JUDGMENT : (A.K. JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR, J.) These writ appeals preferred by the State impugn the common judgment dated 30.05.2017 of the learned Single Judge in WP(C) Nos.28422, 31084, 31131, 31138 of 2012. The short issue decided by the learned Single Judge was whether a claimant for compensation under under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act was entitled to base his claim in respect of the land acquired from his possession, on an award passed by the Lok Adalat. The said issue was answered in the affirmative by the learned Single Judge by the judgment impugned in these writ appeals. 2. When these writ appeals came up for hearing before us, the learned Government Pleader brought to our notice the judgment of the Supreme Court in New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) v. Yunus and Others [ 2022 (9) SCC 516 ], wherein the Supreme Court categorically held that an application under Section 28A cannot be maintained on the basis of an award passed by the Lok Adalat under Section 20. The reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgment can be paraphrased in the following terms: i. An award passed by the Lok Adalat under 1987 Act is the culmination of a non adjudicatory process where the parties are persuaded even by members of the Lok Adalat to arrive at a mutually agreeable compromise. The provisions contained in Section 21 of the Act, by which the Award is treated as if it were a decree is intended only to clothe the Award with enforceability. The purport of the law giver being only to confer the Award with an enforceability in a like manner as if it were a decree, the legal fiction that the Award is to be treated as a decree cannot be extended further. ii. Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act deals with determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the Award of the Court. The reference to the word ‘Court’ implies that an Award under Part III of the Act for the purposes of Section 28A must necessarily be one that was passed consequently to a reference under Section 18. In such cases, the Court proceeds to adjudicate the reference, in particular, bearing in mind, the matter which are to be considered under Section 23 of the Act. iii. In such cases, the Court proceeds to adjudicate the reference, in particular, bearing in mind, the matter which are to be considered under Section 23 of the Act. iii. For the provisions of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act to be attracted, not only must the award passed be a result of an adjudication, but it must also be passed by “the Court” allowing compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector. The composition of a Lok Adalat in Section 19(2) of the 1987 Act does not make it ‘a Court’ for the purposes of the Land Acquisition Act. iv. In view of the reasons stated above, an application under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be maintained on the basis of an award passed by the Lok Adalat under Section 20 of the 1987 Act. 3. While these appeals could have been allowed by merely referring to the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, we cannot be oblivious to the plight of the respondents herein, who now face a situation where, notwithstanding specific directions issued form this Court to entertain their application under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act and award a higher compensation based on the Lok Adalat award, have to be satisfied with the meager amounts awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer, since the directions issued by this Court in earlier writ petitions, (which have attained finality since they were not challenged by the State in any further proceedings) were not complied with by the appellants herein within the time granted by this Court. In matters involving compulsory acquisition of lands from citizens, we feel we would be forsaking a great tradition if we do not come to the rescue of hapless persons simply because the legal position has changed owing to a subsequent declaration of law by the Supreme Court. In our view, since the respondents herein trace their right to receive compensation to the provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution, it would be the duty of this Court to try and ensure that, notwithstanding the technical objections to their claim for compensation, they are paid compensation at par with what has already been paid to other persons from whom lands were compulsorily acquired for the purposes of the same project, namely, ‘the Karapuzha Irrigation Project’. 4. 4. The respondents in all these cases are persons who owned properties in Vythiri Taluk of Wayanad District and their properties were acquired as per a common notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act for the Karapuzha Irrigation Project. While the Land Acquisition Officer had fixed the market value of the lands acquired from them, at a rate of Rs.6,200/- per Cent, the respondents, on account of certain peculiar circumstances applicable to them, did not prefer any application for reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. While so, on 10.12.2011 at a Lok Adalat organized by the Taluk Legal Services Committee, Sultan Bathery, LAR No.1 of 2008 of Sub Court, Sultan Bathery was settled by the District Collector, Wayanad, by agreeing to pay an amount of Rs.10,600/- per Cent for the acquired lands. It was taking note of the said award of the Lok Adalt that the respondents herein submitted applications under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, seeking a re-determination of the compensation paid to them on the basis of the said Award. 5. When the applications preferred by them under Section 28A of the Act, were not entertained by the Land Acquisition Officer, the respondents approached this Court through the writ petitions aforementioned, which the learned Single Judge allowed by directing the Special Tahsildar to consider the applications preferred by the respondents and to pass appropriate orders thereon within six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. 6. It would appear that the specific directions in the said judgment were not complied with by the Special Tahsildar, who, in gross violation of the directions issued from this Court, passed an order stating that the award passed by the Lok Adalat cannot be treated as a decree of the Civil Court. This led the respondents to approach this Court yet again through another writ petition (WP(C) No.22396 of 2019) which was disposed by a judgment dated 19.06.2020 directing the Special Tahsildar to, once again, consider the matter on merits in the light of the declaration of law by this Court in the judgment dated 30.05.2017 in WP(C) No.28422 of 2012 and connected cases, within a period of two months from the date of the judgment. Surprisingly, the Special Tahsildar did not comply even with the aforesaid direction issued from this Court. Surprisingly, the Special Tahsildar did not comply even with the aforesaid direction issued from this Court. The State, however, preferred the present writ appeals, with a delay of 1883 days, after taking note of the judgment dated 03.02.2022 of the Supreme Court referred above. 7. As can be seen from the aforesaid narration of facts, the unfortunate circumstances in which the respondents herein find themselves in have arisen only due to the lapse on the part of the Special Tahsildar to comply with the directions issued from this Court. We are cognizant of the fact that we cannot direct the State to now comply with those directions since that would be going against the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgment referred above. We do feel however, that the outcome of these writ appeals should not work to the prejudice of the respondents, at least in the matter of obtaining reasonable amounts of compensation which other landowners in the neighbourhood had obtained from the reference Court in respect of the lands acquired from them. We are told that the reference Court had in similar matters, fixed the market value of the acquired land in the area at Rs.10,400/- per Cent, which is only Rs.200/- less than what was fixed by the Lok Adalat in the award that was relied upon by the respondents. The respondents cannot now be relegated to their remedies under the Land Acquisition Act for getting the aforesaid compensation amount in view of the limitation period prescribed under the said statute that would prevent them from pursuing their claims. 8. We feel the ends of justice would require us to extend to the respondents the benefit of the enhanced compensation obtained by other land holders in the same area from whom lands were compulsorily acquired for the same project. Such a direction would only be in conformity with the principles of fairness laid down by the Supreme Court, in matters of compensation granted for the compulsory acquisition of property from a citizen. The precedents of the Supreme Court also require us to take a proactive approach in matters of land acquisition so as to ensure that the Constitutional safeguards against an unfair deprivation of property of citizens by way of compulsory acquisition are not violated. The precedents of the Supreme Court also require us to take a proactive approach in matters of land acquisition so as to ensure that the Constitutional safeguards against an unfair deprivation of property of citizens by way of compulsory acquisition are not violated. We, therefore, deem it appropriate to direct that the appellants shall ensure that the respondent claimants are paid an amount of Rs.10,400/- per Cent towards the market value of the lands acquired from them, and the compensation due to them fixed accordingly by taking the said market value into consideration. The respondents shall also be entitled to the statutory benefits that flow from the said revised fixation of the market value. As regards the payment of statutory interest, we make it clear that although the Section 4(1) notification was of the year 2000, in the peculiar factual situation in these cases, the interest on the compensation amount need be paid only for the period from 30.05.2017, the date of the impugned judgment in these appeals, till the date of payment of the compensation amounts to the respondents. The writ appeals preferred by the State are thus allowed by following the judgment of the Supreme Court in New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) v. Yunus and Others [ 2022 (9) SCC 516 ], subject to the directions issued in relation to the respondents, as above.