JUDGMENT : Pankaj Jain, J. Defendant is in second appeal. For convenience, the parties are being referred to by their original position in the suit i.e. the appellant as defendant and respondent No.1 as plaintiff. 2. Plaintiff filed suit for confirmation of possession by way of specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 12.05.2009 qua land measuring 8 Kanals 6 Marlas agreed to be sold in his favour by the defendant for a valuable consideration of Rs.9,55,656.84/- (Rupees Nine Lakh Fifty Five Thousand Six Hundred & Fifty Six And Eighty Four Paise Only). 2.1. As per plaintiff, the defendant agreed to sell aforesaid land in his favour and executed written agreement to sell dated 12.05.2009. At the time of execution of agreement to sell, earnest money of Rs.2 lakh was paid. Agreement to Sell was scribed by Deed Writer Barjinder Mohan Singh Bedi. The same was attested by two witnesses namely Dheeraj Sharma and Gurdass Ram. It was agreed that defendant shall execute registered sale deed in favour of plaintiff on or before 30.12.2009 on receiving balance sale consideration of Rs.7,55,656.84/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Fifty Five Thousand Six Hundred & Fifty Six And Eighty Four Paise Only). Prior to the agreed date, sons of defendant namely Jagdish Chander, Satish Kumar ad Pardeep Chand got served a legal notice dated 06.10.2009 upon the plaintiff claiming that agreement to sell in question was not binding and that their 93 years old father was mentally incapacitated to enter into agreement to sell. Plaintiff replied to the aforesaid notice controverting the defense of mental incapacity as raised by defendant and further sent notice dated 22.12.2009 to defendant asking them to come present before the Sub-Registrar, Hoshiarpur on 30.12.2009. On 30.12.2009, the plaintiff remained present in the office of Sub-Registrar, Hoshiarpur and also got his affidavit attested as a testimony of his presence, but defendant failed to appear and performed his part of contract. 2.2. Suit was contested by defendant who filed written statement through his attorney. It was claimed that defendant being 93 years old man was suffering from serious loss of memory and was not capable to think properly and thus, agreement to sell in question was misuse of weak mental state of defendant by the plaintiff. 2.3. On the basis of pleadings, the Court of first instance framed following issues:- 1. It was claimed that defendant being 93 years old man was suffering from serious loss of memory and was not capable to think properly and thus, agreement to sell in question was misuse of weak mental state of defendant by the plaintiff. 2.3. On the basis of pleadings, the Court of first instance framed following issues:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for confirmation of possession by way of specific performance of agreement to sell dated 12.5.2009 in respect of the suit property on payment of balance sale-consideration of Rs. 7,55,656-84? OPP. 2. Or in the alternative, whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs. 4 Lakh i.e. Rs. 2 Lakh on account of earnest money and Rs. 2 Lakh on account of damages alongwith interest @ 18% per annum? OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing and is still ready and willing to perform his part of contract? OPP. 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunction restraining the defendant from dispossessing the plaintiff as well as from alienating the suit property to any person except the plaintiff? OPP. 5. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD. 6. Whether the plaintiff has not come to the court with clean hands? OPD. 6A).Whether the plaintiff has no locus-standi to file the suit against defendant as he never executed alleged agreement to sell dated 12.5.2009 in favour of plaintiff? OPD. 6B). Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit and plaint is therefore liable to be rejected U/o 7 Rule 11 CPC? OPD. 6C).Whether the defendant is entitled to compensatory cost under Section 35-A CPC?OPD. 7. Relief 2.4. Plaintiff examined Deed Writer Barjinder Mohan Singh Bedi who proved that the agreement to sell in question was scribed by him at the instance of plaintiff and defendant. He also produced copy of register entry as Ex.PW1/A to show that entry with respect to agreement to sell in question was made at Sr. No.41 dated 12.05.2009. However, before witness could be cross-examined he died. Plaintiff in order to address the situation, examined son of Barjinder Mohan Singh Bedi as PW7 namely Navjinder Singh, who admitted the signatures of his father and proved the register entry. 2.5. No.41 dated 12.05.2009. However, before witness could be cross-examined he died. Plaintiff in order to address the situation, examined son of Barjinder Mohan Singh Bedi as PW7 namely Navjinder Singh, who admitted the signatures of his father and proved the register entry. 2.5. Affidavit of the plaintiff showing his presence before the Sub- Registrar on 30.12.2009 was proved on record as Ex.PW2/A. Both the attesting witnesses to the agreement to sell namely Gurdass Ram and Dheeraj Sharma, who appeared as PW3 and PW4, respectively, proved the agreement to sell. Plaintiff himself appeared as PW5. Plaintiff further examined Assistant Manager of SBI Bank, Vijay Batta, as PW6 to prove deposit of Rs.2 lakh received by defendant — Tara Chand in his account on 12.05.2009. 2.6. Defendant did not step into the witness box. DW1 Sanjeev Kumar Uppal, his grandson, appeared as his Special Power of Attorney as defendant was unable to attend the Court due to his old age. Defendant also examined Handwriting and Fingerprint Expert to dispute his signatures upon deposit voucher. 2.7. Trial Court while answering issue Nos.1, 3 and 4 came to the conclusion that plaintiff proved his case. Since, the defendant disputed agreement to sell, he cannot be allowed to dispute readiness and willingness of the plaintiff, but further held that affidavit Ex.PW2/A proves readiness and willingness of the plaintiff. It was further held that the defendant was having sufficient money to pay the balance sale consideration as he is owner of 15-16 acres of land. Resultantly, the Trial Court decreed the suit filed by plaintiff for main relief. 2.8. In appeal the aforesaid findings given by Trial Court have been affirmed by lower Appellate Court. 3. Counsel for the appellant/defendant while assailing the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below has submitted that the Courts below erred in ignoring the fact that even though possession is stated to have been delivered to plaintiff by defendant and the suit has been filed for confirmation of possession, the agreement to sell was unregistered document and ought not have been admitted in evidence in view of Section 17 read with Section 49 of Registration Act, 1908. He has further submitted that the Courts below erred in ignoring the fact that plaintiff in order to succeed in suit for specific performance is required to prove readiness and willingness and there was no proof brought on record by plaintiff to show that he was in possession of the requisite funds on the given date. 4. Per contra, counsel for respondent No.1/plaintiff has submitted that concurrent findings of fact have been recorded by the Courts below with respect to execution of agreement to sell and readiness and willingness of the plaintiff. There is no substantial question of law involved in the present appeal and thus, the same needs to be dismissed. He has further submitted that in terms of directions issued by Trial Court, the plaintiff deposited an amount of Rs.7,55,656.84/- (Rupees Seven Lakh Fifty Five Thousand Six Hundred & Fifty Six And Eighty Four Paise Only) vide challan dated 10.04.2017. Further draft Sale Deed through Court Commissioner is already on record of Ld. Executing Court. 5. I have heard counsels for the parties and have carefully gone through records of the case. 6. In the considered opinion of this Court, the Courts below have rightly answered the question with respect to execution of agreement to sell in favour of plaintiff. There is overwhelming evidence on record in favour of plaintiff to prove the agreement to sell dated 12.05.2009. Even defendant has not denied the same. Rather the stand of defendant is that the same was executed by defendant-Tara Chand at the time when he was not in his proper senses owing to old age. The only man to controvert the execution of agreement to sell by proving defence of defendant is Tara Chand himself. Conspicuously, Tara Chand opted to appear through his Special Power of Attorney and himself remained absent. Special Power of Attorney even admitted that his grandfather is fully aware and is mentally alert and executed Special Power of Attorney in his favour while being in control of his mental faculties, but claimed that execution of agreement to sell was result of mental weakness of defendant — Tara Chand. Weight of his own testimony is enough to suit the defence raised by defendant. Thus, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the agreement to sell dated 12.05.2009 stands proved by the plaintiff. 7. Weight of his own testimony is enough to suit the defence raised by defendant. Thus, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the agreement to sell dated 12.05.2009 stands proved by the plaintiff. 7. This Court, however, feels that the Courts below erred in answering issue No.3. Chapter II of the 1963 Act deals with specific performance of contract. Section 16 inserted therein prescribes personal bars to the relief of specific performance of the contract. The plaintiff is required to overcome the same to claim entitlement to decree of specific performance. The mandate of statute is not dependent upon the defence raised by defendant. Reference can be made to following observations made by Apex Court in J.P. Builders Vs. A. Ramadas Rao, (2011) 1 SCC 429 , wherein it has been held as under:- xxxx xxxx xxxx 21. Among the three clauses, we are more concerned about clause (c). “Readiness and willingness” is enshrined in clause (c) which was not present in the old Act of 1877. However, it was later inserted with the recommendations of the 9th Law Commission’s Report. This clause provides that the person seeking specific performance must prove that he has performed or has been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him. 22. The words “ready” and “willing” imply that the person was prepared to carry out the terms of the contract. The distinction between “readiness” and “willingness” is that the former refers to financial capacity and the latter to the conduct of the plaintiff wanting performance. Generally, readiness is backed by willingness. 23. In N.P. Thirugnanam v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao [ (1995) 5 SCC 115 ] at SCC para 5, this Court held: “5, ... Section 16(c) of the Act envisages that the plaintiff must plead and prove that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than those terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must of necessity be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution till date of the decree he must prove that he is ready and has always been willing to perform his part of the contract. As stated, the factum of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.” 24. In P. D’Souza v. Shondrilo Naidu [ (2004) 6 SCC 649 ] this Court observed: “19. It is indisputable that in a suit for specific performance of contract the plaintiff must establish his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. The question as to whether the onus was discharged by the plaintiff or not will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No straitjacket formula can be laid down in this behalf. ... *** 21. ... The readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract would also depend upon the question as to whether the defendant did everything which was required of him to be done in terms of the agreement for sale.” 25. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 mandates “readiness and willingness” on the part of the plaintiff and it is a condition precedent for obtaining relief of grant of specific performance. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 mandates “readiness and willingness” on the part of the plaintiff and it is a condition precedent for obtaining relief of grant of specific performance. It is also clear that in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff must allege and prove a continuous “readiness and willingness” to perform the contract on his part from the date of the contract. The onus is on the plaintiff. 26. It has been rightly considered by this Court in R.C. Chandiok v. Chuni Lal Sabharwal [ (1970) 3 SCC 140 ] that “readiness and willingness” cannot be treated as a straitjacket formula. This has to be determined from the entirety of the facts and circumstances relevant to the intention and conduct of the party concerned. 27. It is settled law that even in the absence of specific plea by the opposite party, it is the mandate of the statute that the plaintiff has to comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and when there is non-compliance with this statutory mandate, the court is not bound to grant specific performance and is left with no other alternative but to dismiss the suit. It is also clear that readiness to perform must be established throughout the relevant points of time. “Readiness and willingness” to perform the part of the contract has to be determined/ascertained from the conduct of the parties. xxxx xxxx xxxx” 8. A bare perusal of the plaint would reveal that apart from claiming that he is a big land owner and owns 15-16 acres of land, plaintiff has spelled out nothing with respect to his readiness. ‘Readiness’ and ‘Willingness’ are two different expressions. Even though provision has used the same conjointly, yet each of them needs to be pleaded and proved independently. Reliance can be placed upon para No.22 of J.P. Builders’ case (supra). 9. Even if the affidavit executed before the Sub-Registrar is believed, it may be held to be a cogent evidence to prove his willingness. Proof with respect to readiness of plaintiff is still missing. Trial Court erred in ignoring the same. 10. So far as the lower Appellate Court is concerned, apart from writing one single line that plaintiff proved his readiness and willingness, it has not bothered to deal with issue No.3 in light of evidence on record. 11. Proof with respect to readiness of plaintiff is still missing. Trial Court erred in ignoring the same. 10. So far as the lower Appellate Court is concerned, apart from writing one single line that plaintiff proved his readiness and willingness, it has not bothered to deal with issue No.3 in light of evidence on record. 11. In view thereof, this Court finds that the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court cannot be sustained. The matter is remanded back to the lower Appellate Court to decide the same afresh after appreciating evidence on record and then record its finding on issue No.3 as per law. 12. Appeal stands disposed off in the above terms. 13. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed off.