JUDGMENT : Easwaran S., J. Can State of Kerala claim absolute right, title and interest over properties relinquished in favour of erstwhile Travancore State in the absence of any particular statute governing the procedure for such relinquishment is the essence of the dispute raised in this Regular Second Appeal ?. The plaintiffs in O.S No.552 of 1992 on the files of I Additional Sub Court, Thiruvananthapuram, in a suit for declaration of title, recovery of possession and mandatory injunction of the plaint schedule property are the appellants herein. 2. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are as follows:- The plaintiffs are the members of Noorani tarwad, who were in possession of 1 Acre of property in Survey No.169/4A of Thiruvallam Village, which is scheduled in the plaint. According to the plaintiffs, the property was given to erstwhile State of Travancore, ruled by the Royal Family, during 1952 on the assurance that, it would be acquired, on payment of compensation or the Government would cease to occupy the said property whenever so demanded by the Tharwad. There were several yielding trees in the said property and the plaintiffs were collecting the usufructs from the said property. The occupation of the 1 st defendant was purely permissive. Even at the time of filing of the suit, the plaintiffs were shown as the owners of the property in the revenue records. Finding that the Government is occupying the property without paying compensation and that making substantial improvements therein, the plaintiffs decided to issue a lawyer's notice on 20.08.1991, calling the State of Kerala to surrender the vacant possession of the land by terminating the licence to use the occupied plaint schedule property. To the said notice, on 01.01.1992, the District Collector, Thiruvananthapuram, replied by requiring the plaintiffs to produce documents to show their possession. Thus, after issuing notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, the plaintiffs approached the Sub-Court, Thiruvananthapuram, seeking for a mandatory injunction directing the defendant to hand over the vacant possession of the plaint schedule property. Subsequently, the suit was amended by incorporating a prayer for declaration of title and also recovery of possession. This was by order dated 04.02.1993. The defendant entered appearance and contested the suit by raising an issue regarding maintainability of the suit. Subsequently, the suit was amended by incorporating a prayer for declaration of title and also recovery of possession. This was by order dated 04.02.1993. The defendant entered appearance and contested the suit by raising an issue regarding maintainability of the suit. According to the defendant, the property was given as a gift to the erstwhile State of Travancore and that subsequent to the coming into force of the Kerala State, the property stood vested with the State of Kerala. It was further contended that, except Ext.A1 Partition Deed, no other document is produced by the plaintiffs to substantiate their claims that they are in possession of the plaint schedule property. Additional written statement was also filed to controvert the contentions raised pursuant to the amendments made by the plaintiffs. In the additional written statement it was specifically contended that the Karanavar of the Tarwad gifted the plaint schedule property to the Government for establishing the Government OfÏce through which the locality was developed and the land value of the plaint schedule property held by the plaintiffs also increased. The ultimate aim of the Karanavar of the plaintiffs is the welfare and development of the family and the property that the Karanavar, who was one competent to surrender or gift the property for the welfare of the family, cannot be challenged at this point of time. On behalf of the plaintiffs, Exts.A1 to A9 documents were produced and on behalf of the defendants Exts.B1 to B5 documents were produced. PW1 was examined on behalf of plaintiffs and DW1 was examined on behalf of the defendants. The Trial Court on the basis of the material evidence and pleadings on record framed the following questions:- 1. Whether the suit is not maintainable? 2. Whether the defendant had given any assurance in 1952 that the plaint schedule property would either be acquired on payment of compensation or cease to occupy the same whenever demanded as alleged in the plaint? 3. Whether the plaint schedule land was surrendered to the Government free of costs in 1952 by the then karanaver of the plaintiffs family ? 4. Whether the plaintiffs or their predecessor in interest had ever possessed the plaint schedule property any time? 5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get possession of the property with mesne profits as prayed for ? 6. Reliefs and costs ? Addl. 4. Whether the plaintiffs or their predecessor in interest had ever possessed the plaint schedule property any time? 5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get possession of the property with mesne profits as prayed for ? 6. Reliefs and costs ? Addl. Issue No.7 :- Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration as sought for? 3. On appreciation of the pleadings and evidence, the Trial Court came into conclusion that the claim for declaration of the title and possession is not maintainable inasmuch as Ext.A1 Partition Deed did not include the plaint schedule property towards the ‘Thavazhi’ of the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree, the plaintiffs preferred A.S No.75/2010. The District Court by judgment dated 28.10.2015, confirmed the findings of the Trial Court by holding that the plaintiffs' predecessor had gifted the property to the State of Kerala and therefore there is a valid relinquishment. By holding so, the District Court rejected the argument of the appellants, that in order to constitute a valid relinquishment, the procedures under the Kerala Land Relinquishment Act, 1958, has to be followed and that it has no retrospective effect. Thus the appeal was dismissed and therefore the plaintiffs are before this Court with the present appeal. 4. Heard Shri.Praveen K. Joy, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, the learned Government Pleader for the State of Kerala and Shri.Suman Chakravarthi, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Corporation of Thiruvananthapuram, which was subsequently impleaded as the additional 17 th respondent in the appeal. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants would point out that as per Ext.A6 Thandaper register, which was issued on 10.04.1987, the name of the plaintiffs are shown as the owner of the plaint schedule property. In order to substantiate the fact that after the alleged gift in favour of the State of Kerala was made by the Karanavar and that the Government had acted upon the said gift and have done changes in the revenue records, an attempt has been made by the Government to produce Ext.B4, which is a subsequently created document and will not confer any title over the plaint schedule property in favour of the State of Kerala. It is further pointed out that no relinquishment was done by the Karanavar and it was only a temporary entrustment and the plaint schedule property has been reserved for future partition in Ext.A1 Deed. Therefore, the plaintiffs' family being the rightful claimant over the plaint schedule property was perfectly justified and in maintaining the suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The mere silence on the part of the plaintiffs to question the permissive occupation of the State Government over the plaint schedule property will not ipso facto lead to a conclusion that the plaintiffs have given up their rights over the plaint schedule property. It is further pointed out that, if the Government had any intention to assert the right over the plaint schedule property, they would have done so prior to the issuance of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Only when the notice was issued by the plaintiffs, the District Collector required the appellants to produce the evidence to show their possession. 6. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the State of Kerala would contend that there is no reservation in Ext.A1, which would entitle the plaintiffs to claim absolute right title and interest over the property, in the absence of any prior title deed, over which the plaintiffs claimed the right title and interest. The Partition Deed alone cannot confer any title in favour of the plaintiffs. In absence of such a document, the Trial Court rightly found that on consideration of Ext.A1, the plaintiffs do not have any title over the plaint schedule property. 7. Shri.Suman Chakaravarthy, the learned Standing counsel appearing for the Corporation of Thiruvananthapuram, contended that from 1952 onwards, the property is vested with the Government and after the States Reorganisation Act, the State of Kerala became the rightful owner of the property. A Veterinary Hospital has been established in the said property and there after the property stood vested with Thiruvallam Panchayat and once the Thiruvallam Panchayat merged with the Trivandrum Corporation, the property became included in the Asset Register of the Trivandrum Corporation and thus vested with them. At this point, the learned counsel would point out that several community development activities have been carried out and the plaintiffs were always obstructing them on the premises, that they have a right over the property. At this point, the learned counsel would point out that several community development activities have been carried out and the plaintiffs were always obstructing them on the premises, that they have a right over the property. It is further pointed out that as per the provisions of Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 , even if it is assumed that it is a licence, cannot be revoked, if the licensee had made substantial constructions and put up structures pursuant to the licence agreement. Therefore, it is prayed that the dismissal of the suit, which was also confirmed by the First Appellate Court, does not require any interference. 8. When the appeal was admitted on 26.09.2016, this Court framed the following substantial questions of law:- (i) Whether the First Appellate Court was justified in drawing an analogy from the provisions of the Kerala Land Relinquishment Act in respect of a transaction that admittedly arose prior to its enactment? (ii) Whether the principles in the Kerala Land Relinquishment could be applied retrospectively more particularly since the said enactment itself is brought into force with prospective effect? (iii) Whether the question as to the applicability of the provisions of Kerala Land Relinquishment Act could have been resorted to in the judgment more particularly since the said issue was never mooted by the parties? (iv) Whether in the light of the stand that the plaint schedule property was gifted to the Government, the Courts were justified in upholding the said claim in the absence of any document to evidence the transfer of any right in favour of the Government? (v) Whether the courts below have erred in denying a relief to the plaintiffs on the sole score that the partition deed did not include the plaint schedule property? (vi) Whether the mere fact that the partition deed made mention of a gift in favour of the Government could have served as a ground to deny the title and possession of the plaintiffs? 9. In the light of substantial questions of law framed as above, it becomes imperative for this Court to answer the same on the findings presented, in order to see whether the plaintiffs can succeed in the suit for declaration of title. 10. The facts as narrated above, would clearly show that the plaintiffs are asserting their right over the plaint schedule property based on Ext.A1 Partition Deed. 10. The facts as narrated above, would clearly show that the plaintiffs are asserting their right over the plaint schedule property based on Ext.A1 Partition Deed. The perusal of Ext.A1 Partition Deed would show that the C schedule is allotted to the 2 nd plainti property forms part of item No.4. The description of item No.4 reads as under:- 11. A cursory reading of the description of the property would show that, when the properties were partitioned by the Karanavar, extent of 1 Acre 4 cents was not reserved for the branches of the 2nd plaintiff. Of course, it is the specific contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants that it was reserved to be claimed later after getting the property from the Government. However, read as may, this Court could not find any said reservations in Ext.A1, which would entitle the plaintiffs to claim right title and interest over the property at a later point of time. Therefore, it is clear that the plaint schedule property was not allotted to the share of the 2 nd plaintiff-P.Kamalakshi Amma. 12. Can the plaintiff’s still claim title over the property not allotted to them under the partition deed?. This question assumes importance especially since, the plaintiff’s have not adduced any evidence to show that other than Ext.A1, they had derived right title and interest over the plaint schedule property by virtue of another deed. Presumably realising that there are no other documents other than Ext.A1 to claim title over the plaint schedule property, the plaintiffs set up their case contenting before this Court, that the Karnavar was not competent to execute any gift deed or any deed of conveyance thereby,transferring the plaint schedule property to the erstwhile State of Travancore in the year 1952. However, pertinently, neither the 2 nd plainti plaintiff had any such case between 1960 and 1992. The callousness on the part of the plaintiff’s, to question the dedication of the property in favour of the erstwhile State of Travancore either before 1956 or immediately thereafter, would show that the parties never intended to claim any right over the plaint schedule property. It is only during 1991, that the plaintiffs turned around and raked up their claim, raising a plea that, what was permitted was only a licence to occupy and not a gift or relinquishment. It is only during 1991, that the plaintiffs turned around and raked up their claim, raising a plea that, what was permitted was only a licence to occupy and not a gift or relinquishment. However, it must be noted that, at no point of time, a challenge was raised as regards, the exclusion of plaint schedule property in Ext.A1. Therefore, this court cannot but hold, that the appellant- plaintiff’s failed to establish title over the plaint schedule property. 13. The learned counsel for the appellants, fervently tried to point out that as per the revenue records, the property is still vests with them. Therefore the dedication in favour of the State is bad. This argument has basic infirmities. Firstly, the plaintiff’s miserably failed to establish their title. Secondly, there is no document to show that, the right of the plaintiff’s to claim back the plaint schedule property was reserved under Ext.A1. Therefore, even assuming that in the revenue records, the plaintiff’s name finds a place, that by itself will not entitled them to sustain their plea, in view of the settled position that the revenue records do not confer any title over the property. If that be so, it must be held that the plaintiffs had no right title and interest over the property at the time of institution of the suit. 14. In the above backdrop, this Court proceeds to consider the substantial questions of law raised as above. The first three questions which have been framed by this Court for consideration is as regards the sustenance of the dedication or the gift or the so called gift in favour of erstwhile State of Travancore before the Kerala Land Relinquishment Act came into force. It is pertinent to mention that the indisputable facts shows that in the year 1952, there was a dedication or as a gift going by the terminology used in Ext.A1 in respect of plaint schedule property in favour of erstwhile State of Travancore. Nobody knows exactly, what is the nature of transactions entered by the parties. Plaintiff’s presume that no registered documents were executed by the parties concerned for the said dedication. There are no enabling provisions under the Kerala Land Relinquishment Act, 1958, which applies to the relinquishment made prior to 1956. That be so, the provisions of the Kerala Land Relinquishment Act will not apply in the present case. Plaintiff’s presume that no registered documents were executed by the parties concerned for the said dedication. There are no enabling provisions under the Kerala Land Relinquishment Act, 1958, which applies to the relinquishment made prior to 1956. That be so, the provisions of the Kerala Land Relinquishment Act will not apply in the present case. In fact, this court must say that the question of law framed as such is improper especially since the Land Relinquishment Act does not have any retrospective operation. True, the first appellate court, was carried away by drawing analogy from the provisions of the Kerala Land Relinquishment Act 1958. However, that by itself will not improve the case of the appellants, since the conclusion drawn by the first appellate court is sustainable for other reasons. Therefore, while answering the questions of law 1 to 3 raised above, it is held that though, the Kerala Land Relinquishment Act 1958 does not have retrospective effect, still the relinquishment in favour of the erstwhile Travancore State is not invalid and that the analogy drawn by the first appellate court is totally unwarranted. 15. Before moving forward, this court is required to consider whether there was any enabling statute which permitted the individuals to relinquish the right over their property in favour of the erstwhile State of Travancore. It must be remembered that prior to 1956, when the State of Kerala was formed, the erstwhile State of Travancore was ruled by the Royal King. During the pre-independence period, there were hardly any laws which controlled the relinquishment of land in favour of the Maharaja. The Travancore State was largely a princely state, where the Maharaja enjoyed a considerable degree of internal autonomy. Therefore, when such relinquishment or dedication is required, it is done predominantly through a royal declaration. 16. The status of the property held by the erstwhile State of Travancore, underwent a drastic change once the State of Kerala was formed in the year 1956. By virtue of States Reorganisation Act 1956, (Act 37 of 1956), the right title and interest over the plaint schedule property stood vested with the State of Kerala. After the States Reorganisation Act came into existence, the entire asset got automatically vested with the State Of Kerala. By virtue of States Reorganisation Act 1956, (Act 37 of 1956), the right title and interest over the plaint schedule property stood vested with the State of Kerala. After the States Reorganisation Act came into existence, the entire asset got automatically vested with the State Of Kerala. By virtue of Section 5 of the Act, the territory of Travancore Cochin, excluding the territories mentioned under Section 4, stood vested in the State of Kerala. By virtue of Section 76 of the Act 37 of 1956, all assets of the erstwhile Travancore state stood vested with the State of Kerala. Hence, irrespective of manner by which the relinquishment of the plaint schedule property took place in favour of erstwhile State of Travancore, once Act 37 of 1956 was promulgated, the State of Kerala became the custodian of all the assets of the erstwhile princely State. Therefore, when there is a statutory vesting of the property, in the favour of the State of Kerala, the plaintiff’s cannot be heard to contend that the relinquishment in the year 1952 was not proper and hence the consequent holding is also invalid. 17. That apart, Article 295 (2) of the Constitution of India, succinctly delineates the manner in which succession to property, assets rights , liabilities and obligations are evolved. Article 295 (2) reads as under. 1 Xxxxxxx 2 Subject as aforesaid, the Government of each State specified in Part B of the First Schedule shall, as from the commencement of the corresponding Indian State as regards all property and assets and all rights, liabilities and obligations, whether arising out of any contract or otherwise, other than those referred to in clause (1). Reading of Article 295(2) would dispel any doubt as regards the entitlement of the State of Kerala to hold the property in question. Therefore when the Constitution guarantees a right in favour of the State, the courts cannot ignore the same and hold a roving enquiry as to whether relinquishment was proper or not. Moreover, it must be remembered that the plaintiff’s failed miserably in their attempt to prove that the alleged relinquishment was contrary to the existing law. Therefore when the Constitution guarantees a right in favour of the State, the courts cannot ignore the same and hold a roving enquiry as to whether relinquishment was proper or not. Moreover, it must be remembered that the plaintiff’s failed miserably in their attempt to prove that the alleged relinquishment was contrary to the existing law. In the light of the above discussions, this court holds that the possession of the plaint schedule property by the State of Kerala is protected under Section 76 of the Act 37 of 1956 as well as under Article 295(2) of the Constitution of India and hence the fourth question of law is answered against the appellant. 18. Before proceeding to answer the other questions raised by this Court, it is necessary to deal with the precedents, cited across the Bar by the learned counsel for the appellants. The learned counsel for the appellants relied on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Natarajan v. Village OfÏcer [ 2013 (1) KLT 846 ] and the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Mukeshkumar and others [ (2011)10 SCC 404 ]. The Division Bench decision in Natarajan (supra) dealt with a case of a relinquishment under Section 4 of the Kerala Land Relinquishment Act, 1958. It was held that even in the absence of any formal order under Section 4 would not lead to an automatic restoration of land in favour of the registered holder, who had voluntarily relinquished the same. It is the specific case of the learned counsel for the appellants that the reliance placed by the First Appellate Court to the aforesaid decision is completely misconceived, since the decision arose out of the applicability of the Kerala Land Relinquishment Act, 1958. Therefore, it is contended that the findings of the First Appellate Court are erroneous and perverse. 19. However, this court is of the considered view that the above decision is not applicable to the facts of this case inasmuch as the same arose under the provisions of the Kerala Land Relinquishment Act 1958. This court has already held that in the light of Article 295(2) of the Constitution of India and also the provisions contained under the States Reorganisation Act 1956, the State of Kerala is entitled to hold the property, Hence the aforesaid contention is liable to be rejected. 20. This court has already held that in the light of Article 295(2) of the Constitution of India and also the provisions contained under the States Reorganisation Act 1956, the State of Kerala is entitled to hold the property, Hence the aforesaid contention is liable to be rejected. 20. Insofar as the decision in Mukeshkumar (supra) is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the State cannot claim adverse possession being a welfare State and cannot acquire the land of the citizen by adverse possession. Though, the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court cannot be disputed, in the facts of the present case, the possession by the State of Kerala is not based on adverse possession but on the basis of a relinquishment made by the Karnavar of the Tarwad of the appellants. That be so, the possession is pursuant to a grant and hence the question of adverse possession will not apply. Here the defence set up by the State of Kerala is not by adverse possession. 21. Lastly, it is contended by the learned counsel for the Appellant that as per the provisions of Travancore/Cochin Land Conservancy Act (Act 19 of 1951) the holders of the land are subjected to the payment of land revenue to the Government. Section 3(1)(c) provides for the payment of land revenue by any other registered holder of land in proprietary right. Based on the aforesaid provision, it is contended with reference to the additional documents produced along with I.A No.2/2022, that these properties were included in the register and therefore it could not have been relinquished. 22. However, the above argument is thoroughly misconceived. Explanation -I to Section 3 reads as under Lands once registered in the name of a person but subsequently abandoned or relinquished and all lands held by right of escheat, purchase , resumption, reversion or acquisition under the Travancore or Cochin Land Acquisition Act are the property of the Government within the meaning of the section. Therefore, even if a person was subjected to payment of fee over a holding in favour of erstwhile State of Travancore, inasmuch as the right over the said holding was relinquished, by virtue of the Explanation -I, it becomes the property of the Government. The above provision would dispel any doubt as regards the question- in whose favour the proprietary rights stood vested?. The above provision would dispel any doubt as regards the question- in whose favour the proprietary rights stood vested?. Therefore, the additional documents produced before this court in an application under Order 41 Rule 27, will not improve the case of the appellants. Hence this court is of the considered view that the application under Order 41 Rule 27 is not at all germane to the issue raised in this appeal and accordingly the same is rejected. 23. That apart, when the plaintiff’s failed to prove that they derived the right title and interest over the plaint schedule property through any document other than Ext.A1 and in the absence of any reservations in favour of the plaintiff’s, whereby the right to claim partition is reserved on the plaint schedule property as and when the property reverts back to them from the Government the entire edifice on which the case is built up collapses. Resultantly, questions of law 5 and6 are answered against the appellant. As an upshot of the above discussions, this court holds that the courts below have correctly appreciated the facts and law in question while negating the claim of the plaintiffs. The concurrent finding of fact and law by the courts below does not call for any interference by this Court. Accordingly the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Costs made easy.