JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri Sajjad Husain, learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri V.P. Nag, the learned Standing counsel appearing for the State of U.P., Shri Puneet Chandra, the learned counsel appearing for Awas Vikas Parishad and Mohd. Altaf Mansoor, the learned counsel appearing for the opposite party Nos.6 & 7. 2. By means of the instant intra-Court Appeal filed under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, the appellant, who has described himself as “Kalamuddin; popularly known as Shanu, S/o Nasiruddin- Incharge, Vidhan Sabha (East); Bhartiya Kisan Union (Avadh) Raju Gupta Sangathan, U.P. Lucknow, Regional Office- 529/17-C, Near State Bank, Khurram Nagar, Vikas Nagar, Lucknow- 226022” has challenged an interim order dated 26.11.2024 passed by an Hon’ble Single Judge of this Court in Writ C No.10189 of 2024, which order reads as follows:- “1. Heard Shri Mohd. Altaf Mansoor, learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing counsel who accepts notice on behalf of respondent nos.1,2 and 5. 2. Shri Puneet Chandra, Advocate who appeared through video conferencing accepts notice on behalf of respondent nos.3 and 4. Shri Chandra opposes the petition, however, states that he wants to file counter affidavit to bring on record the essential facts. 3. Learned Standing Counsel may seek instructions and file counter affidavit within four weeks. 4. Rejoinder affidavit, may be filed within a week thereafter. 5. List this case on 22.1.2025. 6. Till the next date of listing, no further steps for ceiling/demolition shall be taken in pursuance to order dated 20.5.2004, contained in Annexure No.2 and consequential request made vide order dated 16.11.2024 contained in Annexure No.14.” 3. The learned counsel for the opposite parties have raised three fold preliminary objections against maintainability of the Special Appeal. The first preliminary objection is that the writ petition was filed challenging an interim order dated 30.09.2024 by which the opposite parties have been granted time to file counter affidavits and the petitioner has been granted time to file a rejoinder affidavit and the operation of a ceiling / demolition order has been stayed till the next date of listing of the Writ Petition, i.e. 22.01.2025. The Writ Court has not decided any point by the order under challenge in this Appeal and the order does not fall within the category of a ‘judgment’. Therefore, the Special Appeal would not lie against such an order. 4. The Writ Court has not decided any point by the order under challenge in this Appeal and the order does not fall within the category of a ‘judgment’. Therefore, the Special Appeal would not lie against such an order. 4. The second objection is that the Writ Petition was filed against an order passed by the Commissioner, Division, Lucknow in an Appeal under Section 28 A (4) of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 and, therefore, the Special Appeal is not maintainable as per the provisions contained in Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules.. 5. The third objection raised by the learned Counsel for the opposite parties is that the appellant was not a party to the Writ Petition and he can file a Special Appeal only after seeking leave of this Court. However, the Special Appeal has been filed without seeking leave of the Court and, therefore, it is not maintainable. 6. In reply to the aforesaid preliminary objections, the learned counsel for the appellant merely submitted that the petitioners had concealed certain relevant facts from the Writ Court and had obtained an ex-parte stay order hastily by making a mention for taking up the case on urgent basis. The learned counsel for the appellant stated that a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court had passed an order dated 20.09.2024 in Writ-C No.8129 of 2024, recording its concern that the authorities are proceedings against one particular building and not against several others and had directed Awas Vikas Parishad to file an affidavit regarding action, if any, taken against the owners of various buildings which are being used for commercial purposes including marriage halls, which have been allowed to go on with their business unrestricted. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the counsel for petitioner in Writ-C No.8129 of 2024 and in Writ-C No.10189 of 2024 is the same and the Counsel has concealed the order dated 20.09.2024 from the Court while advancing submissions in Writ-C No.10189 of 2024 and has obtained the interim order dated 26.11.2024 which runs contrary to the order dated 20.09.2024 passed by a Division Bench. 7. The Learned counsel for the appellant did not give any reply to any of the three preliminary objections raised against the maintainability of the Special Appeal. 8. 7. The Learned counsel for the appellant did not give any reply to any of the three preliminary objections raised against the maintainability of the Special Appeal. 8. It will be appropriate to have a look at the provisions contained in Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, for a proper appreciation of the preliminary objections: - “5. Special appeal: An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction) in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its power of superintendence or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction or in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award --(a) of a tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or (b) of the Government or any officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act of one Judge. (Emphasis added) 9. In Ashutosh Shrotriya v. Vice-Chancellor, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar University , AIR 2015 All 187 : 2015 SCC OnLine All 8553, a Full Bench of this Court formulated the following principles regarding what would constitute a ‘judgment’ as per the term used in Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules: - “30. (Emphasis added) 9. In Ashutosh Shrotriya v. Vice-Chancellor, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar University , AIR 2015 All 187 : 2015 SCC OnLine All 8553, a Full Bench of this Court formulated the following principles regarding what would constitute a ‘judgment’ as per the term used in Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules: - “30. We now formulate the governing principles: (i) The expression ‘judgment’ was advisedly not defined in the Letters Patents of various High Courts which conferred a right of appeal against a judgment of a single Judge to a Division Bench of that Court; (ii) The expression ‘judgment’ is not to be construed in the narrower sense in which the expression ‘judgment’, ‘decree’ or ‘order’ is defined in the CPC, but must receive a broad and liberal construction; (iii) Every order passed by a trial Judge on the Original side of a High Court exercising original jurisdiction or, for that matter, by a learned single Judge exercising the writ jurisdiction, would not amount to a judgment. If every order were construed to be a judgment, that would result in opening a flood of appeals and there would be no end to the number of orders which could be appealable under the Letters Patent; (iv) Any interlocutory order, to constitute a judgment, must possess the characteristic of finality in the sense that it must adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding. In order to constitute a ‘judgment’, the adverse effect on a party must be direct and immediate and not indirect or remote; (v) In order to constitute a judgment, an interlocutory order must : (a) decide a matter of moment; or (b) affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and must also work serious injustice to the party concerned: (vi) On the other hand, orders passed in the course of the proceedings of a routine nature, would not constitute a judgment even if they result in some element of inconvenience or hardship to one party or the other. Routine orders which are passed by a single Judge to facilitate the progress of a case may cause some element of inconvenience or prejudice to a party but do not constitute a ‘judgment’ because they do not finally determine the rights or obligations of the parties. Routine orders which are passed by a single Judge to facilitate the progress of a case may cause some element of inconvenience or prejudice to a party but do not constitute a ‘judgment’ because they do not finally determine the rights or obligations of the parties. Procedural orders in aid of the progression of a case or to facilitate a decision are not judgments.” (Emphasis added) 10. An order granting time to the parties to complete the pleadings and staying ceiling / demolition of a building till the next date of listing of the Writ Petition, does not decide any aspect of the controversy involved in the Writ Petition and it does not possess the characteristic of finality. It does not adversely affect any valuable right of the appellant, who does not claim that any of his personal rights are involved in the matter. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the order under challenge in the Special Appeal is not a ‘judgment’ and the Special Appeal is not maintainable for this reason. 11. A bare perusal of Chapter VIII Rule 5 makes it clear that no Special Appeal shall lie against an order passed in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award of the Government or any officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any State Act of one Judge. 12. Since, the order under challenge in this Special Appeal has been passed in Writ Petition under Article 226 in respect of a judgment passed by the Divisional Commissioner in exercise of appellate powers under Section 28 A (4) of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, the Special Appeal filed against such an order is not maintainable. 13. Moreover, the appellant was not a party to the Writ Petition. He could have filed a Special Appeal only after seeking leave of the Court but neither any application seeking leave has been filed by the appellant, nor did the learned Counsel for the appellant seek time for filing an application for this purpose. Therefore, the Special Appeal filed without seeking leave of the Court is not maintainable. 14. He could have filed a Special Appeal only after seeking leave of the Court but neither any application seeking leave has been filed by the appellant, nor did the learned Counsel for the appellant seek time for filing an application for this purpose. Therefore, the Special Appeal filed without seeking leave of the Court is not maintainable. 14. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the present Special Appeal filed against an interlocutory order passed in a writ petition directed against an order passed in Appeal under Section 28 A (4) of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, by a person who is not a party to the Writ Petition, is not maintainable for all the aforesaid three reasons and it is liable to be dismissed as such. 15. It has been alleged by the appellant that the petitioners had not approached this Court with clean hands while filing Writ-C No.10189 of 2024 and they have concealed material facts. The allegation of concealment of facts have been levelled against the learned counsel for the petitioners also and he has been repetitively named and blamed for filing the writ petition challenging the validity of sealing order. It has been alleged that as the same counsel had filed Writ-C No.8129 of 2024, wherein an order was passed on 20.09.2024. The appellant has contended that he should have not filed Writ-C No.10189 of 2024 or he should have disclosed the order dated 20.09.2024 passed in Writ-C No.8129 of 2024. The allegations have been levelled against the officers/officials of Registry of this Court for passing the writ petition in a cursory manner and the allegations have been levelled against the Court for granting permission for hearing the writ petition on the day of filing itself keeping in view the urgency involved in the matter. The Hon’ble Single Judge who has passed the interim order under challenge has been blamed for taking up the writ petition treating it to be urgent and for passing the impugned order. 16. These allegations have been seriously objected by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties no.6 and 7 and he has submitted that the allegations are wholly misconceived, unfounded and malicious. 17. 16. These allegations have been seriously objected by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties no.6 and 7 and he has submitted that the allegations are wholly misconceived, unfounded and malicious. 17. The appellant has concealed the fact that he had filed an application for impleadment in the Appeal before the Commissioner and that application had been rejected by the order dated 30.09.2024, which is under challenge in the Writ Petition at the instance of respondent Nos.6 & 7 (petitioners) only. The appellant has not challenged the order of rejection of his impleadment application. In these circumstances, he was not required to be impleaded in the Writ Petition. Sri. Altaf Mansoor, the learned Counsel for the private opposite parties no. 6 and 7 has informed the Court although the appellant has not been impleaded in the Writ Petition, since he had filed a caveat application, a copy of the Writ Petition was given to the learned Counsel for the appellant before it was filed. 18. So far as the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned counsel for the petitioner had made a concealment of material facts in Writ-C No.10189 of 2024, the learned counsel for the appellant admitted that the petitioners in Writ-C No.8129 of 2024 are not parties to Writ-C No.10189 of 2024 or to present Appeal. Writ-C No.8129 of 2024 was filed by a person who had booked the marriage hall in question for the wedding of his sister whereas Writ-C No.10189 of 2024 has been filed challenging the validity of a ceiling order and the appellate order. The subject matters as well as parties to both the Writ Petitions are different. Merely because counsel for the petitioner in both the writ petitions happens to be the same, the counsel is not under any obligation to disclose the facts relating to any other case filed on behalf of any other person in respect of a different order. The counsel in fact owes a professional duty to his client not to disclose the facts of his case to any other person. Therefore, the allegation of concealment of fact is misconceived and it has been leveled in a reckless and irresponsible manner. 19. The counsel in fact owes a professional duty to his client not to disclose the facts of his case to any other person. Therefore, the allegation of concealment of fact is misconceived and it has been leveled in a reckless and irresponsible manner. 19. Although the appellant has alleged that the registry has passed the Writ Petition in a cursory manner, the appellant has not alleged violation of the provisions of any specific Rule in filing the Writ Petition. There is no specific allegation of violation of any Rule by the officers/officials of the registry also. The Hon’ble Judge has been blamed for accepting the request for taking up the Writ Petition on urgent basis, whereas it is the normal practice prevalent in this Court that in matters regarding which the Court is satisfied that the same warrants an urgent hearing, the Court grants request for urgent hearing. The appellant has recklessly leveled misconceived, vague and unsubstantiated allegations against the petitioners, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, the officers and officials of the Registry of this Court as well as the Hon’ble Judge who has passed the order, which are wholly unwarranted and unacceptable. We strongly deprecate the conduct of the appellant in leveling such allegations. 20. The learned Counsel for the appellant is under a professional obligation to draft and file the appeal carefully and we deprecate the conduct of the learned Counsel for the appellant in putting in such baseless allegations while drafting the Special Appeal. 21. In view of the forgoing discussion, we are of the considered view that filing of the present Special Appeal by making reckless and irresponsible allegations, without ascertaining its maintainability within the scope of provisions contained in Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules amounts to a gross abuse of the process of law taxing upon the valuable time of the Court. Therefore the Special Appeal is dismissed with a cost of Rs.25,000/- which shall be deposited by the appellant with the Registry of this Court within a period of 30 days from today, failing which the Senior Registrar shall initiate proceedings for recovery of the amount by sending a recovery certificate to the Collector concerned, who shall recover the amount as arrears of land revenue and shall remit the same to this Court within a period of three months from the date of issuance of the recovery certificate. The Senior Registrar of this Court is directed to transmit the amount of cost to Children’s Home (Girls), Lucknow, which is being run and maintained under the Department of Women and Child Development, Government of U.P.