JUDGMENT : ROBIN PHUKAN, J. Heard Mr. B. Chetri, learned counsel for the petitioner; Ms. S. Chutia, learned standing counsel for the respondent No. 1 in Elementary Education Department; Ms. R.M. Barooah, learned standing counsel for the respondent No. 2 in Finance Department; and Mr. S. Bora, learned standing counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 to 6 in Bodoland Territorial Council) BTC. 2. In this petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 26.12.2014 (Annexure – L of the petition), issued by the respondent No. 4 and also prayed for directing the respondent Nos. 2 & 4 to release his arrear salary, w.e.f. 23.03.2010 – 09.09.2013 (42 months) in view of the order of this court, dated 25.09.2019, passed in W.P.(C) No. 7383/2017. Background Facts:- 3. The background facts, leading to filing of the present petition, are adumbrated herein below:- “The petitioner was appointed as Assistant Teacher in Siddheswar M.E. School, vide order dated 18.03.1979, and thereafter his service was regularized vide office order dated 24.03.1987, w.e.f. 01.09.1986, and his service was confirmed vide order dated 23.11.1992. The petitioner being a founder and senior most teacher of the said school, he held the post of Headmaster (i/c) of the School, w.e.f. 1998 – 2000. Thereafter, in the year 2004 – 2005, due to some dispute for the post of Headmaster, the then Headmaster severally harassed the petitioner and put him under suspension vide order dated 17.11.2008, without serving/supplying any suspension order to him. However, subsequently, it was revoked vide order dated 23.03.2010, by the authority concerned. But, his arrear and current salary was not released and therefore, he approached this court by filing a writ petition, being W.P. (C) No. 1119/2011, and vide order dated 12.08.2011, this court had directed the respondent authorities in BTAD to ensure payment of the arrear and current salary of the petitioner within a time. Subsequently, his arrear salary, w.e.f. 17.11.2008, was released to him in view of the order dated 17.08.2012, passed by this court in Cont. Case (C) No. 129/2012. Subsequently, his arrear salary, w.e.f. 17.11.2008, was released to him in view of the order dated 17.08.2012, passed by this court in Cont. Case (C) No. 129/2012. The further pleaded case of the petitioner is that he was reinstated in his service, vide office order dated 23.03.2010, and he resumed his duties by submitting application to the then Head Master (i/c) of the school and while the dispute for Headmastership of the School was continued between him and the Headmaster (i/c), the then Headmaster (i/c) of the School created problems one after another to him, by not allowing him to sign in the Teacher's Attendance Register and placed false report to the authority concerned about not reporting for duties etc. and even forced him to leave the job. And during the pendency of the Cont. Case (C) No. 129/2012, for non compliance of the order, dated 12.08.2011, passed in W.P.(C) No. 1119/2011, the Director of Education (BTC), vide office order dated 05.02.2012, placed him under suspension, w.e.f. 27.01.2012, without assigning any reason and the copy of the suspension order was supplied to him after three months, that too by imposing double punishment by directing that during the suspension period, he will put signature in the Teacher’s Attendance Register from the very beginning till ending of school hours, which was out and out an illegal order, just to cause damage and undue harassment to him. Subsequently, the petitioner was reinstated in his service and transferred him to Madhya Howly M.E. School, against the vacant post, vide office order, dated 03.06.2013, passed by the Secretary of Education, BTC, (respondent No. 3) to resolve the dispute of Headmastership. Accordingly, the Director of Education (respondent No. 4) vide order dated 22.08.2013, issued the transfer order in the same scale and grade pay and posted him at Madhya Howly M.E. School and he joined the said school on 10.09.2013, and he had to run from pillar to post for his arrear and current salary for the survival of his family members and ultimately, he approached the this court by filing one writ petition, being W.P.(C) No. 1802/2014 and this court, vide order dated 28.04.2014, passed in W.P.(C) No. 1802/14 and order dated 09.06.2014, passed In M.C. No. 1604/2014, directed the respondent authorities to pay the salary to the petitioner and thereafter, he had received the unpaid salary from 10.09.2013 –31.01.2017. Thereafter, the petitioner had requested the respondent authorities and also issued one Legal Notice on 05.06.2017, regarding release of his retirement/pensionary benefits, including the provisional pension, G.I.S., leave encashment and also the arrear salary for the period of 23.03.2010 – 09.09.2013, i.e. for 42 months, as well as Revised Pay Scale and the Senior Grade Pay as per his entitlement. But, the same failed to evoke any response. Then the petitioner had filed another writ petition, being WP(C) No. 7383/2017, which was disposed of on 25.09.2019, by directing the petitioner to file one representation before the respondent authorities. Then he had submitted one representation, dated 06.12.2019, before the respondent authorities praying for releasing his arrear salary, w.e.f. 23.03.2010 – 09.09.2013, as well as the Revised Pay Scale and Senior Grade Pay. But, the respondent authorities failed to comply with the order of this court, though he submitted several representations. Thereafter, the District Elementary Education Officer, Baksa, vide letter dated 08.09.2020, informed the Director of Education, BTC, Kokrajhar about the order of this court, dated 25.05.2019, passed in W.P. (C) No. 7383/2017, on the basis of the application submitted by the petitioner along with the report of the BEEO, Gobardhana Block, Baksa dated 01.09.2020, wherein an office order dated 26.12.2014, had been enclosed, in which it was stated that the petitioner received salary from 23.03.2010 to 04.02.2012, vide Bill No. 78, dated 30.06.2012, for 23 months 8 days and that the petitioner is not entitled for arrear salary from March, 2012 to 09.09.2013 (i.e. for 19 months 9 days) as he was absent from duty and thereby rejected the claim. Thereafter, knowing about the fact of issuing the impugned order, dated 26.12.2014, the petitioner submitted an application on 09.11.2020, before the DEEO, Mushalpur to provide him the said office order and subsequently, it was supplied to him in the month of December, 2020 and for which, this present petition could not preferred in time but, now he put to challenge the same, with a prayer for directing the respondent authorities to release his arrear salary, w.e.f. 23.03.2010 to 09.09.2013 (42 months) in view of the order of this court, dated 25.09.2019, passed in W.P.(C) No. 7383/2017. 4. 4. The respondents in BTC had filed their affidavit-in-opposition denying the statements and averments made by the petitioner in the petition, wherein a stand has been taken that the petition is not maintainable on account of being filed belatedly and without clean hands. The respondent authorities further stated that the petitioner had suppressed the material facts regarding the order dated 26.12.2014 (Annexure – L) issued by then Director of Education, BTC and that the law does not allow to claim arrear salary after 3 years. It is also stated that the petitioner has already drawn arrear salary for the period of 23.03.2010 to 04.02.2012 (i.e. 22 months 13 days), against the Bill No. 78, dated 30.06.2012, amounting to Rs. 4,56,227/- and for the period of 05.02.2012 – 09.09.2013, the petitioner had not attended the school in violation of the suspension order dated 05.02.2012 and FR53(1)(a) and that on the ground of ‘no work no pay’, the salary for the said period cannot be released. It is also stated that the petitioner has already received the arrear of revised pay scale as per ROP 2017, amounting to Rs. 77,920/- and that since the petitioner has not approached the court with clean hands, he is not entitled to any relief. Submissions:- 5. Mr. Chetri, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there was a dispute between the petitioner and the then Headmaster (i/c) for the post of Headmastership and the then Headmaster (i/c) had harassed the petitioner to a great extent and the petitioner became the victim of conspiracy, for which, he was suspended from service, vide order dated 17.11.2008, however, the same was revoked vide order dated 23.03.2010. 5.1. Mr. Chetri further submits that after his joining, again dispute arose and the petitioner was again placed under suspension vide order dated 05.02.2012 and in the said suspension order, no reason was assigned and the copy of the same was supplied to him only after three months, that too by imposing double punishment by directing him put signature in the Teacher’s Attendance Register and to remain in School from the beginning to end of the School hours, during the suspension period, which was totally illegal and unjust and such stipulation in the suspension order was placed only to harass him. 5.2. Further submission of Mr. 5.2. Further submission of Mr. Chetri is that the petitioner had preferred one writ petition, being W.P.(C) No. 1119/2011 for issuing direction to the respondent authorities to release his arrear and current salaries and vide order dated 12.08.2011, this court directed the respondent authorities to release the same in favour of the petitioner and thereafter, for non-compliance of the said order, one contempt case, being Cont. Case (C) No. 129/2012, was initiated by him and only thereafter, he had received the arrear salary, w.e.f. 17.11.2008. 5.3. It is the further submission of Mr. Chetri that the petitioner came to know about the order dated 26.12.2014 (Annexure – L), which is being challenged in this petition at a belated stage, and the order was furnished to him only after three months, for which, the petitioner could not approach this court in earlier point of time to challenge the same and that the delay is not intentional. Mr. Chetri further submits that though the petitioner was suspended on two occasions, no departmental proceeding was drawn up against him and in view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Narain vs. Union of India and Others , reported in (2019) 5 SCC 809 , the petitioner is entitled to full back wages with arrear, after reinstatement. Further, referring to another decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others , reported in (2020) 2 SCC 569 Mr. Chetri submits that the delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of continuing cause of action or where the facts shock judicial conscience of court. Again, referring to the decision of this court in the case of Jogamaya Saikia (Dr.) and Others vs. National Institute of Technology and Others reported in 2008 (1) GLT 215 , Mr. Chetri submits that the principle of ‘no work no pay’ cannot be applied mechanically although it is true that the payment of back wages in all cases cannot be automatic. 5.4. Under such circumstances, Mr. Chetri submits that the respondent authorities may be directed to release the arrear salary of the petitioner for the period of 23.03.2010 – 09.09.2013 (i.e. for 42 months) in terms of the order of this court dated 25.09.2019, passed in W.P.(C) No. 7383/2017. 6. Per-contra, Mr. Bora, learned standing counsel for the respondent Nos. 5.4. Under such circumstances, Mr. Chetri submits that the respondent authorities may be directed to release the arrear salary of the petitioner for the period of 23.03.2010 – 09.09.2013 (i.e. for 42 months) in terms of the order of this court dated 25.09.2019, passed in W.P.(C) No. 7383/2017. 6. Per-contra, Mr. Bora, learned standing counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 – 6 in BTC has vehemently opposed the petition and submits that the petitioner has not approached this court with clean hand and the relief being sought for is not equitable in nature, as the petitioner has suppressed the material facts about the order dated 26.12.2014 (Annexure-L) issued by the then Director of Education, BTC and therefore, he is not entitled for the same and in support of the said submission, Mr. Bora has referred to the decision of this court in the case of State of Assam and Others vs. Badan Chandra Dihingia reported in 1997 (1) GLT 638 6.1. Mr. Bora further submits that there is inordinate delay in filing the present petition, in view of the decision of this court in the case of Aswini Kumar Das vs. State of Assam and Others , reported in 2016 (4) GLT 579 and also in view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of S.S. Balu and Another vs. State of Kerala and Others , reported in (2009) 2 SCC 479 , on account of laches of the petitioner, he is not entitled to any relief as the petition itself is not maintainable. 6.2. Referring to another decision of this court, in the case of Harendra Chandra Nath and Others vs. State of Tripura and Others , reported in 2013 (2) GLT 1094 , Mr. Bora submits that since this petition is filed after 10 years of passing of the impugned order, dated 26.12.2014, the petitioner is not entitled to receive the arrear salary because of limitation of 3 years. Under such circumstances, Mr. Bora has contended to dismiss this petition. Finding of this court :- 7. Bora submits that since this petition is filed after 10 years of passing of the impugned order, dated 26.12.2014, the petitioner is not entitled to receive the arrear salary because of limitation of 3 years. Under such circumstances, Mr. Bora has contended to dismiss this petition. Finding of this court :- 7. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, I have carefully gone through the petition as well as the documents placed on record and also gone through the impugned order dated 26.12.2014, along with all the earlier directions passed by this court in WP(C) No.7383/2017 and also gone through the decisions, referred by learned counsel for both the parties. 8. Before a discussion is directed to the submissions advanced by learned counsel for both the parties, this court deemed it necessary to refer to the impugned order dated 26.12.2014, which reads as under:- ORDER Dated, Kokrajhar the 26th Dec./2014. Seen the order dated 28-04-2014 of the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court passed in WP(C) No. 1802/2014 filed by Sri Devi Prasad Ghimire, Asstt. teacher, Madhya Howly M.E. School for payment of salary with effect nom 23-03-2010. Also read reports submitted by the District Ele. Edn. Officer, Baksa, in his letter No. DEEO/Baksa/susp/Gob/08/122 th dtd. 20 May/2011 and the documents received from the Headmaster. Sidheswar M.E. School/Madhya Howly M.E.School at the time of hearing held on 24-12-2014, in Office Chamber of the Director of Education, BTC by the concerned DEEO, Baksa BEBO, Gobardhana and Headmasters of both the Schools respectively. From the report stated above and material available in the records, it is found that Sri Devi Prasad Ghimire, Asstt. teacher, Sidheswar M.E. School, physically assaulted Sri Jagat Bahadhur Pradhan, the then Headmaster of the said school, consequently, he was placed under suspension by the DEBO, Baksa vide his order Memo No.DEEO/Baksa/Susp /Gob/08/4557-63 dtd. 17-11-2008 and then after the DEEO, Baksa re-instated him in service vide Memo No. DEEO/Baksa/susp/Gob/08/527-32 dtd 23-03-2010. However, he did not report in duty after his re-statement in service. As the instant petitioner was found non-complying of the authority's direction & negligence of duty, the BTC vide letter No.BTC/Edn (EI), 752/2010/222 dtd. 27-01-2012 and this Directorate Memo No.DE/BTC/Susp/Middle-14/06/48 dtd. 5th Feb./2012 placed him under suspension and now he is working at Madhya Howly M.E. School as per transfer order issued by the Director of Education, BTC vide order Memo No. DE/BTC/Apptt-110/Pt-11/08/09/335 dtd.22-08-2013. 27-01-2012 and this Directorate Memo No.DE/BTC/Susp/Middle-14/06/48 dtd. 5th Feb./2012 placed him under suspension and now he is working at Madhya Howly M.E. School as per transfer order issued by the Director of Education, BTC vide order Memo No. DE/BTC/Apptt-110/Pt-11/08/09/335 dtd.22-08-2013. The records submitted by the Headmaster, Sidheswar M.E. School says that the petitioner had received salary up to Feb/2012 amounting Rs. 5,31,650/-(Five lacs thirty one thousand six hundred fifty) only in spite of he remained absent from the duty. The petitioner was unauthorised absent in his duty from th Jan/2011 to 9 Sept/2013 so far as the teacher’s attendance register of Sidheswar M. E. School is concerned. The records th says that he was not in work from March/2012 to 9 Sept/2013 hence he is not entitled for payment of salary for the period on the principle of 'No work no pay’. The instant petitioner of the case found attending in his duty at Madhya Howly M.E. School from 10 Sept. 2013 as such his current pay bill have been submitted to the Secretary, BTC by the BEEO, Gobardhana for the period w.e.f 10-09-2013 to Nov/2013 and the same is under process to pay soon. After consideration of the case, the claim of the petitioner is prima-facie does not seems to be adequate as reports of the concerned district authority and Headmaster of the Schools, who is allowable for arrear salary only w.e.f. 10-09-2013 to Nov/2013 and hence his claim for payment of salary w.c.f. 23-03-2010 to till date is herewith rejected having no merit non-est as per rules. This is issued in tune with the order 28-04-2014 of the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court passed in WP(C) No. 1802/2014, Sri Devi Prasad Ghimire-Vs-State of Assam & Ors. Sd/-R.S. Borgoyari Director of Education, Bodoland Territorial Council, Kokrajhar. Dated Kokrajhar the 26 Dec./2014 8.1. Thus a perusal of the impugned order indicates that the petitioner was not th in work from March, 2012 to 9 Sept, 2013 hence he is not entitled for payment of salary for the period on the principle of 'no work no pay’. Further, it appears that the petitioner was found attending his duty at Madhya Howly M.E. School th from 10 Sept, 2013 and his current salary bill has been submitted to the Secretary, BTC by the BEEO, Gobardhana for the period w.e.f. 10.09.2013 to Nov, 2013 and the same is under process to pay soon. 8.2. Further, it appears that the petitioner was found attending his duty at Madhya Howly M.E. School th from 10 Sept, 2013 and his current salary bill has been submitted to the Secretary, BTC by the BEEO, Gobardhana for the period w.e.f. 10.09.2013 to Nov, 2013 and the same is under process to pay soon. 8.2. The said order also indicates that after consideration of the case, the claim of the petitioner is prima facie does not seem to be adequate as reports of the concerned district authority and Headmaster of the schools, who is allowable for arrear salary only w.e.f. 10.09.2013 to Nov, 2013 and hence his claim for payment of salary w.e.f. 23.03.2010 to till date is herewith rejected having no merit non-est as per rules. 8.3. It also appears that the period of March, 2012 to 09.09.2013, for which the principle of ‘no pay no work’ was applied was the period under which the petitioner was under suspension and in view of the order 05.02.2012. Thereafter, he was reinstated vide order dated 03.06.2013, by the Secretary, BTC (respondent No.3) without drawing up any disciplinary proceeding against him. He was transferred from that School to Madhya Howly M.E. School to resolve the dispute of Headmastership, by the Director, BTC vide order, dated 22.08.2013. He joined in the Madhya Howly M.E. School on 10.09.2013. 8.4. Further, from a perusal of the suspension order dated 05.02.2012, it appears that there was a stipulation that the petitioner will be allowed to draw 50% of the subsistence allowance, under F.R. 53(1a) with the condition that during the period of suspension he will put signature in the Teacher’s Attendance Register from the very beginning to end of the School hours. 8.5. It is to be noted here that right to subsistence allowance is a fundamental right as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. reported in 1999 SCC (L & S) 810. In the said case it has been held that right to subsistence allowance is a fundamental right of an employee when he is suspended by the employer. The subsistence allowance is not equal with salary but it is only an allowance. Hence any order, which directs recovery of such subsistence allowance has to be held in contravention of the provision of the Constitution and has to be struck down as unconstitutional. 8.6. The subsistence allowance is not equal with salary but it is only an allowance. Hence any order, which directs recovery of such subsistence allowance has to be held in contravention of the provision of the Constitution and has to be struck down as unconstitutional. 8.6. As a logical corollary to above proposition, it can be held that denial of subsistence allowance on the ground of failing to put signature in the Teachers’ Attendance Register and also failing to remain present in the School from very beginning to end of the School hours is also illegal and arbitrary exercise of power by the employer. In holding so, this Court derived authority from a decision of a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Zonal Manager, FCI & Ors vs. Khaled Ahmed Siddiqui reported in 1982(2) SLJ 166 (APHC) wherein it has been held that the direction to the employee to attend office and mark attendance daily during period of suspension is illegal. This proposition of law is also endorsed by another Division Bench of Delhi High Court W.P.(C) No. 5935/2013, (Radhey Shyam vs. Union of India & Ors.). But, this aspect eschewed consideration of the Director of Education, BTC, (respondent No.4), while the impugned order dated 26.12.2014 was being passed. If direction to put signature in the School Attendance Registrar, and to remain present in the School from the beginning to end the School hours, in the suspension order, itself is illegal, then denial of the subsistence allowance, as well as salary to the petitioner, on such illegal ground, by the impugned order dated 26.12.2014, is also illegal and arbitrary. The Principle of No Work No Pay and It’s Application:- 9. The law with regard to application of the principle of ‘no work no pay’ is well settled. This principle is found in proviso to F.R. 17(1), which read as under:- ‘ F.R.17(1):- Subject to any exceptions specifically made in these rules an officer shall begin to draw the pay and allowances attached to his tenure of a post with effect from the date when he assumes the duties of that post, and shall cease to draw them as soon as he ceases to discharge those duties: Provided that an officer who is absent from duty unauthorisedly shall not be entitled to any pay and allowances during the period of such absence.’ 10. Now, what left to be seen is whether, this principle is applicable to the given facts and circumstances herein this case or not. The issue, with regard to the applicability of this principle has been dealt with by Hon’ble Supreme Court in plethora of decisions. At this juncture, this Court deemed it appropriate to discuss some of them to decide the controversy at hand with greater precision. 11. In the case of Commr. Karnataka Housing Board vs. C. Muddaiah , reported in (2007) 7 SCC 689 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “ 34 We are conscious and mindful that even in absence of statutory provision, normal rule is “no work no pay”. In appropriate cases, however, a court of law may, nay must, take into account all the facts in their entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The court, in a given case, may hold that the person was willing to work but was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do so. The court may in the circumstances, direct the authority to grant him all benefits considering “as if he had worked”. It, therefore, cannot be contended as an absolute proposition of law that no direction of payment of consequential benefits can be granted by a court of law and if such directions are issued by a court, the authority can ignore them even if they had been finally confirmed by the Apex Court of the country (as has been done in the present case). The bald contention of the appellant Board, therefore, has no substance and must be rejected.” 12. In the case of J.N. Srivastava vs. Union of India & Another, reported in (1998) 9 SCC 559 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “ 3. The short question is whether the appellant was entitled to withdraw his voluntary retirement notice of three months submitted by him on 3-10-1989 which was to come into effect from 31-1-1990. It is true that this proposal was accepted by the authorities on 2-11-1989. But, thereafter before 31-1-1990 was reached, the appellant wrote a letter to withdraw his voluntary retirement proposal. This letter is dated 11-12-1989. The said request permitting him to withdraw the voluntary retirement proposal was not accepted by the respondents by communication dated 26-12-1989. It is true that this proposal was accepted by the authorities on 2-11-1989. But, thereafter before 31-1-1990 was reached, the appellant wrote a letter to withdraw his voluntary retirement proposal. This letter is dated 11-12-1989. The said request permitting him to withdraw the voluntary retirement proposal was not accepted by the respondents by communication dated 26-12-1989. The appellant, therefore, went to the Tribunal but the Tribunal gave him no relief and took the view that the voluntary retirement had come into force on 31-1-1990 and the appellant had given up the charge of the post as per his memo relinquishing the charge and consequently, he was estopped from withdrawing his voluntary retirement notice. In our view the said reasoning of the Tribunal cannot be sustained on the facts of the case. It is now well settled that even if the voluntary retirement notice is moved by an employee and gets accepted by the authority within the time fixed, before the date of retirement is reached, the employee has locus poenitentiae to withdraw the proposal for voluntary retirement. The said view has been taken by a Bench of this Court in the case of Balram Gupta v. Union of India [ 1987 Supp SCC 228 ]. In view of the aforesaid decision of this Court it cannot be said that the appellant had no locus standi to withdraw his proposal for voluntary retirement before 31-1-1990. It is to be noted that once the request for cancellation of voluntary retirement was rejected by the authority concerned on 26-12-1989 and when the retirement came into effect on 31-1-1990 the appellant had no choice but to give up the charge of the post to avoid unnecessary complications. He, however, approached the Tribunal with the main grievance centering round the rejection of his request for withdrawal of the voluntary retirement proposal. The Tribunal, therefore, following the decision of this Court ought to have granted him the relief. We accordingly, allow these appeals and set aside the orders of the Tribunal as well as the order of the authorities dated 26-12-1989 and directed the respondents to treat the appellant to have validly withdrawn his proposal for voluntary retirement with effect from 31-1-1990. The Tribunal, therefore, following the decision of this Court ought to have granted him the relief. We accordingly, allow these appeals and set aside the orders of the Tribunal as well as the order of the authorities dated 26-12-1989 and directed the respondents to treat the appellant to have validly withdrawn his proposal for voluntary retirement with effect from 31-1-1990. The net result of this order is that the appellant will have to be treated to be in service till the date of his superannuation which is said to be somewhere in 1994 when he completed 58 years of age. The respondent-authorities will have to make good to the appellant all monetary benefits by treating him to have continuously worked till the date of his actual superannuation in 1994. This entitles him to get all arrears of salary and other emoluments including increments and to get his pensionary benefits re-fixed accordingly. However, this will have to be subject to adjustment of any pension amount and other retirement benefits already paid to the appellant in the meantime up to the date of his actual superannuation. It was submitted by learned Senior Counsel for the respondent- authorities that no back salary should be allowed to the appellant as the appellant did not work and therefore, on the principle of “no work, no pay”, this amount should not be given to the appellant. This submission of learned Senior Counsel does not bear scrutiny as the appellant was always ready and willing to work, but the respondents did not allow him to work after 31-1-1990. The respondents are directed to make available all the requisite monetary benefits to the appellant as per the present order within a period of 8 weeks on the receipt of copy of this order at their end. Office shall send the same to the respondents at the earliest. 13. In case of Union of India vs. K. V. Jankiraman , reported in (1991) AIR (SCW) 2276 , Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- “ 25. We are not much impressed by the contentions advanced on behalf of the authorities. The normal rule of “no work no pay” is not applicable to cases such as the present one where the employee although he is willing to work is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault of his. We are not much impressed by the contentions advanced on behalf of the authorities. The normal rule of “no work no pay” is not applicable to cases such as the present one where the employee although he is willing to work is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault of his. This is not a case where the employee remains away from work for his own reasons, although the work is offered to him. It is for this reason that F.R. 17(1) will also be inapplicable to such cases.” 14. It is also stated in the case of Jogamaya Saikia (Supra) that the principle of ‘no work no pay’ cannot be applied mechanically nor can it be automatic. 15. The legal proposition, that can be crystallized from the aforesaid decision is that the principle ‘ No work, no pay’ is applicable only when an employee is absent due to his own act or omission/fault. But, when the employee is kept away from the work by an act or omission on the part of the employer, the employee cannot be denied salary on the principle of ‘ No Work No Pay’. 16. In the instant case, the petitioner had made a specific averment in his pleading that after his suspension, vide order dated 17.11.2008, he was reinstated in his service, vide office order dated 23.03.2010, and he resumed his duties by submitting application to the then Head Master (i/c) of the School and while the dispute for Headmastership of the School was continued between him and the Headmaster (i/c), the then Headmaster (i/c) of the School created problems one after another to him, by not allowing him to sign in the Teacher's Attendance Register and placed false report to the authority concerned about not reporting for duties etc. and even forced him to leave the job. This averment in the pleading of the petitioner remained un-traversed in the affidavit in opposition of the respondent authorities. 17. Thus, having applied the aforesaid principle, to the given facts and circumstances on the record, this court is unable to record concurrence with the submission of Mr. Bora, learned standing counsel for the respondent Nos. This averment in the pleading of the petitioner remained un-traversed in the affidavit in opposition of the respondent authorities. 17. Thus, having applied the aforesaid principle, to the given facts and circumstances on the record, this court is unable to record concurrence with the submission of Mr. Bora, learned standing counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 to 6 in BTC, that the principle of ‘no work no pay’ will be applicable herein this case, while indisputably, no disciplinary proceeding was also drawn up against him so as to deprive the petitioner from his salary pursuant to order of imposing punishment in the said disciplinary proceeding. Under such circumstances, the submission of Mr. Bora stands overruled/ repudiated. 18. Thus, having tested the impugned order on the touchstone of the principles discussed herein above, this court is of the considered opinion that th the impugned order dated 26 December, 2014, so passed by the Director of Education, BTC, is illegal and arbitrary and on such count the same failed to withstand legal scrutiny and accordingly, the same is liable to be interfered with. 19. Though Mr. Bora, learned standing counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 to 6 in BTC has advanced an argument that the petitioner has not approached this court with clean hands and he has suppressed the material facts about the impugned order dated 26.12.2014 and obtained the order of this court dated 25.09.2019, yet, the said submission left this court unimpressed, inasmuch as, even if it is accepted that he has suppressed the same, he derived no benefit from the same. 20. It is a fact that the petitioner has approached this court belatedly in the year 2021, while the impugned order was passed on 26.12.2014. But, it is a categorical contention of the petitioner that he came to know about the said order in the year 2020 only and as such, the delay and laches cannot be attributed to the petitioner nor an oblique motive can be attributed to him for suppressing the aforementioned fact and that being so, the decision relied upon by him in respect of suppression of fact and delay as well as the laches would not advance his argument. It is well settled in the case of Vidya Devi (supra) that in case continuous cause of action delay and laches cannot be raised. 21. It is well settled in the case of Vidya Devi (supra) that in case continuous cause of action delay and laches cannot be raised. 21. It is stated in the case of Raj Narain (Supra) that the petitioner is entitled to back wages for the period of suspension. It is also stated in the case of Vidya Devi (Supra) that right to salary is a right recognized under Article 300(A) and 21 of the Constitution of India and right to property is a human right also. The relevant paragraphs are quoted herein below for ready reference:- “ 12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. 13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it.” 22 . In the case of the State of Orissa vs. Mamata Mohanty , reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that it is needless to say that the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply in writ jurisdiction. 23. This Court has also considered the submission of Mr. Bora, the learned standing counsel for the BTC in respect of the delay in challenging the impugned order by the petitioner and also gone through the decisions Aswini Kumar Das (supra) and also in S.S. Balu (supra) referred by him. In the case of S.S. Balu (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 17. It is also well-settled principle of law that “delay defeats equity”. The Government Order was issued on 15-1- 2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. In the case of S.S. Balu (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 17. It is also well-settled principle of law that “delay defeats equity”. The Government Order was issued on 15-1- 2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal thereagainst, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage. In NDMC v. Pan Singh [ (2007) 9 SCC 278 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 398] this Court held: (SCC p. 283, para 16) “ 16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction.” 24. But, what is apparent from a perusal of the aforesaid decision is that the said decision proceeds on their own facts, and as such proposition of law laid down therein, are not applicable to facts herein this case on account of the same being distinguishable. Therefore, the decisions so referred by Mr. Borah would not come into his assistance. But, what is apparent from a perusal of the aforesaid decision is that the said decision proceeds on their own facts, and as such proposition of law laid down therein, are not applicable to facts herein this case on account of the same being distinguishable. Therefore, the decisions so referred by Mr. Borah would not come into his assistance. It is well settled in the case of Vidya Devi (Supra) that right to salary is a right recognized under Article 300(A) and 21 of the Constitution of India and right to property is a human right also. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. In the case in hand the cause of action appears to be recurring and continuing one. 25. In the given facts and circumstances on the record, this court finds sufficient merit in this petition and accordingly, the same stands allowed. The impugned order dated 26.12.2014, stands set aside and quashed. The respondent authorities in the BTC are directed to release the arrear salary w.e.f. 23.03.2010 to 09.09.2013 (i.e. for 42 months) in terms of the order being passed by this court in W.P.(C) No. 7383/2017, including the Revised Scale Pay, Senior Grade Pay and Time Scale Pay, as per his entitlement, however, after proper verification. 26. Let the aforesaid exercise be carried out within a period of 3 (three) months, from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order. On equitable consideration, it is further provided that the respondent authorities in the BTC, shall release the aforementioned reliefs with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of accrual of the amount till the date of payment. 27. In terms of above, this writ petition stands disposed of leaving the parties to bear their own costs. 28. The petitioner shall obtain a certified copy of this order and place the same before the respondent authorities in the BTC, within a period of 2 (weeks) week from today.