JUDGMENT : DEEPAK ROSHAN, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioner for the following reliefs: (i) An appropriate writ, order or direction declaring that Rule 9(1) ¼Ä½ of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules 2004 as amended by the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2017 as ultra vires article 14 and 19(1) ¼Ä½ of the Constitution of India and Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals Development and Regulation Act, 1957; (ii) Upon such declaration, for issuance of a further appropriate writ, order direction commanding upon the concerned respondent to process the petitioner's application for grant of Mining Lease for Building Stone applied for over an area of 10.10 Acres on Plot No. 3349(Part) under Khata No.2 in Mauja Amdiya, under Kolhan Thana in the District of West Singhbhum, Jharkhand vide it's application dated 20.01.2017 in accordance with the rules of 2004. 3. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings are that the grant of leases for 'Minor Minerals' in Jharkhand is governed by the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004, which provide a specific procedure for the grant of mining leases, including for building stone. The petitioner under the extant provisions of the aforesaid rule, applied for a mining lease for building stone over an area of 10.10 acres on Plot No. 3349 (Part) under Khata No. 2, in Mauja Amdiya, under Kolhan Thana in the District of West Singhbhum, Jharkhand, through an application dated 02.11.2015. The application was processed by the DMO Chaibasa vide letter Nos. 1302 and 1303 dated 02.11.2015, and reports were requested from the Circle Officer, Hatgamharia, and the DFO, Chaibasa, regarding Revenue and Forest perspectives, respectively. The Circle Officer, Hatgamharia, provided his report vide letter No.383 dated 07.11.2015, and the DFO, Chaibasa, furnished his report via letter No. 2743 dated 01.12.2015, to the DMO Chaibasa. 4. Subsequently, the Petitioner obtained approval for a mining plan from the Assistant Mining Officer, Chaibasa, which was communicated to the petitioner's consultant through a letter contained in Memo No. 1460 dated 05.12.2015. 4. Subsequently, the Petitioner obtained approval for a mining plan from the Assistant Mining Officer, Chaibasa, which was communicated to the petitioner's consultant through a letter contained in Memo No. 1460 dated 05.12.2015. The petitioner was also granted “Environmental Clearance” for an area of 4.08 hectares within the applied area by the State Level Environment Impact Assessment Authority (SEIAA) via letter No. 2618 dated 31.12.2015, as required under rule 9(1) ¼x½ of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004, as amended by the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2014 (hereinafter to be referred as “Rules of 2004”). It further reveals that for the grant of a mining lease for a minor mineral, holding a Gram Sabha was imperative in terms of Rule 24(5) of the Rules of 2004. The petitioner's application was approved by the Gram Sabha held on 07.05.2016. Notably, the Rules of 2004, under rule 11 ¼d½ provided for the issuance of a letter of intent (LoI) within 120 days from the date of application. 5. Since the petitioner was not issued such letter of intent (LoI) within 120 days from the date of its application dated 2nd November 2015, it reapplied for a mining lease over the same area through applications dated 09.03.2016 and 19.07.2016. The petitioner’s application was duly acknowledged, but no decision was made, compelling the Petitioner to submit another application before the expiry of 120 days from the date of application. Finally, vide letter dated 13.01.2017, the Petitioner's application dated 19.07.2016, was rejected, and the petitioner reapplied through an application dated 12.01.2017. This application was duly acknowledged in Form-B bearing No. 42/16- 17 dated 20.01.2017, in terms of Rule 10 of the Rules of 2004. During the pendency of the application dated 12.01.2017, the Rules of 2004 were amended by the Amendment Rules of 2017, which were published in the Jharkhand Gazette No. 149 on March 2, 2017, inter alia inserting rule 9(1) ¼Ä½ to the Rules of 2004. Rule 9(1) ¼Ä½ declares all pending applications for the grant of mining leases of minor minerals as ineligible, except those submitted with respect to raiyati land of less than 5 hectares. The petitioner's application, being in respect of Government Land of less than 5 hectares, was purportedly rendered ineligible. The impugned Rule is annexed to the Writ Petition as Annexure 6. 6. The petitioner's application, being in respect of Government Land of less than 5 hectares, was purportedly rendered ineligible. The impugned Rule is annexed to the Writ Petition as Annexure 6. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had filed the instant Writ Petition inter alia challenging the vires of Rule 9(1) ¼Ä½ of the JMMC Rules as amended by the Rules of 2017, due to which the petitioner’s pending application, which remained in such state due, in view of the admitted fact of inaction of the State Government, was rendered ineligible which is certainly in violation of its fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. In fact, after filing of the instant Writ Petition, the NGT vide an order dated 11.4.2017 passed in OA no. 108/2015/EZ, specifically stayed the effect of the impugned rule. However, in light of the same the petitioner’s application was still not considered and this fact has been concealed in the Counter Affidavit filed by the State as well. This clearly shows the mala fide and lackadaisical attitude of the State. 7. Ld. Counsel contended that the Petitioner has raised two issues, firstly, impugned rule treats un-equals equally by bringing into effect a provision which does not distinguish between applicants whose application were at initial stage and those whose were fully matured for grant. Secondly, the impugned provision is in spirit, a blanket order declaring all eligible applications as in-eligible without giving a fair opportunity of hearing or window for breathing to individual applicants. In the instant case, the foregoing facts would demonstrate beyond doubt that the petitioner was made to take all steps and procure all clearances/approvals/permits for final grant of lease but it was purely due to the delay on the part of State Government that the lease deed could not be executed prior to amendment of the rules and coming into force of the impugned rule. 8. He further contended that the impugned Rule further makes a classification of applicants based on size of applied area and nature of the land on which the lease has been applied for, which classification is not based on any intelligible differentia. Rather, the classification should have been made based on stage of application. 8. He further contended that the impugned Rule further makes a classification of applicants based on size of applied area and nature of the land on which the lease has been applied for, which classification is not based on any intelligible differentia. Rather, the classification should have been made based on stage of application. In order to explain the above issue, he submitted an example; an applicant who was issued with a LoI but did not procure clearances or whose applications for such clearances were still pending has been saved by the impugned rule but the petitioner, being an applicant who had all clearances but no LoI in its favour has been declared in- eligible. It is settled principle of law that a reasonable classification should be made on the basis of ‘intelligible differentia’ distinguishing persons or things that are grouped together and separates them from the rest of the unlike group. Further, such ‘intelligible differentia’ must have a nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the legal provision. In this regard he placed reliance on U.P. Power Corporation. Ltd. v. Ayodhya Prasad Mishra & Anr. (2008) 10 SCC 139 [Para 40]. 9. Learned counsel further submits that the State Government did not consider the Petitioner’s application for grant of lease which was complete in all respect and there was a clear recommendation for grant of lease in its favour. The fact that the petitioner’s application was complete in all respect and the petitioner had all requisite clearances/permissions etc. as has been clearly admitted in paragraph nos. 10 to 15 of the Counter affidavit dated 19.07.2017 filed by the State. In fact, there was not a single reason for which the petitioner’s application for grant as per the unamended law could have been rejected. On the other hand, there were several other applications which were in initial stages and the final grant to such applicants would have depended on their fulfilling several conditions. The impugned rule, in effect treated all such applications alike and as such violated the petitioner’s right under article 14 of the Constitution of India. In this regard he placed reliance on Md. Usman & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Ors. (1971) 2 SCC 188 and Ramesh Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar & Ors. The impugned rule, in effect treated all such applications alike and as such violated the petitioner’s right under article 14 of the Constitution of India. In this regard he placed reliance on Md. Usman & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Ors. (1971) 2 SCC 188 and Ramesh Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar & Ors. (1978) 1 SCC 37 and submitted that the impugned rule in such view of the matter is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. He contended that the instant case is an example where the State has failed to discharge its duty and as such, now, the petitioner cannot be left to suffer the consequences. In order to buttress this argument, he placed reliance on the judgment reported in AIR 1954 Bom 232 . He reiterated undisputably, before the amendment, the petitioner was eligible for grant of lease, however post amendment, its application was declared ineligible. The State’s action of denying grant to the petitioner taking aid of the amendment is arbitrary. He also relied on the judgment rendered in Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilisers Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioners & Commercial Taxes & Ors. (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 21 in this regard. 10. He lastly submits that grant having been recommended in favour of the petitioner prior to amendment, the State cannot take advantage of its own wrong of not concluding the entire process before amendment, which otherwise would be in violation of Article 14. Reliance is placed on State of Bihar & Ors. v. Kalyanpur Cement Ltd. (2010) 3 SCC 274 in this regard. It is thus submitted that in the given circumstances, the petitioner’s application being mature for grant and there being a recommendation for grant, the amendment in law may be declared ultra vires and the State Government be directed to execute a lease deed with the petitioner. Reliance is placed on Hindustan Sugar Mills v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (1980) 1 SCC 599 in this regard. 11. Learned counsel for the Respondent-State has filed its counter affidavit and opposed the prayer of the petitioner. The Respondent submitted that the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 was, amended by the amendment Rules of 2017 which came into effect from 02.03.2017. (1980) 1 SCC 599 in this regard. 11. Learned counsel for the Respondent-State has filed its counter affidavit and opposed the prayer of the petitioner. The Respondent submitted that the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 was, amended by the amendment Rules of 2017 which came into effect from 02.03.2017. It has been further submitted that the petitioner did not submit a properly authenticated Gram Sabha proceeding before the concerned authority and hence the application of the petitioner could not be processed. Under the said Rule, all applications for grant of leases of Minor Minerals over an area of more than 5 hac. of Raiyati Land were rendered ineligible. Since the land over which the petitioner applied for a lease was a Government Land, the same became in eligible as per 9(1) ¼Ä½ of the JMMC Rules, 2004 as amended by the JMMC Amendment Rules, 2017 (Impugned Rule). It has been further submitted that the State Government is empowered to amend the JMMC Rules having derived such power from Section 15 of the MMDR Act, 1957. Hence the impugned Rule is not ultra vires. It was thus submitted that, since the State had power to amend the rules, the impugned rule passed the test of reasonableness as it does not impose any unreasonable restriction. 12. Ld. Counsel contended that it is a settled law that the State Government has power to amend the rules framed under section 15 of the MMDR Act and hence they are competent to amend the Rules. Section 15 of the MMDR Act is the general rule making power of the State Government by which the State Government has been empowered to make rules regarding Minor Minerals. Moreover, the petitioner has never disputed the State Government’s power to make rules. He lastly submits that in view of the amended Rules 2017, the Petitioner is having no case; as such the instant writ application deserved to be dismissed. 13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the documents annexed with the respective affidavits and the documents annexed therein; it transpires that the petitioner has never disputed the State Government’s power to make Rules; however, such rule making power should also be exercised with due care and caution in a manner which is not prejudicial to the interest of the public at large. Every citizen of India has guaranteed fundamental rights and any Rule, made under any provision of any statute is bad, if the same is ultra vires the Constitution of India and infringes vital rights of the citizens. From the facts and the pleadings, it appears that the classification put in place by the impugned rule is not based on any intelligible differentia and is highly prejudicial for lease applicants like petitioner who have taken all the pains to obtain all required clearances by investing huge money and time and one fine day, such applicant is slapped with deemed rejection due to sudden change in law without any saving or transitory provision. It is a clear case where un-equals (one who applied for lease and did not have any clearance and the other who after application secured all clearances and was ready for grant of lease by issuing LoI) have been treated equally. Notably, no reply/submission has been made by the State on this aspect. 14. The issue of Gram Sabha not authenticated by competent authority was raised for the first time in the pleadings of the respondents in this Writ Petition; however, Annexure-C to the Counter-affidavit filed by the Respondents is self-explanatory as it records the satisfaction of the Circle Officer regarding Gram Sabha proceeding. Further, there is no communication on record that would demonstrate that the Petitioner was ever informed about such irregularity in Gram Sabha proceedings. The petitioner has also annexed a valid Gram Sabha proceeding annexed as Annexure-7 to the Writ petition along with its rejoinder (Page 20 of rejoinder) to the counter affidavit filed by the State; in order to demonstrate that there was a valid Gram Sabha. Even otherwise, for the sake of argument, even admitting the stand of the State made in the Counter Affidavit, that Gram Sabha was not authenticated by competent authority which was mandatory; it is true that for the grant of a mining lease for a minor mineral, holding a Gram Sabha was imperative in terms of Rule 24(5) of the Rules of 2004. However, the record reveals that the Circle Officer, Hatgamharia, provided his report vide letter No.383 dated 07.11.2015, and the DFO, Chaibasa, furnished his report via letter No. 2743 dated 01.12.2015, to the DMO Chaibasa. Further, the petitioner's application was approved by the Gram Sabha held on 07.05.2016 itself. However, the record reveals that the Circle Officer, Hatgamharia, provided his report vide letter No.383 dated 07.11.2015, and the DFO, Chaibasa, furnished his report via letter No. 2743 dated 01.12.2015, to the DMO Chaibasa. Further, the petitioner's application was approved by the Gram Sabha held on 07.05.2016 itself. Then, as per the State, Gram Sabha was not authenticated by competent authority; then what prevented the State to inform the Petitioner and/or to hold a fresh Gram Sabha, inasmuch as, all these developments happened much prior to the amendment in 2017. 15. Having regards to the foresaid discussions, the instant writ application requires interference for the following reasons:- (i) The impugned rule, in effect, rejects the petitioner’s pending application for grant of lease dated 20.01.2017 which has been completed much before the amendment and only due to the latches of the Respondents the LoI has not been issued, inasmuch as, all required clearances/approvals were available in the file. (ii) The impugned rule treats un-equals equally by bringing into effect a provision which does not distinguish between applicants whose application were at initial stage and those whose were fully matured for grant thereby infringing petitioner’s right guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution of India. Reference in this regard may be made on decision of Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in U.P. Power Corpration. Ltd. v. Ayodhya Prasad Mishra & Another (Supra). The relevant portion is quoted herein below: “40. It is well settled that equals cannot be treated unequally. But it is equally well settled that unequals cannot be treated equally. Treating of unequals as equals would as well offend the doctrine of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that Executive Engineers placed in Category I must get priority and preference for promotion to the post of Superintendent Engineer over Executive Engineers found in Category II.” Further in Mohd. Usman & Ors. v. State of A.P. (1971) 2 SCC 188 wherein Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows: “4. It was urged that this rule is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution because though among the clerks there are UDCs as well as LDCs, yet all of them had been put in one class for the purpose of recruitment. Usman & Ors. v. State of A.P. (1971) 2 SCC 188 wherein Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows: “4. It was urged that this rule is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution because though among the clerks there are UDCs as well as LDCs, yet all of them had been put in one class for the purpose of recruitment. As per the Ministerial Service Rules the UDCs had to be selected from the LDCs after the LDCs had put in certain number of years of service and after they had passed the Accounts Test as well as the Registration Test. A UDC holds superior post to that of an LDC His salary is higher and his conditions of service are better than that of an LDC Hence it was urged that as Rule 5 treats UDCs as well as LDCs as equal for the purpose of recruitment for the post of a Grade-II Sub- Registrar, the Rule violates the doctrine of equality. According to the petitioners the equality doctrine is attracted not only when equals are treated as unequals but also where unequals are treated as equals. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that a statutory provision may offend Article 14 of the Constitution both by finding differences where there are none and by making no difference where there is one. The proposition of law advanced on behalf of the petitioners is unexceptionable. This Court ruled in Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1961 SC 552 : (1961) 3 SCR 77 : (1961) 2 SCJ 269 that when the statute obliged every person who held land to pay tax at the flat rate prescribed, whether or not he made any income out of the property, or whether or not the property was capable of yielding any income, there being no attempt at classification in the provisions of the statute, the statute denied equality before law because of lack of classification. Similar views have been expressed by this Court in other decisions. It is not necessary to refer to those decisions.” In Ramesh Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (1978) 1 SCC 37 the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows: “6. Turning to the other ground on which the judgment under appeal rests viz. Similar views have been expressed by this Court in other decisions. It is not necessary to refer to those decisions.” In Ramesh Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (1978) 1 SCC 37 the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows: “6. Turning to the other ground on which the judgment under appeal rests viz. the violation of guarantee of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, we would like to reiterate and re-emphasise what has been oft repeated by this Court viz. that the doctrine of equality before law and equal protection of laws and equality of opportunity in the matter of employment and promotion enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution which is intended to advance justice by avoiding discrimination is attracted only when equals are treated as unequals or where unequals are treated as equals. (See Md. Usman v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1971) 2 SCC 188 : AIR 1971 SC 1801 ) The guarantee of equality does not imply that the same rules should be made applicable to all persons in spite of differences in their circumstances and conditions. (See Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, 1950 SCC 833 : AIR 1951 SC 41 : 1950 SCR 869 ) It is also well recognised that although Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution forbid hostile discrimination, they do not forbid reasonable classification and equality of opportunity in matters of promotion means equality as between members of the same class of employees and not equality between the members of separate and independent classes. (See All India Station Masters' & Assistant Station Masters' Association v. General Manager, Central Railway, AIR 1960 SC 384 : (1960) 2 SCR 311 ) It must always be remembered that though the concept of equal protection and equal opportunity undoubtedly permeates the whole spectrum of an individual's employment from appointment through promotion and termination to the payment of gratuity and pension, it has an inherent limitation arising from the very nature of the constitutional guarantee. Equality is for equals, that is to say those who are similarly circumstanced are entitled to an equal treatment but the guarantees enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution cannot be carried beyond the point which is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court.” (iii) No power can be exercised unreasonably as has been done in the present case by drastically and suddenly changing the regime and declaring all pending applications in-eligible, without categorizing them as per their maturity. (iv) The application of the petitioner, despite of being complete in all respect was kept pending due to inaction on the part of the State Government. The fact is evident from Annexure- E to the Counter Affidavit dated 07.11.2015, which recommends grant of lease in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner’s applications got time barred time and again and the petitioner had to keep renewing its applications just due to inaction on the part of the State. Now after amendment, it is thus not open for the State to take a stand that the law has changed and therefore nothing can be done. Reliance in this regard may be placed on the decision rendered in the case of All India Groundnut Syndicate Ltd. v. Commr. of Income Tax, Bombay City, AIR 1954 Bom 232 wherein it has been held as under: “4. The same was the position in 1945-1946. In that year the assessee company returned a loss of Rs. 15,654 and the Income-tax Officer made an order in terms identical to the orders which he had made in respect of the assessment for the year 1944-1945.” In the case of Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilisers Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Ors. (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 21 it has been held in Paras 9, 25, 26 as under:- “9. There is, as set out earlier, no dispute that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the Notification dated June 30, 1969. There is also no dispute that the refunds were eligible to be adjusted against sales tax payable for respective years. (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 21 it has been held in Paras 9, 25, 26 as under:- “9. There is, as set out earlier, no dispute that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the Notification dated June 30, 1969. There is also no dispute that the refunds were eligible to be adjusted against sales tax payable for respective years. The only controversy is whether the appellant, not having actually secured the “prior permission” would be entitled to adjustment having regard to the words of the Notification of August 11, 1975, that “until permission of renewal is granted by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, the new industry should not be allowed to adjust the refunds”. The contention virtually means this: “No doubt you were eligible and entitled to make the adjustments. There was also no impediment in law to grant you such permission. But see language of clause 5. Since we did not give you the permission you cannot be permitted to adjust.” Is this the effect of the law? 25. It appears to us that the view taken of the matter by the High Court does not acknowledge the essential distinction between what was a matter of form and what was one of substance. There was no other disentitling circumstance which would justify the refusal of the permission. Appellant did not have prior permission because it was withheld by the Revenue without any justification. The High Court took the view that after the period to which the adjustment related had expired no permission could at all be granted. A permission of this nature was a technical requirement and could be issued making it operative from the time it was applied for. 26. We, therefore, allow the appeal set aside the judgment of the High Court under appeal and direct the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Admn.) to grant the permission for the said three years operative from the dates of the application. The permission shall entitle the appellant to the adjustment of the refunds against the taxes due for the respective years. We issue these directions in view of the admitted position that, apart from the technical objection that periods to which the applications related had since expired, there was no other impediment for the grant of permission. The permission shall entitle the appellant to the adjustment of the refunds against the taxes due for the respective years. We issue these directions in view of the admitted position that, apart from the technical objection that periods to which the applications related had since expired, there was no other impediment for the grant of permission. It also follows that the demand notices which proceed on the premise that adjustment of refunds against taxes due was unavailable cannot also stand. They are quashed.” (v) Sudden change in rule declaring mature applications as well as those in initial stage as ineligible, is arbitrary and violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. 16. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of this case we are of the considered opinion that the action of the Respondents in rejecting to grant Letter of Intent (LOI) having been recommended in favour of the petitioner prior to amendment, the State cannot take advantage of its own wrong of not concluding the entire process before amendment, which otherwise would be in violation of Article 14. Reference in this regard may be made to the decision rendered in the case of State of Bihar & Ors. v. Kalyanpur Cement Ltd. (2010) 3 SCC 274 . The relevant portion is quoted herein below: “80. In the present case, the claim of the Government is based on a change in policy advocated in the Chief Ministers' Conference. These Conferences had taken place before the affidavit was filed on 5-12-2001. Therefore, the High Court concluded that the Government has not been candid in disclosure of the reasons for passing the Order dated 6-1- 2001. In our opinion, the aforesaid decisions with regard to the discontinuance of the sales tax exemptions from 1-1-2000 could not have affected the rights of the Company under the Industrial Policy, 1995. Necessary application was made to the Government seeking exemption on 21-11-1997. For more than three years, the Company and the financial institutions had been assured by the Government that the notification will be issued forthwith. However, it was not issued. We are of the opinion that the action of the appellants is arbitrary and indefensible.” 17. Necessary application was made to the Government seeking exemption on 21-11-1997. For more than three years, the Company and the financial institutions had been assured by the Government that the notification will be issued forthwith. However, it was not issued. We are of the opinion that the action of the appellants is arbitrary and indefensible.” 17. Now coming to the prayer made in this application; though the Petitioner has prayed to declare the impugned provision; Rule 9(1) ¼Ä½ of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules 2004 as amended by the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2017 as ultra vires to Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals Development and Regulation Act, 1957; but in the attending facts of this case, instead of declaring the aforesaid provision as ultra vires; it would be apt to read out the same, inasmuch as, the impugned provision i.e. Rule 9(1) ¼Ä½ of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules 2004 as amended by the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2017, shall not be applicable to those pending applications like that of the Petitioner, which were otherwise complete in all respect; where even the statuary clearances were granted and the same was kept pending due to inaction on the part of the State Government. 18. Having regard to the aforesaid discussions, the instant writ application is allowed The Respondents are further directed to issue Letter of Intent (LoI) to the Petitioner without giving adherence to the amended provision i.e. Rule 9(1) ¼Ä½ of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules 2004 as amended by the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2017. The entire exercise in issuing the LoI to the Petitioner and entering into the Lease Agreement with it shall be completed within a period of 10 weeks from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. 19. Pending I.A., if any, also stands closed.