ORDER : 1. In writ petition No.11578 of 2022, the petitioners are challenging the orders dated 05 th April, 2022 (Annexure-M) passed in Miscellaneous Appeal No.39 of 2021 by the VI Additional District and Special Judge, Mysuru and Order dated 28 th October, 2021 (Annexure-H) passed by the respondent No.1; inter alia sought for a direction to the respondents not to dispossess petitioners from the land in question. 2. In writ petition No.14493 of 2020, petitioners are challenging the order dated 21 st December, 2019 (Annexure-A) passed by the respondent No.4 and Order dated 20 th December, 2019 (Annexure-F10) passed by the respondent No.1; inter alia sought for declaration that the entire acquisition proceedings initiated as per the Final Notification dated 26 th November, 2005 (Annexure-G) is void. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties in these petitions are referred to as per their ranking before this Court in Writ Petition No.14493 of 2020. FACTS OF THE CASE: 4. The relevant facts for adjudication of Writ Petition No.14493 of 2020 are as follows: 4.1. Petitioners claim to be the legal heirs of late Venkategowda and the land in question has been granted to the grandfather of petitioners viz., Bundegowda as per the order dated 14 th March, 1980 passed by the Land Tribunal. After the demise of the said Bundegowda, the revenue records in respect of the land in question transferred in favour of his son late Venkategowda (father of the petitioners). During the year-1981, the respondent-Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board proposed to acquire the land in question to an extent of 2 acre 20 guntas out of 4 acre 37 guntas in Survey No.92 of Hootagalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Mysuru Taluk for industrial purpose. It is also stated that the father of petitioners viz., late Venkategowda, during the year-1984 borrowed loan from one Mulagi M. Patel by executing a nominal Sale Deed without delivering the physical possession of the land. Thereafter, the said late Venkategowda cleared the loan and as such, the possession of land to an extent of 2 acre 17 guntas in Survey No.92 of Hootagalli Village, remained with late Venkategowda and his children. Thereafter, the said late Venkategowda cleared the loan and as such, the possession of land to an extent of 2 acre 17 guntas in Survey No.92 of Hootagalli Village, remained with late Venkategowda and his children. Further, it is averred in the writ petition that, son of the said Mulagi M. Patel viz., H.M. Patel filed Original Suit Nos.54 of 2004 and 94 of 2004 against late Venkategowda and others seeking relief of declaration and permanent injunction in respect of the land in question. Thereafter, the said late Venkategowda and others, being a defendants in the aforesaid suits filed written statement and contended that the Sale Deed dated 15 th June, 1984 is only a nominal Sale Deed and as such, the said suits came to be dismissed on 04 th September, 2012. 4.2. It is further stated in the writ petition that the respondent-KIADB tried to interfere with the possession of late Venkategowda, father of petitioners in the land in question and therefore, father of petitioners filed Writ Petition No.2570 of 2006. This Court, by order dated 18 th August, 2008 (Annexure-C), dismissed the Writ Petition No.2570 of 2006, holding that the father of petitioners had already instituted civil suit and therefore he shall agitate his rights over the land in question in such other forum. It is also stated that the respondent-KIADB once again tried to interfere with the land in question by issuing Notifications for acquisition and as such, the petitioners being the coparceners and are in continuous possession and enjoyment of the land in question, filed Writ Petition No.27355 of 2010, challenging the acquisition proceedings and the said writ petition came to be dismissed on 18 th April, 2011, considering the dismissal of the earlier Writ Petition No.2570 of 2006 filed by late Venkategowda. 4.3 It is further stated that the petitioners continued to be in possession of the land in question till the year-2017 and they have not received any notice in respect of passing of award by the respondent-KIADB, so also, the respondent- KIADB has not taken possession of the land in question from the petitioners. 4.3 It is further stated that the petitioners continued to be in possession of the land in question till the year-2017 and they have not received any notice in respect of passing of award by the respondent-KIADB, so also, the respondent- KIADB has not taken possession of the land in question from the petitioners. In the meanwhile, the respondent-KIADB issued a Tippani dated 13 th January, 2011 (Annexure-D) and sought to allot the land in question to the respondent No.5-M/s.Rali-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd. Since, the petitioners were in possession of the land in question, the respondent No.5 was not able to take the possession of the same and as such, the respondent No.5 filed Writ Petition No.8516 of 2017 before this Court, seeking direction to remove the encroachment in the land in question. This Court, by order dated 23 rd September, 2019 (Annexure-E), disposed of the said petition with a direction to the respondent No.5 and the petitioners herein to approach the respondent-KIADB to agitate their rights. Thereafter, the proceedings were conducted before the Zonal Office of the respondent-KIADB, Mysuru and the petitioners have sought for dropping the acquisition proceedings as per the Resolution dated 27 th March, 1999 passed in its 220 th Board Meeting. It is also stated in the writ petition that, without considering the aforementioned aspects, the respondent-KIADB in order to favour the respondent No.5- M/s. Rali-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd, tried to demolish the existing building in the land in question, however, same was resisted by the petitioners. In the meanwhile, the Land Acquisition Act was amended and as such, the new Act namely, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 came into existence. 4.4. It is further case of the petitioners that, as per Section 24 (2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act , 2013, acquisition proceedings have to be held as lapsed for the reason that the respondents neither taken possession nor paid compensation in respect of the land in question. 4.4. It is further case of the petitioners that, as per Section 24 (2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act , 2013, acquisition proceedings have to be held as lapsed for the reason that the respondents neither taken possession nor paid compensation in respect of the land in question. Accordingly, the petitioners contended in the writ petition that, without considering the aforementioned aspects, the respondent-KIADB passed order dated 21 st December, 2019 (Annexure-A) and as such, rejected the claim made by the petitioners and without application of mind, confirmed the allotment made in favour of the respondent No.5-M/s. Rali-e- Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd. Thereafter, petitioners have made an application under the Right to Information Act and pursuant to the same, petitioners came to know that the land in question is not in the Blue Print Sketch of the respondent-KIADB as stated in the letter dated 02 nd January, 1998 (Annexure-F1) and therefore, the Resolution at Annexure- F2 was passed by the respondent-KIADB to drop the acquisition proceedings in its 220 th Board Meeting held on 27 th March, 1999. In furtherance of the same, petitioners came to know about the allotment of land in question made in favour the respondent No.5-M/s. Rali-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd. as per Allotment Letter dated 28 th October, 2010 (Annexure-F4) and Possession Certificate dated 08 th July, 2011 (Annexure-F5). Hence, petitioners presented Writ Petition No.14493 of 2020, challenging the proceedings of the respondent-KIADB in respect of acquisition of the land in question. 5. Relevant facts for adjudication of Writ Petition No.11578 of 2022 are as follows: 5.1. Petitioners claim to be in possession of the land in question and the respondent-KIADB issued Show-cause Notice dated 08 th April, 2021 (Annexure-A) under Section 4(1) of the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as 'the KPP Act- 1974') to the petitioners for compliance of the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.8516 of 2017 decided on 23 rd September, 2019. Pursuant to the same, petitioners addressed objection/representation dated 12 th April, 2021 (Annexures 'B' and 'C'). Thereafter, petitioners filed Writ Petition No.10045 of 2021, seeking direction to the respondent-KIADB to consider their representation for granting of reasonable time to file objections to the Show-cause Notice dated 08 th April, 2021. Pursuant to the same, petitioners addressed objection/representation dated 12 th April, 2021 (Annexures 'B' and 'C'). Thereafter, petitioners filed Writ Petition No.10045 of 2021, seeking direction to the respondent-KIADB to consider their representation for granting of reasonable time to file objections to the Show-cause Notice dated 08 th April, 2021. This Court, by order dated 09 th July, 2021 (Annexure-D), disposed of the petition with a direction to the respondent- KIADB to consider the same in accordance with law. Thereafter, the respondent-KIADB, by proceedings dated 28 th October, 2021 (Annexure-H) passed an order to declare that the petitioners herein are in un-authorized occupation of the land in question. Being aggrieved by the same, petitioners preferred appeal in Miscellaneous Appeal No.39 of 2021 before the VI Additional District and Special Judge, Mysuru and the learned judge, by order dated 05 th April, 2022 (Annexure-M), dismissed appeal preferred by the petitioners. Being aggrieved by the same, petitioners preferred Writ Petition No.11578 of 2022. 6. Heard Sri. Ajoy Kumar Patil, learned counsel appearing for petitioners in Writ Petition No.11578 of 2022; Sri. G.A. Srikante Gowda, learned counsel appearing for petitioners in Writ Petition No.14493 of 2020; Sri. Mahantesh Shettar, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondent-State; Sri. Ashok N. Naik, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-KIADB and Sri. A. Madhusudhan Rao, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-M/S. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd. 7. Sri. G.A. Srikante Gowda, learned counsel appearing for petitioners in Writ Petition No.14493 of 2020 contended that the respondent-KIADB committed an error in not considering the representation filed by the petitioners dated 16 th February, 2016 before the competent Authority for declaring the acquisition proceedings has lapsed in view of not taking possession and not to proceed further for which the land has been acquired by the respondent-Authorities. The principal submission of learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is that the respondent-KIADB allotted the land in question in favour of the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd., much before the completion of acquisition proceedings and got issued the lease in favour of the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd., though the said allottee has not paid the entire allotment cost and therefore, the malafide contention of the respondent-Authorities is to be considered. It is further argued by learned counsel appearing for petitioners that, though the acquisition notifications issued were upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, however, the respondent-KIADB before the Hon'ble Supreme Court suppressed the resolution of the 220 th Board Meeting held on 27 th March, 1999, where the Board has resolved to drop the acquisition proceedings and the said suppression of material by the respondent-KIADB should be considered in the present writ petition. It is contended by learned counsel that the respondents have not produced the relevant acquisition material before this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in respect of taking possession or making deposit of compensation as required under law. Accordingly, he sought for interference of this Court. 8. Referring to the impugned Final Notification dated 26 th November, 2005, learned counsel Sri. G.A. Srikante Gowda, appearing for petitioners argued that the said notification was issued at the behest of the respondent No.5- M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd., taking into consideration the suitability of the land to the respondent No.5 without considering the Resolution of 220 th Board Meeting with an intention to help the respondent No.5, which amounts to collusion, favouritism and fraud in grabbing the land belonging to the petitioners for the benefit of the respondent No.5. It is further argued by learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that, though the petitioners have placed sufficient material to establish that there is no land in existence namely Survey No.92/2, however, the respondent-Authorities have issued the impugned Final Notification illegally to facilitate the respondent No.5 and therefore sought for interference of this Court. It is also argued by learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that, though the Preliminary Notification was issued during the year-1997, the possession of the land in question has not been taken till date and no compensation has been deposited before the competent Civil Court as required under law, which aspect of the matter was considered by this Court at paragraph 24 in Writ Petition No.8516 of 2017, wherein the finding has been recorded, which would suffice that, no award has been passed nor compensation has been paid to land owners. Accordingly, he sought for interference of this Court. 9. It is further argued by Sri. Accordingly, he sought for interference of this Court. 9. It is further argued by Sri. G.A. Srikante Gowda, learned counsel appearing for petitioners that, since the fraud has been committed by the respondent-Authorities against the petitioners as well as this Court by misrepresenting the facts, petitioners have challenged the same by filing Writ Petition No.14493 of 2020 and therefore, writ petition is maintainable before this Court. 10. Nextly, by referring to the letter dated 02 nd January, 1998 (Annexure-F1), Resolution of the 220 th Board Meeting dated 27 th March, 1999 (Annexure-F2), and letter dated 13 th April, 1999 (Annexure-F3), Sri. G.A. Srikante Gowda, learned counsel appearing for petitioners argued that the land bearing Survey No.92 has not found place in the Blue Print of the respondent-KIADB at the time of approval of the scheme and that apart, the 220 th Board Meeting Resolution envisages for dropping of acquisition proceedings. Accordingly, he contended that the entire aspect of the matter was not properly appreciated by the respondent-KIADB in the impugned order dated 21 st December, 2019 (Annexure-A) and as such, sought for setting-aside the same. 11. Further the learned counsel Sri. G.A. Srikante Gowda, by referring to the impugned Final Notification dated 26 th November, 2005 (Annexure-G) argued that there is no signature on the impugned Final Notification. In this regard, learned counsel refers to the identical Notifications issued by the Government, wherein the signature of the Under Secretary to Government is affixed and therefore, he contended that the impugned Notification dated 26 th November, 2005 (Annexure-G) is bad in law. 12. By referring to the letter dated 06 th March, 2021 (Annexure-L) issued by the respondent-KIADB, Sri. G.A. Srikante Gowda, appearing for petitioners contended that the compensation was deposited before the Civil Court belatedly, despite the fact that the Final Notification was issued on 26 th November, 2005, which would establish the fact that, the compensation was deposited after two decades from the date of issuance of preliminary notification. In this regard, he further contended that, the intention of the respondent- Authorities is to grant the land in question in favour of the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd., much before the passing of the award and depositing the compensation and such, actions are arbitrary in nature and therefore, the entire acquisition proceedings is liable to be quashed. Learned counsel appearing for petitioners Sri. Learned counsel appearing for petitioners Sri. G.A. Srikante Gowda, by referring to Memo dated 10 th July, 2012 (Annexure-F9), submits that the State Level Single Window Committee had decided to allot the land in question in favour of one 'M/s. Shakthi Timbers', however, without any reason in the absence of final notification, to favour the respondent No.5, impugned order dated 21 st December, 2019 (Annexure-A) is passed by the respondent-KIADB, which would makes it clear that the respondent-Authorities are acting arbitrarily. Further, Sri. G.A. Srikante Gowda, learned counsel appearing for petitioners, while referring to Possession Certificate dated 08 th July, 2011 (Annexure-M) agued that the possession of the land in question was transferred by the respondent-KIADB to the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd., and the entire contention of the respondent-Authorities falsifies the case on record in view of the finding recorded by this Court in Writ Petition No.8516 of 2017 decided on 23 rd September, 2019. Learned counsel appearing for petitioners, in this regard, refers to Section 28 (6) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act , 1966 (for short hereinafter referred to as 'KIAD-Act') and argued that the entire case of the respondents is by misrepresenting facts before this Court in the earlier proceedings and before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and as such, the fraud has been committed by the respondents. 13. Referring to Regulation 7 of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Regulations, 1969, it is argued by Sri. G.A. Srikante Gowda, learned counsel for petitioners that, no material has been produced before this Court in the present writ petition and in the earlier proceedings in respect of the notification on the availability of land and calling for application for allotment of the land in question. Therefore, he submitted that, in the absence of the same, the malafide exercise of power by the respondent-Authorities is to be assessed in the light of absence of fairness and justness on the part of the respondents, and as such, the entire proceedings is contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, he submitted that, in the absence of the same, the malafide exercise of power by the respondent-Authorities is to be assessed in the light of absence of fairness and justness on the part of the respondents, and as such, the entire proceedings is contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel appearing for petitioners also refers to the Annexures 'G1' and 'G2' and contended that, as on 15 th April, 2011, no award was passed and the question relating to the ownership of the land in question has to be determined and the said aspect of the matter was ignored by the respondent-authorities by issuing the impugned order. 14. Lastly, by referring to the judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No.8516 of 2017 disposed of on 23 rd September, 2019, it is argued by the learned counsel Sri. G.A. Srikante Gowda, appearing for petitioners that, this Court directed the Development Officer, Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board and further imposed cost of Rs.25,000/- on the respondent-KIADB for their lethargic way of functioning and the said aspect was ignored by the respondent-KIADB and therefore, the impugned order dated 21 st December, 2019 (Annexure-A) passed by the Executive Engineer, Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board, Mysuru, required to be quashed. Accordingly, he sought for interference of this Court. 15. In order to buttress his arguments with regard to the contentions raised by the respondents in the statement of objections on applicability of res judicata in view of earlier proceedings before this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court, learned counsel Sri. G.A. Srikante Gowda, refers to the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A.V. Papayya Sastry and Others vs. Government of A.P. and Others, AIR 2007 SC 1546 and contended that, the respondents herein had obtained the order of dismissal of the writ petition on the earlier round of litigation based on the fraud and misrepresentation and during the earlier proceedings, the petitioners were not aware about the contentions raised above as to the malfunctioning of the respondent-KIADB. In respect of the functioning of the Single Window Committee, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners invited the attention of the Court to the judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No.2862 of 2007 and connected petitions disposed of on 23 rd April, 2024, particularly referring to paragraphs 42, 49 and 51 and contended that, the entire proceedings of the Single Window Committee allotting the land in question in favour of the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd., requires interference by this Court. 16. Learned counsel Sri. G.A. Srikante Gowda, argued that the judgment of this Court in Writ Appeal No.6819 of 2017 decided on 28 th September, 2022 is fairly applicable to the case on hand as the respondent-KIADB has not taken possession of the land in question for more than two decades after issuance of the preliminary notification and on account of unreasonable delay in passing the relevant notification, the acquisition proceedings in respect of the land of the petitioners has lapsed on account of efflux of time. 17. Nextly, Sri. Ajoy Kumar Patil, learned counsel appearing for petitioners in Writ Petition No.11578 of 2022, argued on similar lines as that of Sri. G.A. Srikante Gowda, learned counsel appearing for petitioners in Writ Petition No.14493 of 2020. In addition to that, learned counsel Sri. Ajoy Kumar Patil, contended that, possession of the land in question has been not taken as per the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.8516 of 2017. In this regard, he referred to paragraph 27 of the judgment in Writ Petition No.8516 of 2017 and argued that the order passed by the Chief Executive Officer and Executive Member, Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board dated 30 th March, 2021 (Annexure-G) is without jurisdiction. 18. By referring to order dated 30 th March, 2021 (Annexure-G) passed by the Chief Executive Officer and Executive Member, learned counsel appearing for petitioners argued that the Chief Executive Officer and Executive Member of the respondent-KIADB, has no jurisdiction under Section 25(2) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act , seeking eviction of the petitioners by stating that the petitioners are the unauthorised occupants and therefore, the entire proceedings based on the Order dated 30 th March, 2021 (Annexure-G) passed by the Chief Executive Officer and Executive Member requires to be quashed. In this regard, learned counsel refers to Notification issued by the respondent-State produced at Annexure-R6 in the statement of objections and argued that, only the persons specified in the said Notifications are empowered to issue the eviction notice under Section 4(1) of the Public Premises Act-1974. It is also contended by the learned counsel Sri. Ajoy Kumar Patil, appearing for the petitioners that, no document has been produced before this Court by the respondent-KIADB in respect of transfer of land by the State Government to the respondent- KIADB as required under Section 28 (8) of the and that apart, State Government alone is empowered to issue Notice for eviction of the unauthorised occupants and not the respondent-KIADB. Accordingly, he sought for setting aside the impugned orders in these petitions. 19. Nextly, by referring to order dated 28 th October, 2021 (Annexure-H) passed by the respondent-KIADB, learned counsel appearing for petitioners contended that the competent authority in the said order had observed that the possession of the land was delivered to the respondent-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd. on 08 th July, 2011, however, there is no material before the said authority to that effect and the petitioners are in possession of the land in question as recorded by this Court at paragraph No.24 in Writ Petition No.8516 of 2017. 20. By referring to the finding recorded by the VI Additional District and Special Judge, Mysuru in the impugned order dated 05 th April, 2022 passed in Miscellaneous Appeal No.39 of 2021 (Annexure-M), it is argued by the learned counsel appearing for petitioners that, the learned Trial Judge has failed to appreciate the material on record in the right perspective and also given a wrong finding that, the respondent-KIADB had entered into Lease-cum-Sale Agreement with the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd. on 08 th August, 2011, without there being any material before the Trial Court and therefore, the finding recorded by the learned District Judge and the order dated 28 th October, 2021 (Annexure-H) passed by the incompetent authority requires to be set-aside. 21. Per contra, Sri. 21. Per contra, Sri. Ashok N. Nayak, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-KIADB submitted that, the writ petitions are not maintainable on the ground that, the father of petitioners viz., late Venkate Gowda had filed Writ Petition No.2570 of 2006, which came to be dismissed and thereafter, Writ Appeal No.1719 of 2008 filed by the father of the petitioner came to be dismissed and same is confirmed in SLP (C) No.28360 of 2010 and that apart, another writ petition filed by petitioners in Writ Petition No.27355 of 2010 was dismissed on 18 th April, 2011 (Annexure-R5), by imposition of cost and the said fact would indicate that, the instant writ petition is not maintainable as the same is hit by res judicata. 22. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent- KIADB submits that, the Chief Executive Officer and Executive Member of the respondent-KIADB being a chief of the Board, is empowered to issue Notification for eviction of the petitioners in Writ Petition No.11578 of 2022 as per Section 25 of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act and the State Government has authorised the Development/Executive Engineer under Section 25(2) of the to evict the unauthorised occupants. In this regard, he referred to the Notification dated 24 th June, 2020 in respect of re-designation of the post to the respondent-KIADB and contended that, the writ petitions are required to be dismissed. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent- KIADB by referring to the letter at Annexure-R1, wherein, it is stated that the land in question was handed over to the respondent-KIADB under Section 28 (8) of the and as such, he sought for dismissal of the writ petitions. 23. In order to buttress his arguments, Sri. Ashok N. Nayak, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-KIADB, refers to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Special Land Acquistion Officer, KIADB, Mysore and Another vs. Anasuya Bai (Dead) By Legal Representatives and Others, (2017) 3 SCC 313 and contended that, once the proceedings are initiated under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act , neither Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 nor Section 24 (2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act , 2013 would be applicable. Referring to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V. Chandrasekaran and Another vs. Administrative Officer and Others, (2012) 12 SCC 133 , it is argued by learned counsel appearing for the respondent-KIADB that, once the land is acquired by the State Government under Section 28 (1) of the , the acquired land vest with the State Government and therefore, the petitioners have no locus standi to challenge the acquisition proceedings. 24. Sri. A. Madhusudhana, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. ltd., submitted that, as soon as the Notification under Section 28 (1) of the KIAD Act is issued, the land in question vests with the State Government as per (5) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act and therefore, the petitioners have no locus standi to challenge the acquisition proceedings. Emphasising on the proceedings before this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in respect of the acquisition proceedings, which has reached finality, Sri. Madhusudhan, learned counsel for respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e- Marg Software Consultants Pvt. ltd., argued that the conduct of the petitioners has to be considered as the petitioners are not entitled for equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, since they have not approached this Court with clean hands. 25. By referring to the 81 st District Level Single Window Committee meeting held on 26 th September, 2005, Sri. A. Madhusudhan Rao, learned counsel for respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd. submitted that the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd., had participated in the proceedings and taking into consideration the requirement of the land to the respondent No.5, decision was taken by the said Single Window Committee to allot the same to the respondent No.5 and therefore, the petitioners have no locus standi to challenge the same. Accordingly, he sought for dismissal of the Writ Petitions. 26. In the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, I have carefully examined the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the available records. It is forthcoming from the records that, the land in question bearing Survey No.92 of Hootagalli Village, Mysuru Taluk and District was granted in favour of one Bundegowda (grandfather of petitioners) to an extent of 4 acres 37 guntas. It is forthcoming from the records that, the land in question bearing Survey No.92 of Hootagalli Village, Mysuru Taluk and District was granted in favour of one Bundegowda (grandfather of petitioners) to an extent of 4 acres 37 guntas. On 08 th February, 1981, the respondent-KIADB acquired 2 acre 20 guntas out of 4 acres 37 guntas of land and had left the remaining extent of 2 acres 17 guntas from the acquisition. It is also forthcoming from the writ petitions that, as there is a dispute between late Venkategowda (father of the petitioners) with one H.M. Patel, Original Suit Nos.54 of 2004 and 94 of 2004 were filed before the competent Civil Court at Mysuru based on the Sale deed dated 15 th June, 1984 and the said suits came to be dismissed. In the meanwhile, the respondent- Authorities have issued the Preliminary Notification dated 05 th May, 1997 (Annexure-F11) under Section 28 (1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act and sought to acquire 2 acres 17 guntas of land in Survey No.92 and other two adjacent lands for industrial purposes. It is also to be noted that, as per the 220 th Board Meeting of the respondent- KIADB held on 27 th March, 1999, the Board resolved to drop the acquisition proceedings on the ground that, the land in question has not found place in the Blue Print of the Hootagalli Industrial Area Development and also the residential houses are constructed in the land in question, which is situated in Gram Thana. However the respondent-Authorities have issued the Final Notification dated 26 th November, 2005 (Annexure-G) under (3) of the . It is also to be noted that the father of the petitioners viz., Venkategowda had challenged the acquisition proceedings before this Court in Writ Petition No.2570 of 2006 and the said writ petition came to be dismissed on 18 th August, 2008. The aforementioned order was confirmed in Writ Appeal No.1719 of 2008 on 19 th July, 2010 (Annexure-R3) and SLP (C) No.28360 of 2010 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as per order 22 nd October, 2010 (Annexure-R4). It is also pertinent to mention here that, petitioners herein have challenged the acquisition proceedings in Writ Petition No.27355 of 2010 and this Court, by order dated 18 th April, 2011 (Annexure-R5) dismissed the writ petition by imposing cost as writ petition is not maintainable. 27. It is also pertinent to mention here that, petitioners herein have challenged the acquisition proceedings in Writ Petition No.27355 of 2010 and this Court, by order dated 18 th April, 2011 (Annexure-R5) dismissed the writ petition by imposing cost as writ petition is not maintainable. 27. Learned counsel appearing for respondents argued that the acquisition proceedings have been questioned before this Court and upheld as per the orders passed by this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court and therefore, the principle of res judicata is applicable. In this regard, on careful consideration of the writ papers would indicate that the petitioners have made application to the respondent-Authorities under the Right to Information Act and have produced the documents at Annexure-F series, which would indicate that the aforementioned documents at Annexure-F series were not within the knowledge of the petitioners at the time of conclusion of the proceedings before this Court as well as before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Therefore, the maintainability of the present writ petitions have to be considered as the petitioners are alleging element of fraud against the respondent-Authorities to help the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd. It is pertinent to mention here that the respondent-KIADB had taken decision to drop the acquisition proceedings in their 220 th Board Meeting held on 27 th March, 1999 (Annexure-F2), however, Final Notification is issued ignoring the said factual aspects. 28. On careful examination of Tippani dated 13 th January, 2011 (Annexure-D), wherein the respondent-KIADB has stated that the Mysuru District Level Single Window Committee had taken decision on 26 th September, 2005 to allot the land bearing Survey No.92 to an extent of 2 acre 22 guntas in favour of the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd. It is pertinent to mention here that, as on 26 th September, 2005, the respondent-Authorities have not issued the Final Notification under Section 28 (4) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act , which aspect is to be considered, since the Final Notification was issued by respondent-Government under (4) of the Act on 26 th November, 2005 (Annexure-G). Therefore, what emerges from the facts of the case is that, even prior to issuance of Final Notification under (4) of the on 26 th November, 2005, the respondent-Authorities have taken decision to allot the land in favour of the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd., which amounts to arbitrary exercise of power by the respondent-Authorities to help the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd., while concluding the acquisition proceedings. The said aspect of the matter is further emphasised that the land in question bearing Survey No.92 to an extent of 2 acre 22 guntas belonged to the petitioners is not found place in the Blue Print of the Layout as per the Layout Plan approved on 03 rd November, 2010, which is forthcoming in the Tippani dated 13 th January, 2011 (Annexure-D). That apart, this Court, in Writ Petition No.8516 of 2017 disposed of on 23 rd September, 2019 (Annexure-E) at paragraphs 24 and 25 held as follows: "24. Very strangely, the KIADB has not produced any record before this Court, except admitting the allotment and execution of lease cum sale agreement and has not stated about anything with regard to possession taken from the owners and it is not the case of the KIADB that KIADB has cancelled the allotment made in favour of the petitioner for non payment of balance amount as alleged by respondent Nos.7 to 13. 25. Under the provisions of the KIADB Act, which acquiring property of individual owners, it is the duty of the KIADB to complete the acquisition by taking possession and pass award and pay compensation to the lawful owners who are in possession as on the date of the notifications, based on the Khata or RTC etc. Admittedly, the KIADB has neither passed any award nor paid compensation. Thereby, litigation is created by the KIADB by not paying compensation to the lawful owners. (Emphasis supplied) 29. This Court, in the aforesaid Writ Petition No.8516 of 2017 had categorically held that the respondent-Authorities neither passed award nor paid compensation to the petitioners and further the possession of the land in question was not taken by the respondent-KIADB. The aforementioned finding is to be accepted as the petitioners have not challenged the order of this Court passed in Writ Petition No.8516 of 2017 and same has reached finality. The aforementioned finding is to be accepted as the petitioners have not challenged the order of this Court passed in Writ Petition No.8516 of 2017 and same has reached finality. In the backdrop of these aspects, whether the arguments advanced by learned counsel appearing for respondents that the principle of res judicata or constructive res judicata is applicable to the case on hand is to be considered. It is to be noted that the respondent-KIADB issued Memorandum dated 10 th July, 2012 (Annexure-F9), wherein, the respondent-KIADB resolved to allot the land in question to one M/s. Shakthi Timbers as per the State Level Single Window Committee Resolution. On perusal of the report of the Tahsildar dated 25 th February, 2012 (Annexure-F7) addressed to the Assistant Commissioner, Mysuru Sub-Division, Musuru reveals that the land in question is situated adjacent to the Hootagalli Village Layout and further there are four residential houses. It is also pertinent to mention here that the respondent-KIADB issued Possession Certificate dated 08 th July, 2011 (Annexure-F5) stating that the possession has been handed over to the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd., which is per se arbitrary and illegal on the ground that, this Court had already given a finding that the possession of the land in question is with the petitioners. 30. On careful consideration of Annexure-F2 would indicate that the land in question has not find place in the Blue Print and situate in the Hootagalli Gram Thana and therefore, the respondent-KIADB in its 220 th Board Meeting held on 27 th March, 1999 resolved to drop the acquisition proceedings. However, the said aspect of the matter was ignored by the respondent-KIADB while issuing the impugned order dated 21 st December, 2019 (Annexure-A). It is not forthcoming from the submission of the respondent-KIADB as to on what basis the Final Notification dated 26 th November, 2005 (Annexure-G) came to be issued without considering the resolution of the 220 th Board Meeting held on 27 th March, 1999, where, the respondent-Board resolved to drop the acquisition proceedings in respect of the land in question. It is not forthcoming from the submission of the respondent-KIADB as to on what basis the Final Notification dated 26 th November, 2005 (Annexure-G) came to be issued without considering the resolution of the 220 th Board Meeting held on 27 th March, 1999, where, the respondent-Board resolved to drop the acquisition proceedings in respect of the land in question. It is also to be noted that the Special land Acquisition Officer of the respondent-KIADB was made known by the Special Deputy Commissioner as per letter dated 02 nd January, 1998 (Annexure-F1) with regard to non-inclusion of the land in question in the Blue Print of the original layout plan of the respondent-KIADB in respect of acquisition proceedings. Having taken note of the aforementioned aspects as urged by learned counsel appearing for petitioners and by taking into account the relevant documents i.e., Annexure-F series in Writ Petition No.14493 of 2020, I am of the view that, those documents have been issued to the petitioners under the Right to Information Act, which were not produced before this Court in the earlier writ petitions as well as before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP(C) No.28360/2010 and therefore, I am of the view that, it is a clear case of colourable exercise of power by the respondent- KIADB and the Government to acquire the land in question belonging to the petitioners to aid/support the cause of the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd. It is a clear case of fraud committed by the respondent- KIADB to acquire the property belonging to the petitioners and to allot the same in favour of the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e- Marg Software Consultations Pvt. Ltd. In this regard, it is relevant to extract paragraph 26 and 31 in the case of A.V. PAPAYYA SHASTRI (supra) which reads as under: "26. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the orders, this Court stated: "It is unrealistic to expect the appellant company to resist a claim at the first instance on the basis of the fraud because appellant company had at that stage no knowledge about the fraud allegedly played by the claimants. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the orders, this Court stated: "It is unrealistic to expect the appellant company to resist a claim at the first instance on the basis of the fraud because appellant company had at that stage no knowledge about the fraud allegedly played by the claimants. If the Insurance Company comes to know of any dubious concoction having been made with the sinister object of extracting a claim for compensation, and if by that time the award was already passed, it would not be possible for the company to file a statutory appeal against the award. Not only because of bar of limitation to file the appeal but the consideration of the appeal even if the delay could be condoned, would be limited to the issues formulated from the pleadings made till then. Therefore, we have no doubt that the remedy to move for recalling the order on the basis of the newly discovered facts amounting to fraud of high degree, cannot be foreclosed in such a situation. No Court or tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall its own order if it is convinced that the order was wangled through fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basis of the claim. The allegation made by the appellant Insurance Company, that claimants were not involved in the accident which they described in the claim petitions, cannot be brushed aside without further probe into the matter, for, the said allegation has not been specifically denied by the claimants when they were called upon to file objections to the applications for recalling of the awards. Claimants then confined their resistance to the plea that the application for recall is not legally maintainable. Therefore, we strongly feel that the claim must be allowed to be resisted, on the ground of fraud now alleged by the Insurance Company. If we fail to afford to the Insurance Company an opportunity to substantiate their contentions it might certainly lead to serious miscarriage of justice." ****** 31. The matter can be looked at from a different angle as well. Suppose, a case is decided by a competent Court of Law after hearing the parties and an order is passed in favour of the applicant/plaintiff which is upheld by all the courts including the final Court. The matter can be looked at from a different angle as well. Suppose, a case is decided by a competent Court of Law after hearing the parties and an order is passed in favour of the applicant/plaintiff which is upheld by all the courts including the final Court. Let us also think of a case where this Court does not dismiss Special Leave Petition but after granting leave decides the appeal finally by recording reasons. Such order can truly be said to be a judgment to which Article 141 of the Constitution applies. Likewise, the doctrine of merger also gets attracted. All orders passed by the courts/authorities below, therefore, merge in the judgment of this Court and after such judgment, it is not open to any party to the judgment to approach any court or authority to review, recall or reconsider the order. The above principle, however, is subject to exception of fraud. Once it is established that the order was obtained by a successful party by practicing or playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held legal, valid or in consonance with law. It is non-existent and non est and cannot be allowed to stand. This is the fundamental principle of law and needs no further elaboration. Therefore, it has been said that a judgment, decree or order obtained by fraud has to be treated as nullity, whether by the court of first instance or by the final court. And it has to be treated as non est by every Court, superior or inferior." 31. At this stage, it is also relevant to cite the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Odisha and Others vs. Sulekh Chandra Pradhan and Others, AIR 2022 SC 2030 , wherein at paragraphs 36 and 37, it is held as under: "36. That leaves us with the submission of Shri R. Balasubramanian, learned Senior Counsel that since the view taken by the Tribunal has been affirmed by the High Court and the special leave petition challenging the same has been dismissed, the view of the Tribunal has become final. In this respect, reliance could be placed on the judgment of this Court in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala and another, wherein this Court has held as under: “27. In this respect, reliance could be placed on the judgment of this Court in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala and another, wherein this Court has held as under: “27. A petition for leave to appeal to this Court may be dismissed by a non-speaking order or by a speaking order. Whatever be the phraseology employed in the order of dismissal, if it is a non-speaking order i.e. it does not assign reasons for dismissing the special leave petition, it would neither attract the doctrine of merger so as to stand substituted in place of the order put in issue before it nor would it be a declaration of law by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution for there is no law which has been declared. If the order of dismissal be supported by reasons then also the doctrine of merger would not be attracted because the jurisdiction exercised was not an appellate jurisdiction but merely a discretionary jurisdiction refusing to grant leave to appeal. We have already dealt with this aspect earlier. Still the reasons stated by the Court would attract applicability of Article 141 of the Constitution if there is a law declared by the Supreme Court which obviously would be binding on all the courts and tribunals in India and certainly the parties thereto. The statement contained in the order other than on points of law would be binding on the parties and the court or tribunal, whose order was under challenge on the principle of judicial discipline, this Court being the Apex Court of the country. No court or tribunal or parties would have the liberty of taking or canvassing any view contrary to the one expressed by this Court. The order of the Supreme Court would mean that it has declared the law and in that light the case was considered not fit for grant of leave. The declaration of law will be governed by Article 141 but still, the case not being one where leave was granted, the doctrine of merger does not apply. The Court sometimes leaves the question of law open. Or it sometimes briefly lays down the principle, may be, contrary to the one laid down by the High Court and yet would dismiss the special leave petition. The reasons given are intended for purposes of Article 141. The Court sometimes leaves the question of law open. Or it sometimes briefly lays down the principle, may be, contrary to the one laid down by the High Court and yet would dismiss the special leave petition. The reasons given are intended for purposes of Article 141. This is so done because in the event of merely dismissing the special leave petition, it is likely that an argument could be advanced in the High Court that the Supreme Court has to be understood as not to have differed in law with the High Court.” 37. It is thus clear that a mere dismissal of the special leave petition would not mean that the view of the High Court has been approved by this Court. As such, the contention in that regard is rejected. (Emphasis supplied) 32. In the light of the aforementioned judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, I am of the view that the contention raised by learned counsel appearing for respondents that the land once acquired cannot be restored to the land owners and therefore principle of res judicata is applicable to the present, cannot be accepted and as such, the judgments referred to by learned counsel appearing for the respondent-KIADB are not applicable to the case on hand. It is also to be noted that, immediately after issuance of Preliminary Notification dated 05 th May, 1997 under Section 28 (1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act , the respondent-KIADB had taken a decision in its 220 th Board meeting held on 27 th March, 1999 (Annexure-F2) to drop the acquisition proceedings in respect of the land in question, however, after a belated period of six years, issued Final Notification dated 26 th November, 2005 (Annexure-G) during the year-2005. This fact would makes it clear that the respondent-Authorities have no intention to acquire the land of the petitioners however the cause for issuance of Final Notification is to facilitate the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt Ltd. It is also forthcoming from the perusal of Endorsement dated 15 th April, 2011 (Annexures-G1) and letter dated 26 th August, 2011 (Annexure-G2) that the possession of the land in question has not been taken and award has not been passed. Perusal of the letter dated 06 th March, 2021 (Annexure-L) would indicate that the respondent-KIADB had taken decision to deposit compensation before the competent Court after an inordinate delay of more than two decades from the date of issuance of the acquisition notifications. It is well settled principle in law that, unless the passing of award and compensation is deposited before the competent Court, any allotment made in favour of third party much less the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli- e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd., in the present case is bad in law. The aforementioned aspect makes it clear that the respondent-KIADB suppressed the entire facts on record in the earlier proceedings before this Court as well as before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and have acted arbitrarily. Accordingly, an element of fraud is forthcoming from the documents narrated above and same would substantiate that the respondent-Authorities being an instrumentality under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, have not followed the provisions contained under the KIAD Act and the settled principle of law by this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in respect of the acquisition proceedings. Therefore, the petitioners have made out a case for interference in these writ petitions to interfere with the acquisition proceedings as the respondents have not made out a case as to bring home their actions within the rule of principles of law. 33. It is also to be noted that the entire discussion made by the competent authority while passing the impugned order dated 21 st December, 2019 (Annexure-A) is without considering the original records and the entire discussion made by the respondent-KIADB in the said order is arbitrary in nature and to help the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd., in allotment of the land in question. In this regard and even with regard to the competency of the Officer to pass the impugned order in the present case, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd., cannot be accepted as the same is contrary to judgment passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.8516 of 2017. 34. In this regard and even with regard to the competency of the Officer to pass the impugned order in the present case, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd., cannot be accepted as the same is contrary to judgment passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.8516 of 2017. 34. Insofar as the acquisition proceedings are concerned, it is not in dispute that the Preliminary Notification was issued on 05 th May, 1997 (Annexure-F11) and Final Notification came to be issued on 26 th November, 2005 (Annexure-G) and that apart the compensation was deposited before the competent Civil Court as per letter dated 06 th March, 2021 (Annexure-L) after a period of more than two decades and the said aspect makes it clear that the respondent- Authorities have not acted within a reasonable period. Therefore, the entire acquisition proceeding requires to be set- aside. In this regard, it is relevant to follow the dictum of this Court in the case of The Special Land Acquistion Officer and Others vs. K.B. Lingaraju and Others in Writ Appeal No. 6819 of 2017 decided on 28 th September 2022, wherein at paragraph 9 to 12, it is held as under: "9. We have considered the submissions made on both the side and have perused the record. The Supreme Court in M.NAGABHUSHANA vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA has held that the KIAD Act is a self contained code and is a law relating to acquisition of land for public purpose and for payment of compensation. It was further held that once the proceedings for acquisition of land is initiated under the KIAD Act, the provisions under Section 11A of the Act of 1894 do not apply to the acquisition under the KIAD Act. The aforesaid decision was relied upon in SLAO, KIADB MYSORE vs. ANASUYA BAI DEAD BY LRS. Thus, it is evident that the Act is a self contained code and the time limits prescribed under the Act of 1894 do not apply in respect of the land acquired under the KIAD act. The proceedings under the KIAD Act cannot be held to have been lapsed if the award is not passed within a period of two years in view of the timeline prescribed under Section 11A of the Act of 1894. 10. The proceedings under the KIAD Act cannot be held to have been lapsed if the award is not passed within a period of two years in view of the timeline prescribed under Section 11A of the Act of 1894. 10. We are aware that the KIAD Act does not prescribe any time limit for conclusion of the proceeding and a Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in OFFSHORE HOLDINGS PRIVATE LIMITED vs. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND OTHERS which has been subsequently adverted to in BANGALORE DEVELOPMETN AUTHORITY AND ANOTHER vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHERS has held that the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act of 1894 cannot be read into the provisions of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976. 11. It is well settled in law that the right to hold the property is a constitutional right guaranteed under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. No citizen can be deprived of his property without following due process of law. It is well settled legal proposition that where a statute does not provide for time limit of performance of an act, such act has to be preformed within a reasonable time and what would be the reasonable time has to be decided in the facts and circumstances of the cases. (See: MEHER RUSHI DALAL vs. UNION OF INDIA , P.K. SREEKANTAN vs. P. SREEKUMARAN NAIR and K.B. NAGUR vs. UNION OF INDIA ). Therefore, in the facts of the case, we have to ascertain whether the acquisition proceedings initiated by KIADB is vitiated on account of inordinate delay in conclusion of the same. 12. However, in the instant case, the preliminary notification was issued on 15.09.2000 whereas, the final notification under Section 28 (4) of the KIAD Act was issued on 13.05.2005.. Event after a period of 7 years from the date of decision of the Division Bench of this Court, i.e., on 16.12.2010, no action was taken by KIADB to conclude the proceeding of land acquisition. No explanation has been offered for the delay of 7 years in concluding the proceeding which is fatal. Event after a period of 7 years from the date of decision of the Division Bench of this Court, i.e., on 16.12.2010, no action was taken by KIADB to conclude the proceeding of land acquisition. No explanation has been offered for the delay of 7 years in concluding the proceeding which is fatal. Therefore, the learned Single Judge in the facts of the case and in the absence of the any explanation on behalf of the appellants for the delay in concluding the land acquisition proceedings has rightly held that the land acquisition proceedings insofar as it pertains to lands of the respondents have lapsed on account of efflux of time. For the aforementioned reasons, we do not find any ground to divert with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed." 35. It is also pertinent to mention here that the purpose of the respondent-KIADB is to facilitate the formation of industrial establishment and development and in this regard, it is the duty of the respondent-Authorities to acquire the property and the duty cast on the respondent-KIADB as per the KIAD Act is nothing to do with granting of clearance under the Facilitation Act. The object of the Facilitation Act is to provide for grant of approvals/clearances and such approval or clearances would not lead to and inference that the respondent-KIADB would have to initiate the acquisition proceeding whenever an applicant/investor like the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd. seeks allotment of the land in question. The acquisition of the land by the State Government is by exercising its power under eminent domain and the State Government has to exercise its sovereign power to initiate acquisition proceedings for public purpose only and not to help or support the firms like the respondent No.5 herein. Therefore, the entire exercise of the respondent- Authorities in the present case would contravene the provisions under Section 28 and 29 of the KIAD Act as well as usurping the jurisdiction of the State Government to facilitate the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd. In that view of the matter, the entire action of the respondent-Authorities to acquire the land in question requires to be set-aside. In this regard, the judgment referred to by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-KIADB is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 36. In this regard, the judgment referred to by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-KIADB is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 36. In Writ Petition No.11578 of 2022, petitioners have challenged the order dated 05 th April, 2022 (Annexure-M) passed in Miscellaneous Appeal No.39 of 2021 on the file of the VI Additional District and Special Judge, Mysuru and the order dated 28 th October, 2021 (Annexure-H) passed by the respondent-KIADB. The aforementioned proceedings are arising out of the eviction proceedings initiated against the petitioners by the respondent-KIADB. Taking into consideration the forgoing reasons, as I have arrived at a conclusion that the entire acquisition proceedings have to be quashed on the ground of element of fraud being committed by the respondent-KIADB to acquire the land in question to facilitate the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd., I am of the view that the entire finding recorded in Miscellaneous Appeal No.39 of 2021 (Annexure-M) and the order dated 28 th October, 2021 (Annexure-H) requires to be quashed as even according to the respondent-KIADB, no possession was taken from the petitioner/land owners and therefore, the petitioners cannot be considered as unauthorised occupants under the provisions of Public Premises Act-1974. In this regard, it is relevant to cite the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs. vs. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs. and Others, (1994) 1 SCC 1 wherein at paragraphs 5 and 6 reads as under: "5. The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that “there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence”. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. 6. The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. Jagannath was working as a clerk with Chunilal Sowcar. He purchased the property in the court auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. He had, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed (Ex. B-15) in favour of Chunilal Sowcar regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his master Chunilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all these facts, he filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial is tantamount to playing fraud on the court. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court that the appellants-defendants could have easily produced the certified registered copy of Ex. B-15 and non-suited the plaintiff. A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party." 37. In the case of Meghmala and Others vs. G. Narasimha Reddy, 2010 AIR SCW 5281 at paragraphs 28 to 36, Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "Fraud/Misrepresentation:- 28. In the case of Meghmala and Others vs. G. Narasimha Reddy, 2010 AIR SCW 5281 at paragraphs 28 to 36, Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "Fraud/Misrepresentation:- 28. It is settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an order/office by making misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the competent authority, such order cannot be sustained in the eye of the law. “Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.” (Vide S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath (dead) by LRs and Others AIR 1994 SC 853 ). In Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley 1956 All. E.R.349), the Court observed without equivocation that "no judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything.” 29. In Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation. v. M/S. GAR Re-Rolling Mills [ (1994) 2 SCC 647 , this Court observed that a writ court, while exercising its equitable jurisdiction, should not act as to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud as the courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith. “Equity is always known to defend the law from crafty evasions and new subtleties invented to evade law.” 30. In Smt. Shrisht Dhawan v. M/s. Shaw Brothers AIR 1992 SC 1555 ], it has been held as under: “20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct.” 31. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh & Others AIR 2000 SC 1165 , this Court observed that “Fraud and justice never dwell together” (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) and it is a pristine maxim which has never lost its temper over all these centuries. 32. The ratio laid down by this Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit to the persons who played fraud or made misrepresentation and in such circumstances the Court should not perpetuate the fraud. 32. The ratio laid down by this Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit to the persons who played fraud or made misrepresentation and in such circumstances the Court should not perpetuate the fraud. (See Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi [ (1990) 3 SCC 655 ; Union of India v. M. Bhaskaran [1995 Supp (4) SCC 100]; Vice Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Girdharilal Yadav (2004) 6 SCC 325 ; State of Maharashtra v. Ravi Prakash Babulalsing Parmar (2007) 1 SCC 80 ; Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. v. Coal Tar Refining Co. AIR 2007 SC 2798 ; and Mohammed Ibrahim v. State of Bihar (2009) 8 SCC 751 ]. 33. Fraud is an intrinsic, collateral act, and fraud of an egregious nature would vitiate the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice. Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due. The expression “fraud” involves two elements, deceit and injury to the person deceived. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. [Vide Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Admnistration AIR 1963 SC 1572 ; Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 550 ; State of A.P. v. T. Suryachandra Rao (2005) 6 SCC 149 ; K.D. Sharma v. SAIL (2008) 12 SCC 481 ; and Central Bank of India v. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir (2008) 13 SCC 170 ] 34. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. Suppression of a material document would also amount to a fraud on the court. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. Suppression of a material document would also amount to a fraud on the court. [Vide S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (1994) 1 SCC 1 ; Gowrishankar v. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust [ (1996) 3 SCC 310 ; Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi (2003) 8 SCC 319 ; Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal [ (2002) 1 SCC 100 ; Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School & Intermediate Education (2003) 8 SCC 311 ; and Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of T.N. (2004) 3 SCC 1 ] 35. In Kinch v. Walcott (1929 AC 482, it has been held that: “… mere constructive fraud is not, at all events after long delay, sufficient but such a judgment will not be set aside upon mere proof that the judgment was obtained by perjury”. Thus, detection/discovery of constructive fraud at a much belated stage may not be sufficient to set aside the judgment procured by perjury. 36. From the above, it is evident that even in judicial proceedings, once a fraud is proved, all advantages gained by playing fraud can be taken away. In such an eventuality the questions of non-executing of the statutory remedies or statutory bars like doctrine of res judicata are not attracted. Suppression of any material fact/document amounts to a fraud on the court. Every court has an inherent power to recall its own order obtained by fraud as the order so obtained is non est." 38. Following the law declared by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases, though the respondent-KIADB had taken decision to drop the acquisition proceedings as per their 220 th Board Meeting held on 27 th March, 1999, had issued Final Notification dated 26 th November, 2005 (Annexure-G) during the year-2005 at the instance of the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd. and the District Level Single Window Committee had taken a decision to allot the land in question to the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd, I am of the opinion that, interference be called for in these writ petitions. Be that, as it may, the entire proceedings are liable to be quashed on the ground that the possession of the land in question has not been taken and deposit of compensation before the competent Civil Court was made as per letter dated 06 th March, 2021 (Annexure-L), after a delay more than two decades and the said aspect of the matter was ignored by the respondent-KIADB while issuing the impugned order dated 21 st December, 2019 (Annexure-A). Therefore, petitioners have made out a case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and I am of the considered opinion that the entire action of the respondent-Authorities to acquire the land in question belonging to petitioners is to allot the same to the respondent No.5-M/s. Reli-e-Marg Software Consultants Pvt. Ltd. Therefore, I pass the following: ORDER: a) Writ Petition No.11578 of 2022 allowed. b) Writ Petition No.14493 of 2020 allowed. c) Order dated 05 th April, 2022 (Annexure-M) passed in Miscellaneous Appeal No.39 of 2021 on the file of the VI Additional District and Special Judge, Mysuru and order dated 28 th October, 2021 (Annexure-H) passed by the respondent-KIADB, which are challenged in Writ Petition No.11578 of 2022 are hereby quashed. d) Order dated 21 st December, 2019 (Annexure-A) passed by the respondent-KIADB and Order dated 20 th December, 2019 (Annexure-F10) passed by the respondent No.1, which are challenged in Writ Petition No.14493 of 2020 are hereby quashed. e) Consequently, the entire acquisition proceedings as per Final Notification dated 26 th November, 2005 in respect of the land bearing Survey No.92 measuring 2 acre 20 guntas of Hootagalli Village, Mysuru Taluk is hereby declared as void and contrary to law. Ordered accordingly.