aforesaid Bail Applications were pending before this Court, on 13/05/2025, the respondent No. 2 passed the impugned detention order No. F.No.-U-11011/23/2025-PITNDPS, issued by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance Department of revenue (PITNDPS Unit). (vi) B.A No. 1205/2025 was disposed of on 14/05/2025 granting bail to the petitioner subject to the conditions recorded in the order itself. The B.A No.1364/2025 was disposed on 28/05/2025 granting bail to the petitioner on conditions recorded in that order. Relevant to state that Bail Application of the co-applicant namely, Jayad Khan in B.A No. 1364/2025 was rejected by the Court through the same order dated 28/05/2025. (vii) The detention order dated 13/05/2025 along with its annexures, detailing the grounds on which the detention order had been passed, was served upon the petitioner on 28/05/2025 even as the petitioner was still in custody, awaiting his release in accordance with the order dated 28/05/2025 passed in B.A No. 1364/2025. (viii) The petitioner submitted representations against the detention order dated 13/05/2025 on 12/06/2025 before the respondent No. 1, 2 & 4 and the same was disposed on 30/06/2025 by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue (PITNDPS Division), i.e. by the respondent No.2 which was served on the petitioner on 08/07/2025, and by the respondent no.1 on a date not disclosed but conveyed to the petitioner by memorandum dated 22.7.2025 which was received by the petitioner on 28.7.2025 along with another order dated 28.7.2025 conveying that the Central Government had directed that the petitioner by detained for a period of 1 year from the date of his detention i.e. 28.5.2025. (ix) The Detention Order No. F.No.-U-11011/23/2025-PITNDPS dated 13/05/2025 and all consequential orders has been assailed in this writ petition with further prayer to set aside the order dated 30/06/2025, which had rejected the representation of the petitioner, with further prayer for directing the respondent authorities to set the petitioner at liberty. 4. Submissions made on behalf of the petitioner : I. Mr. M. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner has initiated his argument by referring to the impugned detention order to state that the order was passed on the basis of a reference made by the sponsoring Authority in the month of January 2025. 4. Submissions made on behalf of the petitioner : I. Mr. M. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner has initiated his argument by referring to the impugned detention order to state that the order was passed on the basis of a reference made by the sponsoring Authority in the month of January 2025. The learned counsel has submitted that the delay of more than 5 months, on the part of the authority in passing the detention order, in itself serves as a reason to interfere with the decision to detain the petitioner. He has submitted that by such delay, the very ‘live and proximate connection’ between the alleged prejudicial activities and the purpose of the detention order had been severed. The learned counsel has also stressed that the delay caused in disposing his representation and confirming the detention has also vitiated the continued detention of the petitioner. Elaborating his argument on the first contention that the delay on the part of the authority passing the detention order would itself vitiate the decision to detain, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner was arrested on 02/01/2024 in connection with NCB Crime No. 17/2023 and he was shown arrested in connection with NCB Crime No. 18/2023 on 03/01/2024. The petitioner had thereafter been in continuous custody all throughout till he was granted bail on 28/05/2025. However, before he has been released on bail, the impugned order dated 13/05/2025 was brought into existence and he continued to languish behind bar. The counsel for the petitioner submits that 0.457 Kg of Heroin was recovered from four persons on 16/10/2023 and 29/10/2023 another amount of 0.409 Kg of Heroin had been seized from a Maruti Swift Car from the joint possession of two other persons. The learned counsel for the petitioner stated that it is a matter of record that there was no recovery made from the petitioner at any point of time. As per the grounds on which the detention order has been issued, the petitioner was served with a notice under section 67 of the NDPS Act to appear at Lakhiganj Police out-post at Dhubri district on 28/05/2025 and he appeared. As per the grounds on which the detention order has been issued, the petitioner was served with a notice under section 67 of the NDPS Act to appear at Lakhiganj Police out-post at Dhubri district on 28/05/2025 and he appeared. The learned counsel submits that based on alleged voluntary confessional statement made by the petitioner that he was the intended receiver in both the cases, he was arrested in connection with NCB Crime No. 17/2023 on 02/01/2024 and he was shown arrested in connection with NCB Crime No. 18/2023 on 03/01/2024. The learned counsel has drawn our attention to the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent No. 1, 2 & 3 where, at paragraph-7, it has been noted that the procedure of ordering a detention was followed since January 2025 and after proper scrutiny of the case record and verifying of the role of the detenu, the detention order dated 13/05/2025 was issued. The learned counsel there- fore submits that though the alleged recovery of narcotic was made in December 2023 and the petitioner was arrested on 02/01/2024 and was shown arrested on 03/01/2024, it is also admitted that the sponsoring authority had proposed the impugned action of detaining the petitioner in the month of January 2025. The learned counsel argued that there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner was found to be involved or engaged in any allegation of similar nature in the interregnum and these solitary instances were the only basis in proposing the detention of the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sushanta Kumar Banik -vs- State of Tripura & Others, reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 1333 to stress that delay in passing the order of detention from the date of proposal snaps the ‘live and proximate link’ between the alleged prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention. He argued that the detaining authority has made no reference as to why it took 5 months to decide whether the petitioner was required to be detained as a preventive measure. He has stressed that such delay would be fatal to the decision which the petitioner has been subjected to and therefore, he has prayed that the very initial order of detention requires interference of this Court. II. He has stressed that such delay would be fatal to the decision which the petitioner has been subjected to and therefore, he has prayed that the very initial order of detention requires interference of this Court. II. The learned counsel then argued that the detaining authority did not take into consideration the impact and the conditions imposed on the bail order and therefore, it could not have come to the subjective decision regarding the actual requirement of keeping the petitioner in preventive detention. The learned counsel has also argued that the effectiveness of the conditions imposed when the detenu was granted bail deserved consideration before an order of preventive detention could be passed and/or confirmed and in the present case, no consideration has been made by the authorities. The detention order therefore cannot be sustained in law. Elaborating the second limb of his argument that the impugned order suffers from non-application of any judicious mind, inasmuch as, the conditions laid down in the bail order are not discussed in the impugned order, and as such the same is liable to interfered with, the learned counsel has stressed that the impugned order would demonstrate that no reference at all was made to the privilege of bail which was granted to the petitioner with imposition of stringent conditions. He has further stated that the order granting him bail was available with the respondent authorities prior to the day when the impugned detention order been served upon him and yet even with such knowledge, the detaining authority proceeded to serve the impugned order upon him without considering the impact of the conditions of bail which was imposed by this Court will granting him conditional bail. The orders rejecting his representations and the orders confirming his detention also do not discuss the effect of the conditions of bail imposed on the petitioner. The learned counsel has placed reliance in the case of Vijay Narain Singh -versus- State of Bihar & Others, reported in (1984) 3 SCC 14 more specifically to paragraph-32. He has submitted that in view of the well settled position of law preventive detention is a hard law and therefore it should be strictly construed, the provision of such law should not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is allegedly involved in a criminal prosecution. He has submitted that in view of the well settled position of law preventive detention is a hard law and therefore it should be strictly construed, the provision of such law should not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is allegedly involved in a criminal prosecution. He stressed that the Hon’ble Apex Court has made it clear that when the person is enlarged by a criminal competent court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinizing the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court. He has submitted that though the mere presence of an order granting bail by the Court cannot be a bar to bring in an order of preventive detention but due application of mind has to be exercised by the authorities before the power to impose preventive detention of a citizen. III. Third limb of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in the absence of fulfilling the conditions mandatorily precedent for issuing the detention order when the detenu was already in custody, the detention order de-serves to be interfered with. To buttress the third limb of his argument , Mr. M. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the mandatory conditions precedent for issuing the order of detention having not been fulfilled prior to the detention being passed and that therefore the detention of the petitioner deserves to be interfered with by this Court. He has argued that to sustain the order of detention, the authority had to demonstrate the compelling necessity justifying the detention and mere reciting of facts will not suffice the justification required in law. The learned counsel has submitted that it is necessary for the detaining authority to express that there are compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention. He has submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the detaining authority should express its satisfaction that the detenu is likely to be released from custody in near future and that taking into the nature the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities. He has submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the detaining authority should express its satisfaction that the detenu is likely to be released from custody in near future and that taking into the nature the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities. He has drawn our attention to the detention order dated 13/05/2025 and submitted that although the order recited in a mechanical way that the authority was aware of his conscious involvement in dealing in illegal drugs and psychotropic substances in repeated manner, no reason was given as to why the said authority thought that he has high propensity to be involved in prejudicial activities in future also, more so, when he had already spent nearly one and half years in custody. The learned counsel has referred to the case of Amritlal & Others -versus- Union Government & Others, reported in (2001) 1 SCC 341 and submitted that the power of the detention should not be exercised unless there is imminent possibility that the detenu would be released from custody. The material before the officer passing the detention must be cogent to indicate that the detenu is likely to be released on bail. The inference cannot be based on the ipse dixit of the officer passing the order. He thereafter referred to the judgment of the case of Huidrom Konungjo Singh -versus- State of Manipur & Others, reported in (2012) 7 SCC 181 to emphasize that in the case of a challenge of the detention order, the detaining authority has to satisfy the court that the authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was actually in the custody, there was reliable materials before the said authority on the basis of which it could have reasons to believe that there was real possibility of his release on bail and further on being released that he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to public order and finally that the authority felt it necessary to prevent him in indulging in such activities. By referring to the judgment & order dated 07/12/2023 passed in the case of Smti Nancy -versus- State of Nagaland & Others, W.P.(Crl) No. 12/2023, the learned counsel has argued that the detention order does not refer to the existence of any cogent and reliable material to indicate that there was high propensity that the petitioner may resort to prejudicial activities. The very language used by the detaining authority to the fact that the presence of the petitioner in the society is a threat and his activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public security, peace and order show that the detaining authority was acting on ipse-dixit, more so, when no indication of relevant materials has been made in the order impugned to support the assumption that the petitioner has propensity to be involved in prejudicial activities in future also. IV. The learned counsel has further argued that since the detention order has not been issued for the purpose authorized by the statue, the detention order deserves inference. Elaborating the fourth limb of his argument to assail that the legality of the detention order, the learned counsel has submitted that initial arrest of the petitioner had been made on 02/01/2024 and 03/01/2024 and thereafter, for almost a period of 1 year, the concerned authorities made no move to propose or initiate any process to impose preventive detention of the petitioner. It is the admitted position in the affidavit filed by the respondent No. 1, 2 & 3 that the first proposal by the sponsoring authority had been done some time in the year January 2025. Fact remains that the petitioner had already moved bail petitions in the year 2024 itself and the charge-sheet had been submitted on 06/04/2024 and 22/04/2024 respectively in both the cases where he was arrayed as accused. It is also an admitted position that even thereafter, when a proposal was made by the sponsoring authority, it was only after an unexplained delay of nearly 5 months that the detaining authority became active to process the proposal submitted by the sponsoring authority and orders were passed only a day prior to the petitioner being granted bail in the first bail petition in the year 2025. He has submitted that it is an irony that the Court was not informed about the existence of the order dated 13/05/2025 when the court granted bail on 14/04/2025 in connection with NDPS Crime No. 17/2023. When the second bail petition of the petitioner was taken up by the Court on 16/05/2025, a request was made by the respondents for time to produce the recent Central Government notification in connection with the accused, which was allowed. The order dated 28/05/2025 passed in B.A No. 1364/2025 recorded the submission of the learned Standing counsel for the NCB that the petitioner was arrested under Section-3(1) of the PITNDPS Act, 1988. The learned counsel lays stress on the fact that it was only on that day i.e. 28/05/2025 that the petitioner was served with a copy of the order dated 13/05/2025. By referring to the chain of events, the learned counsel submitted that the impugned order having been passed on 13/05/2025, the same was not informed to the court when a relevant matter was taken up on 13/05/2025 and on 16/05/2025 when prayer for time was allowed to produce the Central Government notification and which is produced on 28/05/2025, there can be no reasonable explanation as to why the copy of the order was served on the petitioner only on 28/05/2025 i.e. on that day when the Court granted bail to the petitioner. The learned counsel submitted that the chain of event would clearly reflect that the only intention of the detaining authority was to ensure that the petitioner would not be able to enjoy the privilege of bail granted to him. He further submitted that as already demonstrated herein above, in the absence of cogent material to indicate that the petitioner might resort to prejudicial activities, the only inference that can be drawn is that the respondents intended to ensure continuous and prolonged detention of the petitioner for reasons other than those made permissible in law. He further submitted that as and when a constitutional court is called upon to test the legality of orders of preventive detention, it will be also be entitled to examine as to whether the power of detention has been exercised for achieving the purpose for which it has been conferred or it has been exercised for some improper purpose which is not authorized by the statute. The learned counsel has submitted that the petitioner has admittedly complied with the orders which required him to be present for questioning prior to his arrest and it was not the case of the respondents at any stage that the petitioner was likely to violate any of the conditions imposed on him when he was granted bail or that the conditions so imposed were not enough to deter him from participating in prejudicial activities. He submitted that there were no grounds or circumstances which warranted the circumvention of ordinary criminal procedure and to resort to an extraordinary measure of law of preventive detention. The learned counsel referred to the judgment passed in Ameena Begum Vs State of Telengana and others , reported in (2023) 9 SCC 587 in support of his contentions. Summing up his arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner prayed that the detention order and all other subsequent orders passed by the respondents be interfered with and directions may be issued to set the petitioner at liberty forthwith. It would be pertinent to note here that the order dated 28.07.2025 confirming the detention and continuing it for a period of one year from 28.05.2025 was passed during the pendency of this writ petition and has been brought on record by both the contesting parties. 5. Submissions made on behalf of the respondents: I. Mr. K.K. Parashar, learned Central Government Counsel, appearing for the respondents no 1, 2 and 3 has put up vehement opposition to the prayers made in the writ petition as well as to the arguments made for the petitioner. Mr. Parashar, learned CGC has submitted that the petitioner was not arrested in connection with NCB case no 17/2024 only on the basis that he had confessed to his involvement in the said case but there were other substantial evidence against him. He submitted that the impugned order clearly records findings that the petitioner had financial transactions with the persons from whom commercial quantity of narcotics were recovered and his call record details also pointed towards his active involvement in the crimes alleged. His confessional statements had corroborated the other material evidence. He has further submitted that the petitioner was not granted bail on the merits of his plea but only on a technical ground that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to him in the manner prescribed in law. His confessional statements had corroborated the other material evidence. He has further submitted that the petitioner was not granted bail on the merits of his plea but only on a technical ground that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to him in the manner prescribed in law. He has further submitted that the minor delay in supplying the petitioner with the order of detention along with the grounds had arisen in preparing the translated versions of the relied upon documents, such translation running into about 160 pages. He further submitted that the said delay did not in any manner sever the “live and proximate” link as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner. He further submitted that the detention order and the reasons therefor had been communicated to the detenu within fifteen days from the date on which the order was made and therefore, there was no delay in communicating the said order. The orders rejecting the representations and the order communication the detention to be effective for one year were also served instantly. He therefore submits that the petitioner has not been able to make out any case for interference by this Court and prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. Learned Central Government Counsel relied upon the judgment and order dated 12.12.2024 passed in WP(Crl.) 33/2024 to support his contentions. 6. Discussion and decision: The undisputed facts and dates have already been set forth hereinabove. The issue that requires our attention first is whether there was a delay in issuing the order directing preventive detention of the petitioner and whether by such a delay, the live and proximate connection between the alleged prejudicial acts and the need to detain the petitioner was severed in such a manner so as to render the detention order itself to be not sustainable in law. I. On the aspect of delay: A person can be detained by an order for preventive detention under the PIT-NDPS Act in order to curtail that person's anticipated activities in illicit trafficking in contraband substances. It is undoubtedly a drastic measure and the object is not to punish the person for having done something, rather it is to intercept him and to prevent him from doing it. It is undoubtedly a drastic measure and the object is not to punish the person for having done something, rather it is to intercept him and to prevent him from doing it. It has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sushanta Kumar Banik vs. State of Tripura and others (supra) that if there is unreasonable delay between the date of the proposal and passing of the order of detention, unless such delay is satisfactorily explained, a considerable doubt is thrown on the genuineness of the requisite subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority in passing the detention order. Consequently, it would render the detention order bad and invalid because of the snapping of the live and proximate link between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention. A question whether the delay is unreasonable and stands un-explained depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In Sushanta Kumar Banik [supra], the Hon'ble Court has found that the circumstances indicated that the Detaining Authority, after the receipt of the proposal from the sponsoring authority, was indifferent in passing the order of detention with greater promptitude and as there was no explanation as regards the delay, which incidentally was also of five months as in this case, the live and proximate link between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention had been found to have been snapped. In the present case, it is seen that the prejudicial activity complained of last occurred in January 2024 and the proposal by the Sponsoring authority was admittedly submitted in January 2025. No explanation for such delay of one year has been brought to the notice of this Court. Then thereafter, there was another delay of around five months in issuing the order of detention. This delay has been admitted in the affidavit in opposition filed on behalf of the respondents no 1, 2 and 3. The delay between the last of the prejudicial activities alleged against the detenu and the passing of the Detention Order was more than 16 months and in the considered opinion of this Court, the Detaining Authority was required to provide an explanation whether detention of the petitioner was still necessary even after such elapse of time. No such explanation is available either in the order impugned or in the affidavit in opposition filed on behalf of the respondents. No such explanation is available either in the order impugned or in the affidavit in opposition filed on behalf of the respondents. When such delay remains unexplained, it is apparent that the aspect of the severance of the live and proximate link between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention did not receive the attention of the authority who passed the order of preventive detention. Thus, there arises considerable doubt on subjective satisfaction stated to have been reached by the Detaining Authority. We find force in the argument of Mr. Biswas, learned Counsel for the petitioner that the delay of one year in submitting the proposal by the sponsoring authority and the delay of more than 16 months between the last known prejudicial activity and the passing the detention order as also the delay of five months between the sponsoring of the proposal and the passing of the order has severed the live and proximate link between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention, more so, when such delay remained unexplained even in the writ proceedings. We restrain ourselves from referring to the explanation of the respondents stating the translation of 160 pages to be the cause of 15 days delay form 13.5.2025 to 28.5.2025 in supplying the detention order etc. save and except to say that the explanation fails to inspire confidence, especially in a matter which involves curtailing the right to liberty of a citizen. II. On the aspect of non-consideration of conditions of bail: It is not in dispute that the two instances, and no other instances have been referred to in the impugned order dated 13.5.2025, were of December 2023 and arrests were made in the first few days of January 2024. The sponsoring authority took one year to send the proposal and this was much after the earlier bail petitions had not been entertained by the Courts. The order detaining the petitioner was passed one day prior to the petitioner being granted bail in the first case and it was served on the petitioner on the day that he was granted bail in the second case. The bail orders and the conditions of bail imposed on the petitioner were available with the respondents and yet there is no indication that the same were considered even when the representations of the petitioner were considered and rejected. The bail orders and the conditions of bail imposed on the petitioner were available with the respondents and yet there is no indication that the same were considered even when the representations of the petitioner were considered and rejected. The respondents have not been able to successfully rebut the assertion of the petitioner that the fact of the petitioner having been granted bail under stringent conditions did not receive the attention of the respondents and therefore, this issue is also answered in the positive in favour of the petitioner. III. On the aspect of non-fulfilling of mandatory conditions: We have carefully gone through the materials available on record. The respondents have not been able to draw our attention to any document or record to demonstrate that there were cogent material on which the respondents could rely upon to frame a decision that there is a high propensity that the petitioner would revert back to the alleged prejudicial activities if he is allowed to enjoy the privilege of bail. The petitioner had been in custody for around 15 months before the impugned order was passed and the said order does not refer to any material other than the two cases registered as NCB case no 17/2024 and 18/2024 while passing the impugned order. In Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat –Vs- Union of India & Others; reported in (1990) 1 SCC 746 , it has been held that an order for detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention; and (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention. The expression "compelling reasons" in the context of making an order for detention of a per- son already in custody implies that there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities. In Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu , reported in (2011) 0 Supreme(SC) 369 , The Supreme Court of India, had observed as follows:- “Whenever an order under a preventive detention law is challenged one of the questions the court must ask in deciding its legality is: Was the ordinary law of the land sufficient to deal with the situation? If the answer is in the affirmative, the detention order will be illegal. In the present case, the charge against the detenu was of selling expired drugs after changing their labels. Surely the relevant provisions in the Indian Penal Code and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act were sufficient to deal with this situation. Hence, in our opinion, for this reason also the detention order in question was illegal.” In the present case, we find that the none of the impugned orders reflect that the detaining authority or any other authority had applied its mind to find out as to whether the provisions of ordinary criminal law would suffice to deal with the situation and whether the conditions of bail imposed on the petitioner would suffice to ensure his deterrence from participating in similar prejudicial activities. In such view of the matter, we have no hesitation in holding that the impugned orders also suffer from illegality for non-fulfilling of mandatory conditions required to be fulfilled prior to passing an order of preventive detention. IV. On the issue that the detention order has not been issued for the purpose authorized by the statue: It is by now settled law that purpose of preventive detention is not to punish for an act done, rather it is a measure to ensure that the detenu is prevented from indulging the prejudicial activity. In the present case, the petitioner had been granted bail by the Court by imposing stringent conditions. In Sama Aruna vs. State of Telengana and another ; reported in (2018) 12 SCC 150 , the order of detention dated 23.11.2016 was challenged on the premise that the grounds of detention were stale as they were based on six crime cases reported during the period from 21.11.2013 to 05.09.2016 and the incidents said to have occurred during the period from 2002 – 2003 to 21.11.2014. In such backdrop, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while reviewing the order of detention, has observed in the following manner:- “16. In such backdrop, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while reviewing the order of detention, has observed in the following manner:- “16. Obviously, therefore, the power to detain, under the 1986 Act can be exercised only for preventing a person from engaging in, or pursuing or taking some action which adversely affects or is likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order; or for preventing him from making preparations for engaging in such activities. There is little doubt that the conduct or activities of the detenu in the past must be taken into account for coming to the conclusion that he is going to engage in or make preparations for engaging in such activities, for many such persons follow a pattern of criminal activities. But the question is how far back? There is no doubt that only activities so far back can be considered as furnish a cause for preventive detention in the present. 17. We are, therefore, satisfied that the aforesaid detention order was passed on grounds which are stale and which could not have been considered as relevant for arriving at the subjective satisfaction that the detenu must be detained. The detention order must be based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct in light of the surrounding circumstances. The live and proximate link that must exist between the past conduct of a person and the imperative need to detain him must be taken to have been snapped in this case. A detention order which is founded on stale incidents, must be regarded as an order of punishment for a crime, passed without a trial, though purporting to be an order of preventive detention. The essential concept of preventive detention is that the detention of a person is not to punish him for something he has done but to prevent him from doing it. See G. Reddeiah vs. State of A.P. [G. Reddeiah vs. State of A.P., (2012) 2 SCC 389 ] and P.U. Iqbal v. Union of India [P.U. Iqbal v. Union of India, (1992) 1 SCC 434 ].” 22. We are of the view, that the detention order in this case is vitiated by taking into account incidents so far back in the past as would have no bearing on the immediate need to detain him without a trial. We are of the view, that the detention order in this case is vitiated by taking into account incidents so far back in the past as would have no bearing on the immediate need to detain him without a trial. The satisfaction of the authority is not in respect of the thing in regard to which it is required to be satisfied. Incidents which are stale, cease to have relevance to the subject-matter of the enquiry and must be treated as extraneous to the scope and purpose of the statute.” In Golam Hussain vs. State of W.B. [ Golam Hussain v. State of W.B., [1974] 4 SCC 530 ] it was observed as follows : [SCC p. 535, para 5] “5. No authority, acting rationally, can be satisfied, subjectively or otherwise, of future mischief merely because long ago the detenu had done something evil. To rule otherwise is to sanction a simulacrum of a statutory requirement. But no mechanical test by counting the months of the interval is sound. It all depends on the nature of the acts relied on, grave and determined or less serious and corrigible, on the length of the gap, short or long, on the reason for the delay in taking preventive action, like information of participation being available only in the course of an investigation. We have to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case.” In Chinneilhing Haokip @ Neopi D/O Thangboi Hoakip Vs. The State Of Nagaland And 3 Ors, [W.P.(Crl.) 13 of 2024 Decided on : 22-01-2025], this Court has observed as follows: “24. The phrase, ‘study the past if you would divine the future’ is a quote by Confucius conveying the idea that a study of the past helps one to understand the future. As per Machiavelli, ‘whoever wishes to foresee the future must consult the past; for human events ever resembled those of preceding times. This arises from the fact that they are produced by men whoever have been, and ever shall be, animated by the same passions, and thus, they necessarily have the same results’. This quote suggests that the past can help you foresee the future. This arises from the fact that they are produced by men whoever have been, and ever shall be, animated by the same passions, and thus, they necessarily have the same results’. This quote suggests that the past can help you foresee the future. The proposition that the conduct or activities of the detenu in the past can be taken into account for coming to the conclusion that he is going to engage in or make preparations for engaging in such activities, for many such persons follow a pattern of criminal activities, is a rational proposition in a matter of preventive detention for reaching the subjective satisfaction. It is found to be a settled proposition that the detention order must be based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behavior of a person based on his past conduct in light of the surrounding circumstances. Live and proximate link must exist between the past conduct of a person to give rise to the pressing need to de- tain him with a view of preventing him from indulging in criminal activities with which he was found to be involved in the past. In the case of the detenu in hand, with no criminal antecedents of involvement in any crime case earlier under any pe- nal law, not to speak of any crime relating to contraband substance or under the NDPS Act, it is difficult to comprehend about the manner in which the Detaining Authority had reached a subjective satisfaction that unless the detenu is detained, she is likely to engage illicit traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substance in future. There were no previous criminal activities of the detenue to indicate about her tendency or inclination to indulge in activities of illicit traffic in future for taking into account by the Detaining Authority for reaching of any subjective satisfaction. The prescription in Section 3 of the PIT NDPS Act for detention of a person is reaching of satisfaction, albeit subjective satisfaction, of the detaining authority with a view to preventing him from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and the necessity for such detention. The prescription in Section 3 of the PIT NDPS Act for detention of a person is reaching of satisfaction, albeit subjective satisfaction, of the detaining authority with a view to preventing him from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and the necessity for such detention. It is pertinent to mention that the Special Court empowered to grant or refuse to bail to an accused involved with an offence under the NDPS Act and to hold a trial for such offences takes into account all the relevant factors while granting or refusing bail. The Special Court while allowing the two accused persons, Smti. Chinneilhing Haokip @ Neopi and Nehkhoi Guite in connection with Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. 05 of 2024 on 05.06.2024, on execution of a bail bond of Rs. 50,000/-, had inter-alia observed that the accused persons shall have to appear before the I.O. and the Court, as and when summoned, and they shall not commit similar offence within which they are accused of. It was inbuilt in the order granting bail that if the accused person, Smti. Chinneilhing Haokip @ Neopi would be found involved in any offence under the NDPS Act, it would be sufficient for the investing authority to seek cancellation of the bail and to seek the accused person into custody again. In the Detention Order dated 30.05.2024, the Detaining Authority simply recorded that it had derived satisfaction on careful exami- nation of the proposal and other supporting documents and ‘found sufficient grounds for detention’ with no reflection as regards the process of considering the materials placed before it and the justification for exercising the drastic power of preventive detention. 26. Article 20 [3] of the Constitution has provided that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. It is a fundamental right embedded in Part - III of the Constitution. It is a right which has been incorporated in the Constitution to serve as a shield against potential abuse of power by the au- thorities. Article 20 [3] is based on the maxim, ‘nemon tenetur seipsum accusare’ which means that ‘no person is obliged to accused himself’. It is a fundamental right embedded in Part - III of the Constitution. It is a right which has been incorporated in the Constitution to serve as a shield against potential abuse of power by the au- thorities. Article 20 [3] is based on the maxim, ‘nemon tenetur seipsum accusare’ which means that ‘no person is obliged to accused himself’. It is a proposition that a confessional statement is not admissible in evidence but on disclosure of any infor- mation, discovery can be made and such can be used as an evidence against such a person and the same would not be violative of Article 20 [3] by virtue of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and proviso to Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. Article 20[3] is a safeguard against self-incrimination 28. The materials which was made the basis of preventive detention by the Detaining Authority was the confessional statement of the detenu as an accused and not materials which were collected on the basis of the alleged inculpatory statement of the detenu, made as an accused in Narcotic Police Station, PHQ Case no. 05 of 2024 after formal accusations were made in an FIR dated 06.04.2024. Therefore, the protective sweep of Article 20 [3] of the Constitution gets operational in the case. 29. All the above have got enough force to make the foundation of subjective satisfaction, claimed to have been reached by the Detaining Authority, shaky and vulnerable in preventively detaining the detenu from the perspective that if the detenu is not preventively detained, the detenu is likely to indulge in illicit traffic in future, more particularly, in the absence of any previous history or antecedent of the detenu’s involvement in any case of crime, much less a crime relating to illicit traffic. Non-existence of any live and proximate link has made the Order of Detention more shaky and vulnerable." In the context of the present case at hand, we have already noticed that there has been undue and unexplained delay between the last incident complained of and the decision for ordering preventive detention of the petitioner. Non-existence of any live and proximate link has made the Order of Detention more shaky and vulnerable." In the context of the present case at hand, we have already noticed that there has been undue and unexplained delay between the last incident complained of and the decision for ordering preventive detention of the petitioner. When the live and proximate link is severed and the detaining authority has not given any reasons for coming to a conclusion that there is a high propensity of the petitioner to again indulge in the prejudicial activities, we find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the or- der of detention does not appear to have been passed for the purpose authorized by the statue and in that view of the matter also the detention of the petitioner cannot stand the scrutiny of law. 7. With regard to the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that there is no delay in serving the impugned order and the grounds therefor on the petitioner, we agree that the impugned detention came into effect on and from 28.5.2025 when the order dated 13.5.2025 was served on the petitioner and there is no doubt that the grounds of such detention had been informed to him on the same day itself and therefore, it cannot be said that the delay of 15 days in serving the order upon the petitioner would be fatal. However, the effect of the delay between the submission of proposal and issuing the detention order and the delay between the last prejudicial activity and the detention order have been discussed hereinbefore. 8. Therefore, on the basis of determinations as held hereinabove, this writ petition deserves to be allowed. The detention order under F. No. U- 11011/23/2025-PITNDPS dated 13.05.2025 issued by the Joint Secretary, (PITNDPS) Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, thereby ordering detention of the petitioner, namely, Eusuf Ali @ Yusub Ali under PITNDPS Act on the ground stated therein as well as all orders consequential thereto are set aside. The detention order under F. No. U- 11011/23/2025-PITNDPS dated 13.05.2025 issued by the Joint Secretary, (PITNDPS) Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, thereby ordering detention of the petitioner, namely, Eusuf Ali @ Yusub Ali under PITNDPS Act on the ground stated therein as well as all orders consequential thereto are set aside. Since the petitioner has already been granted bail in connection with NDPS Case No. 129/2024 corresponding to NCB Crime No. 17/2023 and NDPS Case No. 140/2024 corresponding to NCB Crime No. 18/2023, he be set at liberty forthwith on complying with the conditions of bail imposed in the respective orders dated 14.05.2025 and 28.5.2025, if not in custody in connection with any other case. Accordingly, this writ petition stands allowed to the extent as indicated herein. 9. There shall be no order as to costs.