Afzal Basha S/o Ahmed Pasha v. National Investigation Agency Rep. by Special Public Prosecutor, Bangalore
2025-12-02
K.S.MUDAGAL, VENKATESH NAIK T.
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : K.S. MUDAGAL, J. 1. Challenging the order of rejection of his bail application, accused No.5 in Spl.C.No.152/2021 on the file of XLIX Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge (Special Judge for the trial of NIA Cases) (CCH-50), Bengaluru has preferred this appeal. 2. Appellant and 145 others have been charge sheeted in the said case for the offences punishable under Sections 15, 16, 18 and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short ‘UAP Act’), Sections 143, 147, 307, 436, 353, 332, 333, 427, 504, 506 read with Sections 149 and 34 of IPC, Section 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 and Section 2 of the Karnataka Prevention of Destruction and Loss of Property Act, 1981 (for short ‘KPDLP Act’). Against appellant, Sections 16, 18 and 20 of UAP Act, Sections 120B, 34, 149 read with Sections 143, 145, 147, 188, 427, 436 and 353 of IPC and Section 2 of KPDLP Act was invoked. 3. Appellant filed bail application before the trial Court claiming that he is falsely implicated in the case and he is in judicial custody since five years without trial. The same was opposed by the prosecution. The trial Court on hearing the parties by the impugned judgment and order has rejected his bail application on the following grounds: (i) That there is prima-facie material to show involvement of the appellant in the crime. (ii) Delay in trial is because of the calculated acts of the accused themselves. Therefore appellant cannot make the same as ground. (iii) Section 43D(5) of UAP Act bars grant of bail as prima-facie case is forthcoming against the appellant. 4. The said order is challenged in the above case. Heard both side. 5. Sri Akarsh S Kanade, learned Counsel for the appellant reiterating the ground of appeal and grounds urged before the trial Court contended that the appellant is falsely implicated in the case and he is in custody without trial since five years. He also submitted that some of the co-accused have been granted bail by the trial Court, therefore the trial Court was in error in rejecting the bail application of the appellant. He further submitted that the mother of the appellant is suffering from carcinoma and she is solely dependant on him. Therefore, he is entitled to bail. 6.
He also submitted that some of the co-accused have been granted bail by the trial Court, therefore the trial Court was in error in rejecting the bail application of the appellant. He further submitted that the mother of the appellant is suffering from carcinoma and she is solely dependant on him. Therefore, he is entitled to bail. 6. In support of his submissions, he relied on the following judgments: 1. Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713 2. Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India and Ors. (1996) 2 SCC 616 3. Ajay Ajit Peter Kerkar v. Directorate of Enforcement & Anr. Crl. Appeal Nos. 2601-2602/2024 dated 16.05.2024 4. Muzammil Pasha & Ors. v. National Investigating Agency, W.P. No. 1417/2021 dated 10.06.2021 5. Ateeq Ahmed v. National Investigation Agency, Crl. Appeal No. 793/2024 dated 18.06.2024 7. Per contra, Sri P.Prasanna Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor justifies the impugned order on the ground that there is sufficient material to show involvement of the appellant in antinational activities. He submits that the appellant did not even spare the police and the police station. Absolutely there was no delay on the part of the prosecution, it was the strategy of the accused themselves which had led to the delay. So far as granting bail to some of the co-accused, he submits that they were not facing allegations of offences under UAP Act. Therefore parity does not apply, whereas the bail application of the similarly situated accused were rejected by the trial Court, confirmed by this Court and the Hon’ble Apex Court. He submits that the judgments relied on by appellant’s Counsel are not applicable. 8. In support of his submissions, he relies on the following judgments: 1. Shaikh Muhammed Bilal & Ors. v. National Investigating Agency, Crl. Appeal Nos. 585/2021 C/W 576/2021, 582/2021, 745/2021- dated 15.09.2021 2. Mohammed Kaleem Ahmed v. National Investigating Agency, SLP (Crl.) No. 848/2022 dated 28.02.2022 3. Imran Ahmed @ Imran Khan v. National Investigating Agency, Crl. Appeal No. 1640/2021 dated 22.12.2021 4. Mohamed Shariff v. National Investigating Agency, 2022 SCC Online Kar 662 5. Ateeq Ahmed v. National Investigating Agency , Crl. Appeal No. 814/2022 C/w Crl. Appeal No. 788/2022 dated 19.07.2022 6. Imran Ahmed v. National Investigating Agency , Crl. Appeal No. 124/2023 dated 29.05.2023 7. Suhail Basha v. National Investigating Agency , Crl. Appeal No. 1631/2023 dated 25.01.2024 8.
Mohamed Shariff v. National Investigating Agency, 2022 SCC Online Kar 662 5. Ateeq Ahmed v. National Investigating Agency , Crl. Appeal No. 814/2022 C/w Crl. Appeal No. 788/2022 dated 19.07.2022 6. Imran Ahmed v. National Investigating Agency , Crl. Appeal No. 124/2023 dated 29.05.2023 7. Suhail Basha v. National Investigating Agency , Crl. Appeal No. 1631/2023 dated 25.01.2024 8. Firoz Pasha v. National Investigating Agency , Crl. Appeal No. 47/2024 dated 15.02.2024 9. Rubah Waqas & Ors. v. National Investigating Agency , Crl. Appeal No. 827/2024 C/w Crl. Appeal No. 828/2024 dated 30.08.2024 10. Shabbar Khan v. National Investigating Agency , Spl. Leave to Appeal No. 17214/2024 dated 13.02.2025 11. National Investigating Agency v. Zahoor Ahmed Shah Watali , (2019) 5 SCC 1 12. Suneel Roy v. State of U.P. & Ors. 1998 SCC OnLine All 1178 13. Suresh Jaiswal v. D.M. Lucknow and Ors. 1986 SCC OnLine All 462 14. Virupakshappa Gouda v. State of Karnataka , (2017) 5 SCC 406 15. Varinder Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh , (2020) 3 SCC 321 16. Kareem @ Sadam v. State by National Investigating Agency , Crl. Appeal No. 238/2025 dated 01.07.2025 17. Ziya Ur Rehman @ Ziya v. National Investigating Agency , Crl. Appeal Nos. 767/2024 C/W 34/2024 dated 29.07.2025 18. Mohammed Shariff v. The State of Karnataka , Crl. Appeal No. 1824/2024 dated 07.08.2025 9. On hearing both sides and on examination of the materials on record, the point that arises for consideration is “whether the impugned order of rejection of the bail application of the accused is sustainable ” Analysis 10. Case of the prosecution in brief is as follows: (i) That prime accused in the case with some political aspirations to grab votes of Muslims, conspired to create unrest in the society on religious lines and in that direction to provoke others, accused No.19 made facebook post belittling Hindu deities to invoke reaction of Naveen, a nephew of Shri Akhanda Srinivasa Murthy, MLA of Pulakeshi Nagar constituency, tagged him to the said post. In response to such post, Naveen posted some message about Prophet Mohammed on his facebook. (ii) That on 11.08.2020 at 7.45 p.m. Moulvi named Sri Firdous Pasha had lodged the complaint before D.J. Halli Police Station against Naveen alleging blasphemy of Prophet Mohammed and hurting religious sentiments of persons belonging to particular religion.
In response to such post, Naveen posted some message about Prophet Mohammed on his facebook. (ii) That on 11.08.2020 at 7.45 p.m. Moulvi named Sri Firdous Pasha had lodged the complaint before D.J. Halli Police Station against Naveen alleging blasphemy of Prophet Mohammed and hurting religious sentiments of persons belonging to particular religion. Based on such complaint, first information report was registered against him. Despite that at 8.00 p.m. accused No.4 K.M.Wajid Pasha accompanied by 50 persons gathered at D.J.Halli police station demanding arrest of Naveen. By that time, appellant with extreme religious ideologies on social network like whatsapp, phone calls etc. started instigating others to assemble at D.J.Halli police station, thus huge number of accused assembled at D.J.Halli police station and started insisting to register their complaints though case was already registered. They started demanding to handover Naveen to them. Ultimately, the mob turned into assembly of 800 to 1500 people, shouting slogans against the police of pouring petrol and burning the police station. Despite attempt of the police to control them, at 8.45 p.m. aggressive group forcibly entered D.J.Halli police station with weapons, stones, sticks, rods and started damaging the police station building and attacked the police personnel. (iii) Ultimately, proclamation under Section 144 of Cr.P.C was imposed and through public announcement requisition was made to disperse the mob. But the mob did not heed to that. Ultimately, mob over powering the police proceeded to cellar and set fire to sixty seven (67) Government vehicles including both four wheelers and two wheelers parked in the police station. The police resorted to lathi charge and tear gas charging. That also did not yield any result. After issuance of warning to the mob, police were forced to take recourse to firing to disperse the mob. The mob attempted to grab the weapons of the police. In police firing several people were injured, two persons died at the spot and many police personnel also suffered injuries in the hands of attackers. 11. The allegations against accused No.5/appellant is that on learning about derogatory facebook post by Naveen, he reached D.J.Halli police station in conspiracy with accused No.3 and others, mobilized many people at the scene of offence provoked them and participated in violent acts of damaging the property in the police station, obstructing the police from performing the duties and pouring petrol on vehicles and setting them on fire. Reg.
Reg. Prima facie case: 12. So far as prima-facie case, appellant does not dispute occurrence of the incident, but claims that his name does not figure in the first information report and subsequently he is falsely implicated. Legal principles in consideration of bail applications is no more res integra. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment in Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali’s case referred to supra relying on several of its earlier judgments, at the stage of consideration of bail application has laid down the following principles: (i) At the stage of consideration of bail application, the duty of the Court is to satisfy whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that accusation against the accused is prima-facie true; (ii) For that purpose, the Court has to examine the materials or the evidence collected by the Investigating Officer with reference to the accusations; (iii) Degree of satisfaction of prima-facie case at bail stage is lighter than such satisfaction at the stage of framing of charges or trial (iv) It is necessary on the part of the Court to see that culpability of the accused and involvement of the accused in commission of organized crime directly or indirectly; (v) Antecedents and propensities of the accused, nature and the manner in which the offence is committed; (vi) Once the charges are framed, it would be safe to assume that a very strong suspicion is founded upon the materials before the Court. 13. The trial Court relied upon the charge sheet materials and the statements of LWs.25 and 27 who are protected witnesses. Before this Court, learned Special Public Prosecutor produced copies of statements of LWs.25, 27, 122 and 124. LWs.25 and 27 are the statements of eyewitnesses who are head constables of the said police station and LWs.122 and 124 are the statements of other eyewitnesses. They speak about the incident, presence of appellant along with other accused. They also speak about appellant along with other accused instigating other members of the mob, vandalizing police station, the appellant pouring petrol and burning vehicles in the police station and obstructing the police from performing their duties. Considering the same, the trial Court rightly held that name of the appellant not appearing in first information report is not fatal. 14. It is settled law that first information report is not encyclopedia and other materials also has to be examined.
Considering the same, the trial Court rightly held that name of the appellant not appearing in first information report is not fatal. 14. It is settled law that first information report is not encyclopedia and other materials also has to be examined. The Investigating Officer has collected call detail records of the appellant to show that he contacted the other accused persons during the incident and tower location of his mobile phone indicated his presence at D.J.Halli police station area. As per the charge sheet records, the Investigating Officer sent the seized mobile phone of the appellant to FSL to retrieve the data and as per FSL Report, the appellant found to have received voice message from accused No.21 exhorting Muslims to gather at D.J.Halli police station and even to be ready to martyr themselves. The call detail records revealed that he received 14 calls and made 28 outgoing calls during the relevant time. Hence, the trial Court was justified in holding that there was prima-facie material against the appellant. Reg. Delay in trial: 15. So far as delay in trial, the trial Court in para 22 of the impugned order has observed that the accused themselves have delayed the trial by repeatedly filing applications and such applications were filed consecutively by each of the accused, though common advocate was representing same sets of the accused. Having regard to that, learned Special Public Prosecutor was asked to submit the list of applications filed by the accused and their results. 16. Learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted the statement of applications filed by the accused before the trial Court with their result and the statement of the cases filed by the accused before this Court which are as follows: Bail Applications /Interim bail Applications Application seeking examination of sanction order Application for transfer of cases Application under Section 229 of Cr.P.C. (Plead Guilty) Application for discharge Petitions and Appeals filed before this Court 17. The above statement clearly shows that the accused themselves are delaying the proceedings, strategically to make such delay a ground to seek bail. Examination of the earlier orders of the trial Court on the official website of the concerned Court shows that since 2021 though the matter was being posted for hearing regarding framing of charges, by filing one or the other applications, accused themselves are causing obstructions in achieving progress in the case.
Examination of the earlier orders of the trial Court on the official website of the concerned Court shows that since 2021 though the matter was being posted for hearing regarding framing of charges, by filing one or the other applications, accused themselves are causing obstructions in achieving progress in the case. They further show that as one or the other accused did not appear on the appointed date, non-bailable warrants and proclamations were being issued by the trial Court. Applications for bail or discharge are being filed consecutively by individual accused instead of filing them collectively, though some set of accused are represented by common advocate. Other strategy is that they keep changing advocates and changed lawyers seek adjournments. Therefore delay cannot be attributed either to the prosecution or the trial Court. The accused being themselves cause for delay, cannot be permitted to reap the benefit of their own mistake on ground of delay. Reg. Parity: 18. Further, there is no dispute that similarly situated accused i.e. accused No.6 approached this Court in Crl.A.No.1631/2023 challenging rejection of his bail application. The same on hearing came to be dismissed by this Court on 25.01.2024. The said order has attained finality. 19. So far as the contention that some other accused have been granted bail, the trial Court has observed that those accused are not facing the allegations of commission of crime under UAP Act. Nothing is placed on record to show that the accused who were granted bail were also facing the charges under the provisions of UAP Act. So far as medical ground of the mother of the appellant, copy of the ration card produced by the appellant shows that she is living with her husband i.e. father of the appellant and five other siblings of the appellant. Thus there is no merit in the contention that the mother is solely dependant on him. Reg. Citations: 20. Perusal of all the judgments relied on by learned Counsel for the appellant shows that, in those cases bail was granted either on the ground of delay in trial or medical grounds of the accused. In the present case, appellant does not plead any of his medical ground.
Reg. Citations: 20. Perusal of all the judgments relied on by learned Counsel for the appellant shows that, in those cases bail was granted either on the ground of delay in trial or medical grounds of the accused. In the present case, appellant does not plead any of his medical ground. So far as the proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that bar of Section 43D(5) of UAP Act does not oust the ability of the Constitutional Courts to grant bail on the ground of violation of Part III of the Constitution, there cannot be any dispute. However, since the facts of the present case show that delay was on the part of the accused themselves, the said judgments relied on by learned Counsel for the appellant cannot be justifiably applied to the facts of the case on hand. 21. Mahatma Gandhi famously stated, "The true source of rights is duty. If we all discharge our duties, right will not be far to seek". His another related quote is ‘Right is duty well performed". Appellant is seeking bail on the ground that his fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution is violated. He gets that right when he adheres to his fundamental duties encapsulated in Article 51A of the Constitution. 22. For the purpose of this case, following fundamental duties under Article 51A (c)(e)(i) of the Constitution are relevant and the same read as follows: “51A. Fundamental duties. - It shall be the duty of every citizen of India: (a) to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals and institutions, the National Flag and the National Anthem; (b) …………………….……………………………………………… (c) to uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India (d) …………………………………………………………………… (e) to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic and regional or sectional diversities ; to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women; (f) .…………………………………………………………………… (g) …………………………………………………………………… (h) …………………………………………………………………… (i) to safeguard public property and to abjure violence .” 23.
Since there is prima-facie material to show that the appellant had indulged in vandalizing the police station, assaulted the police obstructed them from discharging their duties, caused them injuries, tried to damage the public properties, indulged in violence and denting harmony amongst the people on religious lines in breach of the above referred fundamental duties and accused themselves have delayed the proceedings, they cannot seek benefit of Article 21 of the Constitution. There is no merit in the contention that the impugned order of the trial Court is unsustainable. Hence the following: ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.