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2025 DIGILAW 1574 (KER)

Selvi W/o Sivakumar v. State of Kerala

2025-06-03

JOBIN SEBASTIAN

body2025
JUDGMENT : Jobin Sebastian, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against an order of detention dated 14.03.2025 passed against one Sreejith S/o Sivakumar, the detenu, under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAA(P) Act’ for brevity). The petitioner herein is the mother of the detenu. The said order of detention was confirmed by the Government vide order dated 16.05.2025, and the detenu was ordered to be detained for a period of six months, from the date of detention. 2. The records reveal that, considering the recurrent involvement of the detenu in criminal activities, a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Palakkad, on 20.02.2025 seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. For the purpose of initiation of the said proceedings, the detenu was classified as a 'known rowdy' as defined under Section 2p(iii) of the KAA(P) Act. 3. Altogether, eight cases in which the detenu got involved were considered by the detaining authority for issuing Ext.P1 order of detention. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is Crime No. 61/2025 of Kasaba Police Station alleging the commission of offences punishable under Sections 308(4) r/w 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (for short “BNS”) and the detenu is arrayed as the 1st accused in the said case. 4. We heard Sri. M.H. Hanis, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that Ext.P1 order is illegal, arbitrary, and was passed without proper application of mind. According to the learned counsel, there is an inordinate delay in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the order of detention, and hence, the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention is snapped. The learned counsel further urged that the jurisdictional authority passed the impugned order of detention without taking note of the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity and the conditions imposed on him at the time of granting bail itself were sufficient to deter the detenue from involving in further criminal activities. According to the learned counsel, the sufficiency of the bail conditions was not properly considered by the jurisdictional authority, and passed the impugned order in a casual manner. The learned counsel further submitted that there is a time gap of more than 2 years and 3 ½ months between the last prejudicial activity and the last but one case registered against the detenu, and therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived on by the detaining authority is vitiated. The learned counsel further urged that apart from registering an FIR, there is nothing to show the complicity of the detenu in the last case registered against him, and therefore, the said case could not be treated as a qualified one to classify the detenu as a ‘known rowdy’. 6. In response, the learned Government Pleader asserted that there is no delay in passing Ext.P1 detention order. He pointed out that the proposal for initiation of proceedings under KAA(P) Act was mooted without much delay from the date of the detenu’s release from jail in connection with the last prejudicial activity, and hence, the contention of the petitioner regarding delay in forwarding the proposal is absolutely baseless. According to the counsel, as the order of detention was also passed within a reasonable time, the petitioner could not be heard to say that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the order of detention was snapped. The learned Government pleader further submitted that the jurisdictional authority passed Ext. P1 order after taking note of the fact that the detenu was on bail in connection with the last prejudicial activity and after being satisfied that the bail conditions imposed while granting bail to the detenu are not sufficient to prevent him from involving in criminal activities. The learned Government Pleader further urged that the order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after proper application of mind and after arriving on the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction, and hence, warrants no interference. 7. The records reveal that the impugned order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority after considering the recurrent involvement of the detenu in criminal activities. As already stated, 8 cases in which the detenu was involved were considered by the detaining authority for passing the detention order, and the detenu was classified as a ‘known rowdy’ for the purpose of initiation of proceedings under KAA(P) Act. 8. As already stated, 8 cases in which the detenu was involved were considered by the detaining authority for passing the detention order, and the detenu was classified as a ‘known rowdy’ for the purpose of initiation of proceedings under KAA(P) Act. 8. While considering the contention of the petitioner sticking on the delay in passing the impugned order, it could not be ignored that an order under Section 3(1) of KAA(P) Act is having a significant impact on the personal as well as the fundamental rights of an individual. Therefore, such an order could not be passed in a casual manner; instead, it can only be passed on credible materials and after arriving at the requisite objective and subjective satisfaction. Furthermore, there exists no inflexible rule requiring a detention order to be issued within a specific time frame following the last prejudicial act. However, when there is unreasonable delay in making the proposal and passing the detention order, the same would undermine its validity, particularly when no convincing or plausible explanation is offered for the delay. 9. Keeping in mind the above, while coming to the facts in the present case, it can be seen that the last prejudicial activity was committed by the detenu on 21.01.2025. The detenu who was arrayed as the 1st accused in the said case was arrested on 23.01.2025, and he was released on bail on 25.01.2025. It is true that the proposal for the initiation of proceedings under KAA(P) Act was mooted by the District Police Chief, Palakkad, only on 20.02.2025. However, as already stated, eight cases in which the detenu got involved formed the basis for passing the impugned order. Therefore, some minimum time would have been required for collecting the details of the said cases and for verification of records. Therefore, the short delay in mooting the proposal is only justifiable. After the proposal, Ext. P1 order was passed on 14.03.2025. The sequence of events narrated above clearly shows that there is no inordinate delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the impugned order of detention. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, sticking on the delay, is only liable to be discarded. 10. After the proposal, Ext. P1 order was passed on 14.03.2025. The sequence of events narrated above clearly shows that there is no inordinate delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the impugned order of detention. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, sticking on the delay, is only liable to be discarded. 10. Another contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that it was without taking note of the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity and without considering the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed by the court at the time of granting bail, the jurisdictional authority passed the the impugned order of detention. While considering the contention of the counsel for the petitioner in the above regard, it is to be noted that there is no law that precludes the jurisdictional authority from passing an order of detention against a person who is already on bail. However, when an order of detention is passed against a person who is on bail, it is incumbent upon the authority to take note of the said fact and to consider whether the bail conditions imposed on such a person while granting bail by the court are sufficient to restrain him from involving in criminal activities. Keeping in mind the above, while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that in the impugned order itself, the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the case registered against him with respect to the last prejudicial activity is specifically adverted to. Moreover, in the impugned order, the sufficiency of the bail conditions is also seen properly considered by the jurisdictional authority. In the impugned order, it is specifically mentioned that the conditions clamped on the detenu are not sufficient to deter him from repeating criminal activities. It is true that the conditions imposed by the court while granting bail are not extracted in the impugned order. But there is no requirement of law that the bail conditions shall be extracted in the order of detention. But what is required is that the jurisdictional authority should consider the sufficiency of bail conditions imposed in the bail order. It is true that the conditions imposed by the court while granting bail are not extracted in the impugned order. But there is no requirement of law that the bail conditions shall be extracted in the order of detention. But what is required is that the jurisdictional authority should consider the sufficiency of bail conditions imposed in the bail order. The same is seen done by the jurisdictional authority while passing the order, and the authority entered into a conclusion that those conditions are not sufficient to deter the detenu from repeating criminal activities. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the above regard will also fail. 11. The learned counsel further submitted that there is a gap of more than 2 years between the date of last prejudicial activity and the date of last but one case registered against the detenu, and therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived on by the detaining authority is vitiated. It is true that the last prejudicial activity was committed by the detenu on 21.01.2025, and the date of occurrence of the last but one case registered against the detenu as crime No. 943/2022 of Palakkad Town Police Station is on 25.09.2022. In short, there is a gap of around 2 years and 4 months between the date of commission of the last prejudicial activity and the date of occurrence of the last but one case. However, the said gap alone is not a reason to enter into a conclusion that the satisfaction arrived on by the authority to pass the impugned order is vitiated. Evidently, the acts done by the detenu within seven years prior to the date of order alone formed the basis for passing Ext.P1 order of detention. All the cases are qualified to be considered for passing the said order and to classify the detenu as a known rowdy under KAA(P) Act. Therefore, the gap of around 2 years and 4 months between the last prejudicial activity and the last but one case registered against the detenu is of little consequence as far as the subjective satisfaction arrived on by the authority is concerned. Therefore, the gap of around 2 years and 4 months between the last prejudicial activity and the last but one case registered against the detenu is of little consequence as far as the subjective satisfaction arrived on by the authority is concerned. In this regard, we are fortified by the decision in Ammini v. State of Kerala and others , 2016 (3) KHC 456 , wherein it was held that cumulative effect of the nature of crime in which the detenu is involved during the previous seven years and the activities of the detenu in recent time would give the necessary factual foundation for detaining authority to arrive at subjective satisfaction. The fact that no crimes were registered against the detenu for a considerable length of time is not a ground to hold that the subjective satisfaction arrived at is vitiated. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the time gap between the two crimes highlighted by the counsel for the petitioner has no significance. 12. Another contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that apart from registering an FIR, there is nothing to prove the complicity of the detenu in the last prejudicial activity, and hence the said case should not have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the impugned order. While considering the said contention, it is to be noted that mere registration of an FIR alone is not sufficient to treat a case as a qualified one to initiate the proceedings under KAA(P) Act. Now, by a series of judicial pronouncements, it is well settled that apart from registering an FIR, there must be ‘something more’ to treat a case as a qualified one for passing an order under KAA(P) Act. However, it cannot be ignored that the jurisdiction to pass an order under KAA(P) Act is a jurisdiction of suspicion. Therefore, there is no legal requirement that in order to treat a case as a qualified one, for passing an order under KAA(P) Act, a final report should be filed in that case. However, as already stated, there must be some material to prove the complicity of the detenu in the commission of the offence apart from mere registration of an FIR. However, as already stated, there must be some material to prove the complicity of the detenu in the commission of the offence apart from mere registration of an FIR. Keeping in mind the above while reverting to the facts in the present case, it can be seen that in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity, the detenu is seen arrayed as the 1st accused. A perusal of the FIS, which is a relied-upon document, reveals that the name of the detenu is specifically mentioned in it. Moreover, specific overt acts are also assigned to the detenu. A perusal of records further reveals that there are sufficient materials to prima facie prove the detenu’s involvement in the said case. Therefore, we are of the view that the detenu could not be heard to say that, apart from registering an FIR there is no material to prove the complicity of the detenu in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the above regard will also fail. 13. From a perusal of the records, we are satisfied that all the necessary procedural requirements before passing an order under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act have been scrupulously complied with in this case. We are further satisfied that the competent authority passed the detention order after thoroughly verifying all the materials placed by the sponsoring authority and after arriving at the requisite objective, as well as subjective satisfaction. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order passed under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act is vitiated in any manner. 14. In view of the discussion above, we hold that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference. Hence, the writ petition stands dismissed.