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2025 DIGILAW 16 (KER)

SREE RAJA RAJESWARI DEVI v. SURESH BABU S/O SARASANADHAN

2025-01-06

T.R.RAVI

body2025
JUDGMENT : T.R. RAVI, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred against the order passed by the Sub Court, Attingal, in O.P. No. 5 of 2023, filed by the appellants seeking leave under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for instituting a suit. The trial court dismissed the application following the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ghat Talab Kaulan Wala vs. Baba Gopal Dass Chela Surti Dass (Dead) by LRs. Ram Niwas, AIR 2020 SC 705 . The court found that an application under Section 92 CPC by the trust itself is not maintainable. Since the issue involved a larger question of law, this Court sought the assistance of Senior Advocate Sri P.B. Krishnan as amicus curiae. 2. The amicus curiae addressed the Court in extenso on the scope of Section 92 and also took the Court to the provisions contained in the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920 (‘1920 Act’ for short). Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads thus: “92. Public charities: (1) In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the leave of the court, may institute a suit, whether contentious or not, in the principal civil court of original jurisdiction or in any other court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject matter of the trust is situate to obtain a decree: (a) removing any trustee. (b) appointing a new trustee. (c) vesting any property in a trustee. (cc) directing a trustee who has been removed or a person who has ceased to be a trustee, to deliver possession of any trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property. (d) directing accounts and inquiries. (e) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust. (f) authorizing the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged. (g) settling a scheme. (d) directing accounts and inquiries. (e) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust. (f) authorizing the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged. (g) settling a scheme. (h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require. (2) Save as provided by the Religious Endowments Act, 1863 (20 of 1863), or by any corresponding law in force in [the territories which, immediately before the 1st November, 1956, were comprised in Part B States, no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in sub-section (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with the provisions of that sub-section. (3) The Court may alter the original purposes of an express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature and allow the property or income of such trust or any portion thereof to be applied cypres in one or more of the following circumstances, namely: (a) where the original purposes of the trust, in whole or in part: (i) have been, as far as may be, fulfilled. (ii) cannot be carried out at all, or cannot be carried out according to the directions given in the instrument creating the trust or, where there is no such instrument, according to the spirit of the trust. (b) where the original purposes of the trust provide a use for a part only of the property available by virtue of the trust. (c) where the property available by virtue of the trust and other property applicable for similar purposes can be more effectively used in conjunction with, and to that end can suitably be made applicable to any other purpose, regard being had to the spirit of the trust and its applicability to common purposes. (d) where the original purposes, in whole or in part, were laid down by reference to an area which then was, but has since ceased to be, a unit for such purposes. (e) where the original purposes, in whole or in part, have, since, they were laid down: (i) been adequately provided for by other means. (ii) ceased, as being useless or harmful to the community. (iii) ceased to be, in law, charitable. (e) where the original purposes, in whole or in part, have, since, they were laid down: (i) been adequately provided for by other means. (ii) ceased, as being useless or harmful to the community. (iii) ceased to be, in law, charitable. (iv) ceased in any other way to provide a suitable and effective method of using the property available by virtue of the trust, regard being had to the spirit of the trust.” 3. Going by the words used in Section 92, it would appear that the persons who can approach the Court are: (i) the Advocate General. (ii) two or more persons having an interest in the Trust who have obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate General. The Section also says that the purpose for seeking leave is when there is an alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes or for charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such Trust. It also provides that the suit need not be contentious. The decrees that can be sought are all relating to the manner in which the Trust is administered and the conduct of the persons who are in the administration of the Trust. A reading would show that the Section 92 does not speak about the Trust itself approaching the Court. It is in the above context that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held in Ghat Talab Kaulan Wala (supra) that an application by a Trust is not contemplated under Section 92 CPC. 4. In the case on hand, the Trust is the 2nd petitioner, the deity is the 1st petitioner and two other persons interested in the Trust are petitioners 3 and 4. As such, it cannot be stated to be a petition filed by the Trust alone. Even if the 2nd petitioner was removed from the party array going by the reasoning of the trial court, there could have been no issue regarding the maintainability of the application. The respondents in the petition are the President, Secretary, and other office bearers of the temple, who are in administration. The allegation is regarding mismanagement. As such, it cannot be said that the prayers will not come within the scope of Section 92 CPC. 5. The respondents in the petition are the President, Secretary, and other office bearers of the temple, who are in administration. The allegation is regarding mismanagement. As such, it cannot be said that the prayers will not come within the scope of Section 92 CPC. 5. In Ghat Talab Kaulan Wala (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court was not called upon to decide whether the words “two or more persons interested in the Trust” could include the Trust also, being a legal entity. The amicus curiae pointed out that Section 92 CPC does not say about the person against whom the suit can be laid. It only says about the person approaching the Court. Secondly, the nature of relief is also specified and it includes only either a breach or direction. The counsel pointed out that when it comes to the question of direction, there should be no objection to the Trust itself being an applicant. It is pointed out that the protection available also extends to the Trustees. Regarding the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the amicus pointed out that it was a case by a Trust against a Sevadar, which did not even otherwise be a dispute/situation postulated under Section 92 and it was in that context the observations were made, which can only be treated as an obiter and the judgment cannot be understood to cover any aspect which was not really in issue. 6. The counsel for the respondent submitted that the words of the Statute are not in any manner ambiguous, and it does not contemplate the Trust obtaining leave under Section 92. The counsel submits that a Trust can file a suit even without the requirement of filing an application under Section 92. The counsel referred to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Ganapathi Nampoothiri N. v. State of Kerala, 2024 (2) KHC 1 with particular reference to paragraphs 16 and 17 to submit that the intention is to protect public trusts of a charitable or religious nature from vexatious litigation, which is why the Statute is specific as to who can approach the Court. On the question whether the Trust can be interested in the Trust, the counsel relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Suganthi v. Jagadeeshan, 2002 (1) KLT 581 (SC) to submit that it is impermissible for the High Court to overrule the decision of the Apex Court on the ground that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had laid down the legal position without considering any other part. In the said judgment, the Court held that it is not only a matter for discipline for the High Courts in India but is a mandate of the Constitution as provided in Article 141 that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. It is hence submitted that this Court cannot by interpreting the judgment in Ghat Talab Kaulan Wala (supra) take a stand that the law laid down is only an obiter. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Neotia & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1988 SC 1353 was also relied on for the same purpose. 7. Sri P.B. Krishnan, Senior Counsel referred to the provisions of the 1920 Act. Section 3 of the Act deals with the power to apply to the Court in respect of trusts of charitable and religious nature. Section 7 of the 1920 Act deals with the power of the trustees to apply for directions of the court on any question affecting the management or administration of the trust property and says that the court can give its opinion, advise or direction, as the case may be. Reference is made to suits under Section 92 CPC and it says that court can direct the defendant to deposit from any money in his hands as the Trustee of the Trust to which the suit relates, such sum as the court considers sufficient to meet the expenditure of the suit. The judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Avoch Thevar v. Chummar, 1957 KLT 461 was also referred to which deals with the manner in which Section 7 and Section 12 of the 1920 Act is to be understood. The Division Bench held that the court under the said Sections exercises what might be called its consultative jurisdiction giving guidance to the Trustee. The Division Bench held that the court under the said Sections exercises what might be called its consultative jurisdiction giving guidance to the Trustee. Another judgment referred to is the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sugra Bibi v. Hazi Kummu Mia, AIR 1969 SC 884 wherein the Court was considering a suit for removal of the Muthavalli and appointment of a new Trustee. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Section 92 has no application unless three conditions are fulfilled; (i) the suit must relate to a public charitable or religious trust, (ii) the suit must be founded on an allegation of breach of trust or the direction of the court is required for the administration of the Trust and (iii) the reliefs claimed are those which are mentioned in the Section. The amicus has also referred to a Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court reported in M/s. ARR Charitable Trust v. Amritha Vishwa Vidyapeetham, 2023 (5) LW 665 wherein the petitioner was a Trust. The Division Bench considered the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ghat Talab Kaulan Wala (supra) which was relied upon in the judgment which was under challenge. The Court while deciding the question also took into account the practise of the Court, which was to entertain application or suits under Section 92 with a prayer for sale of the property in terms of Section 92(1)(f) for a considerably long time, and was of the opinion that no deviation from such procedure was required in the interests of the institution. With respect to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court, the counsel for the respondent submitted that there is no such practise in this Court. The amicus curiae also referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad R. & Ors. 2008 (2) KHC 35 . The Senior Counsel submitted that since all Trusts operate through human agency, there can be a situation that the Trust may have to go against the trustees. A Division Bench of this Court in S.N.D.P. Yogam A Public Ltd. Co. v. Krishnamoorthy, 2022 (4) KLT 36 held that Section 92 of the Code makes no difference whether the Trustee is an individual or a Company and either can prefer an application under Section 92. 8. A Division Bench of this Court in S.N.D.P. Yogam A Public Ltd. Co. v. Krishnamoorthy, 2022 (4) KLT 36 held that Section 92 of the Code makes no difference whether the Trustee is an individual or a Company and either can prefer an application under Section 92. 8. Keeping in mind the aforesaid judgments, I shall consider the issue involved in this case. The only reason stated in the impugned order dated 26.6.2023 is that the 2nd petitioner, who is the proposed plaintiff No. 2 is a Trust, in respect of which the petition has been filed and hence the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ghat Talab Kaulan Wala (supra) would squarely apply. As is evident from the passage, which is extracted in the order, the case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was one where the Trust was a petitioner and the respondent was a Sevadar, which was the prime reason why the Court held that Section 92 of the Code has no application. In the case on hand, the Trust is only one of the petitioners and there are three other petitioners before the Court. The Court did not even go into the question whether the petition is maintainable by the said three persons. As such, the petition could not have been dismissed in limine without even a consideration of such aspects. Secondly, the respondents in the petition are persons who are holding office and thus persons in management rather than employees. The allegations contained are also regarding mismanagement of the Trust and the prayers come squarely within the four walls of Section 92 CPC. The question whether the Trust was a person interested in such a situation has also not been gone into. In view of the law laid down in the decisions that have been cited at the Bar, I am of the opinion that the Court ought not to have thrown out the petition at the initial stage itself, even without consideration of any of the aspects pointed out in the petition. At best, an opportunity should have been afforded to the petitioners to remove the 2nd petitioner from the party array and to proceed with the application. I am hence of the opinion that this Court need not really go into the question whether the Trust can be an applicant in this case since there are other applicants as well. At best, an opportunity should have been afforded to the petitioners to remove the 2nd petitioner from the party array and to proceed with the application. I am hence of the opinion that this Court need not really go into the question whether the Trust can be an applicant in this case since there are other applicants as well. This Court, however, agrees with the amicus curiae on the submission that there can be a situation where the Trust itself is against the Trustees and the prayers or reliefs which are permissible under Section 92 at the hands of the Trust can be invoked by the Trust itself, which is not an aspect that was considered and decided in Ghat Talab Kaulan Wala (supra). There can be other situations as well where the Trust, being the owner of certain properties, seeks relief of recovery of such properties if they have fallen into the hands of strangers due to mismanagement by the Trustees. Here again, it cannot be the law, that the owner cannot seek recovery of the properties. If it was a case of recovery alone, there was no necessity for going under Section 92, but when recovery is sought coupled with allegations of mismanagement of the Trust by certain Trustees which has resulted in the property of the Trust falling into the hands of strangers, there cannot be a blanket bar to the Trust to approach the Court. 9. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The order of the court below is set aside. The trial court is directed to reconsider the application and pass fresh orders. The parties shall appear before the trial court on 04.02.2025.