ORDER : S.R.Krishna Kumar, J. The petitioners in all these petitions are land owners seeking to assail the impugned acquisition proceedings in relation to their respective subject lands situated at Abbachikkanahalli Village and Lalagondanahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Devanahalli Taluk, Bangalore Rural District, which were sought to be acquired by the State Government for the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) for expansion of its space activities. The total extent of land sought to be acquired by the respondents including the subject lands of the petitioners is 81 acres 39 guntas, out of which, the petitioners are land owners of portions of the subject lands claimed by them. 2. Since common questions of law and fact arise for consideration in all the petitions, which challenge the very same impugned acquisition proceedings in relation to the very same subject matter, all the petitions are taken up together for consideration and disposed of by this common order. 3. The brief facts giving rise to the present petitions are as under: The respondent-ISRO submitted representations in the year 2009 requesting the State Government to acquire additional extent of 100 acres of land adjacent to its Devanahalli campus for the purpose of expansion of its space activities. In pursuance of the same, the respondent-ISRO deposited a sum of Rs.13.66 Crores on 22.12.2009 with the respondent-State towards the acquisition. On 28.01.2010, the respondent-State issued a preliminary notification invoking/exercising emergency clause under Section 17 (1) and (4) read with Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ‘the LA Act’) proposing to acquire about 81 acres 39 guntas of land in the aforesaid village. The said preliminary notification was published in the official gazette on 04.02.2010 and also published in Kannada Prabha Newspaper on 02.03.2010 and in Vijaya Karnataka Newspaper on 03.03.2010. 3.1 Some of the land owners preferred W.P.No.17054/2010 challenging the aforesaid notification and this Court vide order dated 17.03.2010 stayed the impugned notification and directed the respondents not to take possession of the lands from the writ petitioners. Subsequently, vide final order dated 18.06.2010, this Court disposed of the said writ petition by directing the said impugned notification dated 28.01.2010 issued under Section 17 by treating the same as a preliminary notification issued under Section 4(1) of the L.A Act and by permitting the petitioners to file their objections to the same and directing the respondents to proceed thereafter in accordance with law. In pursuance of the same, the respondents contend a mahazar was drawn by the Village Accountant and Revenue Inspector on 16.07.2010, which amounts to publication of the preliminary notification in the village chavadi; however, the legality, genuineness, validity and correctness of the aforesaid mahazar is seriously disputed and denied by the petitioners who contend that the respondents have not published the aforesaid final declaration/notification in the village chavadi as contended by them. 3.2 In pursuance of the aforesaid final order passed by this Court in W.P.No.17054/2010 dated 18.06.2010, the LAO is said to have issued notices to the land owners who are said to have filed their objections to the acquisition proceedings urging various contentions, pursuant to which, the LAO passed an order dated 27.12.2010 rejecting the objections of the petitioners and directing continuation of the acquisition proceedings. Thereafter, the respondent-State proceeded to issue a final notification/declaration under Section 6(1) of the L.A Act dated 30.05.2011 which was published in the ‘Vijaya Karnataka’ and ‘Vijaya Vani’ Newspapers on 25.06.2011 and also published in the official gazette on 30.06.2011. It is contended by the respondents that in addition to the aforesaid publications of the final notification/declaration, the respondent-State also published the same in Village Chavadi on 16.08.2011 by placing reliance upon a mahajar in this regard; however, the legality, genuineness, validity and correctness of the aforesaid mahazar is seriously disputed and denied by the petitioners who contend that the respondents have not published the aforesaid final declaration/notification in the village chavadi as contended by them. 3.3 Subsequently, the respondents contend that the LAO passed an award on 10.06.2013 and that the same was approved by the State Government on 19.07.2013. Even this contention is seriously disputed and denied by the petitioners who contend that the award was actually passed / made only on 19.07.2013 and not earlier or on 10.06.2013 and the said award passed beyond the prescribed period of limitation was invalid and illegal, thereby resulting in lapsing of the entire acquisition proceedings as contemplated under Section 11A of the L.A.Act. 4. 4. As stated supra, the petitioners have preferred the respective petitions interalia contending that the impugned acquisition proceedings deserve to be quashed for the following reasons:- (i) The final notification / declaration not having been published within the prescribed period of limitation of one year from the date of the preliminary notification as contemplated under Section 6(2) of the L.A.Act; (ii) Non-conducting of necessary / requisite enquiry under Section 5A of the L.A.Act despite the petitioners filing detailed objections to the preliminary notification. (iii) The award not having been made within the prescribed period of limitation of two years from the date of the final notification / declaration as contemplated under Section 11A of the L.A.Act; 5. The respondents – State and ISRO have filed separate statement of objections contesting the petitions and interalia contending that the preliminary notification, Section 5A enquiry, final notification / declaration as well as the award were all issued / made in accordance with law and in terms of the provisions contained in Sections 4, 5A, 6 and 11A of the L.A. Act and as such, there was no merit in the petitions which are liable to be dismissed. 6. Heard the respective learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Advocate General for the respondents – State as well as the learned counsel appearing for respondent – ISRO and perused the material on record. 7. I have also procured the original records relating to the impugned acquisition proceedings from the respondents – State and have perused the same. 8. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in the petition and referring to the material on record, learned counsel for the petitioners jointly submit in unison that the impugned acquisition proceedings are illegal, arbitrary and contrary to Sections 4, 5A, 6 and 11A of the L.A.Act and the same deserve to be quashed. It was submitted that the final notification / declaration was issued beyond the prescribed period of limitation of one year from the date of the preliminary notification apart from the fact that the requisite / necessary enquiry under Section 5A of the L.A.Act had not been conducted by the LAO in addition to the award having been passed beyond the prescribed period of limitation of two years from the date of the final notification / declaration and as such, the impugned acquisition proceedings deserve to be quashed. In support of their submissions, they placed reliance upon the following judgments:- (i) State of U.P. vs. Rajiv Gupta – (1994) 5 SCC 686; (ii) Mohan vs. State of Maharastra – (2007) 9 SCC 431; (iii) Ashok Kumar vs. State of Haryana – (2007) 3 SCC 470; (iv) Devendra Kumar Thyagi vs. State of U.P. – (2011) 9 SCC 164 ; (v) Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd. vs. Vemagunti Ramakrishan Rao – (2013) 8 SCC 789 ; (vi) Tippanna Ningappa Tummarmatti vs. State of Karnataka – ILR 2016 KAR 1170 ; (vii) State of West Bengal vs. Aziman Bibi – (2016) 15 SCC 710; (viii) Suresh Jugaraj vs. State of Karnataka – ILR 2018 KAR 1901; (ix) BEML Employees’ HBCS vs. State of Karnataka – (2005) 9 SCC 248; (x) Women’s Education Trust vs. State of Haryana – (2013) 8 SCC 99 ; (xi) Anand Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh – (2010) 11 SCC 242 ; (xii) Gojer Brothers Pvt. Ltd., vs. State of West Bengal – (2013) 16 SCC 660 ; (xiii) University of Agricultural Science Employees HBCS vs. SLAO – ILR 1999 KAR 4597 ; (xiv) Lok Seva Shikshan Mandal vs. A.R. Mundhada Charitable Trust – (2007) 9 SCC 779 ; (xv) N.V.Ramesh vs. State – W.P.No.3403/2012 dated 17.12.2019; (xvi) M.Suresh Kumar vs. State – (2022) 3 Kar.L.R. 367; (xvii) Shabbir Ahmed vs. State of Karnataka – (2015) SCC Online KAR 2215; (xviii) Prerana Bhat vs. State – (2012) SCC Online KAR 8240; (xix) Abdul Azeez vs. Commissioner – W.P.No.75827/2013 dated 08.10.2021. 9. Per contra, learned Advocate General appearing for respondents - State and learned counsel appearing for respondent – ISRO would reiterate the various contentions urged in their respective statements of objections and submit that there is no merit in the petitions and that the same are liable to be dismissed. 9. Per contra, learned Advocate General appearing for respondents - State and learned counsel appearing for respondent – ISRO would reiterate the various contentions urged in their respective statements of objections and submit that there is no merit in the petitions and that the same are liable to be dismissed. In support of their submissions, they placed reliance upon the following judgments:- (i) Srinivas Ramnath Khatod vs. State of Maharastra – (2002) 1 SCC 689 ; (ii) Urban Improvement Trust, Udaypur vs. Bherulal & others – (2002) 7 SCC 712 ; (iii) Bailamma vs. Poorna Prajna HBCS & others – (2006) 2 SCC 416 ; (iv) Ramachandrappa & others vs. State of Karnataka – ILR 1996 KAR 3269; (v) State of Haryana vs. Raghuveer Dayal – (1995) 1 SCC 133; (vi) Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan vs. State of Karnataka – (1994) SCC Supp.(1) 583; (vii) Harisingh vs. State of U.P. – (1984) 2 SCC 624 ; (viii) Indore Development Authority vs. Manohar Lal – (2020) 8 SCC 129 ; (ix) Sethi Auto Service Station vs. DDA – (2009) 1 SCC 180; 10. The following points arise for consideration in the present petitions are as under:- (i) Whether the impugned final notification / declaration issued under Section 6 of the L.A.Act was published within the prescribed period of limitation of one year from the date of publication of the preliminary notification as contemplated under Section 6(2) of the L.A.Act? (ii) Whether the impugned final notification / declaration was vitiated on account of non-compliance of Section 5A of the L.A.Act? (iii) Whether the impugned award passed under Section 11 of the L.A.Act was made within the prescribed period of limitation of two years from the date of publication of the final notification / declaration as contemplated under Section 11A of the L.A.Act? Re-Point No.(i):- 11. (iii) Whether the impugned award passed under Section 11 of the L.A.Act was made within the prescribed period of limitation of two years from the date of publication of the final notification / declaration as contemplated under Section 11A of the L.A.Act? Re-Point No.(i):- 11. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that it is an undisputed fact that the preliminary notification was issued under Section 17 r/w Section 4 of the L.A.Act invoking the emergency provisions on 28.01.2010 and was published in the official gazette on 04.02.2010 as well as published in the ‘Kannada Prabha’ News paper on 02.03.2010 and ‘Vijaya Karnataka’ News paper on 03.03.2010; it is also not in dispute that some of the land owners approached this Court in W.P.No.17054/2010 and connected matters, in which, an interim order of stay of the preliminary notification was passed by this Court on 17.03.2010 which was in force up to 18.06.2010, when this Court disposed of the petitions by directing the preliminary notification to be treated as having been issued only under Section 4 and not under Section 17 and by directing the petitioners therein to file their objections and with a direction to the LAO to consider the same and proceed further in accordance with law. The material on record also reveals that on 19.08.2010, the LAO issued notices to the land owners who filed their objections culminating in an order dated 27.12.2010 which rejected the objections of the land owners and directed continuation of the acquisition proceedings. The material on record also reveals that on 19.08.2010, the LAO issued notices to the land owners who filed their objections culminating in an order dated 27.12.2010 which rejected the objections of the land owners and directed continuation of the acquisition proceedings. 11.1 The respondents contend that meanwhile they published the preliminary notification on 16.07.2010 in the village chavdi and accordingly, the final notification / declaration also published in the village chavdi on 16.08.2011 (excluding the period of 93 days when there was an interim order of stay in W.P.No.17054/2010 and connected matters) was well within the prescribed period of limitation of one year as contemplated in Section 6(2) of the L.A.Act; however, according to the petitioners, no such publication of the preliminary notification was made in the village chavdi on either 16.07.2010 or the final notification in the village chavdi on 16.08.2011 and that the last date of publication of the preliminary notification being 03.03.2010 in the Newspapers, the last date of the publication of the final notification / declaration in the official gazette having been made on 30.06.2011 was beyond the prescribed period of one year and 93 days, which expired on 06.06.2011 and as such, the final notification / declaration published thereafter on 30.06.2011 was barred by limitation. In this context, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in University of Agricultural Science Employees’ HBCS case supra, wherein it was held as under:- “The appellant is a registered housing co-operative Society. It is aggrieved by the order dated 14.2.1997 passed in W.P. No. 2919/92 an analogus cases. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge has quashed the notifications issued under Section 4 (1) and 6 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short the ‘Act’) by which the lands of the private respondents were sought to be acquired for the purpose of formation of housing sites by the appellant society. 2. The short question of law involved in this writ appeal is as to whether the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was barred by limitation under Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act? 3. The preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was first published in the two local dailies viz., Prajavani and Sanjewani on 31.3.1990 and 5.4.1990 respectively. 3. The preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was first published in the two local dailies viz., Prajavani and Sanjewani on 31.3.1990 and 5.4.1990 respectively. Thereafter, the same was published in the Karnataka Gazette on 12.4.1990. According to the learned Single Judge, since there was no convincing material on record to show that the substance of the said notification was published at the convenient places in the locality of the villages in question, therefore, he took the last date of publication of the said notification as 12.4.1990 for the purpose of computing limitation under Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act. 4. The declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published in the Karnataka Gazette on 23.5.1991. It was also published in the local daily Lokavani on 13.5.1991 and another local daily Deccan Herald on 18.5.1991. The substance of the declaration was duly notified in the office of the Land Acquisition Officer and in the village chavadi as well. 5. In view of the above said facts, the questions that arise for consideration are (i) whether keeping in view the materials on record, it can be held that the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published at convenient places in the locality concerned and if so on what dates; and, (ii) whether the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made before the expiry of one year from the date of publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. 5. Section 4(1) of the Act as amended by the Land Acquisition (Mysore and Amendment) Act, 1961 reads thus— 4. Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon - (1) Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government [or the Deputy Commissioner] that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company, [notification stating the purpose for which the land is needed, or likly to be needed, and describing the land by its survey number, if any, and also by its boundaries and its approximate area] shall be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality. The Deputy Commissioner may also cause a copy of such notification to be served on the owner, or where the owner is not the occupier on the occupier of the land. Explanation:— the expression ‘convenient places’ includes, in the case of land situated in a village, the office of the Panchayat within whose jurisdiction the land lies.” 6. From the above provisions it is clear that the last date of publication through the third statutory mode as envisages under Section 4 has to be taken as the date of publication of the notification for the purpose of computing limitation under Clause (ii) of proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act. Therefore, if it is found that there was a publication of substance of the notification through the last mode in the locality on the dates subsequent to the first two modes, then that date has to be taken as the date of publication of notification. In the present case, the Land Acquisition Officer as well as the appellant has taken the stand that there was a publication by the third mode by giving public notice at convenient places in the locality; 7. Section 55 of the Act empowers the State Government to make rules consistent with the Act for guidance of officers in all matters connected with its enforcement. Pursuant to the said power, the State of Karnataka has framed the Karnataka Land Acquisition Rules, 1965, (in short the ‘Rules’). Rule 3 of the Rules provides the manner in which the third mode of publication envisages under Section 4(1) of the Act has to be effected. This rule reads as under 3. Pursuant to the said power, the State of Karnataka has framed the Karnataka Land Acquisition Rules, 1965, (in short the ‘Rules’). Rule 3 of the Rules provides the manner in which the third mode of publication envisages under Section 4(1) of the Act has to be effected. This rule reads as under 3. Issue of notice :— Immediately after the publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4, the Deputy Commissioner shall as required by the said Sub- section cause a notice stating that the land is needed, or is likely to be need for a public purpose, specifying the purpose and requiring all persons interested in that land to lodge before the Deputy Commissioner, before the date specified in the Notification (mentioning the said date) a statement in writing, of their objections, if any, to the proposed acquisition of the land or any land in the locality, to be published at convenient place in the locality where the land proposed for acquisition is situated and copies thereof affixed in the offices of the Deputy Commissioner of the District, Tahsildar of the Taluk and the village chavadi, if any, of the village which the land is situated. A copy of the notice may also be caused to be served individually, on every person known or believed to be interested in the land to be acquired. 8. Keeping in view the above noticed statutory rule, we had sought for the original records to ascertain as to whether public notices were effected at the public places statutorily specified. The records contained the materials show that affixation of public notice was effected in the offices of the Deputy Commissioner and the Tahsildar. So far as publication of public notice in the village chavadi is concerned, the land acquisition officer has relied on two documents to substantiate the said publication. Those are Panchanama (Mahazar) dated 23.5.1991 (Annexure ‘F’) and the report of the revenue inspector dated 31.5.1990 (Annexure ‘G’). 9. So far as the Mahazar is concerned, it merely proves that on 15.5.1990 the substance of notification under Section 4(1) was read over to eight villagers of Jakkur and Shivanahalli villages and nothing more. Those are Panchanama (Mahazar) dated 23.5.1991 (Annexure ‘F’) and the report of the revenue inspector dated 31.5.1990 (Annexure ‘G’). 9. So far as the Mahazar is concerned, it merely proves that on 15.5.1990 the substance of notification under Section 4(1) was read over to eight villagers of Jakkur and Shivanahalli villages and nothing more. The english translation of report of the revenue inspector dated 30.5.1990 (Annexure ‘G’) furnished by the appellant reads as under— “With reference to the above order, notices were served to the farmers of Jakkur and Shivanahalli village and directed them to file objection if any on or before 15.6.1990 against 4(1) notification. The above said notification was also published in the notice board of the village accountant. The mahajar of the villagers was conducted and all the notices served were forwarded for further proceedings.” 10. The above report of the revenue inspector even remotely does not suggest that the public notice of the notification under Section 4(1) was made by affixation either in the Chavadi of the respective villages of Jakkur and Shivanahalli or in the office of the respective grama panchayats. 11. It cannot be disputed that the third mode of the publication of notification cannot be said to have been complied with unless the substance of the notification is published at the convenient places of the locality concerned which as per the Karnataka Amendment and the statutory Rules should necessarily be affixed in the office of the jurisdictional panchayats. The Deputy Commissioner, the Tahsildar and as also in the village chavadi. In the present case, there is nothing on the record to shown that the substance of the notice was published in the village chavadi or in the office of the village panchayat. Therefore, it has to be held that in law there was no publication of notice by the third mode as mandatorily required. 12. Sri N. Narashima Murthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted that keeping in view the report of the revenue inspector and the Mahazar as referred to above, legal presumption should be drawn as per Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act that the requirement of the third mode of publication was duly complied with. 12. Sri N. Narashima Murthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted that keeping in view the report of the revenue inspector and the Mahazar as referred to above, legal presumption should be drawn as per Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act that the requirement of the third mode of publication was duly complied with. In support of his submission he has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Krishan Shingal v. Union of India [ (1996) 10 SCC 721 .] , wherein it has been held thus— “It is not the law and could not and would not be the law that publication of the substance of Section 4(1) notification in the locality should be established beyond shadow of doubt and benefit should be extended to the owner or interested person of the land. Obvious thereto, presumption under Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act has been raised that official acts have been properly done unless proved otherwise.” 13. The above law of presumption taken note of by the Supreme Court, about the existence of certain facts and due discharge of official acts can be resorted to only if there is atleast some material or evidence on record to show that the said official acts have been purported to be done. But in the present case, there is nothing on record to show that substance of the notice was published in the village chavadi or in the office of the village panchayat. Therefore, it has to be held that in law there was no publication of public notice by the third mode as mandatorily required. 14. Notwithstanding the above finding, in the facts of the present case and keeping in view the law laid by the Supreme Court in the cases of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Makrand Singh [ (1995) 2 SCC 497 .] and in the case of Eugenio Misquita v. State of Goa [ (1997) 8 SCC 47 .] , the ultimate conclusion drawn by the learned Single Judge which led to the quashing of the impugned notification has to be upheld. 15. Section 6 of the Act provides for declaration that the land is required for a public purpose but the proviso to the said section sets out limitation for making such declaration. This section reads as under- 6. 15. Section 6 of the Act provides for declaration that the land is required for a public purpose but the proviso to the said section sets out limitation for making such declaration. This section reads as under- 6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose (1) xxxxxxxxxxxx Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4, sub-section (1)- (i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967), but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification; or (ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification; Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of the public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. 15. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 further provides that every declaration shall be published in the official gazette and the two dailies having circulation in the locality concerned out of which one shall be in the regional language. It also requires the collector to cause public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at convenient place in the said locality. This sub-section also declares the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of the public notice, as the ‘date of publication of the declaration’. 16. In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti's case (supra), it has been held that publication in the official gazette will be deemed to be date of making of declaration under Section 6 of the Act for the purpose of computation of limitation prescribed under the proviso thereof. So far as sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act providing three different modes of publication are concerned, those have been held to be procedural and ministerial acts meant for the purpose of procedure to be followed subsequent to making of declaration. Relying on this judgment in Eugenio Misquita's case (supra). In para 17 it has been held thus— “As held in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti case mere making of declaration is not enough. Relying on this judgment in Eugenio Misquita's case (supra). In para 17 it has been held thus— “As held in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti case mere making of declaration is not enough. The making of declaration under Section 6 is complete for the purpose of Clauses (i) and (ii) of the first proviso to Section 6(i) when it is published in the Official Gazette.” 17. From the above declaration of law by the Apex Court, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether in terms of declaration under Section 6 was made within one year from the date of publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act or not, we have to take the date of making declaration as the date on which it was published in the Karnataka Gazette i.e. 23.5.1991. If this date is taken to be the date of making declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act, then irrespective of the fact as to whether the date of publication of preliminary notification under Section 4(1) is taken as 12.4.1990. i.e. its publication in the official gazette, or 15.5.1990, the date on which the publication is claimed by the third mode, making of declaration will be definitely after the expiry of one year from the said dates and as such declaration under Section 6 has to be held as invalid. 18. For the said reasons, the impugned order of the learned Single Judge cannot be interfered with. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed. 11.2 In Devendra Kumar Thyagi’s case supra , the Apex Court held as under:- “6. Since the petitioners' land situated at Hapur is included in these notifications, the petitioners have filed present writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution praying for issuance of appropriate writ or directions to quash these notifications issued under Section 4 and Section 6 of the LA Act. In this writ petition, the issues before us are: I. Whether the Notification dated 18-12-2007 issued by the respondents under Section 6 read with Section 17(1) of the LA Act is within the period of limitation as contemplated by proviso (ii) to Section 6(1) of the LA Act? II. Whether the respondent is justified in invoking the urgency provision under Section 17(1) and excluding the application of Section 5-A in terms of 11. II. Whether the respondent is justified in invoking the urgency provision under Section 17(1) and excluding the application of Section 5-A in terms of 11. To appreciate the point in issue, it would be appropriate to set out the relevant portion of Sections 4(1) and 6 of the LA Act: “ 4. Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon .—(1) Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company, a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as ‘the date of the publication of the notification’). *** 6. *** 6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose .—(1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under Section 5-A sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under Section 4 sub-section (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under Section 5-A sub-section (2): Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4 sub-section (1)— (i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967), but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification; or (ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification: Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a company, wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. *** (2) Every declaration shall be published in the Official Gazette, and in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is situate of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as ‘the date of the publication of the declaration’), and such declaration shall state the district or other territorial division in which the land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area, and, where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected. (3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company, as the case may be; and, after making such declaration, the appropriate Government may acquire the land in manner hereinafter appearing.” 13. It is not in dispute that the declaration of the Notification under Section 6 was issued on 18-12-2007. It is also not in dispute that the Notification under Section 4 was issued on 3-7-2006 and the same was published in two daily newspapers in Hindi language on 4-7-2006 having circulation in the locality where the land is situated. Also, the people at Pargana Hapur in Ghaziabad District are well- conversant with the Hindi language. In our considered view, the publication of the notification in two newspapers having circulation in the locality where the land is situated and where people are well-conversant with Hindi amounts to ample compliance with the requirement of the publication under Section 4(1) of the LA Act. In view of this, the subsequent publication of English translation of the said Notification under Section 4 in two newspapers on 5-1-2007 is unnecessary and will not assist the respondents to extend the period of limitation envisaged in the proviso to Section 6(1) of the LA Act. Hence, the last date of publication for the purpose of Section 4(1) of the LA Act, which can be treated as the date of publication, is the date on which, the second Notification under Section 4 was published in the newspaper, that is, 4-7-2006. Hence, the last date of publication for the purpose of Section 4(1) of the LA Act, which can be treated as the date of publication, is the date on which, the second Notification under Section 4 was published in the newspaper, that is, 4-7-2006. Therefore, the period of limitation commences from 4-7-2006, which is the date of publication of the Notification under Section 4(1) of the LA Act. 24. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties before us. The second point in issue before us is no more res integra as it has already been decided by this Court in Radhy Shyam v. State of U.P. [ (2011) 5 SCC 553 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 1] , to which one of us was the party (G.S. Singhvi, J.), wherein this Court has considered the development of the jurisprudence and law, with respect to invoking of the urgency provisions under Section 17 vis-à- vis right of the landowner to file objections and opportunity of hearing and enquiry under Section 5-A, by reference to a plethora of earlier decisions of this Court. This Court had culled out the various principles governing the acquisition of the land for public purpose by invoking urgency thus: (SCC pp. 602-03, para 77) “77. From the analysis of the relevant statutory provisions and interpretation thereof by this Court in different cases, the following principles can be culled out: (i) Eminent domain is a right inherent in every sovereign to take and appropriate property belonging to citizens for public use. To put it differently, the sovereign is entitled to reassert its dominion over any portion of the soil of the State including private property without its owner's consent provided that such assertion is on account of public exigency and for public good — Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd. [(1953) 2 SCC 791 : AIR 1954 SC 119 ] , Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India [1950 SCC 833 : AIR 1951 SC 41 ] and Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat [1995 Supp (1) SCC 596] . & Wvg. Co. Ltd. [(1953) 2 SCC 791 : AIR 1954 SC 119 ] , Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India [1950 SCC 833 : AIR 1951 SC 41 ] and Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat [1995 Supp (1) SCC 596] . (ii) The legislations which provide for compulsory acquisition of private property by the State fall in the category of expropriatory legislation and such legislation must be construed strictly — DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana [ (2003) 5 SCC 622 ] , State of Maharashtra v. B.E. Billimoria [ (2003) 7 SCC 336 ] and Dev Sharan v. State of U.P. [ (2011) 4 SCC 769 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 483] (iii) Though, in exercise of the power of eminent domain, the Government can acquire the private property for public purpose, it must be remembered that compulsory taking of one's property is a serious matter. If the property belongs to economically disadvantaged segment of the society or people suffering from other handicaps, then the court is not only entitled but is duty- bound to scrutinise the LA action/decision of the State with greater vigilance, care and circumspection keeping in view the fact that the landowner is likely to become landless and deprived of the only source of his livelihood and/or shelter. (iv) The property of a citizen cannot be acquired by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities without complying with the mandate of Sections 4, 5-A and 6 of the LA Act. A public purpose, however, laudable it may be does not entitle the State to invoke the urgency provisions because the same have the effect of depriving the owner of his right to property without being heard. Only in a case of real urgency, the State can invoke the urgency provisions and dispense with the requirement of hearing the landowner or other interested persons. (v) Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) confers extraordinary power upon the State to acquire private property without complying with the mandate of Section 5- A. These provisions can be invoked only when the purpose of acquisition cannot brook the delay of even a few weeks or months. (v) Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) confers extraordinary power upon the State to acquire private property without complying with the mandate of Section 5- A. These provisions can be invoked only when the purpose of acquisition cannot brook the delay of even a few weeks or months. Therefore, before excluding the application of Section 5-A, the authority concerned must be fully satisfied that time of few weeks or months likely to be taken in conducting inquiry under Section 5-A will, in all probability, frustrate the public purpose for which land is proposed to be acquired. (vi) The satisfaction of the Government on the issue of urgency is subjective but is a condition precedent to the exercise of power under Section 17(1) and the same can be challenged on the ground that the purpose for which the private property is sought to be acquired is not a public purpose at all or that the exercise of power is vitiated due to mala fides or that the authorities concerned did not apply their mind to the relevant factors and the records. (vii) The exercise of power by the Government under Section 17(1) does not necessarily result in exclusion of Section 5-A of the LA Act in terms of which any person interested in land can file objection and is entitled to be heard in support of his objection. The use of word ‘may’ in sub-section (4) of Section 17 makes it clear that it merely enables the Government to direct that the provisions of Section 5-A would not apply to the cases covered under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17. In other words, invoking of Section 17(4) is not a necessary concomitant of the exercise of power under Section 17(1). (viii) The acquisition of land for residential, commercial, industrial or institutional purposes can be treated as an acquisition for public purposes within the meaning of Section 4 but that, by itself, does not justify the exercise of power by the Government under Sections 17(1) and/or 17(4). The court can take judicial notice of the fact that planning, execution and implementation of the schemes relating to development of residential, commercial, industrial or institutional areas usually take few years. Therefore, the private property cannot be acquired for such purpose by invoking the urgency provision contained in Section 17(1). The court can take judicial notice of the fact that planning, execution and implementation of the schemes relating to development of residential, commercial, industrial or institutional areas usually take few years. Therefore, the private property cannot be acquired for such purpose by invoking the urgency provision contained in Section 17(1). In any case, exclusion of the rule of audi alteram partem embodied in Sections 5-A(1) and (2) is not at all warranted in such matters.” (emphasis supplied) 36. In view of above discussion, we hold that the declaration of the Notification dated 18-12-2006 under Section 6 of the LA Act is beyond the period of limitation as envisaged by the proviso to Section 6(1) of the LA Act. We also hold that the State Government was not justified, in the facts and circumstances of this case, to invoke the urgency provision of Section 17(4) of the LA Act. Therefore, the appellants cannot be denied their valuable right under Section 5-A of the LA Act. 37. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed. The impugned Notification dated 3-7-2006 under Section 4 and Notification dated 18-12-2006 under Section 6 of the LA Act are hereby quashed. Costs are made easy.” 11.3 In Tippanna Ningappa’s case supra , this Court held as under:- “5. The submissions of the Learned Counsel have received my thoughtful consideration. The first question that falls for my consideration is whether the final notification is within one year from the date of the publication of the preliminary notification. It is not in dispute that the preliminary notification was published on 9.6.2008. The final notification was published on 18.5.2010. An attempt is made by the respondents to establish that the publication of the final notification is within one year from the last of the publications of the preliminary notification. It is their contention that the preliminary notification was put up on the notice board of Gram Chavadi on 20.5.2009, as is evident from Annexure- R5 drawn under the mahazar. I find it difficult to accept this submission, because the next annexure, that is Annexure-R6 (to the fifth respondent's statement of objections) states that it was notified in the Gram Chavadi on 31.12.2008. The discrepancy in the matter of dates between Annexures-R5 and R6 has remained unexplained. I find it difficult to accept this submission, because the next annexure, that is Annexure-R6 (to the fifth respondent's statement of objections) states that it was notified in the Gram Chavadi on 31.12.2008. The discrepancy in the matter of dates between Annexures-R5 and R6 has remained unexplained. The communication, dated 6.11.2009 (Annexure-R6) further states that the notice is sent to all the interested persons on 31.10.2008 granting time to them to file the objections till 30.11.2008. When the notice displayed in the Gram Chavadi mentions that the objections are to be filed within 30.11.2008, it cannot be contended by the respondents with any rate of success that the notice in Gram Chavadi came to be displayed on 20.5.2009. 6. As the last of the publications was issued on 31.12.2008, the final notification ought to have been issued on or before 31.12.2009. Admittedly, the final notification is published on 18.5.2010. This is a clear violation of the time- line prescribed by proviso to Section 6(1) of the said Act. 13. Thus on both the grounds, the acquisition proceedings are liable to be invalidated. The impugned notifications are quashed in so far as they pertain to the petitioners' lands. However, it is made clear that the quashing of the impugned notifications would not come in the way of the authorities resorting to the initiation of the land acquisition proceedings afresh, if there is any need for the land for any public purpose. There is nothing like estoppel in the acquisition matters. But nobody can be deprived of his property without following the due process of law. 15. The validity of the respondents' resistance to these petitions must be tested upon the principles substantially equitable. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. When the illegalities in the acquisition proceedings are so very manifest, the respondents' defence to these petitions cannot be sustained on the slender ground of delay and laches.” 11.4 In Suresh Jugaraj’s case supra , this Court held as under:- “Petitioners are owners of land bearing Survey No. 202 measuring 18 acres 27 guntas and Survey No. 204 measuring 19 acres 17 guntas of Kengeri Village, Bengaluru South Taluk, Bangalore District. Their lands were proposed to be acquired by the Karnataka Housing Board by issuing preliminary notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “Act”) on 12.3.2010. The same was published in the Karnataka Gazette on 22.4.2010. This was followed by final notification issued under Section 6 (1) of the Act dated 9.3.2012 published in the Karnataka Gazette on 26.4.2012. Petitioners are calling in question the said notifications mainly on the ground that the final notification dated 9.3.2012 issued under Section 6 (1) of the Act was beyond the period of one year from the date of Section 4 (1) notification published in the gazette on 22.4.2010 and therefore, in terms of the proviso (ii) to Section 6 (1) of the Act, the final declaration made does not have the effect of affecting the rights of the petitioners. 5. Upon hearing Learned Counsel for both the parties and on consideration of the entire materials on record, the main question that falls for consideration is:— Whether the notification dated 9.3.2012 issued under Section 6(1) of the Act can be said to be within the period of one year and therefore, in conformity with the provisions of Section 6(1) of the Act in the facts and circumstances of the case? 6. The requirement of publication of 6(1) notification within one year from the last of the publications of 4(1) notification has been introduced by amending Act 68/84 with a laudable object. The statement of objects and reasons appended to the amending Act 68/1984 make it very clear that individuals and institutions who are unavoidably to be deprived of their property rights in land need to be adequately compensated for the loss keeping in view the sacrifice they have to make for the larger interests of the community. Pendency of acquisition proceedings for long period often caused hardship to the affected parties and rendered unrealistic the scale of compensation offered to them. Therefore, it was intended to restructure the legislative frame work for acquisition of land. Pendency of acquisition proceedings for long period often caused hardship to the affected parties and rendered unrealistic the scale of compensation offered to them. Therefore, it was intended to restructure the legislative frame work for acquisition of land. Thus, keeping in view the aforesaid objects and also the recommendations, certain changes were brought by way of amendment to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and a time limit of one year was proposed to be provided for completion of formalities between the issuance of preliminary notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act and declaration for acquisition of specified land under Section 6 (1) of the Act. 7. The amended provisions of Section 6(1) as amended by Act No. 68/84 reads as under:— 6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose. — (1) Subject to the provision of Part VII of this Act, appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under section 5A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorized to certify its orders and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (1) irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under section 5A, sub-section (2); Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under section 4, sub-section (1)- (i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967), but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984), shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification; or (ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984), shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification: Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. Explanation 1.-In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under section 4, sub-section (I), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. Explanation 2.-Where the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenues. 8. It is thus clear from the provisions contained under sub-Clause 1 of Section 6 of the Act that prior to amendment of 1984 and after the introduction of Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967), period prescribed within which final declaration was required to be issued was 3 years from the publication of 4(1) notification. After the amendment by Amendment Act 68/1984, this period has been reduced to one year. 9. In the present case, Section 4(1) notification has been issued on 12.3.2010 after the Amendment Act 68/1984 came into force. It was published in the gazette on 22.4.2010. Publication in the two newspapers was on 21.5.2010, but the substance of the notification was published in ‘Chawadi’ on 23.5.2011. Therefore, for the purpose of present case, the period of one year is the determining factor. Hence, Court has to see whether declaration made under Section 6(1) of the Act was after the expiry of one year from the date of publication of Section 4(1) notification. 13. The language employed in the statute makes it clear that intention of the Legislature was to prohibit any delay of more than one year between the date of publication of Section 4(1) notification and date of issuance of declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act. Intention is very clear, in that Legislature prohibits undue delay by fixing the maximum period in issuing final declaration as one year. Intention is very clear, in that Legislature prohibits undue delay by fixing the maximum period in issuing final declaration as one year. Authorities, who are entrusted with the duties and functions of effecting different modes of publication including publication in Chawadi have to ensure that same is done without causing inordinate delay.” 11.5 In the instant case, it is pertinent to note that immediately upon the respondents publishing the preliminary notification on 03.03.2010 in the Newspapers, some of the land owners approached this Court in W.P.No.17054/2010 which was disposed of on 18.06.2010, much prior to the alleged chavdi publication which was alleged to have been done subsequently on 16.07.2010; in this context, it is significant to note that a perusal of the mahazar relied upon by the respondents will indicate that the same contains alleged signatures of persons/witnesses without disclosing their names, identities, material particulars etc., as required in law; in addition thereto, the original records also do not contain any cross-reference to the alleged mahazar which is the only document relied upon by the respondents to substantiate their contention that they published the preliminary notification in the village chavdi on 16.07.2010 as contended by them, thereby casting a serious doubt as to the very genuineness, authenticity and validity of the said document; further, the factum of the preliminary notification having been published on 16.07.2010 is also not corroborated by contemporaneous material which are conspicuously absent and not produced by the respondents; at any rate, in the light of the undisputed fact that this Court disposed of W.P.No.17054/2010 on 18.06.2010 by directing the preliminary notification issued under Section 17 of the L.A.Act to be treated as a preliminary notification under Section 4 of the L.A.Act, there was no occasion for the respondents to once again publish the preliminary notification subsequently on 16.07.2010 much after this Court accepted and recognised the earlier preliminary notification and directed the respondents to proceed further in the matter. 11.6 Under these circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the respondents have failed to establish that the preliminary notification was published in the village chavdi on 16.07.2010 as contended by them; it follows therefrom that for the purpose of computing the prescribed period of limitation of one year, the date of the preliminary notification is to be reckoned / considered from the last date of the paper publication i.e., 03.03.2010 and the final notification was to be published on or before the prescribed period of one year and 93 days (excluding the period when there was an interim of stay in W.P.No.17054/2010) from 03.03.2010 i.e., on or before 06.06.2011. In the instant case, it is an undisputed fact that even according to the respondents that the final notification / declaration was issued on 30.05.2011 but published in the Newspaper on 25.06.2011 and the official gazette on 30.06.2011 and the alleged publication in the village chavdi on 16.08.2011, all the publications being well beyond the last date of limitation which expired on 06.06.2011 and consequently, the final notification is barred by limitation and the same deserves to be quashed. 11.7 Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered in favour of the petitioners by holding that the impugned final notification / declaration issued under Section 6 of the L.A.Act was not published within the prescribed period of limitation of one year from the date of publication of the preliminary notification as contemplated under Section 6(2) of the L.A.Act and consequently, the impugned final notification / declaration deserves to be quashed. Re-Point No.2:- 12. The next point that arises for consideration is whether the respondents had conducted the requisite / necessary enquiry as contemplated under Section 5A of the L.A.Act before issuing the final notification / declaration under Section 6 of the L.A.Act. Re-Point No.2:- 12. The next point that arises for consideration is whether the respondents had conducted the requisite / necessary enquiry as contemplated under Section 5A of the L.A.Act before issuing the final notification / declaration under Section 6 of the L.A.Act. In this context, the respondents have produced a common order dated 27.12.2010 passed in LQSR1 / 2009-10 which encompasses the entire extent of lands proposed for acquisition including the subject lands; a perusal of the said order dated 27.12.2010 purported to have been passed pursuant to an enquiry under Section 5A will indicate that the said order is a completely / totally cryptic, laconic, non-speaking and unreasoned order without any application of mind nor assigning cogent or valid reasons as to why the objections filed by the petitioners / land owners are being over- ruled and acquisition proceedings are being directed to be continued by the respondents; in fact, after referring to the various objections filed by the land owners, the LAO summarily rejects the objections and directs continuation of the acquisition proceedings on the sole ground that the lands are required for public purposes without assigning any other reasons whatsoever and without conducting requisite / necessary enquiry as required under Section 5A of the Act. 12.1 In Anand Singh’s case supra, the Apex Court held as under:- “41. The power of eminent domain, being inherent in the Government, is exercisable in the public interest, general welfare and for public purpose. Acquisition of private property by the State in the public interest or for public purpose is nothing but an enforcement of the right of eminent domain. In India, the Act provides directly for acquisition of particular property for public purpose. Though the right to property is no longer a fundamental right but Article 300-A of the Constitution mandates that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. That Section 5-A of the Act confers a valuable right to an individual is beyond any doubt. As a matter of fact, this Court has time and again reiterated that Section 5-A confers an important right in favour of a person whose land is sought to be acquired. 42. That Section 5-A of the Act confers a valuable right to an individual is beyond any doubt. As a matter of fact, this Court has time and again reiterated that Section 5-A confers an important right in favour of a person whose land is sought to be acquired. 42. When the Government proceeds for compulsory acquisition of a particular property for public purpose, the only right that the owner or the person interested in the property has, is to submit his objections within the prescribed time under Section 5-A of the Act and persuade the State authorities to drop the acquisition of that particular land by setting forth the reasons such as the unsuitability of the land for the stated public purpose; the grave hardship that may be caused to him by such expropriation, availability of alternative land for achieving public purpose, etc. Moreover, the right conferred on the owner or person interested to file objections to the proposed acquisition is not only an important and valuable right but also makes the provision for compulsory acquisition just and in conformity with the fundamental principles of natural justice.” 12.2 In Gojer Brother’s case supra , the Apex Court held as under:- 13. Since the main ground on which the appellant has assailed the impugned order relates to violation of Section 5-A(2) i.e. non-application of mind by the Land Acquisition Collector and the State Government to the objections filed by the appellant, it will be useful to notice the contents of the report dated 29-7-2005. The same reads as under: “Objection hearing under Section 5-A in respect of Premises No. 220/2, A.J.C. Bose Road, Kolkata Received the LA proposal along with plan for acquisition of land with building comprising Premises No. 220/2, A.J.C. Bose Road, Kolkata for public purpose, namely, for accommodation of Central Model School from the Joint Secretary, School Education Department, Secondary Branch vide their Memo No. 580-s.e (s)/7B-1/2005 dated 12-5-2005 and the said proposal vetted by the Government in land and Land Reforms Department vide their Memo No. 1287-s.a./1E-06/2005 dated 17-5-2005. After observing formalities PER was prepared on 9-6-2005. Notification under Section 4 being No. 4-LA/D/2005/S.E. Department dated 9-6-2005 was published in the Calcutta gazettes on 10-6-2005. The substance of notification in Form 30 was served to the interested persons. After observing formalities PER was prepared on 9-6-2005. Notification under Section 4 being No. 4-LA/D/2005/S.E. Department dated 9-6-2005 was published in the Calcutta gazettes on 10-6-2005. The substance of notification in Form 30 was served to the interested persons. The substance of notification was displaced (sic displayed) and also published in two daily newspapers in Asian Age on 10- 6-2005 and Ganashakti on 11-6-2005 on the spot on 15-6- 2005. After that on receipt of notice an objection petition was filed by Abhijit Guha Roy, Advocate, on behalf of M/s Gojet Brothers Private Ltd. Notice under Section 5-A of the LA Act was served upon the interested persons including the Receiver is fixed on 20- 7-2005 and 29-7-2005 for hearing. But the Receiver refused to accept the notice of hearing though the Receiver received the substance of notification in Form 3D of the LA Act. On the date of hearing 29-7-2005 owners and Advocate were present. The contentions of their submissions were that the acquisition proceedings in respect of the premises in question does not cover the public purpose and acquisition proceedings is bad in law. They have submitted two letters dated 22-6-2005 and 29-7-2005 issued by Abhijit Guha Roy, Advocate, High Court addressed to the First Land Acquisition Collector, Kolkata along with the order of the Hon'ble High Court and Apex Court in connection with title suit matter between the parties. There is no stay and or any injunction restraining the Government for acquisition of the premises for a public purpose. Proposal for acquisition of land issued by the School Education Department, Secondary Branch vetted by the Land and Land Reforms Department have been received in this office wherein it appears that the School Education Department, Secondary Branch agreed to pay Rs 10 as a token grant towards payment of compensation money for such acquisition to make it a government proposal in support of the School. On the PER it was recommended to acquire the land as proposed by the Government for a public purpose. No further objection from any corner has been received in this office till date including the Receiver. Hence I overruled the objection filed by the parties and recommend to proceed with acquisition for a public purpose. Submitted to the First Land Acquisition Collector for his kind approval. sd/- CA Rahim 29-7-2005 Land Acquisition Collector, Kolkata. No further objection from any corner has been received in this office till date including the Receiver. Hence I overruled the objection filed by the parties and recommend to proceed with acquisition for a public purpose. Submitted to the First Land Acquisition Collector for his kind approval. sd/- CA Rahim 29-7-2005 Land Acquisition Collector, Kolkata. Approved sd/- K.S. Bandyopadhyay 29-7-2005 First Land Acquisition Collector, Kolkata.” 14. A reading of the report shows that in the first four paragraphs, the Land Acquisition Collector recorded the facts relating to the acquisition proceedings. In the sixth paragraph he briefly noted the objections of the appellant and recorded his conclusion in the following words: “Hence I overruled the objection filed by the parties and recommend to proceed with acquisition for a public purpose.” 15. The ambit and scope of Section 5-A had been considered in several judgments, but we do not consider it necessary to burden this judgment by noticing various judicial precedents and feel that it would be sufficient to take cognizance of four recent judgments in Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana [Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 792 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 402] , Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B. [Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B., (2012) 2 SCC 25 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 506] , Surinder Singh Brar v. Union of India [ (2013) 1 SCC 403 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 620] and Usha Stud and Agricultural Farms (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana [ (2013) 4 SCC 210 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 556] . 16. In Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana [Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 792 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 402] , the Court referred to the earlier precedents on the subject and culled out the following propositions : (SCC p. 805, paras 39-40) “39. In this context, it is necessary to remember that the rules of natural justice have been ingrained in the scheme of Section 5-A with a view to ensure that before any person is deprived of his land by way of compulsory acquisition, he must get an opportunity to oppose the decision of the State Government and/or its agencies/instrumentalities to acquire the particular parcel of land. At the hearing, the objector can make an effort to convince the Land Acquisition Collector to make recommendation against the acquisition of his land. He can also point out that the land proposed to be acquired is not suitable for the purpose specified in the notification issued under Section 4(1). Not only this, he can produce evidence to show that another piece of land is available and the same can be utilised for execution of the particular project or scheme. 40. Though it is neither possible nor desirable to make a list of the grounds on which the landowner can persuade the Collector to make recommendations against the proposed acquisition of land, but what is important is that the Collector should give a fair opportunity of hearing to the objector and objectively consider his plea against the acquisition of land. Only thereafter, he should make recommendations supported by brief reasons as to why the particular piece of land should or should not be acquired and whether or not the plea put forward by the objector merits acceptance. In other words, the recommendations made by the Collector must reflect objective application of mind to the objections filed by the landowners and other interested persons.” 17. In Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. [Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B., (2012) 2 SCC 25 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 506] , this Court considered the report prepared by the Land Acquisition Collector, which is substantially similar to the report which was challenged by the appellant before the High Court and held : (SCC pp. 29-30, paras 14-16) “14. It must be borne in mind that the proceedings under the LA Act are based on the principle of eminent domain and Section 5-A is the only protection available to a person whose lands are sought to be acquired. It is a minimal safeguard afforded to him by law to protect himself from arbitrary acquisition by pointing out to the authority concerned, inter alia, that the important ingredient, namely, ‘public purpose’ is absent in the proposed acquisition or the acquisition is mala fide. The LA Act being an expropriatory legislation, its provisions will have to be strictly construed. 15. Hearing contemplated under Section 5-A(2) is necessary to enable the Collector to deal effectively with the objections raised against the proposed acquisition and make a report. The LA Act being an expropriatory legislation, its provisions will have to be strictly construed. 15. Hearing contemplated under Section 5-A(2) is necessary to enable the Collector to deal effectively with the objections raised against the proposed acquisition and make a report. The report of the Collector referred to in this provision is not an empty formality because it is required to be placed before the appropriate Government together with the Collector's recommendations and the record of the case. It is only upon receipt of the said report that the Government can take a final decision on the objections. It is pertinent to note that declaration under Section 6 has to be made only after the appropriate Government is satisfied on the consideration of the report, if any, made by the Collector under Section 5-A(2). As said by this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. [Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627 ] , the appropriate Government while issuing declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act is required to apply its mind not only to the objections filed by the owner of the land in question, but also to the report which is submitted by the Collector upon making such further inquiry thereon as he thinks necessary and also the recommendations made by him in that behalf. 16. Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the LA Act makes a declaration under Section 6 conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose. Formation of opinion by the appropriate Government as regards the public purpose must be preceded by application of mind as regards consideration of relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. It is, therefore, that the hearing contemplated under Section 5-A and the report made by the Land Acquisition Officer and his recommendations assume importance. It is implicit in this provision that before making declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act, the State Government must have the benefit of a report containing recommendations of the Collector submitted under Section 5-A(2) of the LA Act. The recommendations must indicate objective application of mind.” 18. It is implicit in this provision that before making declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act, the State Government must have the benefit of a report containing recommendations of the Collector submitted under Section 5-A(2) of the LA Act. The recommendations must indicate objective application of mind.” 18. In Surinder Singh Brar v. Union of India [ (2013) 1 SCC 403 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 620] , this Court extensively considered the report prepared by the Land Acquisition Officer and the decision taken by the administration of the Union Territory of Chandigarh and observed : (SCC pp. 450- 51, 455-58, paras 68-70, 76-79 & 84) “68. A cursory reading of the reports of the LAO may give an impression that he had applied his mind to the objections filed under Section 5-A(1) and assigned reasons for not entertaining the same, but a careful analysis thereof leaves no doubt that the officer concerned had not at all applied his mind to the objections of the landowners and merely created a facade of doing so. In the opening paragraph under the heading ‘Observations’, the LAO recorded that he had seen the revenue records and conducted spot inspection. He then reproduced the Statement of Objects and Reasons contained in the Bill which led to the enactment of the Punjab New Capital (Periphery) Control Act, 1952 and proceed to extract some portion of reply dated 31-7-2006 sent by the Administrator to Surinder Singh Brar. 69. In the context of the statement contained in the first line of the paragraph titled ‘Observations’, we repeatedly asked Shri Sudhir Walia, learned counsel assisting Dr Rajeev Dhavan to show as to when the LAO had summoned the revenue records and when he had conducted spot inspection but the learned counsel could not produce any document to substantiate the statement contained in the two reports of the LAO. This leads to an inference that, in both the reports, the LAO had made a misleading and false statement about his having seen the revenue records and conducted spot inspection. That apart, the reports do not contain any iota of consideration of the objections filed by the landowners. Mere reproduction of the substance of the objections cannot be equated with objective consideration thereof in the light of the submission made by the objectors during the course of hearing. That apart, the reports do not contain any iota of consideration of the objections filed by the landowners. Mere reproduction of the substance of the objections cannot be equated with objective consideration thereof in the light of the submission made by the objectors during the course of hearing. Thus, the violation of the mandate of Section 5- A(2) is writ large on the face of the reports prepared by the LAO. 70. The reason why the LAO did not apply his mind to the objections filed by the appellants and other landowners is obvious. He was a minion in the hierarchy of the administration of the Union Territory of Chandigarh and could not have even thought of making recommendations contrary to what was contained in the letter sent by the Administrator to Surinder Singh Brar. If he had shown the courage of acting independently and made recommendation against the acquisition of land, he would have surely been shifted from that post and his career would have been jeopardised. In the system of governance which we have today, junior officers in the administration cannot even think of, what to say of, acting against the wishes/dictates of their superiors. One who violates this unwritten code of conduct does so at his own peril and is described as foolhardy. Even those constituting higher strata of services follow the path of least resistance and find it most convenient to tow the line of their superiors. Therefore, the LAO cannot be blamed for having acted as an obedient subordinate of the superior authorities, including the Administrator. However, that cannot be a legitimate ground to approve the reports prepared by him without even a semblance of consideration of the objections filed by the appellants and other landowners and we have no hesitation to hold that the LAO failed to discharge the statutory duty cast upon him to prepare a report after objectively considering the objections filed under Section 5-A(1) and submissions made by the objectors during the course of personal hearing. *** 76. Section 5-A, which embodies the most important dimension of the rules of natural justice, lays down that any person interested in any land notified under Section 4(1) may, within 30 days of publication of the notification, submit objection in writing against the proposed acquisition of land or of any land in the locality to the Collector. *** 76. Section 5-A, which embodies the most important dimension of the rules of natural justice, lays down that any person interested in any land notified under Section 4(1) may, within 30 days of publication of the notification, submit objection in writing against the proposed acquisition of land or of any land in the locality to the Collector. The Collector is required to give the objector an opportunity of being heard either in person or by any person authorised by him or by pleader. After hearing the objector(s) and making such further inquiry, as he may think necessary, the Collector has to make a report in respect of land notified under Section 4(1) with his recommendations on the objections and forward the same to the Government along with the record of the proceedings held by him. The Collector can make different reports in respect of different parcels of land proposed to be acquired. 77. Upon receipt of the Collector's report, the appropriate Government is required to take action under Section 6(1) which lays down that after considering the report, if any, made under Section 5-A(2), the appropriate Government is satisfied that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, then a declaration to that effect is required to be made under the signatures of a Secretary to the Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders. This section also envisages making of different declarations from time to time in respect of different parcels of land covered by the same notification issued under Section 5(1). In terms of clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification issued under Section 4(1), which is published after 24-9-1984 can be made after expiry of one year from the date of publication of the notification. To put it differently, a declaration is required to be made under Section 6(1) within one year from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1). 78. In terms of Section 6(2), every declaration made under Section 6(1) is required to be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers having circulation in the locality in which the land proposed to be acquired is situated. Of these, at least one must be in the regional language. 78. In terms of Section 6(2), every declaration made under Section 6(1) is required to be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers having circulation in the locality in which the land proposed to be acquired is situated. Of these, at least one must be in the regional language. The Collector is also required to cause public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at convenient places in the locality. The declaration to be published under Section 6(2) must contain the district or other territorial division in which the land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area or a plan is made in respect of land and the place where such plan can be inspected. 79. Section 6(3) lays down that the declaration made under Section 6(1) shall be conclusive evidence of the fact that land is needed for a public purpose. After publication of the declaration under Section 6, the Collector is required to take order from the State Government for the acquisition of land to be carved out and measured and planned (Sections 7 and 8). The next stage as envisaged is issue of public notice and individual notice to the persons interested in the land to file their claim for compensation. Section 11 envisages holding of an enquiry into the claim and passing of an award by the Collector who is required to take into consideration the provisions contained in Section 23. *** 84. What needs to be emphasised is that hearing required to be given under Section 5-A(2) to a person who is sought to be deprived of his land and who has filed objections under Section 5-A(1) must be effective and not an empty formality. The Collector who is enjoined with the task of hearing the objectors has the freedom of making further enquiry as he may think necessary. In either eventuality, he has to make report in respect of the land notified under Section 4(1) or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land to the appropriate Government containing his recommendations on the objections and submit the same to the appropriate Government along with the record of proceedings held by him for the latter's decision. In either eventuality, he has to make report in respect of the land notified under Section 4(1) or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land to the appropriate Government containing his recommendations on the objections and submit the same to the appropriate Government along with the record of proceedings held by him for the latter's decision. The appropriate Government is obliged to consider the report, if any, made under Section 5-A(2) and then record its satisfaction that the particular land is needed for a public purpose. This exercise culminates into making a declaration that the land is needed for a public purpose and the declaration is to be signed by a Secretary to the Government or some other officer duly authorised to certify its orders. The formation of opinion on the issue of need of land for a public purpose and suitability thereof is sine qua non for issue of a declaration under Section 6(1). Any violation of the substantive right of the landowners and/or other interested persons to file objections or denial of opportunity of personal hearing to the objector(s) vitiates the recommendations made by the Collector and the decision taken by the appropriate Government on such recommendations. The recommendations made by the Collector without duly considering the objections filed under Section 5-A(1) and submissions made at the hearing given under Section 5-A(2) or failure of the appropriate Government to take objective decision on such objections in the light of the recommendations made by the Collector will denude the decision of the appropriate Government of statutory finality. To put it differently, the satisfaction recorded by the appropriate Government that the particular land is needed for a public purpose and the declaration made under Section 6(1) will be devoid of legal sanctity if statutorily engrafted procedural safeguards are not adhered to by the authorities concerned or there is violation of the principles of natural justice. The cases before us are illustrative of flagrant violation of the mandate of Sections 5-A(2) and 6(1).” 19. The cases before us are illustrative of flagrant violation of the mandate of Sections 5-A(2) and 6(1).” 19. In Usha Stud and Agricultural Farms (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana [ (2013) 4 SCC 210 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 556] , the Court reiterated the propositions laid down in Raghbir Singh Sehrawat case [Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 792 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 402] and Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B. [Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B., (2012) 2 SCC 25 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 506] and observed : (Usha Stud case [ (2013) 4 SCC 210 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 556] , SCC p. 227, para 30) “30. The ratio of the aforesaid judgments is that Section 5-A(2), which represents statutory embodiment of the rule of audi alteram partem, gives an opportunity to the objector to make an endeavour to convince the Collector that his land is not required for the public purpose specified in the notification issued under Section 4(1) or that there are other valid reasons for not acquiring the same. That section also makes it obligatory for the Collector to submit report(s) to the appropriate Government containing his recommendations on the objections, together with the record of the proceedings held by him so that the Government may take appropriate decision on the objections. Section 6(1) provides that if the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made by the Collector under Section 5-A(2) that particular land is needed for the specified public purpose then a declaration should be made. This necessarily implies that the State Government is required to apply mind to the report of the Collector and take final decision on the objections filed by the landowners and other interested persons. Then and then only, a declaration can be made under Section 6(1).” 20. If the report prepared by the Land Acquisition Collector is scrutinised in the light of the principles laid down in the aforementioned judgments, we do not find any difficulty in holding that the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court committed serious error by approving the acquisition proceedings ignoring that the report was prepared in clear violation of mandate of Section 5-A and the State Government mechanically accepted the report leading to the issue of declaration issued under Section 6(1). In the original and supplementary objections filed by it, the appellant had claimed that the entire exercise of acquisition was vitiated due to mala fides and colourable exercise of power. The history of litigation between the parties was also cited by the appellant to substantiate its plea that the acquisition proceedings were initiated only after the management of the School lost legal battle up to this Court. It was also pleaded that the acquisition was meant to bypass the direction given by this Court to the management of the School to hand over the possession of the School. Unfortunately, the Land Acquisition Collector did not deal with any of the objections and summarily rejected the same as if compliance with Section 5-A(2) was an empty formality. The State Government also did not apply mind and mechanically approved the one-line recommendation made by the Land Acquisition Collector. 21. In our view, non-consideration of the objections filed under Section 5-A(1) has resulted in denial of effective opportunity of hearing to the appellant. The manner in which the Joint Secretary to the Government approved the recommendation made by the Land Acquisition Collector favouring acquisition of the property is reflective of total non- application of mind by the competent authority to the recommendation made by the Land Acquisition Collector and the report prepared by him. 22. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned order [Gojer Bros. (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B., APO No. 126 of 2012, decided on 19-6-2013 (Cal)] as also the one passed by the learned Single Judge in Gojer Bros. (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B. [Gojer Bros. (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B., 2012 AIR CC 1664 (Cal)] and are set aside. 23. What the Division Bench of the High Court has done is to substitute itself for the Land Acquisition Collector, examined the objections raised by the appellant on merits and concluded that no prejudice has been caused on account of violation of the mandate of Section 5-A(2). This was clearly impermissible. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained.” 12.3 In Prerana Bhat’s case supra, this Court held as under:- “8. The Apex Court in the case of HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPN. LTD., v. DARIUS SHAPUR CHENAI - (2005) 7 SCC 627 , was considering the scope of Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. This was clearly impermissible. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained.” 12.3 In Prerana Bhat’s case supra, this Court held as under:- “8. The Apex Court in the case of HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPN. LTD., v. DARIUS SHAPUR CHENAI - (2005) 7 SCC 627 , was considering the scope of Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. It has been held as under: “The Land Acquisition Act is an expropriatory legislation. In such a case the provisions of the statute should be strictly construed as it deprives a person of his land without consent. Section 5A of the Act confers a valuable and important right in favour of a person whose lands are sought to be acquired and having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300- A of the Constitution it has been held to be akin to a fundamental right. The State in exercise of its power of “eminent domain” may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid”. It has been further held as under: “The conclusiveness contained in Section 6 of the Act indisputably is attached to a need as also the purpose and in this regard ordinarily, the jurisdiction of the Court is limited but it is equally true that when an opportunity of being heard has expressly been conferred by a statute, the same must scrupulously be complied with. For the said purpose, Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act must be read conjointly. The Court in a case, where there has been total non-compliance or substantial non- compliance of the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act cannot fold its hands and refuse to grant a relief to the writ petitioner. Section 6(3) of the Act renders a declaration to be a conclusive evidence. But when the decision making process itself is in question, the power of judicial review can be exercised by the Court in the event the order impugned suffers from well-known principles, viz., illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. Moreover, when a statutory authority exercises such enormous power, it must be done in a fair and reasonable manner.” 12.4 In Women’s Education Trust’s case supra , the Apex Court held as under:- “Leave granted. Moreover, when a statutory authority exercises such enormous power, it must be done in a fair and reasonable manner.” 12.4 In Women’s Education Trust’s case supra , the Apex Court held as under:- “Leave granted. The importance of Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act”), which represents the statutory embodiment of one of the facets of the rules of natural justice i.e. audi alteram partem, has been highlighted in several judgments of this Court including Nandeshwar Prasad v. State of U.P. [ AIR 1964 SC 1217 : (1964) 3 SCR 425 ] , Munshi Singh v. Union of India [ (1973) 2 SCC 337 ] , Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra [ (1977) 1 SCC 133 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 49] , Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar [ (1993) 4 SCC 255 ] , Union of India v. Mukesh Hans [ (2004) 8 SCC 14 ] , Union of India v. Krishan Lal Arneja [ (2004) 8 SCC 453 ] , Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai [Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627 ] , Essco Fabs (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana [ (2009) 2 SCC 377 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 537] , Babu Ram v. State of Haryana [ (2009) 10 SCC 115 : (2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 69] , Anand Singh v. State of U.P. [ (2010) 11 SCC 242 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 423] , Dev Sharan v. State of U.P. [ (2011) 4 SCC 769 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 483] , Radhy Shyam v. State of U.P. [ (2011) 5 SCC 553 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 1] , Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana [ (2012) 1 SCC 792 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 402] , Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B. [(2012) 2 SCC 25 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 506] , Surinder Singh Brar v. Union of India [ (2013) 1 SCC 403 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 620] and Usha Stud and Agricultural Farms (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana [ (2013) 4 SCC 210 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 556] . 5. The principles which can be culled out from the above noted judgments are as under: 5.1. 5. The principles which can be culled out from the above noted judgments are as under: 5.1. The rule of audi alteram partem engrained in the scheme of Section 5-A of the Act ensures that before depriving any person of his land by compulsory acquisition, an effective opportunity must be given to him to contest the decision taken by the State Government/competent authority to acquire the particular parcel of land. 5.2. Any person interested in the land, which has been notified under Section 4(1) of the Act, can file objections under Section 5-A(1) and show that the purpose specified in the notification is really not a public purpose or that in the guise of acquiring the land for a public purpose the appropriate Government wants to confer benefit upon private persons or that the decision of the appropriate Government is arbitrary or is vitiated due to mala fides. 5.3. In response to the notice issued by the Land Acquisition Collector under Section 5-A(2) of the Act, the objector can make all possible endeavours to convince the Land Acquisition Collector that the acquisition is not for a public purpose specified in the notification issued under Section 4(1); that his land is not suitable for the particular purpose; that other more suitable parcels of land are available, which can be utilised for execution of the particular project or scheme. 5.4. The Land Acquisition Collector is duty-bound to objectively consider the arguments advanced by the objector and make recommendations, duly supported by brief reasons, as to why the particular piece of land should or should not be acquired and whether the plea put forward by the objector merits acceptance. In other words, the recommendations made by the Land Acquisition Collector should reflect objective application of mind to the entire record including the objections filed by the interested persons. 5.5. The Land Acquisition Collector is required to submit his report and the recommendations to the State Government along with the record of proceedings to enable the latter to take final call on the desirability, propriety and justification for the acquisition of the particular parcel(s) of land. 5.6. 5.5. The Land Acquisition Collector is required to submit his report and the recommendations to the State Government along with the record of proceedings to enable the latter to take final call on the desirability, propriety and justification for the acquisition of the particular parcel(s) of land. 5.6. The declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act can be issued only if the appropriate Government, on an objective application of mind to the objections filed by the interested persons including the landowners and the report of the Land Acquisition Collector, is satisfied that the land is needed for the particular purpose specified in the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. 32. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and scanned the record. 33. In our opinion, the impugned order [Women's Education Trust v. State of Haryana, CWP No. 18 of 2004, decided on 28-1-2011 (P&H)] is liable to be set aside on the short ground that the High Court disposed of the batch of writ petitions by simply adverting to the facts of CWP No. 18 of 2004. While doing so, the High Court completely ignored that in each case, the interested persons had filed separate objections under Section 5-A(1) and the Land Acquisition Collector had made separate recommendations. The High Court did not direct its attention to the factual matrix of the individual cases and dismissed all the petitions by erroneously assuming that the issues of facts and law involved therein were identical. The disposal of a batch of cases is attractive both for the Bar and the Bench because in most of the cases, the lawyer(s) appearing for the petitioner(s) in the main matter advances arguments and the remaining lawyers simply adopt those arguments. The Court finds it convenient to decide all the cases by one order because that saves the time and energy, which is otherwise required to be spent in dealing with individual matters. However, at times, this strategy results in more litigation because appeals and special leave petitions are filed, as has been done in these cases, with the grievance that the matter was decided without even taking cognizance of the grievance made by the individual petitioner. We may hasten to add that the methodology of deciding a batch of petitions by one order may work well if the facts of the cases constituting the batch are identical or almost identical. We may hasten to add that the methodology of deciding a batch of petitions by one order may work well if the facts of the cases constituting the batch are identical or almost identical. 12.5 In the instant case, a perusal of the material on record including the aforesaid order dated 27.12.2010 is sufficient to come to the conclusion that the same has been passed in clear contravention of the provisions contained in Section 5A of the L.A.Act by neither conducting necessary / requisite enquiry nor by assigning valid or cogent reasons and consequently, the said order as well as the impugned final notification / declaration are vitiated on account of being contrary to law and the same deserve to be quashed. 12.6 Accordingly, Point No.2 is also answered in favour of the petitioners by holding that the impugned final notification / declaration is vitiated on account of non-compliance of the provisions contained in Section 5A of the L.A.Act and the same deserves to be quashed on this ground also. Re-Point No.(iii):- 13. The last point that arises for consideration is as to whether the impugned award passed under Section 11 of the L.A.Act was made within the prescribed period of limitation of two years from the date of publication of the final notification / declaration as contemplated under Section 11A of the L.A.Act. 13.1 In Rajiv Gupta’s case supra , the Apex Court held as under:- “3. Shri Yogeshwar Prasad, learned Senior Counsel for the State, contended that a reading of Sections 11 and 11-A would indicate that unless prior approval of the appropriate Government or an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government was obtained by the Land Acquisition Officer, he has no power to pass the award. He also stated that the Government had issued statutory order directing that if the value of the acquisition exceeds Rs 1 crore, the prior approval of the Commissioner, Board of Revenue is mandatory. Before 21-12-1992 no prior approval was given and therefore there was no award made in the eye of law. What the Land Acquisition Officer communicated to the Commissioner, Board of Revenue, was only “proposed award” for prior approval. The date, 20-12-1992, is date on which he wrote the letter to the Commissioner seeking prior approval and that date could not and should not be considered to be a date on which the award was made. What the Land Acquisition Officer communicated to the Commissioner, Board of Revenue, was only “proposed award” for prior approval. The date, 20-12-1992, is date on which he wrote the letter to the Commissioner seeking prior approval and that date could not and should not be considered to be a date on which the award was made. Therefore, the High Court was wrong in its conclusion that the award was made on 20-12-1992. Shri Markandeya, learned counsel for the respondents, contended that pursuant to the direction issued by the Court on 23-11-1992, the Collector was required and made the award and sent it, though styled as a proposed award, to the Commissioner for approval. Except getting approval nothing further need to be done by the Collector and therefore the High Court is right in its holding that the Collector made the award on 20-11-1992. He being the statutory authority, there was no need for him to get any prior approval of the State Government or the Commissioner, nor could he be bound by it. Therefore, in the eye of law there is an award passed under Section 11 of the Act. He also further contended that when the Collector passed the award, pursuant to the direction issued by the Court, the authorities are bound to comply with the directions and, therefore, the final order passed by the High Court in the impugned judgment is consistent with its interim directions issued on 23-11-1992. 5. Its bare reading indicates and emphasises the limitation within which the award should be made and has been statutorily determined, namely, the Collector shall make an award within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration. It is common knowledge that after declaration was published, years used to roll by to make the award and the owners of the lands were put to great hardship. Parliament intended to relieve the owners of the lands from this hardship and pegging of the price prevailing as on date of publication of Section 4(1) notification. It is, therefore, a mandatory duty cast on the Land Acquisition Collector to make the award strictly in accordance with the limitation under Section 11-A. If no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse. It is, therefore, a mandatory duty cast on the Land Acquisition Collector to make the award strictly in accordance with the limitation under Section 11-A. If no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse. In other words, on expiry of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration unless the proviso is attracted, if no award is made in the meantime, in the eye of law the proceedings initiated under Section 4(1) of the Act culminated in the declaration made under Section 6 shall stand lapsed and no proceedings, in the eye of law thereafter do exist, to take further action. 6. Section 11 postulates of conducting an enquiry and making the award by the Collector. The first proviso envisages that “no award shall be made by the Collector under sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this behalf ”. It is common knowledge that exercising the power under the first proviso, the appropriate Government made rules or statutory orders or instructions whatever be the nomenclature, they have statutory operation giving authorisation to the Land Acquisition Collector to make an award up to a particular pecuniary limit without prior approval either of the appropriate Government or an officer authorised by the appropriate Government in that behalf. If the award exceeds the limit, prior approval of the State Governments or authorised officer is mandatory. Any award made in violation thereof, renders the award non est and void as it hinges upon the jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition Collector or Officer. No doubt, Mr Markandeya is right that the State had not produced before us rules or orders issued under the first proviso to Section 11 that the Land Acquisition Officer shall not make an award exceeding one crore of rupees without prior approval of the Commissioner, namely, Commissioner, Board of Revenue. But nonetheless, there is a statutory inhibition by first proviso to Section 11 that the prior approval either of the appropriate Government or of an officer which the appropriate Government authorises in that behalf, is mandatory for making an award. It is a condition precedent. But nonetheless, there is a statutory inhibition by first proviso to Section 11 that the prior approval either of the appropriate Government or of an officer which the appropriate Government authorises in that behalf, is mandatory for making an award. It is a condition precedent. Obviously, for this reason, the Collector in his letter dated 20- 12-1992, addressed to the Commissioner, seeking prior approval thus: “Proposed award *** Thus the proposed lands are disputed lands, and therefore, it has been mentioned in the proposed award that payment of compensation shall be made after obtaining the final report of the enquiry officer and the final judgment passed in the cases pending in different courts. Since, in the present case, the award is to be made up to 21-12-1992 only, it is to request you to kindly give your prior approval on the proposed award.” Its bare reading clearly indicates that the conscience that he is required to make the award on or before 21-12-1992 and to seek prior approval and accordingly he requested the Commissioner to grant him prior approval as is enjoined in the first proviso to Section 11 to make the proposed award. The heading of the award itself clearly indicates working of his mind that it is only a proposed award and after prior approval is given, he is enjoined to make the award under Section 11 of the Act. Since prior approval was not given before the expiry of 21-12-1992, there is no award made by the Land Acquisition Officer. In the eye of law the proposed award of the Collector under Section 11 of the Act is not the award. As seen, Section 11-A is mandatory and on expiry of two years from the date of publication of declaration, i.e., on 21-12-1992, the entire proceedings under the Act stood lapsed. We are not concerned in this case with the proviso to Section 11-A. The High Court was, therefore, not right in its construction that there was an award made by the Collector on 20-12-1992 and the direction to take further steps in that behalf are clearly illegal. The review petition is accordingly allowed. The order dated 10-12-1993 of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The review petition is accordingly allowed. The order dated 10-12-1993 of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The writ petition stands dismissed but in the circumstances parties are directed to bear their own costs.” 13.2 In Mohan’s case supra , the Apex Court held as under:- “9. In our opinion under Section 11-A what has to be seen is the date of last publication of the declaration under Section 6, and not any subsequent corrigendum to the said declaration. The only circumstance under which the period between the declaration under Section 6 and the award can be extended is mentioned in the Explanation to Section 11-A which states: “In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded.”” 13.3 In Singareni Collieries case supra , the Apex court held as under:- “3. With the dismissal of the writ petition and the appeal arising out of the same, the Collector made an award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act on 5-11-1999. The appellant Company's case is that all the owners, except the four respondents who had moved the High Court, sought a reference of the dispute regarding the quantum of compensation payable to them to the civil court in which the Senior Civil Judge, Manthani, District Karimnagar, A.P. held the expropriated owners entitled to receive compensation @ Rs 60,000 per acre besides enhanced value of the structure, wells and trees standing on the same. The appellant Company claims to have deposited one-third of the enhanced value of compensation in the appeal preferred by it against the award made by the civil court. The appeal is, according to the appellant, pending for disposal by the High Court. 4. In the meantime Respondents 1 to 4 in this appeal who apparently did not seek any reference to the civil court for enhancement of the compensation filed Writ Petition No. 22875 of 1999 challenging the validity of the award made by the LAO/Collector on the ground that the same was beyond the period of two years stipulated under Section 11-A of the Act. That contention found favour with the learned Single Judge of the High Court before whom the matter was argued. That contention found favour with the learned Single Judge of the High Court before whom the matter was argued. The Single Judge held [Vemuganti Ramkrishn Rao v. Deptt. of Energy, Forest & Environment Science, WP No. 22875 of 1999, order dated 4-7-2001 (AP)] that the award having been passed beyond the period of limitation stipulated under Section 11-A of the Act, the land acquisition proceedings had lapsed. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. 12. The above, in our opinion, is a complete answer to the contention urged on behalf of the appellant that not only the period during which the interim order of stay remains in force but also the time taken for obtaining the copy of the order vacating the stay should be excluded for reckoning the period of two years stipulated under Section 11-A of the Act. 17. We are in respectful agreement with the above line of reasoning in Ravi Khullar case [ (2007) 5 SCC 231 ] . Section 11-A in terms does not provide for exclusion of the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the judgment or order by which the stay order was either granted or vacated. Section 12 of the Limitation Act has no application to the making of an award under the Land Acquisition Act. In the absence of any enabling provision either in Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act or in the Limitation Act, there is no room for borrowing the principles underlying Section 12 of the Limitation Act for computing the period or determining the validity of an award by reference to Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. 25. The High Court was in the above circumstances perfectly justified in holding that the award made by the Collector/Land Acquisition Officer was non est and that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed by reason of a breach of Section 11-A of the Act. We, however, make it clear that the declaration granted by the High Court and proceedings initiated by the Collector shall be deemed to have lapsed only qua the writ petitioner-respondents herein. With these observations, these appeals fail and are hereby dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs.” 13.4 In Lok Seva Shikshan Mandal’s case supra , the Apex Court held as under:- “12. With these observations, these appeals fail and are hereby dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs.” 13.4 In Lok Seva Shikshan Mandal’s case supra , the Apex Court held as under:- “12. Bare reading of Section 11-A leaves no room of doubt that the Collector is enjoined to make an award within a period of two years from the date of publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act. “If no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse.” Explanation to Section 11-A, however, states as to how period of two years should be counted. It clarifies that in computing the period of two years referred to in the section, the period during which any action or proceedings is stayed by an order of a court would be excluded. Whereas it is contended by the first respondent that the case on hand is governed by the main provision of Section 11-A, the argument of the appellant is that it is governed by the Explanation to the said provision.” 13.5 In N.V.Ramesh’s case supra , this Court held as under:- “10. As held by the Apex Court, in the absence of any interim order/stay order/restraint order passed in favour of the petitioners during the pendency of the writ petition, there was no impediment or obstacle for the respondents, to pass an award or proceed to pass the award with in the period of two years from the date of issuance of final notification. In other words, having regard to the provisions contended in Section 11(A) of the Act, coupled with the decision of the Apex Court in Loka sewa Shikshan mandal v.s A.R. Munidhara Charitable Trust quoted supra, I am of the considered opinion that since the award has been passed on 18.01.2016 beyond the period of two years as prescribed under Section 11(A), in the absence of any restraint order/interim order/stay order, in these petitions the impugned award, notifications and acquisitions proceedings deserve to be quashed.” 13.6 In M.Suresh Kumar’s case supra , this Court held as under:- “22. Answer to Point No.3: What is the reference point of time for considering the period prescribed under Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894? 22.1. This aspect has already been adverted to in answer to Points No.1 and 2 above. Answer to Point No.3: What is the reference point of time for considering the period prescribed under Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894? 22.1. This aspect has already been adverted to in answer to Points No.1 and 2 above. A Perusal of Sub-  Section (2) of Section 6 of L.A.Act which has been reproduced hereinabove, indicates that the last date of publication and giving of such public notice, shall be the date of publication of the declaration. 22.2. Thus, there could be two situations which could arise viz. there could be one final declaration which is published. If that be so, then the date on which the said final declaration was published would be the date of the declaration. However, if there are multiple final declarations published, for example, if there are five final declarations published, then it is the date on which the last declaration i.e., the 5th declaration was published, which would be the reference point of time for considering the period fixed under Section 11A of L.A.Act.” 13.7 In Shabbir Ahmed’s case supra, this Court held as under:- “9. During the course of arguments, it is brought to our notice that as of now, if the award is not passed, Section 11A of the Act is squarely applicable. It is also brought to our notice that on an inspection by the team of the respondents, a report is submitted that these lands are not suitable for construction of houses considering the geographical condition of the lands. 11. When an award is not passed within two years from the date of the final declaration under Section 6(1) of the L.A. Act, Section 11A is squarely applicable. Therefore,  on this ground the appeal of the appellant is required to be allowed because from the date of declaration till now, there was no order of stay granted by any Court restraining the respondents from passing the award. 12. In the result, the appeal is allowed. Therefore,  on this ground the appeal of the appellant is required to be allowed because from the date of declaration till now, there was no order of stay granted by any Court restraining the respondents from passing the award. 12. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The acquisition of the appellant's land initiated by the respondents is hereby declared to be lapsed on account of non-passing of the award within two years as contemplated under Section 11A of the L.A. Act.” 13.8 In the instant case, it is relevant to state that while according to the petitioners, the last date of publication of the final notification in the official gazette was on 30.06.2011 and that there was no publication of the final notification in the village chavdi on 16.08.2011 as contended by the respondents, who would contend that the same was actually published in the village chavdi on 16.08.2011; while dealing with Point No.1 supra, I have noticed the inherent discrepancies, deficiencies, lacuna etc., in the mahazar dated 16.07.2010 in relation to the publication of the preliminary notification; the very same infirmities are contained and found in the alleged mahazar dated 16.08.2011 relied upon by the respondents which will indicate that the same contains alleged signatures of persons/witnesses without disclosing their names,  identities, material particulars etc., as required in law; in addition thereto, the original records also do not contain any crossreference to the alleged mahazar which is the only document relied upon by the respondents to substantiate their contention that they published the final notification in the village chavdi on 16.08.2011 as contended by them, thereby casting a serious doubt as to the very genuineness, authenticity and validity of the said document; further, the factum of the final notification having been published on 16.08.2011 is also not corroborated by contemporaneous material which are conspicuously absent and not produced by the respondents. It is therefore clear that the respondents have failed to establish that they had published the final notification / declaration in the village chavdi on 16.08.2011 and that the last date of such publication was in the official gazette on 30.06.2011; it follows therefrom that the award ought to have been passed before 30.06.2013 i.e., within a period of two years as contemplated under Section 11A of the L.A.Act. 13.9 The respondents contend that the award was passed by the LAO on 10.06.2013 and was approved by the State Government on 19.07.2013 which related back to the date of the  award i.e., 10.06.2013 which was well within the prescribed period of limitation of two years which expired on 30.06.2013; on the other hand, petitioners contend that the award was not passed on 10.06.2013 as falsely contended by the respondents and that was passed only subsequent to 30.06.2013 and that the same was barred by limitation. In this regard, it is necessary to state that both the respondents – State and ISRO have categorically, unequivocally and unambiguously stated in their statement of objections to the writ petitions that the award was passed on 19.07.2013; secondly, the date 10.06.2013 has been written in hand as can be seen from the impugned award which is said to have been approved on 19.07.2013; thirdly, the original records submitted to this Court will also indicate that there is neither any corroborative material nor cross reference to the fact that the award was actually passed on 10.06.2013 and approved subsequently on 19.07.2013; fourthly, the award notices were issued to the land owners more than one year thereafter from 15.11.2014 onwards; lastly, the respondents have not produced any corroborative or legal or acceptable material to establish that the award was passed on 10.06.2013. The cumulative effect of these facts and  circumstances and material on record is sufficient to come to the unmistakable conclusion that the award was passed on 19.07.2013, well beyond the prescribed period of limitation of two years on 30.06.2013 and consequently, the impugned award as well as the acquisition proceedings deserve to be quashed. 13.10 Accordingly, Point No.3 is also answered in favour of the petitioners by holding that the impugned award passed under Section 11 of the L.A.Act was not made within the prescribed period of limitation of two years from the date of publication of the final notification / declaration as contemplated under Section 11A of the L.A.Act and consequently, the impugned award as well as the acquisition proceedings deserve to be quashed. 14. In the result, I pass the following:- ORDER (i) Petitions are hereby allowed. 14. In the result, I pass the following:- ORDER (i) Petitions are hereby allowed. (ii) The impugned acquisition proceedings in relation to the subject lands qua the petitioners arising out of the preliminary notification dated 28.01.2010 and final notification / declaration dated 30.05.2011 and award dated 19.07.2013 issued / passed by  the respondents are hereby quashed insofar as the subject lands of the petitioners are concerned