ORDER : Venkata Jyothirmai Pratapa, J. The instant petition under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , [for short ‘ Cr.P.C ’] has been filed by the Petitioner/Accused No.1 seeking to quash the proceedings against him in Crime No.252 of 2022 on the file of Jaggaiahpet Police Station, NTR District for the offences punishable under Sections 376 , 417 and 506 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 , [for short ‘I.P.C.’] 2. Heard Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri J.V. Phaniduth, learned counsel for the Petitioner and Ms.K. Priyanka Lakshmi, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for State/Respondent No.1. Despite providing sufficient opportunity, learned counsel for Respondent No.2 did not turn up to submit arguments. 3. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner would submit that a bare reading of the report given by Respondent No.2 does not disclose the commission of the alleged offences by the Petitioner. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that, as the marriage proposal of Respondent No.2 with the Petitioner/Accused No.1 was rejected by the Petitioner and his family members, who are the other Accused in the present crime, having borne grudge against them, the present case has been lodged basing on bald and omnibus allegations. Learned Senior Counsel would finally submit that, no prima facie case is made out against the Petitioner. Hence, prayed for quashment of the proceedings against the Petitioner. In support of his contentions, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. The State of Maharashtra & Another, [ (2020) 110 ACC 924 ] and Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another, [(2021) 2 ALD (Cri) (SC) 179] 4. Per contra, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would submit that, after getting the job in the Bank, the Petitioner rejected to marry Respondent No.2. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would further submit that the intention to deceive Respondent No.2 from the inception is the matter to be decided at full length of trial. Since the investigation was stayed at the threshold, and in view of the specific allegations leveled against the Petitioner which would prima facie attract the alleged offences against the Petitioner, the Court cannot quash the proceedings against the Petitioner at this stage. Hence, prays for dismissal of the petition. Point for Determination 5. Since the investigation was stayed at the threshold, and in view of the specific allegations leveled against the Petitioner which would prima facie attract the alleged offences against the Petitioner, the Court cannot quash the proceedings against the Petitioner at this stage. Hence, prays for dismissal of the petition. Point for Determination 5. Having heard the submissions of the learned counsel representing both the parties, now the point that would emerge for determination is: Whether there are any justifiable grounds for quashment of the proceedings against the Petitioner/Accused No.1 in Crime No.252 of 2022 on the file of Jaggaiahpet Police Station, NTR District? Determination by the Court 6. A bare perusal of Section 482 makes it clear that the Code envisages that inherent powers of the High Court are not limited or affected so as to make orders as may be necessary; (i) to give effect to any order under the Code or, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or, otherwise (iii) to secure ends of justice. A court while sitting in Section 482 jurisdiction is not functioning as a court of appeal or a court of revision. It must exercise its powers to do real and substantial justice, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. These powers must be invoked for compelling reasons of abuse of process of law or glaring injustice, which are against sound principles of criminal jurisprudence. 7. As seen from the complaint in the instant case, it is alleged that, Petitioner/Accused No.1 acquainted with Respondent No.2 since she was 15 years old, stating that he loved her and wants to marry her. It is further alleged that the Petitioner/Accused No.1 also introduced her to his family members, who also agreed for the marriage. Under the said promise of marriage, the Petitioner/Accused No.1 has committed sexual intercourse with her in his house, in the absence of inmates. He also introduced the staff of his Bank as she was his fiancée. Subsequently, when Respondent No.2 requested the Petitioner to marry her, he refused for the same stating that he will get Rs.50.00 lakhs dowry if he marries another girl and if Respondent No.2 gets that dowry, then only he would marry. Though, she along with her parents requested for the marriage, all the Accused refused for the same and asked them to do whatever they want. Though, she along with her parents requested for the marriage, all the Accused refused for the same and asked them to do whatever they want. As such, she lodged the present complaint. 8. It is the contention of the Petitioner that, when the parents of Respondent No.2 proposed to perform her marriage with the Petitioner/Accused No.1, his parents refused for the same. As such, having grudge against them, the present complaint has been filed with false and untenable allegations. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra), at Para Nos.5, 16 & 18 it was held as under: “5. In Criminal Application No. 813 of 2016, the appellant moved the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the FIR dated 17 May 2016. By its order dated 7 February 2019 the High Court rejected the application, noting: “3. Though the relationship was with consent, it appears that there was a promise to marry and statement shows that later on, giving reason of caste of Complainant, promise was not kept. 4. In view of this prima facie situation, we are not inclined to intervene in extra ordinary jurisdiction. We make it clear that our observations are only for the purposes of refusing to entertain the grievance in extra ordinary jurisdiction and we have not recorded any finding either way on contentions.” 16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates the woman's “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The “consent” of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a “misconception of fact” where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati this Court observed: “21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. The “consent” of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a “misconception of fact” where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati this Court observed: “21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. … 24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” (Emphasis supplied) 18 To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. Perusal of contents of the complaint would disclose that Petitioner/ Accused No.1 under the promise of marriage, sexually exploited Respondent No.2 and subsequently refused to marry her. As rightly put by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, the presence of the intention to deceive Respondent No.2 under the false promise of marriage at the inception, cannot be decided at this stage and after completion of investigation only the same will come out. 10. At this stage, it is relevant to refer to the judgment in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Others, [2021 SCC OnLine SC 315], wherein, a three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down the following principles of law:- “57. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Khawaja Nazir Ahmad (supra), the following principles of law emerge: i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable offences; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; iii) However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, in the 'rarest of rare cases'. (The rarest of rare cases standard in its application for quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C . (The rarest of rare cases standard in its application for quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C . is not to be confused with the norm which has been formulated in the context of the death penalty, as explained previously by this Court); v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule; viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities. The inherent power of the court is, however, recognized to secure the ends of justice or prevent the above of the process by Section 482 Cr.P.C . ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; xii) The first information report is not an encyclopedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. During or after investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure; xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C . is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be cautious. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P.Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; and xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused, the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C ., only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider on merits whether the allegations make out a cognizable offence or not and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.” (emphasis supplied) 11. Except denial of the allegations levelled against the Petitioner, no prima facie material has been placed by the Petitioner to prove his innocence of the alleged offences. Bald Denials and superficial defenses cannot be evaluated by this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC by conducting a minute inquiry. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the Petitioner is not helpful to the case of the Petitioner, since the facts of the said case are different from the facts of the present case. Since there is verifiable material and factual aspects to be decided during investigation and in view of the stay of proceedings, there is no progress in the investigation, the proceedings against the Petitioner, at this stage, cannot be quashed. There are no merits for quashment of the proceedings against the Petitioner and hence, the petition deserves dismissal. 12. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed.