ORDER : 1. The present second appeal has been filed against judgment and decree dated 19.03.1997 whereby the learned Appellate Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff by setting aside the judgment and decree dated 31.03.1993. 2. In the suit, plaintiff had claimed that the suit was simplicitor for permanent injunction averring that the plaintiff’s restaurant in the form of cabin was situated near Bus Stand, Jassa Kheda. The patta of the land was issued on 17.02.1975 by Tehsildar, Bheem and since then the plaintiff had been running a hotel having the required electricity and water connection. On 24.07.1991, when the plaintiff was as usually earning his livelihood, the defendant asked him to remove his cabin and if he do not remove then they would remove with the help of bulldozer. The plaintiff had sent a notice to the defendants. On 30.07.1991, when the plaintiff returned back to Bheem, the defendant got some signatures obtained on blank papers and, therefore, the plaintiff could not take any advice on the same. Further, there was no scheme of widening of the National Highway and with malafide intention the defendants were trying to dispossess him by removing the cabin and lastly prayed for issuing permanent injunction against the defendants. 3. The defendant filed the reply denying the averments of the plaint and contended that the patta cannot be issued for the land which is recorded as State Government land in revenue record. Particularly, case bearing No.79/69 has already been decided against the plaintiff on 15.10.1989 wherein he had been found as an encroacher. It was further contended that in the so called patta the land has been shown as khasra No.11 whereas the present cabin which is existing on the disputed place is recorded as khasra No.3759. The defendants are, therefore, entitled for removal of encroachment. Only notice was given and there was no personal enmity with the plaintiff. Moreover, it was argued by the defendants that they were not demolishing the cabin but were only shifting the cabin from the territory of the National Highway and other people who are coming within the territory of the National Highway which is 100 ft. wide have been given such similar notice and thus, prayed that the suit may be rejected. 4. That the Trial Court framed the following issues:- 5. Issue Nos.1 and 2 were decided against the plaintiff. wide have been given such similar notice and thus, prayed that the suit may be rejected. 4. That the Trial Court framed the following issues:- 5. Issue Nos.1 and 2 were decided against the plaintiff. Issue No.3 was decided in favour of defendant. Issue No.4 was decided against the defendant. Issue No.5 was decided against the defendant and on the basis of the finding of the Issue Nos.1, 2 and 3, the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 31.03.1993. 6. The plaintiff aggrieved against the judgment and decree dated 31.03.1993 preferred first appeal before the Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Rajsamand (hereinafter referred to as “First Appellate Court”). The learned First Appellate Court vide its judgment dated 19.03.1997 reversed the finding on Issue Nos.1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiff. The finding on Issue No.3 was also reversed and decided against the defendants and on the basis of the findings so reversed, the suit of the plaintiff was decreed in the manner that the defendants were permanently restrained from removing the restaurant from the place of the plaintiff either themselves or through their agent vide judgment and decree dated 19.03.1997. 7. The defendants being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree preferred the present second appeal. The said second appeal was admitted by this Court on 14.05.1998 on the following substantial question of law:- “On the basis of a patta issued by the Revenue Authorities of the State of Rajasthan, the respondent- plaintiff has been held to be entitled to possess his plot on National Highway. The patta was of a land which was not a revenue land. If the land belongs to National Highway and is in the ownership of surface Transport Ministry of Union, can State Authorities issue a patta in relation to that land and that patta can entitle the plaintiff for an injunction?”. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 9. Learned counsel for the defendants/appellants herein submitted that the cabin exists on khasra No.3759 whereas the patta is of the land for khasra No.11. The plaintiff has failed to show that how khasra No.11 and khasra No.3759 are same. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 9. Learned counsel for the defendants/appellants herein submitted that the cabin exists on khasra No.3759 whereas the patta is of the land for khasra No.11. The plaintiff has failed to show that how khasra No.11 and khasra No.3759 are same. Learned counsel for the defendants-appellants further submitted that Case No.79/69 has already been decided on 15.10.1969 wherein the plaintiff had been found as a trespasser and had been directed to vacate the possession. Further, the plaintiff himself on 30.07.1991 had in writing informed the dependents-appellants and admitted the fact of existence of encroachment of the cabin on khasra No.3759 and also assured the defendants that the said cabin would be removed. Thereafter, instead of removing the cabin, the present suit was filed. Thus, the said suit was correctly dismissed by the Trial Court vide judgment dated 31.03.1993 and the First Appellate Court had committed illegality and perversity in reversing the finding of the issues and decreeing the suit of the plaintiff thereof. 10. Per contra, counsel for the plaintiff/respondent herein submitted that the plaintiff is in possession of the cabin for 36 years and is existing on the land of khasra No.11. The patta for the same had been issued to him on 17.02.1975. Further, the counsel for the plaintiff-respondent submitted that his signature was obtained forcibly on the blank papers which has been utilized later for the purpose of creating a document dated 30.07.1991. Therefore, the Appellate Court has rightly found that the plaintiff was to be continued in possession of the owned property and thus granted a decree of permanent injunction in his favour which does not call for interference by this Court in the second appeal. 11. In view of the aforesaid submission, this Court finds that the substantial question of law which has been framed with regard to the ownership i.e. whether the subject land belonged to the plaintiff or the defendants. The Learned First Appellate Court has travelled beyond the scope of the suit while holding that the land was of the ownership of the plaintiff whereas there was no such case of the plaintiff for declaration before the Trial Court. The Learned First Appellate Court has travelled beyond the scope of the suit while holding that the land was of the ownership of the plaintiff whereas there was no such case of the plaintiff for declaration before the Trial Court. The First Appellate Court while reversing the finding on issue Nos.1 to 3 has declared that the property was of the ownership of the plaintiff in garb of issue No.1, however, there was no relief of declaration of ownership. More so, the plaintiff initially had claimed that his cabin is existing on the “pattasuda” land of khasra No.11 for which the patta had been issued on 17.02.1975 whereas the defendants had stated that the plaintiff’s cabin is existing on land of khasra No.3759 which is recorded in the name of PWD. The document Ex.2 though records the fact that in khasra No.3759, 1 biswa has been shown as gair mumkin shop but it did not record the ownership of the plaintiff whereas it recorded the ownership of “Mahkma PWD”, Government of India, and the said settlement is of Samvat year 2021, 2022 and 2023. 12. In absence of any concrete evidence that whether khasra No.11 of which the patta has been issued to the plaintiff and khasra No.3759 are same and if the plaintiff fails to prove this fact then it cannot be held that the disputed cabin was existing either in khasra No.11 or in khasra No.3759. 13. The plaintiff has not been able to show any document to prove the fact that his cabin is existing in khasra No.11 rather the documents placed on record as well as the case of the plaintiff itself states that the cabin is in khasra No.3759. Moreover as per Ex.2 khasra No.3759 is in the name of PWD Mahkma and even though gair mumkin shop has been shown but name of the plaintiff is not shown as the owner of that existing gair mumkin shop. 14. Further, the factum of existence of the shop of the plaintiff being on khasra No.3759 is reflected from his own notice dated 25.07.1991. Though the same has not been exhibited but has been filed by the plaintiff himself as reflected from the list of documents submitted by him. It is a settled position of law that the document filed by a party could be read against the party even if it is not exhibited. Though the same has not been exhibited but has been filed by the plaintiff himself as reflected from the list of documents submitted by him. It is a settled position of law that the document filed by a party could be read against the party even if it is not exhibited. However, the said document cannot be read against the opposite party. This position of law is supported by the judgment of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Rudnap Export-Import vs. Eastern Associates Co. and Ors. , AIR 1984 Delhi 20 wherein the Court while reiterating the said position of law held as under: “25. During the course of arguments the defendants have referred to the letter dt. 31 st July, 1965 from Andhra Pradesh Government to the plaintiff and also a letter dt. 9 th Aug. 1965 from the plaintiff to the Andhra Pradesh Government besides a letter dt. 17 th Dec, 1969 by the plaintiff to the defendants. These three letters were filed by the plaintiff. These documents were not proved by the plaintiff but the same are available on record, I have taken into consideration these three letters in coming to the above conclusion that it was not a transaction of sale between the parties. Learned counsel for the plaintiff submits that these are unproved documents and therefore cannot be looked into. Learned counsel for the defendants on the other hand submits that these are documents produced by the plaintiff and therefore no evidence is required to prove these documents against the plaintiff. These documents have been filed by the plaintiff and they are an important link in the correspondence between the parties. These documents can be looked into and the defendants are entitled to take advantage of these letters against the plaintiff. In the first letter dt. 31st July, 1965 the Andhra Pradesh Government had sought information from the plaintiff with the intention of placing an order for the supply of tractors with the manufacturer i.e. the plaintiff directly, In the second letter dt. 9th Aug. 1965 the plaintiff informed the Andhra Pradesh Government that the defendants were their exclusive agents and that the order should be placed by it with the defendants. The third letter dt. 17th Dec, 1969 from the plaintiff to the defendants is in reply to the defendants' letter dt. 9th Aug. 1965 the plaintiff informed the Andhra Pradesh Government that the defendants were their exclusive agents and that the order should be placed by it with the defendants. The third letter dt. 17th Dec, 1969 from the plaintiff to the defendants is in reply to the defendants' letter dt. 10th Dec, 1969 (Ex, P. 123), In the last letter the plaintiff has observed, "we regret to say that your attitude is not at all in line with a pleasant and traditional relation that should exist between a Principal and Agent". I am of the opinion that a letter filed by a party may be looked into without any further proof at the instance of the opposite party. I, therefore, hold that the defendants were acting as agents and were not the purchasers of these tractors. Both issues are decided accordingly.” 15. Therefore, this Court finds that there was complete lack of proof of ownership of the disputed cabin to be existing on the ownership property of the plaintiff. However, the possession was sufficiently proved to be existing on the date of filing of the suit and in such situation only decree which could have been passed by the Learned Appellate Court was ought to have been to the effect that the plaintiff may not be dispossessed without following the due process of law. 16. The substantial question of law which has been framed by the Court is required to be answered in favour of the appellant for the reason that the plaintiff-respondent had utterly failed to prove the ownership of the property wherein his cabin had been existing and except the existence of his cabin nothing else has been proved. In absence of any declaration or counter claim in respect of the patta, the Learned Appellate Court had committed illegality in deciding Issue No.1 in respect to ownership also in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. 17. In the facts and circumstances of this case, only fact which stood proved by the plaintiff was that he was in possession of the disputed cabin situated on the disputed land as on the date of filing of the suit and, therefore, at the best the suit could have been decreed restraining the defendant from dispossessing him without following the due process of law. 18. 18. Thus, substantial question of law which has been framed is answered in affirmative to the effect that patta could not have been relied upon when there was no declaration or counter declaration in respect to patta to either validate or invalidate the same. Only fact which could have been decided by the First Appellate Court could be in respect to possession as the suit was simplicitor for possession. Therefore, the finding on Issue Nos.1 to 3 as decided by the First Appellate Court is upheld to the extent of possession and set aside as to ownership. The defendants are restrained to the effect that plaintiff may not be displaced without following the due process of law. 19. Accordingly, the second appeal is partly allowed. The decree is modified to the effect that the defendants are restrained from displacing the plaintiff’s restaurant from the place existing without following due process of law. 20. No order as to costs.