Order : “The principles of natural justice ensure that justice is not only done but it is seen to be done as well.” A reasoned order is one of the fundamental requirements of fair administration. It holds utmost significance in ensuring fairness. The courts now term it as the third principle of natural justice. 1. By way of filing of this writ petition, a challenge has been led to the impugned order dated 22.05.2000 passed by the District Superintendent of Police, Tonk by which the petitioner, a Police Constable, has been punished with the punishment of compulsory retirement. 2. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner submitted an appeal before the Deputy Director General of Police, Jaipur Range- II, Jaipur, (for short, ‘the Appellate Authority’) however, the same was rejected vide order dated 31.10.2000. Thereafter, a revision petition was submitted by the petitioner before the State and the same was also rejected vide order dated 23.05.2002. 3. Counsel for the petitioner submits that a charge-sheet under Rule 16/18 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short, ‘the Rules of 1958’) was served upon the petitioner with the charge that two accused persons namely Kamal Shringi and Badri were handed over to the petitioner along with two other Police Officials namely, Head Constable- Moti Lal and Constable-Ram Prasad for escorting them to Court but in the meantime one of the accused persons (Badri) absconded from their custody on account of negligence of the petitioner and other co-delinquents. Counsel submits that a detailed reply to the aforesaid charge-sheet was submitted by the petitioner, wherein it was specifically mentioned that one of the accused persons, Kamal Shringi, wanted to answer the nature’s call, hence, on instructions of the Head Constable-Moti Lal, the petitioner took him to the urinals for the aforesaid purpose and in his absence the other accused person Badri, absconded from the custody of Head Constable- Moti Lal and Constable- Ram Prasad. Counsel argues that the petitioner was not responsible for the above incident. However, this fact was not duly considered during the course of enquiry and subsequently, the impugned order was passed by which the petitioner was subjected to compulsory retirement. Counsel argues that the petitioner was not responsible for the above incident. However, this fact was not duly considered during the course of enquiry and subsequently, the impugned order was passed by which the petitioner was subjected to compulsory retirement. Counsel submits that aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, a statutory appeal under Rule 23 of the Rules of 1958, was submitted before the Deputy Director General of Police, however, the same was rejected vide order dated 31.10.2000 in a cursory manner, without recording any finding and without passing a reasoned and speaking order. Counsel submits that the aforesaid appeal was rejected by the Appellate Authority with the finding that there was negligence on the part of the petitioner. Counsel submits that the Appellate Authority was required to decide the appeal of the petitioner by providing reasons and considering the averments mentioned therein, but no reasons were recorded and the order impugned was passed in a single line. Counsel submits that the aforesaid order was assailed by the petitioner before the Reviewing Authority, but the said review petition was also dismissed in similar manner, hence, under these circumstances, interference of this Court is warranted. 4. Per contra, counsel for the respondents opposes the arguments raised by counsel for the petitioner and submits that two accused persons were entrusted to three Police Officials for safe custody and transportation to the Court, but due to the negligence of all the three Police Officials including the petitioner, the incident occurred and one of the accused persons absconded from their custody. Counsel submits that the aforesaid incident occurred on account of gross negligence on the part of the petitioner and other co-delinquents. Consequently, under these circumstances, the order impugned was passed by the Disciplinary Authority, imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement upon the petitioner. Counsel further submits that while the petitioner was awarded compulsory retirement and other co-delinquents were initially punished with penalty of termination of service, however, after the remand of the matter, the termination order of Moti Lal was modified to compulsory retirement with 10% deduction in his pension, hence, under these circumstances, all three delinquents have been subjected to equal punishment, and therefore, under these circumstances, interference of this Court is not warranted. 5. Heard and considered the submissions made at Bar and perused the material available on record. 6. 5. Heard and considered the submissions made at Bar and perused the material available on record. 6. Perusal of the record indicates that by passing the impugned order dated 22.05.2000, the petitioner was punished with the penalty of compulsory retirement. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed a statutory appeal under Rule 23 of the Rules of 1958 before the Appellate Authority and the same was dismissed in a single line stating that, “there was gross negligence on the part of the petitioner” and no reasons have been assigned by the Appellate Authority, while rejecting the appeal of the petitioner. 7. This fact is not in dispute that any order passed under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules is appealable under Rules 23. Rule 30 of the Rules of 1958, deals with the points of consideration in an appeal. For ready reference Rule 30 is produced as under:- “30. Consideration of appeals. –(1) In the case of an appeal against an order of suspension, the appellate authority shall consider whether in the light of the provision of rule 13and having regard to the circumstances of the case the order of suspension is justified or not and confirm or revoke the order accordingly. Consideration of appeals. –(1) In the case of an appeal against an order of suspension, the appellate authority shall consider whether in the light of the provision of rule 13and having regard to the circumstances of the case the order of suspension is justified or not and confirm or revoke the order accordingly. (2) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in rule 14, the appellate authority shall consider – (a) whether the procedure prescribed in these rules has been compiled with and if not, whether such non– compliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of Constitution or in failure of Justice; (b) whether the facts on which the order was passed has been established; (c) whether the facts established afford sufficient justification for making an order; and (d) whether the penalty imposed is excessive, adequate or inadequate and after giving a personal hearing to Government Servant to explain his case, if he desires so and after consultation with the Commission if such consultation is necessary in the case, pass order – (i) setting aside, reducing, confirming or enhancing the penalty; or (ii) remitting the case to authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such directions as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case: Provided that – (i) the appellate authority shall not impose any enhance penalty which neither such authority nor the authority which made the order appealed against is competent in the case to impose. (ii) no order imposing an enhanced penalty shall be passed unless the appellant is given an opportunity of making any representation which may wish to make against such enhanced penalty; and (iii) if the enhanced penalty which the appellate authority propose to impose is one of the penalties specified in clause (iv) to (vii) or rule 14 and an inquiry under rule 16 has not already been held in the case, the appellate authority shall, subject to the provisions of rule 18, itself hold such inquiry or direct that such inquiry be held and thereafter on consideration of the proceedings of such inquiry pass such orders as it may deem fit. Rule 30 of the Rules of 1958 clearly indicates that the Appellate Authority must decide the appeal by a speaking order, containing sufficient reasons to conclude that whether the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is proper or not. The finding recorded by the Appellate Authority in a single line stating that “there was gross negligence on the part of the petitioner” does not constitute sufficient compliance of the mandatory provisions contained under Rule 30 of the Rules of 1958. 8. It is settled proposition of law that whenever an appeal is submitted before a statutory Appellate Authority, it is expected from the said authority to pass a reasoned and speaking order but herein the instant case, the aforesaid exercise has not been done by the Appellate Authority which has violated the principles of natural justice. The same mistake has also been committed by the Reviewing Authority and the review petition has also not been decided by passing a reasoned and speaking order. 9. The appellate order does not disclose how and in what manner the grounds raised in the appeal were considered by the Appellate Authority. It was the duty of the Appellate Authority to have considered those grounds and record its finding on these grounds by passing a reasoned and speaking order. The Appellate Authority is expected to decide the appeal by recording cogent and proper reasons and by passing a speaking order and if the appeal is decided in a cursory manner, it amounts to violation of principles of natural justice. 10. In the case of Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank and Ors., reported in 2009 (2) SCC 570 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that “because the orders passed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority have severe civil consequences, hence, they must be supported by reasons.” 11. In the case of Maya Devi (Dead) through LRs vs. Raj Kumari Batra (Dead) through LRs. and Ors ., reported in 2010 (9) SCC 486 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that “the juristic basis underlying the requirement that Courts and indeed all such authorities, as exercise the power to determine the rights and obligations of individuals must give reasons in support of their orders has been examined in a long line of decisions rendered by this Court.” 12. In the case of Akshaya Kumar Routray Vs. In the case of Akshaya Kumar Routray Vs. State Bank of India, Bhubaneswar and Ors. reported in 2019 (III) ILR-CUT 521 , the Orissa High Court has held that “the order should be speaking either in itself, if its conclusion is different from the conclusion of the lower authority or it can even speak through the order of the lower authority, if it is in affirmation of or concurrence with the order of the lower authority and the order of the lower authority contains the reasons of the conclusions.” 13. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, in the case of Hari Narain Vs. Union of India and Ors. ( S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1746/1975 , decided on 09.12.1980 has held that “the position appears to be well settled that in all quasi judicial orders, the orders should be reasoned one showing that application of mind by the authority passing the order so that effective remedy can be availed by the person against whom the order has been passed.” 14. Even, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd. Vs. Union of India , reported in 2023(13) SCC 401 , has dealt with the importance of the rule of passing reasoned order and it has been held in para 64, 64.1 to 64.5 as under:- “64. The principles of natural justice ensure that justice is not only done but it is seen to be done as well. A reasoned order is one of the fundamental requirements of fair administration. It holds utmost significance in ensuring fairness; scholars and courts now term it as the third principle of natural justice. The rule of a reasoned order serves five important purposes: 64.1 Firstly, it ensures transparency and accountability. It places a check on arbitrary exercise of power. Lord Denning observed that in giving reasons “lies a whole difference between a judicial decision and an arbitrary one”. Justice Bhagwati observed in Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India, 1978 (1) SCC 248 , that the rule is “designed to secure the rule of law and the court should not be too ready to eschew it in its application to a given case.” 64.2 Secondly, non-reasoned orders have the practical effect of placing the decision out of the purview of judicial review. Union of India, 1978 (1) SCC 248 , that the rule is “designed to secure the rule of law and the court should not be too ready to eschew it in its application to a given case.” 64.2 Secondly, non-reasoned orders have the practical effect of placing the decision out of the purview of judicial review. A non-reasoned order limits the power of the courts to exercise judicial review because the scope of judicial review is not limited to the final finding on law or facts but extends to the reasons to arrive at the finding. A limitation on the right to appeal necessarily means that the scope of judicial review is restricted. 64.3. Thirdly, articulation of reasons aids in arriving at a just decision by minimalizing concerns of arbitrary State action. It introduces clarity of thought and eschews irrelevant and extraneous considerations. 64.4 Fourthly, it enhances the legitimacy of the institution because decisions will appear to be fair. There is a higher probability that the finding through a reasoned order is just. 64.5 Fifthly, reasoned orders are in furtherance of the right to information and the constitutional goal of open government. Secrecy broods partiality, corruption and other vices that are antithetical to a governance model that is premised on the Rule of Law.” 15. After taking into consideration the aforesaid judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the Orissa High Court and the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, it can safely be concluded that the Appellate Authority has failed to apply its mind, while rejecting the appeal submitted by the petitioner inasmuch as, it is evident from its bare perusal that the same has been rejected in a cursory manner, without recording any reasons and furthermore, the Review Authority has also overlooked the same. Hence, both the orders are not sustainable in the eyes of law. 16. In view the above, the impugned order dated 31.10.2000 passed by the Appellate Authority as well as the order dated 23.05.2002 passed by the Reviewing Authority are liable to be quashed and the same are hereby quashed and set aside. Hence, both the orders are not sustainable in the eyes of law. 16. In view the above, the impugned order dated 31.10.2000 passed by the Appellate Authority as well as the order dated 23.05.2002 passed by the Reviewing Authority are liable to be quashed and the same are hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted to the Appellate Authority to rehear the appeal after affording due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner as well as the rival side and thereafter, decide the same strictly in accordance with law by passing a reasoned and speaking order, expeditiously as early as possible, not beyond the period of three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order. 17. Accordingly, the present writ petition stands disposed of. 18. Stay application and all pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 19. Before parting with this order, it is made clear that this Court has not commented on the merits and demerits of the case and the Appellate Authority would be at liberty to decide the appeal afresh on the basis of the material available on record without being influenced by the observations made herein-above.