J UDGMENT : (Kaushik Goswami, J) Heard Mr. S. Dutta, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. S. Choudhury and Mr. R. Medhi, learned Counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. T.J. Mahanta, learned Senior Advocate and Standing Counsel, Gauhati High Court appearing for the respondent nos. 2, 3, 4 & 5, and Ms. P. Bhattacharya, learned Additional Advocate General, Mizoram, appearing for the respondent No.1. 2. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner is assailing inter-alia the notification dated 06.09.2013, whereby the Joint Registrar (Vigilance) Gauhati High Court imposed the punishment of stoppage of 2(two) increments with cumulative effect on the petitioner. 3. The brief facts of the case are as follows:- The petitioner is serving in the Mizoram Judicial Service, Grade-II and is presently holding the post of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aizawl. In the year 2012, when the petitioner was holding the post of Senior Civil Judge cum Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lunglei, Mizoram, she was placed under suspension vide notification dated 10.08.2012. Thereafter an enquiry was held against the petitioner wherein she was exonerated from all the charges, however, the Gauhati High Court, i.e. the Disciplinary Authority, having disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, by order dated 06.09.2013, awarded the said punishment. Aggrieved by the same, the present petition has been filed. 4. Mr. S. Dutta, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Enquiry Officer having exonerated the petitioner of all the charges, the imposition of the punishment vide the impugned order warrants interference from this Court. He further submits that the petitioner, while holding the post of Senior Civil Judge, was also taking care of the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate and Judicial Officer-I in the District Court, and therefore, being overloaded with work, there has been delay in disposing of the cases reserved for orders and, therefore, the charge of delay in disposing of cases by the petitioner is not intentional and therefore the said charge is not established. He further submits that as regards the charge of passing judgment in Money Suit No. 40/2006 on the basis of the draft judgment furnished by the counsel has not been proved and the petitioner has also been exonerated from the said charge by the Enquiry Officer, and therefore, the finding of the Disciplinary Authority holding the petitioner guilty of the said charge is totally perverse. He further submits that the findings of the Disciplinary Authority that the petitioner’s admission that she had taken the copy of the plaint in a pen drive from the plaintiff’s counsel cannot be the basis for awarding the impugned penalty in as much as the same is not the alleged charge in the memorandum of Charge-sheet. 5. Per contra, Mr. T.J. Mahanta, learned Senior Advocate and Standing Counsel, Gauhati High Court, for the respondents submits that there being sufficient material available before the Disciplinary Authority which clearly establishes that the petitioner had not maintained integrity and conducted herself contrary to the dignity of the office she holds, the impugned penalty order warrants no interference from this Court. 6. We have given our prudent consideration to the argument made by the learned counsel appearing for the contesting parties, perused the material available on record and have also considered the case laws cited at the bar. 7. The issue arising for determination in this writ petition is the legality and validity of the penalty order imposed by the Disciplinary Authority against the petitioner. 8. It is well settled that the extent of judicial review with regard to findings of Disciplinary Authority is limited and it is not the sufficiency of evidence or the decision itself but review of the decision making process only. The Constitutional Court may interfere when the Disciplinary Authority has acted in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules providing the procedure of such enquiry, or where the conclusion or finding reached by the Disciplinary Authority is either based on no evidence or the same is against the principles of Wednesbury reasonableness. However, if the findings of the Disciplinary Authority are based on evidence, the Court shall not reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India , reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 . Paragraph 12 & 13 of the aforesaid judgment is extracted hereunder for ready reference:- “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Union of India , reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 . Paragraph 12 & 13 of the aforesaid judgment is extracted hereunder for ready reference:- “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion upon consideration evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” 9. Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles, let us now turn to the facts of the instant case. The charges levelled against the petitioner are extracted hereunder:- “ARTICLE NO. 1 That you, while working as Sr. Civil Judge, Aizawl, have passed judgment in Money Suit No. 40/2006 (Rinpuli Vs. State of Mizoram) and there are reasonable materials to show that you have passed the judgment on the basis of the draft judgment furnished by lawyer. The above acts, on your part, amounted to abuse of judicial power and improper conduct. You, thus, acted in a manner, unbecoming of a judicial officer, violating the provisions of Rule 30(A) of the Mizoram Judicial Service Rules , 2006 read with appendix 'A' of the said Rules and Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. You, are therefore, charged accordingly. ARTICLE NO. 2 That you, while working as Sr. Civil Judge, Aizawl, Mizoram had heard Title Suit 03/1987 (Shri Lalthianghlima Vs State of Mizoram and Ors.) on 27-11- 2009 and the judgment was reserved which was shown to have been delivered on 24-02-2011, i.e. after 1(one) years 2(two) months and 27 (twenty seven) days. The final order does not reflect that the parties were present. The cause list dated 24-02-2011 also does not reflect that the suit is posted for judgment on 24-02-2011. Such inordinate delay in passing the judgment and that too behind the back of the parties exhibits that the case was not disposed speedily, effectively and fairly as required under the law. The cause list dated 24-02-2011 also does not reflect that the suit is posted for judgment on 24-02-2011. Such inordinate delay in passing the judgment and that too behind the back of the parties exhibits that the case was not disposed speedily, effectively and fairly as required under the law. The above acts, on your part, amounted to abuse of judicial power and improper conduct, You, thus, acted in a manner, unbecoming of a judicial officer, violating the provisions of Rule 30(A) of the Mizoram Judicial Service Rules , 2006 read with appendix ‘A’ of the said Rules and Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. You are therefore, charged accordingly. ARTICLE NO. 3 That you, while working as Sr. Civil Judge, Aizawl, Mizoram had heard Title Suit No. 2(A)/1996 (Shri Thanthuana Vs. State of Mizoram and Ors.) on 08-03- 2010, and the judgment was reserved which was shown to have been delivered on 24-02-2011 i.e. after 11(eleven) months and 16 (Sixteen) days. The cause list dated 24 - 02-2011 also does not reflect that the said suit was posted on 24-02-2011 for judgment. Such inordinate delay in passing judgment and that too behind the back of the parties and without exhibiting fairness from the court of law, as required, gives reasonable ground to believe that the case was not disposed speedily, effectively and fairly as required under the law. The above acts, on your part, amounted to abuse of judicial power and improper conduct. You, thus, acted in a manner unbecoming of a judicial officer, violating the provisions of Rule 30(A) of the Mizoram Judicial Service Rules , 2006 read with appendix 'A' of the said Rules and Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1964. You, are therefore, charged accordingly. ARTICLE NO.4 That you, while working as Sr. Civil Judge, Aizawl, Mizoram had heard Title Suit No. 24/1988 (Shri Tinchawia Vs. State of Mizoram and Ors.) on 05-10- 2010 and the Judgment was reserved which was shown to have been pronounced in the open court on 25-02-2011, i.e. after more than 4 months 20 days from the date of argument. The cause list dated 25-02-2011 also does not reflect that the suit is posted for judgment on 25.02.2011. State of Mizoram and Ors.) on 05-10- 2010 and the Judgment was reserved which was shown to have been pronounced in the open court on 25-02-2011, i.e. after more than 4 months 20 days from the date of argument. The cause list dated 25-02-2011 also does not reflect that the suit is posted for judgment on 25.02.2011. Such delay in passing the judgment and that too behind the back of the parties suggests that case was not disposed speedily, effectively and fairly as required under the law. The above acts, on your part, amounted to abuse of judicial power and improper conduct. You, thus, acted in a manner, unbecoming of a judicial officer, violating the provisions of Rule 30(A) of the Mizoram Judicial Service Rules , 2006 read with appendix 'A' of the said Rules and Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. You, are therefore, charged accordingly.” 10. Thereafter, an enquiry was held by the Disciplinary Authority by appointing an Enquiry Officer, wherein the Enquiry Officer, after holding enquiry, submitted his report on 30.04.2013 exonerating the petitioner from all the charges. However, the Disciplinary Authority upon careful consideration of the Enquiry Report, decided not to accept the same and accordingly, issued show-cause notice to the petitioner with a note of disagreement on the Enquiry Report along with a photocopy of the Enquiry Report. Against the aforesaid show-cause notice, the petitioner filed representation on 10.06.2013. The Disciplinary Authority, after considering the aforesaid representation and all the other materials, awarded the punishment of stoppage of 2(two) increments with cumulative effect on the petitioner. 11. It appears that essentially the charges are, firstly that the petitioner had passed judgment in Money Suit No. 40/2006 on the basis of the draft judgment furnished by the counsel and secondly, in Title Suit No. 3/1987, Title Suit No. 2(A)/1996 and Title Suit No. 24/1998, the judgment was delivered after inordinate delay from the date of reserving the same and, that too, in the absence of the parties on dates when the cases were not listed in the cause list for pronouncement of judgment. 12. 12. As regards the first charge of accepting the draft judgment from the plaintiff’s counsel in the case in question, it appears from the statement of the petitioner before the Enquiry Officer that she has admitted that in Money Suit No. 40/2006, she had requested the plaintiff’s counsel to provide the soft copy of the plaint and that the counsel accordingly provided the same in her pen drive. The relevant portion of the statement of the petitioner before the Enquiry Officer is extracted hereunder for ready reference:- "The charge that I had passed the judgment in Money Suit no.40/2006 (Rinpuii Vs. State of Mizoram) on the basis of the draft judgment furnished by lawyer is completely false. I had drafted the judgment and order in the Money Suit no.40/2006. Instead of typing the entire plaint, I had requested the plaintiff's counsel to provide the soft copy of the plaint and he provided the same to me in my pendrive. As the defendants did not submit the written statement I could not take the same from the Government Advocate. As I do not have any Personal Assistant (PA) it was not possible for me to dictate the judgment in the office. Further, at the relevant time I was holding different posts and handling many cases and also dealing with Police and excise papers, hence I could not write the judgment in my office. Convenience sake I had copied the plaint and pasted in the judgment and order prepared by me. After it was ready, I gave the soft copy to the peshkar and the same was printed out in the office. I did not violate any of the provisions of Rule 30(A) of Mizoram Judicial Service Rules , 2009 read with Appendix 'A' and Rule 3 of the Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rule, 1964.” 13. It is thus apparent that the petitioner has admitted the factum of requesting for the soft copy of the plaint from the plaintiff’s counsel which was also provided and she had copied the plaint and pasted the same in the judgment and order prepared by her. It is further evident from the aforesaid statement that after the argument was closed the petitioner accepted the soft copy of the plaint in her pen drive in the absence of the other side. It is further evident from the aforesaid statement that after the argument was closed the petitioner accepted the soft copy of the plaint in her pen drive in the absence of the other side. It further appears that the concerned counsel of the plaintiff, who was brought in as a defence witness, also admitted in his statement that he had provided the soft copy of the plaint as per the request of the petitioner. It appears that though the Enquiry Officer had exonerated the petitioner of the aforesaid charge, however, the Disciplinary Authority was of the opinion that such ex-parte communication by the petitioner amounts to gross improper conduct and unbecoming of a Judicial Officer and accordingly, disagreed with the view of the Enquiry Officer. 14. Apt at this juncture to refer to the grounds of disagreement of the Disciplinary Authority which is extracted hereunder for ready reference:- “Grounds for disagreement in respect of Article No. 1 It is provided in Rule 3(iv) of Appendix 'A', (Rule 30(A) to the Mizoram Judicial Service Rules 2006, that – ‘A Judge shall not initiate, permit or consider ex-parte communications made to the Judge concerning a pending or impending proceedings, without the presence of the parties’. Rule 3 of Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 provides that – ‘(1) Every Government servant shall at all times, (i) maintain absolute integrity; (ii) maintain devotion to duty; and (iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government servant.’ Here in this case, it is an admitted position that Advocate for the plaintiff, Shri Sam Joseph had furnished soft copy and the hard copy of the plaint to the Charged Officer in the Money Suit No. 40/2006, and the Charged Officer had explained that for the sake of convenience she had copied the plaint in pen drive and pasted it in the judgment and order prepared by her. Though Shri Sam Joseph, Advocate for the Plaintiff, denied furnishing draft copy of the judgment to the Charged Officer in his evidence and the Charged Officer also denied accepting any draft judgment and consequently the Enquiry Officer held that Article No. 1 of the charge not proved, yet, what eschewed from consideration of the Enquiry Officer is that accepting hard copy and soft copy in the plaint in pen drive, in absence of the other party to the proceeding, is also not permissible under the Rules. In the case in hand, there is nothing on record to show that the other party to the said proceeding was present during such communication made by the lawyer for the Plaintiff. Permitting such ex-parte communication by the Charged Officer amounts to gross improper conduct and unbecoming of a judicial officer, which ex-facie shows contravention of the aforesaid Rules. Having assessed the materials on record objectively and dispassionately, this Committee is unable to record concurrence with the finding of the Enquiry Officer in Article No.1.” 15. As regards the second charge pertaining to delay in delivering judgments in the Title Suits in question, the petitioner explained the reasons in her statement before the Enquiry Officer which is extracted hereunder:- “Regarding the charges that I heard the Title Suit No.3/1987 (Shri Lalthianghlima Vs. State of Mizoram and ors) on 27.11.2009 and the judgment was reserved which was shown to have been delivered on 24.2.2011, i.e. after 1(one) year 2(two) months and 27 days. Likewise I heard the Title suit No. 2(A)/1996 (Shri Thanthuama Vs. State of Mizoram and ors) on 8.3.2010 and the judgment was reserved which was show to have been delivered on 24.2.2011, i.e. 11(eleven) months and 16 (sixteen) days. And that I heard the Title suit No.24/1998 (Shri Tinchawia Vs. State of Mizoram and ors) on 5.10.2010 and the judgment was reserved which was shown to have been pronounced in the open court on 25.2.11, i.e. after more than 4 months and 20 days, I would like to state that in the three cases after hearing the arguments from the counsel for the plaintiff as well as Government Advocate (Government Advocates includes Additional Government Advocate/Assistant Government Advocates), due to heavy load of work in the office it was not possible for me to dictate my judgment myself in my laptop/computer at home. When the judgments and orders were ready in the above mentioned case, as per the usual practice, I had informed the counsels for the parties. I pronounced the judgment in all the three cases in the presence of the counsel for the plaintiffs as well as the Government Advocate or the AGA. I have not pronounced the judgment and orders behind the back of the parties. I pronounced the judgment in all the three cases in the presence of the counsel for the plaintiffs as well as the Government Advocate or the AGA. I have not pronounced the judgment and orders behind the back of the parties. None of the parties ever complained to any one that I had delivered the judgment behind the back of the parties and none of witnesses produced by the Reporting Officer prove that I had delivered the judgment behind the back of the parties. In fact I will produce the counsels who represented the parties in the above mentioned cases and they can prove that I had acted fairly in delivering the said judgments in the presence of the counsels for both sides. As regard not mentioned in the cause list, I would like to state that the cause lists are prepared by the Peshkars. As the case record was taken by me for preparing judgment and Order, it was not possible for them to know on the day they prepared the cause list. But I had informed the counsels that the judgment was ready and all the judgments were pronounced/delivered in the open court in the presence of the counsels representing the parties.” 16. Though the Enquiry Officer exonerated the petitioner from the aforesaid charge of delay in pronouncement of judgment after reserving the same, the Disciplinary Authority, after taking note of Order XX Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code and the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Anil Rai Vs State of Bihar, reported in (2001) 7 SCC 318 , was unable to accept the version of the petitioner that due to heavy workload she could not pronounce judgments in time in the cases in question. 17. 17. Apt at this juncture to refer to the grounds of disagreement of the Disciplinary Authority in respect of the second charge which is extracted hereunder for ready reference:- “Grounds of disagreement in respect of Article Nos, 2, 3 and 4 Order XX Rule-1 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that- ‘The court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment in an open court, either at once, or as soon as may be practicable and when the judgment is to be pronounced on some future day, the court shall fix a date for that purpose, of which due notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders.’ Proviso to the Rule 1 provides that if judgment is not pronounced at once, it shall be pronounced within 30 days from the date of hearing argument and if it is not practicable so to do on the ground of exceptional and extraordinary circumstances of the case, it shall be pronounced within 60 days of hearing argument after giving due notice to the parties. Pronouncement of judgment within the stipulated period is emphasized in catena of decisions by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In Anil Rai Vs. State of Bihar (2001) 7 SCC 318 , in paragraph 9 of the judgment it has been held that- ‘The pronouncement of the judgment is a part of the justice dispensation system; it has to be without delay. In a country like ours where people consider the Judges only second to God, effort to be made to strengthen that belief of the common people. Delay in disposal of the cases facilitates the people to raise eyebrows, sometimes genuinely which, if not checked, may shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system. A time has come when the judiciary itself has to assert for preserving its stature, respect and regards for the attainment of the rule of law. For the fault of a few, the glorious and glittering name of the judiciary cannot be permitted to be made ugly. A time has come when the judiciary itself has to assert for preserving its stature, respect and regards for the attainment of the rule of law. For the fault of a few, the glorious and glittering name of the judiciary cannot be permitted to be made ugly. It is the policy and purpose of the law, to have speedy justice for which efforts are required to be made to come up to the expectation of the society of ensuring speedy, untainted and unpolluted justice.’ It is also held that- ‘Unexplained long interval between conclusion of arguments and delivery of judgment shakes the confidence of the people in the judicial system and affects the rights of the parties under Article 21 of the constitution of India.’ Keeping the above legal position as well as the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in mind, if the finding of the Enquiry Officer in Article No. 2, 3 and 4 is analyzed, then one would find that the reasons assigned for exonerating the Charged Officer are unacceptable. Without verifying the statement of pendency in the court of the Charged Officer and the workload of the additional posts held by the Charged Officer at the relevant point of time, without specifying the actual number of cases pending in her court, simply believing the version of the Charged Officer and the witnesses that due to heavy workload, she could not pronounce judgments in the Title Suit No. 2(A). 1996 for 11 months and 16 days, and in the Title Suit No. 3/1987 for 01 year 02 months and 27 days and in the Title Suit No. 24/1998 for 04 months 20 days, cannot be accepted. The inputs received from the Registry do not show that the pendency position was very high so as to brand it as heavy work load. Thus, there is no foundation of the facts to support the view taken by the Enquiry Officer. Rather lack of diligence on the part of the Charged Officer is apparent on the face of the record. Besides, there is dearth of materials to show that due notice was ever given to the parties about the dates on which the judgment of the aforesaid cases are to be pronounced, as mandated by Rule 1 of Order XX of the Code of Civil Procedure. This fact is apparent from the Cause List and the order sheet. Besides, there is dearth of materials to show that due notice was ever given to the parties about the dates on which the judgment of the aforesaid cases are to be pronounced, as mandated by Rule 1 of Order XX of the Code of Civil Procedure. This fact is apparent from the Cause List and the order sheet. This being the position, the version of the defense witnesses, upon whom the Enquiry Officer relied on, cannot be accepted and the finding so recorded by the Enquiry Officer is without any factual basis. Rule 3(vii) of the Appendix-A (Rule 30(A) of the Mizoram Judicial Service Rules 2006, provides that a judge shall dispose of all judicial matters speedily, effectively and fairly. The Charged Officer failed to pronounce judgments in the aforementioned three cases within the period prescribed in Rule-1 of Order XX of the Civil Procedure Code, and she pronounced the judgments several months later, in contravention of the mandate of the Rule 1 of Order XX of the Civil Procedure Code. This reflects violation of the aforesaid Rules by the Charged Officer, which amounts to gross negligence and abuse of judicial power and also improper conduct on the part of the Charged Officer. The committee is therefore unable to agree with the finding of the Enquiry Officer and accordingly this Disagreement Note is recorded.” 18. Apt to refer to Rule 30 of the Mizoram Judicial Service Rules , 2006, (hereinafter referred to as “Rules, 2006”) which is extracted hereunder for ready reference:- “30. Conduct: A Judicial Officer appointed under these rules shall be required to maintain the absolute integrity and conduct himself in conformity with the dignity of the office he holds. He should follow the Code of Conduct as provided in Appendix-A to these rules. Conduct: A Judicial Officer appointed under these rules shall be required to maintain the absolute integrity and conduct himself in conformity with the dignity of the office he holds. He should follow the Code of Conduct as provided in Appendix-A to these rules. (A) Disqualification: (1) A Judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the Judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including, but not limited to instances where; (a) The Judge has personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding: (b) The Judge served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law, served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge has been a material witness concerning it; (c) The Judge knows that he or she, individually or a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, parent or child wherever residing, or any other member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding or has any other interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; (d) The judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person; (i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director or trustee of a party; (ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (iii) is known by the judge to have interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; (iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. (2) The rules governing and regulating the conduct of State Civil Service Officers shall, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the rules in this chapter, shall apply to the members of the service. (B) Disciplinary Authority: (1) The members of the service shall be under the disciplinary control of the High Court and the disciplinary proceeding if and when necessity arise may be drawn up against the member of the Service in accordance with the provisions of the rules followed by the Gauhati High Court. (B) Disciplinary Authority: (1) The members of the service shall be under the disciplinary control of the High Court and the disciplinary proceeding if and when necessity arise may be drawn up against the member of the Service in accordance with the provisions of the rules followed by the Gauhati High Court. Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule, penalty of dismissal or removal from Service and reduction in rank in respect of any member of the Service shall be imposed by the Governor only on the recommendation of the High Court. (2) No disciplinary proceeding shall be initiated against any member of the service except by the High Court.” 19. A perusal of the aforesaid Rules, 2006 indicates that a Judicial Officer is required to maintain absolute integrity and conduct in conformity with dignity of the office he/she holds. It is the further mandate of law that a Judicial Officer should follow the code of conduct as provided in Appendix-A to this Rules. Relevant portion of the Appendix-A is extracted hereunder for ready reference:- “APPENDIX-A (see rule 30) (1). Should uphold the Integrity and Independence of Judiciary – An independent and honourable judiciary is indispensable to administer justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing and should personally observe high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. A Judge shall always be aware that the judicial system is for the benefit of the litigant and the public, and not the judiciary. The provisions of this chapter should be construed and applied to further these objectives. (2). Should avoid Impropriety- (i) Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct by Judges. A Judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. A Judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge must therefore accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. (ii) A judge shall respect and observe the law. At all times, the conduct and manner of a judge should promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Without regard to a person's race, gender or other protected personal characteristics, a judge should treat every person fairly, with courtesy and respect. (ii) A judge shall respect and observe the law. At all times, the conduct and manner of a judge should promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Without regard to a person's race, gender or other protected personal characteristics, a judge should treat every person fairly, with courtesy and respect. (iii) A Judge shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence his judicial conduct or judgement. A judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance his private interests or those of others. A Judge shall not convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. A judge shall not appear as a character witness in a Court proceeding unless subpoenaed. (iv) A judge shall not allow activity as a member of an organization to cast doubt on the judge's ability to perform the function of the office in a manner consistent with the code of judicial conduct and the laws of the State. A judge shall not hold membership of an organization protected personal characteristics. Nothing in this paragraph should be interpreted to diminish a judge's right to free exercise of religion. (3) Performance of duties impartially and diligently- (i) A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. A Judge should be unswayed by partisan interest, public clamour, or fear of criticism. (ii) A judge may require lawyers, court personnel, and litigants to be appropriately attired for Court and should maintain reasonable rules of conduct, order and decorum in the Courtroom. (iii) A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of staff, Court officials, and others subject to the judge's direction and control. (iv) A judge shall not initiate, permit or consider ex-parte communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding. (v) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which disqualification is required. (vi) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and shall not permit staff, Court officials and others subject to the judge's direction and control to do so. (vi) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and shall not permit staff, Court officials and others subject to the judge's direction and control to do so. (vii) A judge shall dispose of all Judicial Matters speedily, effectively and fairly. (viii) A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in any Court, make any public comment that might reasonably be expected to effects its outcome or impair its fairness or make any non-public comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing. The Judge shall require similar abstention on the part of Court personnel subject to the judge's direction and control. This clause does not prohibit judges from making public statements in the course of their official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of the Court. This clause does not apply to proceedings in which the judge is a litigant in a personal capacity. (ix) A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording or taking photographs in or out of the courtroom during session of court or recess between sessions except as authorized by the High Court. (x) (a) A judge may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition, and prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, but the judge should bear in mind that undue interference, impatience, or participation in the examination of witness, or severe attitude on the judge's part toward witness, especially those who are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of a trial may tend to prevent the proper presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of truth in respect thereto. (b) Conversation between the judge and counsel in Court is often necessary, but the judge should be studious to avoid controversies that apt to obscure the merits of the dispute between litigants and lead to unjust disposition. In addressing counsel, litigants or witness, the judge should avoid a controversial manner or tone. (c) A judge shall avoid interruptions of counsel in their arguments except to clarify their positions, and should not be tempted to the unnecessary display of learning or premature judgment. In addressing counsel, litigants or witness, the judge should avoid a controversial manner or tone. (c) A judge shall avoid interruptions of counsel in their arguments except to clarify their positions, and should not be tempted to the unnecessary display of learning or premature judgment. (xi) A judge shall adopt the usual and accepted methods of doing justice; avoid the imposition of humiliating acts or discipline, not authorized by law in sentencing and endeavour to conform to a reasonable standard of punishment and not seek popularity or publicity either by exceptional severity or undue leniency. (xii) A judge shall be punctual in attending court and do judicial work during Court hours. He shall ensure punctuality of the staff and Court officials. (xiii) A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and facilitate the performance of the administrative responsibilities of other judges and Court officials. (xiv) A judge should take or initiate appropriate measures as admissible under law against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may become aware. (xv) A judge should not cause unnecessary expense by making appointments. All appointments shall be based upon merit. (xvi) A judge should not approve compensation beyond the fair value of services rendered. (4) Extra Judicial and quasi-judicial activities- ……………….” 20. It is evident from the above extracted Appendix-A to the Rules, 2006 that it is imperative for a Judicial Officer to uphold the integrity and independence of judiciary to avoid impropriety and to perform the duties impartially and diligently. 21. In the present case, it appears that the petitioner has accepted that she had entered into ex-parte communication with the plaintiff’s counsel in the case in question. The aforesaid ex-parte communication in relation to a pending case is totally improper and undignified of a Judicial Officer and such conduct totally shakes the public confidence in the integrity and independence of the judiciary. Therefore, such conduct of the petitioner is irresponsible, improper and bias. Further, under Clause-3 (iv) of Appendix-A, it is mandatory for the petitioner as a Judicial Officer not to initiate, permit or consider ex-parte communications in the absence of the opposite party in a pending proceeding. Therefore, such conduct of the petitioner is irresponsible, improper and bias. Further, under Clause-3 (iv) of Appendix-A, it is mandatory for the petitioner as a Judicial Officer not to initiate, permit or consider ex-parte communications in the absence of the opposite party in a pending proceeding. Since the Disciplinary Authority, having taken note of the aforesaid evidence and the provision of law has held that the first charge is made out against the petitioner, we do not find any infirmity with the said findings of the Disciplinary Authority. 22. As regards the second charge of inordinate delay in pronouncing judgment after reserving the same, that too in the Court when the same is not notified in the Cause List for pronouncement of judgment, the petitioner in her defence, in a very casual manner, has stated that due to heavy workload she could not pronounce the judgments in the cases in question within a reasonable time. Delay in delivering judgment after reserving the same is a serious issue in the context of the judicial scenario today. Such casual explanation of the petitioner on the face of it does not inspire confidence in the integrity, independence and impartiality of the judiciary. On the contrary, inordinate delays in delivering judgments after reserving the same is not a desirable and proper conduct of a Judicial Officer and it tarnishes the faith and confidence of the judiciary in the eye of the public. It is observed that the Disciplinary Authority has already taken note of the evidence and relevant provision of law in this regard. Accordingly, we do not find any infirmity with the said findings of the Disciplinary Authority. 23. It further appears that the Disciplinary Authority has observed the principles of natural justice before issuing the impugned penalty order. 24. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 06.09.2013 whereby penalty of stoppage of 2(two) increments with cumulative effect was imposed on the petitioner is valid. As regards the penalty imposed is concerned, the same does not appear to us to be disproportionate to the gravamen of the charges. Hence, the writ petition fails. 25. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. No order as to costs.