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Rajasthan High Court · body

2025 DIGILAW 1603 (RAJ)

Seva Singh S/o Indra Singh v. State of Rajasthan

2025-10-08

KULDEEP MATHUR

body2025
ORDER : 1. The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner being aggrieved by the order dated 10.09.2025 passed by the learned Board of Revenue, Ajmer in Appeal No.TA/1261/2019 whereby the order passed by the learned Revenue Appellate Authority (RAA) dated 15.03.2019 remanding the matter back to learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi has been maintained. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the present petitioner filed a suit for declaration of his tenancy rights before the learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi under Sections 88 and 53 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Learned counsel submitted that during pendency of the revenue suit, both the parties had entered into a compromise. On the basis of the written compromise produced before the learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi, the suit was decreed vide order dated 13.02.2012. 3. Learned counsel submitted that the respondent No.3 against the compromise deed dated 13.02.2012 preferred an appeal before the learned RAA. The appeal was contested by the petitioner on the ground that appeal against the compromise decree passed by the learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi is not maintainable in view of the express bar contained in Section 96 (3) of CPC. However, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner was not accepted by the learned RAA on ground that the compromise decree was obtained on the basis of blank signed papers of the respondent No.3 available with the petitioner. Further, the signatures of the respondent No.3 were not obtained on the order sheet before passing the compromise decree by the learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi. The judgment/order passed by the learned RAA has been further maintained by the learned Board of Revenue, Rajasthan Ajmer. 4. Learned counsel submitted that the respondent No.3 had also filed an FIR No.188/2012 under Sections 406 , 420, 417, 465, 466, 471 and 120-B of IPC against petitioner and other co- accused alleging inter alia that they have obtained a consent decree from the Court of Assistant Collector, Tibbi by using the blank papers containing his signatures and vakalatnama which was given to the petitioner for using the same in the ceiling proceedings before the learned Divisional Commissioner, Bikaner. Learned counsel contended that the police after making thorough investigation in the matter has filed a negative final report in relation to FIR No.188/2012 which was accepted by the competent criminal Court. Learned counsel contended that the police after making thorough investigation in the matter has filed a negative final report in relation to FIR No.188/2012 which was accepted by the competent criminal Court. According to the learned counsel, the civil and criminal proceedings have been initiated by the respondent No.3 in the present case after consent decree being passed by the Court of Assistant Collector, Tibbi only with a view to keep the dispute alive and pressurize the present petitioner to enter into re- settlement with the present petitioner. It was further urged that appeal against the compromise decree should not have been entertained being barred by Section 96 (3) of CPC. On these grounds, learned counsel for the petitioner prayed that impugned orders passed by the learned RAA and learned Board of Revenue, Ajmer may be quashed and set aside. He has placed reliance on the precedent set by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Pushpa Devi Bhagat (D) Th. Lr. Smt. vs. Rajinder Singh & Ors. (2006) 5 SCC 566 so also this Court in the case of Smt. Basanti Devi & Ors. vs. State, S.B. C.W.P. No. 2479/2006 decided on 22.11.2021. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that a bare perusal of the impugned orders passed by the learned RAA and the learned Board of Revenue, Ajmer would clearly indicate that no compromise as alleged by the petitioner has been entered between the parties. The compromise degree was obtained by the petitioner by playing fraud with the Court and on the basis of his signatures on the papers which were handed over to the petitioner and his father at the time when the ceiling proceedings were being conducted jointly against them by the revenue authorities. 7. Learned counsel submitted that no doubt it is true that Section 93(3) of the CPC says that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. However, when the compromise decree has been obtained by playing fraud then such decree shall not be valid and binding on the parties. Learned counsel submitted that Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Banwari Lal vs. Chando Devi (SMT) (THROUGH LRS.) & Anr. However, when the compromise decree has been obtained by playing fraud then such decree shall not be valid and binding on the parties. Learned counsel submitted that Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Banwari Lal vs. Chando Devi (SMT) (THROUGH LRS.) & Anr. (1993) 1 SCC 581 has been pleased to hold that when it is alleged by one of the parties to the alleged compromise that no such compromise has been entered between the parties, then the Court before which the alleged compromise took place has to decide whether the agreement or compromise in question was lawful and not void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act. If the agreement or the compromise itself is fraudulent, then it shall be deemed to be void within the meaning of explanation to the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 and as such, is not lawful. 8. Learned counsel submitted that in the present case, since the learned RAA and the learned Board of Revenue, Ajmer after considering the material available on record, have come to the conclusion that the compromise degree appears to be doubtful or in other words, has been prima facie obtained by playing fraud then it has committed no illegality in remanding the matter back to the Court before which the alleged compromise had been entered between the parties. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Perused the material available on record. 10. Section 96 of CPC is reproduced below for ready reference:- “96. Appeal from original decree. (1) Save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court. (2) An appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex parte. (3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties. (4) No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law, from a decree in any suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes, when the amount or value of the subject- matter of the original suit does not exceed ten thousand rupees.” 11. (4) No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law, from a decree in any suit of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes, when the amount or value of the subject- matter of the original suit does not exceed ten thousand rupees.” 11. The relevant portion of the order dated 13.02.2012 passed by the learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi wherein the factum with regard to compromise between the parties was noticed is reproduced below for ready reference:- 11. The relevant portion of the order dated 15.03.2019 passed by the Court of learned RAA, Hanumangarh wherein reasons for remanding the matter back to the Court of learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi have been noticed is reproduced below ready reference:- 12. The relevant portion of the order dated 10.09.2025 passed by the learned Board of Revenue, Ajmer giving reasons for affirming the remand order passed by the learned RAA is reproduced below for ready reference:- 13. The para 9 and 13 of the judgment passed the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Banwari Lal (supra) wherein the argument with regard to the remedy available to the party which alleges that the compromise decree has been obtained by playing fraud has been considered in respect to Section 96 (3) of CPC is reproduced below for ready reference:- “9. Section 96 (3) of the Code says that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. Rule1-A(2) has been introduced saying that against a decree passed in a suit after recording a compromise, it shall be open to the appellant to contest the decree on the ground that the compromise should not have been recorded. When Section 96 (3) bars an appeal against decree passed with the consent of parties, it implies that such decree is valid and binding on the parties unless set aside by the procedure prescribed or available to the parties. One such remedy available was by filing the appeal under Order 43, Rule 1(m). If the order recording the compromise was set aside, there was no necessity or occasion to file an appeal against the decree. Similarly a suit used to be filed for setting aside such decree on the ground that the decree is based on an invalid and illegal compromise not binding on the plaintiff of the second suit. If the order recording the compromise was set aside, there was no necessity or occasion to file an appeal against the decree. Similarly a suit used to be filed for setting aside such decree on the ground that the decree is based on an invalid and illegal compromise not binding on the plaintiff of the second suit. But after the amendments which have been introduced, neither an appeal against the order recording the compromise nor remedy by way of filing a suit is available in cases covered by Rule 3-A of Order 23. As such a right has been given under Rule 1-A(2)of Order 43 to a party, who challenges the recording of the compromise, to question the validity thereof while preferring an appeal against the decree. Section 96 (3) of the Code shall not be a bar to such an appeal because Section 96 (3) is applicable to cases where the factum of compromise or agreement is not in dispute. xx xx xx 13. When the amending Act introduced a proviso along with an explanation to Rule 3 of Order 23 saying that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, “ the Court shall decide the question”, the Court before which a petition of compromise is field and which has recorded such compromise, has to decide the question whether an adjustment or satisfaction had been arrived at on basis of any lawful agreement. To make the enquiry in respect of validity of the agreement or the compromise more comprehensive, the explanation to the proviso says that an agreement or compromise “which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act…” shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule. In view of the proviso read with the explanation, a Court which had entertained the petition of compromise has to examine whether the compromise was void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act. Even Rule 1(m) of Order 43 has been deleted under which an appeal was maintainable against an order recording a compromise. In view of the proviso read with the explanation, a Court which had entertained the petition of compromise has to examine whether the compromise was void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act. Even Rule 1(m) of Order 43 has been deleted under which an appeal was maintainable against an order recording a compromise. As such a party challenging a compromise can file a petition under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23, or an appeal under Section 96 (1) of the Code, in which he can now question the validity of the compromise in view of Rule 1-A of Order 43 of the Code.” 14. The para 12 of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Pushpa Devi Bhagat (supra) wherein legislative intent of the scheme of Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3 A of the CPC has been summarized reads as under:- “12. The position that emerges from the amended provisions of Order 23, can be summed up thus: (i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in section 96(3) CPC. (ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause(m) Rule 1 Order 43. (iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule3A. (iv) A consent decree operated as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23.” 15. This Court upon perusal of the facts of the case and precedent law cited at bar by the learned counsel for the petitioner finds that though Section 96 CPC provides for appeals from original decrees, Section 96 (3) however, provided that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. This Court upon perusal of the facts of the case and precedent law cited at bar by the learned counsel for the petitioner finds that though Section 96 CPC provides for appeals from original decrees, Section 96 (3) however, provided that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. The question which thus arises before this Court for consideration is that whether the learned RAA and learned Board of Revenue, Ajmer have committed any illegality and jurisdictional error in remanding the matter back to the learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi in appeal against the order dated 13.02.2012 on prima facie finding that the consent decree was obtained by improper means. This Court upon perusal of the order dated 13.02.2012 passed by the learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi finds that at the time of passing of the compromise decree, the respondent No.3 was summoned by the Court. In response thereof, he appeared before the Court along with his advocate and showed no objection in case the suit property is entered in the name of plaintiff (petitioner herein) in the revenue records. 16. The learned RAA in the appeal against the judgment of learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi after perusing the record of the case, reached to a conclusion that though the notices were issued to the respondent No.3 but there is nothing to indicate that the same were returned after service upon him. Further, neither the compromise deed bears any attestation nor the order sheets bears any signature of respondent No.3 to establish that the respondent No.3 was present before the learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi to verify the alleged factum of compromise between the parties. The learned RAA in these circumstances, remanded the matter to the learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi to decide the question whether there is a valid compromise or not after hearing both the parties. The order passed by the learned RAA dated 15.03.2019 has been affirmed by the learned Board of Revenue, Ajmer. 17. True it is that when a party to the consent decree alleges that the consent decree has been obtained by playing fraud upon the Court then that party to the litigation is required to approach the Court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it and establish that there was no compromise. 17. True it is that when a party to the consent decree alleges that the consent decree has been obtained by playing fraud upon the Court then that party to the litigation is required to approach the Court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it and establish that there was no compromise. The Court which recorded the compromise thereupon is required to decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. In other words, the compromise decree cannot be challenged and entertained by the Appellate Court on merits. 18. As noticed above, in the present case on finding an element of foul play in obtaining the compromise decree, the Appellate Court i.e. the Court of learned RAA on its own has not set aside the compromise decree dated 13.02.2012 passed by the learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi instead the matter has been remanded back to the concerned Court to look into the matter from the angle as to whether there was a valid compromise between the parties or not. This is for the reason that the validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the free and willful compromise between the parties, which as observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pushpa Devi Bhagat (supra) is nothing but contract between the parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the Court. It is a settled principle of law that fraud vitiates even the most solemn proceedings of the Court and thus, a decree obtained by fraud or misrepresentation can be set aside even at the execution stage. 19. In view of aforesaid discussion, and more particularly on finding that the matter has been remanded back to the learned Assistant Collector, Tibbi to determine correctness and validity of the compromise between the parties based on which the compromise decree dated 13.02.2012 was passed, this Court finds no merit in the present case. 20. Consequently, the present writ petition filed by the petitioner against the order dated 15.03.2019 passed by the learned RAA and the order dated 10.09.2025 passed by the learned Board of Revenue, Ajmer is dismissed. 21. No order as to costs.