JUDGMENT : ANANDA SEN, J. Heard the parties. 2. By filing this writ application, the petitioner who is a Head Constable in CISF prays to quash the order dated 22.04.2014 by which he was punished and also the appellate order dated 14.06.2014 by which the appeal was dismissed. 3. Counsel for the petitioner submits that punishment inflicted upon the petitioner i.e. the punishment of dismissal is harsh, considering the fact that the petitioner has served the force for long 32 years. He submits that only on a private complaint departmental proceeding was initiated by the respondents. He denies the allegations of bigamy which has been levelled against him. He submits that there is no lady called Rina Devi, who is alleged to be the second wife of this petitioner. Thus, the entire proceeding is based on misconception of facts. 4. Counsel appearing on behalf of Union of India submits that the departmental proceeding was initiated on the basis of a complaint. The complaint was that the petitioner had married second time without taking any permission from the authorities during the life time of the first wife when the petitioner has not legally divorced his first wife. He submits that this act is a misconduct, thus the petitioner was proceeded against. She further submits that the facts that the petitioner had married for the second time would be evident from the conduct of the petitioner as in 2002 he has changed the nomination in service records and included the name of the second wife as a nominee. She further submits that there is no procedural irregularity or illegality in the process, thus, this Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot interfere in the departmental proceedings and the punishment inflicted upon the petitioner. As per the counsel, the quantum of punishment is also not disproportionate. 5. After hearing the arguments of the parties, I find that petitioner has been dismissed from service. He was serving as Head Constable in CISF from 1982. A Charge of bigamy was levelled against this petitioner and departmental proceeding was initiated and inquiry report was submitted. In the enquiry, the first wife of the petitioner appeared as a witness and stood by the complaint. There were other witnesses who were also examined. Documentary evidences were also furnished. The Enquiry Officer after conclusion of the enquiry held that charges levelled against the petitioner stands proved. In the enquiry, the first wife of the petitioner appeared as a witness and stood by the complaint. There were other witnesses who were also examined. Documentary evidences were also furnished. The Enquiry Officer after conclusion of the enquiry held that charges levelled against the petitioner stands proved. One of the materials to prove the charge is the change of nomination in service record made by the petitioner as the second wife Rina Devi was made the nominee, changing the first nominee. The fact finding authority during the enquiry has found the charge against the petitioner to be proved. Once the charge is proved, the disciplinary authority has to take a decision on the quantum of punishment. After following the procedure laid down by the law i.e issuing notice, the petitioner was inflicted with the punishment of dismissal from service. 6. It is well settled that in a judicial review under Article 226 of Constitution, the Court cannot sit in appeal. The Court should not be concerned with the decision, but the decision making process. The court cannot substitute its own view after reappraising the entire evidence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa, reported in ( 2024) 1 SCC 632 has dealt with the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution while dealing with a departmental proceeding. At paragraph 63 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:- “ 63. It may be clarified at the outset that to satisfy itself that no injustice has been meted out to the appellant, the High Court was required to examine the decision-making process and not just the final outcome. In other words, in exercise of powers of judicial review, the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the factual findings recorded in the departmental proceedings as long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings that cannot be faulted on account of procedural illegalities or irregularities that may have vitiated the process by which the decision was arrived at.” 7. Since the jurisdiction which I am exercising is a revisional jurisdiction, the scope is limited. From the records, I find that there is no procedural lapses in this case. The opportunity was given to the petitioner and proper departmental enquiry was held. Since the jurisdiction which I am exercising is a revisional jurisdiction, the scope is limited. From the records, I find that there is no procedural lapses in this case. The opportunity was given to the petitioner and proper departmental enquiry was held. The respondents thereafter took a decision to impose major penalty. 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Meghalaya v. Mecken Singh N. Marak, reported in (2008) 7 SCC 580 , has also held that if the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the proved misconduct this Court by exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can interfere with the quantum of punishment but the court has to give reasons. The relevant paragraph is reproduced as under:- “ 14. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of the High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice.” 9. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that petitioner has worked from 1982 and worked for 32 years. The misconduct is in respect of bigamy. There is no such allegation that the petitioner has not performed his duty properly or was negligent in the same. Thus, I am of the opinion that dismissal from service of the petitioner of the charge of bigamy is too harsh punishment. 10. Rule 34 of the CISF Rules 2001 provides for nature of penalties. There are two types of penalties prescribed, major penalty and minor penalties. Dismissal from service is a major penalty. Thus, I am of the opinion that dismissal from service of the petitioner of the charge of bigamy is too harsh punishment. 10. Rule 34 of the CISF Rules 2001 provides for nature of penalties. There are two types of penalties prescribed, major penalty and minor penalties. Dismissal from service is a major penalty. There is another major penalty which is prescribed in the rules which is “compulsorily retirement”. In case of dismissal the petitioner who has served the department for 32 years will not get any monthly benefits, but in case of compulsory retirement he will get same. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S.R. Tewari v. Union of India, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 602 held that the High Court can substitute the punishment to shorten the litigation. The relevant paragraph has been reproduced as under:- “ 25. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [ (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44 : AIR 1996 SC 484 ] , this Court after examining its various earlier decisions observed that in exercise of the power of judicial review, the court cannot “normally” substitute its own conclusion or penalty. However, if the penalty imposed by an authority “shocks the conscience” of the court, it would appropriately mould the relief either directing the authority to reconsider the penalty imposed and in exceptional and rare cases, in order to shorten the litigation, itself impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. While examining the issue of proportionality, the court can also consider the circumstances under which the misconduct was committed. In a given case, the prevailing circumstances might have forced the accused to act in a certain manner though he had not intended to do so. The court may further examine the effect, if the order is set aside or substituted by some other penalty. However, it is only in very rare cases that the court might, to shorten the litigation, think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the competent authority.” 11. Thus, considering the punishment of dismissal to be shockingly disproportionate, though the matter could have been remitted to the Appellate Authority to consider the quantum of punishment afresh but remanding the matter to the authorities, will take much more time and will lengthen the entire proceeding. Thus, considering the punishment of dismissal to be shockingly disproportionate, though the matter could have been remitted to the Appellate Authority to consider the quantum of punishment afresh but remanding the matter to the authorities, will take much more time and will lengthen the entire proceeding. Thus, by invoking jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and view of the aforesaid judgment, I convert the punishment of dismissal to that of “Compulsorily Retirement” in terms of section 34 of the CISF Rule, 2001. 12. Thus, this writ application is partly allowed with the aforesaid modification of the quantum of punishment, without interfering with the guilt of the petitioner.