ORDER : 1. This Civil Revision Petition has been filed assailing the order dated 10.09.2025 passed in I.A. No. 215 of 2015 in O.S. No. 94 of 2016 on the file of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Huzurabad. 2. I have heard Mr. P. Rajgopal Reddy, learned counsel for the revision petitioner, and learned counsel for the respondent. 3.1. Briefly stated the relavent facts are that, the revision petitioner, who is the defendant in the suit, filed the present interlocutory application under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “CPC”) seeking permission to receive the certified copy of the deposition of PW.2 (plaintiff) recorded in another suit. The Court below, after hearing both sides, dismissed the petition, observing that the petitioner had failed to cross-examine PW.1 and that a prior petition filed to recall PW.1 for cross-examination had already been dismissed by the trial Court, which dismissal was confirmed by this Court in a revision petition and the present application was an attempt to circumvent the earlier judicial orders. 3.2. Relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mitthulal and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh , (1975) 3 SCC 529 , the trial Court observed that, since the petitioner failed to avail the opportunity to cross-examine PW.1, the request to receive deposition evidence at a belated stage could not be entertained, as such evidence could not be treated as proved in the absence of proper procedure being followed. Accordingly, the application was dismissed. 4.1. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner/defandant contends that the deposition of the plaintiff as PW.2 in O.S. No. 89 of 2013 is a relevant piece of evidence for determining the issues involved in the present suit, as it pertains to the same subject matter and parties. It is argued that the Court below erred in rejecting the application at the threshold by rendering findings on admissibility, rather than merely receiving the document subject to proof and relevancy. Such an approach, according to the learned counsel, amounts to exercising jurisdiction with material irregularity. He further submits that the reliance placed by the trial Court on Mitthulal (supra) is misplaced, as that judgment pertains to criminal proceedings and is not applicable to the present civil context. 4.2.
Such an approach, according to the learned counsel, amounts to exercising jurisdiction with material irregularity. He further submits that the reliance placed by the trial Court on Mitthulal (supra) is misplaced, as that judgment pertains to criminal proceedings and is not applicable to the present civil context. 4.2. He places reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Levaku Pedda Reddamma and others v. Gottumukkala Venkata Subbamma and another , (2022) LiveLaw (SC) 533 , wherein the Apex Court held that, at the stage of trial, the Court ought to adopt a liberal approach in permitting parties to produce relevant evidence to enable effective adjudication of the lis. It was emphasized that mere delay or previous procedural lapses should not be a ground to reject material documents when such evidence could assist in a just and complete adjudication. Hence, it is submitted that refusal to receive the deposition in the present case causes grave prejudice to the petitioner’s defence. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff submits that the order of the trial Court is well reasoned and does not warrant interference. It is contended that the conduct of the petitioner throughout the proceedings reflects a pattern of delay and abuse of process. The petitioner failed to cross- examine PW.1 despite repeated opportunities, and the orders of both the trial Court and this Court conclusively closed that stage. Allowing the present petition, it is argued, would amount to reopening settled proceedings under the guise of introducing new documents. The learned counsel also submits that the deposition sought to be produced pertains to an unrelated suit and cannot be treated as automatically relevant or admissible. He further contends that, as the litigation is between a father and daughter, the petitioner’s repeated attempts to introduce extraneous material at the stage of re-examination of DW.1 would only serve to protract the trial. Accordingly, dismissal of the revision petition is sought. 6. I have carefully perused the material available on record. 7. Admittedly, the suit is at the stage of the defendant’s evidence, and the Court has permitted re-examination of DW.1. The petitioner now seeks to produce a certified copy of the deposition of the respondent/plaintiff recorded in another civil suit between the same parties. The genuineness of the document or its source is not in dispute.
7. Admittedly, the suit is at the stage of the defendant’s evidence, and the Court has permitted re-examination of DW.1. The petitioner now seeks to produce a certified copy of the deposition of the respondent/plaintiff recorded in another civil suit between the same parties. The genuineness of the document or its source is not in dispute. The issue, therefore, is limited to whether such a document can be received at this stage. 8. It is a settled principle of law that reception of documents and marking of evidence are two distinct stages. While receiving a document into record does not by itself amount to treating it as proved or admitting it in evidence, the Court retains the discretion to determine its relevancy and admissibility at a later stage. This principle has been consistently upheld in several decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, including Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat , (2001) 3 SCC 1 and Sait Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam , (1971) 1 SCC 856, wherein it was held that objections regarding admissibility should not prevent the Court from receiving documents on file, subject to proof and relevancy. 9. In the present case, while the petitioner may have failed to avail earlier opportunities during cross-examination, such omission alone should not preclude him from producing a document that may have a bearing on the merits of the case. Denying the petitioner an opportunity to place relevant evidence on record would amount to preventing him from presenting his case in its entirety and could result in miscarriage of justice. 10. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the trial Court erred in rejecting the petitioner’s application outright. The trial Court ought to have permitted the production of the document, subject to proof and relevancy, without expressing any opinion on its evidentiary value or admissibility at this stage. Receiving a document does not automatically render it proved, and the opposing party retains full right to object to its admissibility at the appropriate stage. 11. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 10.09.2025 passed in I.A. No. 215 of 2015 in O.S. No. 94 of 2016 by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Huzurabad, is set aside. The trial Court is directed to receive the document subject to proof and relevancy, and to proceed with the matter in accordance with law. 12.
11. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 10.09.2025 passed in I.A. No. 215 of 2015 in O.S. No. 94 of 2016 by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Huzurabad, is set aside. The trial Court is directed to receive the document subject to proof and relevancy, and to proceed with the matter in accordance with law. 12. It is, however, made clear that the present order shall not entitle the petitioner to circumvent earlier orders of the trial Court or this Court with respect to the closure of cross- examination of PW.1, nor shall it confer any right to seek recall of PW.1 or re-opening of the evidence already concluded. 13. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed, subject to the above observations. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous Petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed.