Judgment : (V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J.) This second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure ("C.P.C." for short) is filed aggrieved against the Judgment and decree, dated 07.12.2011 in A.S.No.278 of 2010, on the file of the Principal District Judge, West Godavari at Eluru, reversing the Judgment and decree, dated 04.08.2010 in O.S.No.689 of 2005, on the file of I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Eluru. 2. The appellant Nos.1 to 8 herein are defendant Nos.2, 3, 5 to 10, 1 st respondent herein is plaintiff and respondent Nos.2 to 4 herein are defendant Nos.1, 4 and 11 in O.S.No.689 of 2005, on the file of I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Eluru. It is to be here that the appellant Nos.2, 6 and 7 herein died during the pendency of this appeal and their legal representatives are brought on record as appellant Nos.9 to 14; 15 and 16 & 17 respectively. 3. The plaintiff initiated action in O.S.No.689 of 2005, on the file of I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Eluru, with a prayer for declaring the title of the plaintiff to the schedule property as lawful owner and for consequential permanent injunction restraining the dependents, their men and followers from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule land and for costs. 4. The learned I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Eluru, dismissed the suit without costs. Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful plaintiff in the above said suit filed A.S.No.278 of 2010, on the file of the Principal District Judge, West Godavari at Eluru. The learned Principal District Judge, West Godavari at Eluru, allowed the appeal by decreeing the suit in favour of plaintiff. Aggrieved thereby, the defendant Nos.2, 3, 5 to 10 approached this Court by way of second appeal. 5. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit. 6. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in O.S.No.689 of 2005, is as follows: The plaint schedule property originally belonged to Adivi Venkata Lakshmamma. She executed a Will on 12.06.1975 bequeathing the same in favour of Adivi Saraswathi in a sound and disposing state of mind and later she died. After the death of Adivi Venkata Lakshmamma, Adivi Saraswathi became the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property. She executed a Will on 12.06.1975 bequeathing the same in favour of Adivi Saraswathi in a sound and disposing state of mind and later she died. After the death of Adivi Venkata Lakshmamma, Adivi Saraswathi became the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property. Adivi Saraswathi took loan from State Bank of India, Vijayarai by mortgaging the plaint schedule property. Adivi Saraswathi died intestate on 12.04.2004 leaving behind her, her husband and children. After the death of Saraswathi, her husband and children succeeded the plaint schedule property and they sold the same to plaintiff under a registered sale deed, dated 13.12.2004 for clearing the loan due to State Bank of India, Vijayarai and delivered possession of the same to the plaintiff. Since the date of the said purchase, the plaintiff has been in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property. 7. The 3 rd defendant filed written statement before the trial Court and the same was adopted by the defendant Nos.1, 2, 4 to 11. The brief averments in the written statement are as follows: The plaint schedule property was leased out to 1 st defendant and 8 th defendant and others for 99 years by virtue of a registered sale deed, dated 24.08.1967 with such terms and conditions as mentioned therein. The tenants have been in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property since then by way of getting bore-well dug. The alienation of the plaint schedule property in favour of plaintiff is contrary to the provisions of Section 15(1) of A.P.(A.A.) Tenancy Act, 1956. Defendant Nos.3 and 5 are the sons of 1 st defendant. Defendant Nos.7, 10 and 11 are the sons of some of the original tenants as detailed in it. The scribe of the above registered leased deed, dated 24.08.1967 by name Adivi Soma Sundara Rao is the son of Adivi Venkata Lakshmamma and he is a close associate of the plaintiff. They colluded together and brought the document of plaintiff into existence. 8. On the basis of above pleadings, the learned I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Eluru, framed the following issues for trial: (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration as he is lawful owner of the plaint schedule property? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for consequential permanent injunction as prayed for? (3) To what relief? 9. 8. On the basis of above pleadings, the learned I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Eluru, framed the following issues for trial: (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration as he is lawful owner of the plaint schedule property? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for consequential permanent injunction as prayed for? (3) To what relief? 9. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiff, P.W.1 to P.W.4 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.10 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.W.1 to D.W.6 were examined and Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.7 were marked. 10. The learned I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Eluru, after conclusion of trial, on hearing the arguments of both sides and on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, dismissed the suit without costs. Felt aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful plaintiff filed the appeal suit in A.S.No.278 of 2010, on the file of the Principal District Judge, West Godavari at Eluru, wherein, the following point came up for consideration: 1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to have declaration and the consequential relief of permanent injunction with respect to the plaint schedule property as prayed for? and 2) Whether the judgment and decree, dated 04.08.2010 passed by the learned I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Eluru in O.S.No.689 of 2005 is liable to be set aside? 11. The learned Principal District Judge, West Godavari at Eluru i.e., the first appellate Judge, after hearing the arguments, answered the points, as above, against the defendants and allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff by decreeing the suit. Felt aggrieved of the same, the Nos.2, 3, 5 to 10 in O.S.No.689 of 2005 filed the present second appeal before this Court. 12. On hearing both side counsels at the time of admission of the appeal, on 27.06.2012, the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, framed the following substantial questions of law: (1) Whether the admitted violation of provision of Section 15(1) of A.P.(A.A.) Tenancy Act can be called a dispute within the meaning of Section 16 of the Act and the tenant has to sought adjudication under Section 16? (2) Whether the non challenging of the violation of Section 15(1) would prevent the tenants from objecting to the sale in the suit by the purchaser? (3) Whether in the absence of determination of tenancy or surrender of lease the purchaser can maintain the suit? (2) Whether the non challenging of the violation of Section 15(1) would prevent the tenants from objecting to the sale in the suit by the purchaser? (3) Whether in the absence of determination of tenancy or surrender of lease the purchaser can maintain the suit? (4) Whether the purchaser from the lessor can be granted permanent injunction when his rights are subject to the Tenancy Rights of the tenants? 13. Heard Sri Kambhampati Ramesh Babu, learned counsel for the appellants and heard Sri M. Radhakrishna, learned counsel, representing Sri E.V.V.S. Ravi Kumar, learned counsel for the 1 st respondent. 14. Law is well settled that under Section 100 of CPC the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the First Appellate Court which is the final Court of facts except in such cases where such findings were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law, or its settled position on the basis of the pronouncement made by the Apex Court or based upon inadmissible evidence or without evidence. In a case of Bhagwan Sharma v. Bani Ghosh , [ AIR 1993 SC 398 ] , the Apex Court held as follows: "The High Court was certainly entitled to go into the question as to whether the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court which was the final Court of fact were vitiated in the eye of law on account of non-consideration of admissible evidence of vital nature." In a case of Kondira Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar , [AIR 1999 SC 471] , the Apex Court held as follows: "The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the First Appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence." 15. The undisputed facts are that one Adivi Venkata Lakshmamma was original owner of the plaint schedule property and she executed a Will on 12.06.1975 bequeathing the same in favour of Adivi Saraswathi in a sound and disposing state of mind and later she died. The undisputed facts are that one Adivi Venkata Lakshmamma was original owner of the plaint schedule property and she executed a Will on 12.06.1975 bequeathing the same in favour of Adivi Saraswathi in a sound and disposing state of mind and later she died. After the death of Adivi Venkata Lakshmamma, Adivi Saraswathi became the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property and the same was not in dispute by either side. It is also not in dispute that Adivi Saraswathi died intestate on 12.04.2004 leaving behind her, her husband and children and the same is not in dispute by the defendants. The ownership of the property in the plaint schedule was not in dispute by the defendants. The contention of the appellants is that Adivi Venkata Lakshmamma leased out the plaint schedule property to defendant Nos.1, 8 and 9 and others for 99 years under a registered sale deed, dated24.08.1967 and that the original tenants and sons of some of the original tenants have been in possession and enjoyment of the same. 16. The plaintiff approached the Court for seeking relief of declaration of title in respect of the plaint schedule property, therefore, the burden is heavily casts on the plaintiff to prove his title in the plaint schedule property. The title of the plaintiff is based on a registered sale deed, dated 13.12.2004 said to have been executed by the husband and children of Adivi Saraswathi. The certified copy of the sale deed is filed and got marked as Ex.A.8 through the plaintiff. Original sale deed is deposited in State Bank of India, Vijayarai by availing loan, the same was proved through the Branch Manager of State Bank of India, Vijayarai i.e., P.W.2. The sale deed of the plaintiff and title of the vendor of the plaintiff and the title of the plaintiff is not at all disputed by the defendants. 17. It is trite law that in a suit for declaration of title, the burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a declaration and the weaknesses, if any, of the case set up by the defendant would not be a ground to grant the relief of declaration of title in favour of the plaintiff. The onus to prove title to the schedule property in question was on the plaintiff. The onus to prove title to the schedule property in question was on the plaintiff. It was incumbent on the part of the Court to record a finding on the claim of title to the suit property, the Court is also bound to enquire or investigate that question on first before going into any other question that may arise in a suit. 18. The evidence of P.W.1 goes to show that he purchased the plaint schedule property under a registered sale deed, dated 13.12.2004 and he has been in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property and his possession is recognized by the revenue authorities. The plaintiff relied on Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.5. The evidence of P.W.1 coupled with Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.5 clearly goes to show that the Tahsildar, Pedavegi issued a certificate on 12.03.2007 to show that the plaintiff has been in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property. Certificate, dated 05.02.2007 issued by the Branch Manager, State Bank of India, Vijayarai which is got marked as Ex.A.2, clearly goes to show that the plaintiff availed crop loan and long term loan by mortgaging the plaint schedule property in the same bank. Ex.A.3, certificate issued by the Assistant Engineer (Operation), Vijayarai clearly goes to show that the bore-well was sanctioned to the plaintiff. Ex.A.4 and Ex.A.5 Adangals also proves the possession of the plaintiff in respect of plaint schedule property. 19. In order to discharge his burden, the plaintiff examined the Branch Manager, State Bank of India, Vijayarai as P.W.2. P.W.2 deposed about availing of loan by the plaintiff and also deposit of original documents by the plaintiff in the State Bank of India by the date of obtaining loan. The evidence of P.W.2 clearly goes to show that the documents covered under Ex.A.2 i.e., original title deed of the plaintiff and other relevant documents are in the custody of the State Bank of India and plaintiff also availed loan from the State Bank of India by depositing documents. His evidence also clearly goes to show that one Adivi Saraswathi obtained loan on the same property and plaintiff cleared the said loan. The original documents Ex.A.6-title deed and Ex.A.7-pattadar passbook and original of Ex.A.8 sale deed and No.3 Adangal and 10(1) Adangal are produced through P.W.2 and the same were compared with Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.9. His evidence also clearly goes to show that one Adivi Saraswathi obtained loan on the same property and plaintiff cleared the said loan. The original documents Ex.A.6-title deed and Ex.A.7-pattadar passbook and original of Ex.A.8 sale deed and No.3 Adangal and 10(1) Adangal are produced through P.W.2 and the same were compared with Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.9. The plaintiff has taken a minute care of summoning the Branch Manager of the State Bank of India, Vijayarai and also examined as P.W.2. The survey number and name of the title-holder and extent were specifically recorded in revenue documents. In cross-examination, the evidence of P.W.2 is not at all shattered on the material aspects of the case. The plaintiff also to discharge his burden examined another two witnesses as P.W.3 and P.W.4. The evidence of P.W.3 and P.W.4 i.e., the third parties to the suit proceedings clearly and clinchingly proves the possession of the plaintiff in the plaint schedule property. 20. Learned counsel for the 1 st respondent would contend that original lease deed is not produced and Ex.B.1 document is Photostat copy. He would further contend that when the party produced original document of 30 years old, then only the presumption under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 would arise. Admittedly, defendant Nos.1, 8 and 9 on whose behalf the lease deed was executed apart from other lessees did not enter into the witness box. Ex.B.1 is registration extract of the lease deed, the same is marked through D.W.1 i.e., the 3 rd defendant. In cross examination, D.W.1 admits that the schedule property belongs to Adivi Venkata Lakshmamma and he has not taken the said property for lease and he was not present at the time of execution of lease deed. Another admission made by D.W.1 in his evidence in cross examination is that they purchased property from Mahalakshsmma, but he got registered as lease. Therefore, he is not having any personal knowledge about Ex.B.1. One of the attestors in Ex.B.1 is examined as D.W.5. In cross examination he admits he does not know about the execution of Will by Venkata Lakshmamma in favour of Saraswathi and he also does not know the government issued pattadar passbook and title deed in favour of Saraswathi. Therefore, he is not having any personal knowledge about Ex.B.1. One of the attestors in Ex.B.1 is examined as D.W.5. In cross examination he admits he does not know about the execution of Will by Venkata Lakshmamma in favour of Saraswathi and he also does not know the government issued pattadar passbook and title deed in favour of Saraswathi. Another admission made by D.W.5 that he does not know all the parties to Ex.B.1 are alive or not and he is not having any knowledge about the purchase of property by the plaintiff. 21. Learned counsel for the 1 st respondent would contend that though some of the lessees are the parties to the suit, the defendants did not examine lessees as witnesses and the alleged registration extract of lease deed is not marked through the lessees, who are the parties to the suit and original was not produced by the defendants. Certified copy of the registered lease deed is only produced and it was marked through the son of one of the lessees, though lessee is alive and lessee is a party to the suit proceedings and the said lessee is 1 st defendant in the suit proceedings but the defendants did not choose to examine him. It is not the case of the defendants that they lost the original of Ex.B.1 and Ex.B.1 was marked through D.W.1. The lessees i.e., defendant Nos.1, 8 and 9 are alive till the date of disposal of the suit and they contested the suit proceedings but the defendants failed to examine them as witnesses, Ex.B.1 is not at all produced from proper custody. 22. Learned counsel for the appellants placed a reliance of this Court in Bommineni Venkatamma and others vs. P. Gangamma and others , [2024 SCC OnLine AP 1475] wherein this Court held as follows: It is in this regard one requires to notice Section 57(5) of the Registration Act, 1908, which reads as below:— “57. Registering officers to allow inspection of certain books and indexes, and to give certified copies of entries: (1) …………. (2) ………… (3) ………… (4) ………… (5) All copies given under this section shall be signed and sealed by the registering officer, and shall be admissible for the purpose of proving the contents of the original documents." One also shall notice Section 79 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads as below:— " 79. (2) ………… (3) ………… (4) ………… (5) All copies given under this section shall be signed and sealed by the registering officer, and shall be admissible for the purpose of proving the contents of the original documents." One also shall notice Section 79 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads as below:— " 79. Presumption as to genuineness of certified copies: - The Court shall presume to be genuine every document purporting to be a certificate, certified copy or other document, which is by Law declared to be admissible as evidence of any particular fact, and which purports to be duly certified by any officer of the Central Government or of a State Government, or by any officer in the State of Jammu and Kashmir who is duly authorized thereto by the Central Government: Provided that such document is substantially in the form and purports to be executed in the manner directed by law in that behalf. The Court shall also presume that any officer by whom any such document purports to be signed or certified, held, when he signed it, the official character which he claims in such paper." The facts in the aforesaid case law is the original was not produced, but certified copy of the document was produced. The contention of the plaintiff in the above case was that they lost the original and therefore they had to file only certified copy of document. Law is very clear for availing the provision under Section 90 of the Evidence Act, the original has to be produced or if the original of 30 years document is lost, a foundation has to be laid for admission of secondary evidence under Section 63 of the Act by producing proof of loss of document or destruction of original and copy of which 30 years old document is also supposed to be produced from proper custody. Learned counsel for the appellants brought to the notice of this Court that Ex.B.1 is marked through D.W.1. D.W.1 is no other than the son of 1 st defendant and 1 st defendant is one of the lessees. Learned counsel for the appellants brought to the notice of this Court that Ex.B.1 is marked through D.W.1. D.W.1 is no other than the son of 1 st defendant and 1 st defendant is one of the lessees. It has to be observed that during the pendency of the suit and during the pendency of the 1 st appeal, the 1 st defendant was alive and the other lessees i.e., defendant Nos.8 and 9 are also alive till the disposal of the suit, but the appellants did not make any venture to exhibit the registration extract of lease deed either through 1 st defendant or through 8 th defendant or 9 th defendant. Admittedly, Ex.B.1 marked through D.W.1 who was not party to the suit. As stated supra, as per his admissions, he has not taken the said property for lease and he was not present at the time of execution of lease deed and another admission made by him is that though they purchased the property from Mahalakshmamma, he has got registered the document as a lease deed. It is quite interesting to note that D.W.1 himself admitted in his cross examination that they purchased the property, but only they got registered a document as a lease. It clearly goes to show that D.W.1 is not having any personal knowledge about Ex.B.1, therefore, Ex.B.1 was not properly proved. 23. In a case of Lakhi Baruah and others vs. Padma Kanta Kalita and others , [(1996) 8 Supreme Court Cases 357] , the Apex Court held as follows: "It was indicated that in view of the clear language of Section 90 the production of the particular document would be necessary for applying the statutory presumption under Section 90. If the document produced was a copy admitted under Section 65 as secondary evidence and it was produced from proper custody and was over thirty years old, then the signature authenticating the copy might be presumed to be genuine; but production of the copy was not sufficient to justify the presumption of due execution of the original under Section 90. In this connection, reference may be made to the decisions in Seethayya v. Subramanya Somayajulu5 and Basant Singh v. Brij Raj Sarn Singh , [ AIR 1935 PC 132 ] . In this connection, reference may be made to the decisions in Seethayya v. Subramanya Somayajulu5 and Basant Singh v. Brij Raj Sarn Singh , [ AIR 1935 PC 132 ] . In view of these Privy Council decisions, disproving the applicability of presumption under Section 90 to the copy or the certified copy of an old document, in the subsequent decisions of the High Courts, it has been consistently held by different High Courts that production of a copy or a certified copy does not raise the presumption under Section 90." The Apex Court further held as follows: "The position since the aforesaid Privy Council decisions being followed by later decisions of different High Courts, is that presumption under Section 90 does not apply to a copy or a certified copy even though thirty years old; but if ia foundation is laid for the admission of secondary evidence under Section 63 of the Evidence Act,1872 by proof of loss or destruction of the original and the copy which is thirty years old is produced from proper custody, then only the signature authenticating the copy may under Section 90 be presumed to be genuine." In a case of The Roman Catholic Mission vs. The State of Madras and another , [AIR 1966 Supreme Court 1457] , the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held as follows: "In reaching the conclusion that both warams were included, the District Judge took into consideration certified copies of certain leases from therecord of an old case O. S. No. 124 of 1944 of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Madurai. These documents are Exts. B-4, 5, 6 and A- 68, 69 and 77. Ex. B-4 is a karalnama (agreement) executed for the fasli years 1348 and 1349 by which the lessees undertook to hand over 1/3 share of the produce as melwaram and to retain 2/3 share as kudiwaram from the lands leased out of Keelapappapathu. Ex. B-5 is another lease for cultivating, the whole of Keelapappapathu Nanja (wet) lands. Ex. B-6 is a muchilika in respect of nanja lands in Keelapappapathu by which lessee undertook to pay half produce as melwaram and to retain the other half as kudiwaram. These documents undoubtedly would have thrown light upon the matter but they were not admissible because they were only copies. Ex. B-6 is a muchilika in respect of nanja lands in Keelapappapathu by which lessee undertook to pay half produce as melwaram and to retain the other half as kudiwaram. These documents undoubtedly would have thrown light upon the matter but they were not admissible because they were only copies. The originals were not produced at any time nor was any foundation laid for the establishment of the right to give secondary evidence." In a case of Iqbal Basith and others vs. N. Subbalakshmi and others , [(2021) 2 Supreme Court Cases 718] , the Full Bench of the Apex Court held as follows: This Court in Lakhi Baruah vs. Padma Kanta Kalita, (1996) 8 SCC 357 , with regard to admissibility in evidence of thirty years old documents produced from proper custody observed as follows : (SCC p.362, paras14-15) "14. It will be appropriate to refer to Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872 which is set out hereunder: “90. Presumption as to documents thirty years old .— Where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the signature and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person’s handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested." 15. Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is founded on necessity and convenience because it is extremely difficult and sometimes not possible to lead evidence to prove handwriting, signature or execution of old documents after lapse of thirty years. In order to obviate such difficulties or improbabilities to prove execution of an old document, Section 90 has been incorporated in the Evidence, Act, 1872 which does away with the strict rule of proof of private documents. Presumption of genuineness may be raised if the documents in question is produced from proper custody. It is, however, the discretion of the court to accept the presumption flowing from Section 90. Presumption of genuineness may be raised if the documents in question is produced from proper custody. It is, however, the discretion of the court to accept the presumption flowing from Section 90. There is, however, no manner of doubt that judicial discretion under Section 90 should not be exercised arbitrarily and not being informed by reasons." In the case on hand, no doubt the plaintiff approached the trial Court for seeking relief of declaration of title based on the registered sale deed. The sale deed is not at all in dispute by the defendants. It is a specific case of the appellants that they are the tenants of the vendor of the plaintiff and they are claiming lease hold rights under original of Ex.B.1. Admittedly, original of Ex.B.1 was not produced from proper custody. It is not the case of the appellants that they have lost the original of Ex.B.1, though lessees are alive who are the defendant Nos.1, 8 and 9 in the suit proceedings, the said Ex.B.1 certified copy of the document is not marked through the lessees. Ex.B.1 is marked through D.W.1. As stated supra, D.W.1 is not having personal knowledge as per his own admissions in his evidence itself. Therefore, Section 90 of the Act is not at all applicable because Ex.B.1 was not produced from proper custody. For all the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that Ex.B.1 is not properly proved. 24. As seen from the material on record, the plaintiff’s title is based on Ex.A.1 sale deed, the same is not at all in dispute. The registered sale deed under Ex.A.8 is not at all in dispute so far as the alleged lease in between the defendants and Vakata Lakshmamma, the contention of the plaintiff is that he has no knowledge about the alleged lease deed. Section 15(1) of A.P. (AA) Tenancy Act, 1956 reads as follows: 15. (Cultivating tenant’s right to first purchase the land leased to him (Substituted by Section 10 of Act No.39 of 1974):-- (1) Any landlord intending to sell the land leased to a cultivating tenant shall first give notice to such cultivating tenant, of his intention to sell such land, and requiring him to exercise his option to purchase the land. (Cultivating tenant’s right to first purchase the land leased to him (Substituted by Section 10 of Act No.39 of 1974):-- (1) Any landlord intending to sell the land leased to a cultivating tenant shall first give notice to such cultivating tenant, of his intention to sell such land, and requiring him to exercise his option to purchase the land. The particulars to be specified in the notice and the time within which the option shall be exercised by cultivating tenant shall be such as may be prescribed. It is undisputed fact that vendors have not given any notice to the defendants by intending to sell the property leased out, the vendors have to give notice in first to the tenants informing about their intention to sell such landed property and by mentioning the facts to the lessees by way of notice. Section 15(6) of A.P. (AA) Tenancy Act, 1956 reads as follows: (6) Any sale of the land by the landlord in cultivating of this section shall be voidable to the option of the cultivating tenant. Admittedly, in the case on hand, no notice is given by the lessor to the lessees i.e., cultivating tenants under Ex.B.1, therefore, by virtue of Section 15(6) of A.P. (AA) Tenancy Act, the sale is voidable to the option of cultivating tenants. 25. In a case of Prem Singh and others vs. Birbal and others , [(2006) 5 Supreme Court Cases 353] wherein the Apex Court held as follows: "When a document is valid, no question arises of its cancellation. When a document is void ab initio, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary as the same is non est in the eye of law, as it would be a nullity. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 refers to both void and voidable documents. It provides for a discretionary relief." In the case on hand, admittedly the appellants have not initiated any proceedings U/Sec.16 of A.P. (AA) Tenancy Act to question the sale deed and to question the sale deed, they have asked the relief of declaration that the sale deed is not valid. It is made it clear that if the sale deed is valid document, question of cancellation does not arise. It is made it clear that if the sale deed is valid document, question of cancellation does not arise. If it is voidable document to the option of the cultivating tenant, the tenant has to question the sale deed under Section 16 of the Act. In the case on hand, the appellants have not questioned the said sale deed under Section 16 of the Act. The fact remains that the appellants have not questioned the sale deed within 3 years from the date of knowledge. The appellants also have not initiated any action under Section 16 of the Act. 26. Learned counsel for the appellants placed a reliance of Atukuri Namonarayana vs. Uppuluri Naramma , [ 1975(1) ALT 172 (D.B.)] The 3 rd defendant reiterated in the written statement as follows: The 3 rd defendant and 5 th defendant are the sons of 1 st defendant. There are three sons including the 7 th defendant are the sons of deceased original lessee Kalathoti Ramayya. There are three sons including 10 th defendant to another original lessee – deceased Geddam China Pentayya and there are three sons including 11 th defendant to another original lessee Pitta Nagabhushanam. Accordingly, three original lessees along with other defendants except the 9 th defendant have been in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property till today as cultivating tenants. According to the appellants some of the lessees are no more and original lessor was died. 27. In a case of Rajulagari Ellamma and others vs. Sri Pedda Jeeyangar Mutt, Tirupati , [ 1996 (4) ALT 847 ] , the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad held as follows: "Section 12 of the Andhra Tenancy Act 1956, amended by amendment Act 39/74 which came into force with effect from 11-7-1980, provides that if the cultivating tenant dies, his widow and his legal heirs shall have the option to continue the tenancy for the unexpired portion of the lease on the same terms and conditions under which the deceased cultivating tenant was holding, and such option shall be exercised by serving a notice in writing on the landlord within a period of three months from the date of demise of such cultivating tenant. Except making such allegations during the course of his evidence, there is no material put forward by defendants to show that the sons of R. Krishna Reddy had in fact exercised such option by issuing notice or presenting the application to the landlord. Therefore, the lower court rightly came to the conclusion that the defendants did not comply with the provisions of Section 12 of the Andhra Tenancy Act by exercising their option to continue 40 the tenancy rights by serving the required notice upon the landlord." The composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad further held as follows: With regard to the mode of service of notice as contemplated under Section 12 of Andhra Tenancy Act and failure of the Legal Representatives of the deceased tenant to exercise such option regarding their tenancy rights, the lower Court has referred to the earlier decisions of this Court which are sought to be relied upon by the respondent in the present appeal also. In the decision reported in "Kallam Jampa Reddy v. Yarava Krishna Reddy 1979 (2) ALT 258 =1979 (2) An.W.R. 241, similar point was raised before the Division Bench of this Court under The Andhra Tenancy Act prior to its amendment effected by amendment Act 39/74 which came into force with effect from 1-7-1980. It is observed by the Division Bench of this Court in the said decision that the option as contemplated in Section 12 of Andhra Tenancy Act has to be exercised by serving the notice in writing and that in view of such specific provision of Section 12, it is not relevant to consider whether the defendant in that suit had made any real request for exercising such option. In the case on hand, the notice as contemplated under Section 12 of the A.P. (AA) Tenancy Act has not been issued by the legal representatives of the lessees by serving notice in writing and they failed to serve the notice to lessor. Therefore, the appellants failed to exercise the option by serving the required notice to the landlord as contemplated under Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, the appellants cannot be considered as cultivating tenants after expiry of three months subsequent to the death of some of the lessees. 28. Ex.A.8 goes to show that possession was delivered to the plaintiff on the date of sale deed itself. Therefore, the appellants cannot be considered as cultivating tenants after expiry of three months subsequent to the death of some of the lessees. 28. Ex.A.8 goes to show that possession was delivered to the plaintiff on the date of sale deed itself. The documentary evidence goes to show that the plaintiff has been in possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property by the date of filing of the suit. The defendants relied on Ex.B.5 and Ex.B.7. Those Ex.B.5 and Ex.B.7 proceedings are issued during the pendency of the suit. Therefore, no reliance has to be given to Ex.B.5 and Ex.B.7 and no importance will be given to Ex.B.5 and Ex.B.7 documents. Though the appellants relied on Ex.B.3 and Ex.B.4 electricity demand notices and receipts alleged to have been issued, those documents does not reveal that those are related to the suit schedule property. The plaintiff also proved by way of documentary evidence to show that he is in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property and he also proved that he came into possession of the plaint schedule property by virtue of a registered sale deed executed by the legal heirs of Saraswathi. As stated supra, the said sale deed is not yet cancelled within three years from the date of knowledge by the appellants. Therefore, I do not find any illegality in the decree and judgment passed by the learned First Appellate Judge and the decree and judgment of the learned First Appellant Judge is perfectly sustainable under law and it requires no interference. Therefore, the second appeal is liable to be dismissed. 29. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed confirming the Judgment and decree, dated 07.12.2011 in A.S.No.278 of 2010, on the file of the Principal District Judge, West Godavari at Eluru. Each party do bear their own costs in the second appeal. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall stand closed.