JUDGMENT : SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI, J. An order dated 23.02.2015 issued by the Addl. Director General of Police (A) Assam by which the prosecution sanction in respect of respondent nos. 7 and 8 have been declined is the subject matter of challenge in this present writ petition. 2. The facts, put in brief are that the husband of the petitioner had initially lodged an FIR on 08.04.2013 alleging that their daughter was kidnapped. Based on the aforesaid FIR, the daughter along with the person against whom the allegation of kidnapping was there had presented themselves before the police station on 29.04.2013 and the petitioner along with her husband had also visited the police station. However, it has been alleged that the petitioner and her husband were not allowed to enter the police station and rather the petitioner was assaulted for which the petitioner had lodged another Ejahar. The Ejahar was however not registered and therefore the Superintendent of Police, Nalbari was approached and as no action was taken even thereafter, the petitioner had filed a writ petition before this Court which was registered as WP(C)/2790/2013. During the pendency of this writ petition, this Court was however apprised of the fact that Nalbari PS Case No. 360/2013 under Sections 354 /325/506/342/34 IPC was registered and investigation was on. On such appraisal, the aforesaid writ petition was disposed of on 20.06.2013 by directing the respondents to carry out the investigation. 3. The said investigation had however culminated in a Final Report dated 22.12.2013. The petitioner has claimed to have filed Naraji Petition against the aspect of acceptance of the final report. The learned CJM, Nalbari on 12.05.2014, after examining the matter had however made an observation that since the accused persons are public servant and the offence alleged has been committed in that capacity, sanction under Section 197 of the Cr.PC (corresponding to Section 218 BNSS ) would be required. The complainant (petitioner) was accordingly directed to obtain necessary sanction. The matter was accordingly placed before the sanctioning authority who vide the impugned order dated 23.02.2015 has declined the sanction. It is the validity and legality of the aforesaid order which have been questioned in this present writ petition. 4. I have heard Shri R. Islam, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the petitioner. The matter was accordingly placed before the sanctioning authority who vide the impugned order dated 23.02.2015 has declined the sanction. It is the validity and legality of the aforesaid order which have been questioned in this present writ petition. 4. I have heard Shri R. Islam, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the petitioner. I have also heard Shri N. Goswami, learned State Counsel as well as Shri D. Nath, learned counsel for the respondent no. 7. It may however be mentioned that initially this writ petition was filed through a counsel who after some dates stopped appearing and accordingly, Shri R. Islam, learned Legal Aid Counsel was appointed to assist the Court on behalf of the petitioner. 5. Shri Islam, the learned Legal Aid Counsel has submitted that once the learned Court of CJM, Nalbari had found prima facie materials to proceed, such sanction could not have been refused vide the impugned order dated 22.03.2015. It is submitted that the petitioner’s Naraji was duly considered by the learned CJM, Nalbari as would be reflected in the order dated 12.05.2014. It is also submitted that the sanctioning authority had simply relied upon the report of the OC and the Superintendent of Police to come to the aforesaid finding. He accordingly submits that the impugned order be interfered with and sanction directed to be given for proceeding against the respondent nos. 7 & 8. 6. Per contra, Shri Goswami, the learned State Counsel has submitted that the sanctioning authority had applied independent mind in accordance with the provisions of Section 197 of the Cr.PC which grants protection to a public servant, who is accused of any offence in discharge of his duties. He has submitted that the relevant factors have been taken into consideration by the sanctioning authority and therefore the order is not liable to be interfered with. 7. Shri D. Nath, the learned counsel for the respondent no. 7 has submitted that the case against his client was instituted only as a counter blast as the initial allegation of kidnapping had turned out to be an incorrect allegation as the daughter of the petitioner had got married to the alleged kidnapper. He has also submitted that all these facts have been taken into consideration by the sanctioning authority before arriving to the decision not to accord sanction which is reflected in the impugned order. He has also submitted that all these facts have been taken into consideration by the sanctioning authority before arriving to the decision not to accord sanction which is reflected in the impugned order. He, accordingly submits that the writ petition be dismissed. 8. The rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties have been duly considered and the materials placed before this Court have been carefully perused. 9. Section 197 of the Cr.PC. (corresponding to Section 218 BNSS ) is on the requirement of sanction for prosecution of, amongst others, public servants. The aspect / objective of such sanction has been discussed in a catena of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In fact, the vires of the aforesaid provision was the subject matter of challenge before a Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Matajog Dobey Vs. HC Hari , reported in AIR 1956 SC 44 which laid down as follows “15. The minor contentions may be disposed of at the outset. Even if there was anything sound and substantial in the constitutional point about the 'vires of S. 5 (1) of the Act, we declined to go into it as it was not raised before the High Court or in the grounds of the petition for special leave to appeal. Article 14 does not render S. 197, Criminal P. C. 'ultra vires' as the discrimination is based upon a rational classification. Public servants have to be protected from harassment in the discharge of official duties while ordinary citizens not so engaged do not require this safeguard. It was argued that S. 197, Criminal P. C., vested an absolutely arbitrary power in the government to grant or withhold sanction at their sweet will and pleasure, and the Legislature did not lay down or even indicate any guiding principles to control the exercise of the discretion. There is no question of any discrimination between one person and another in the matter of taking proceedings against a public servant for an act done or purporting to be done by the public servant in the discharge of his official duties. No one can take such proceedings without such sanction. It the government gives sanction against one public servant but declines to do so against another, then the government servant against whom sanction is given may possible complain of discrimination. No one can take such proceedings without such sanction. It the government gives sanction against one public servant but declines to do so against another, then the government servant against whom sanction is given may possible complain of discrimination. But the petitioners who are complainants cannot be heard to say so for there is no discrimination as against any complainant. It has to be borne in mind that a discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power and that abuse of power is not to be easily assumed where the discretion is vested in the government and not in a minor official. Further, we are not now concerned with any such question. We have merely to see whether the Court could take cognizance of the case without pervious sanction and for this purpose the Court has to find out if the act complained against was committed by the accused while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. Once this is settled, the case proceeds or is thrown out. Whether sanction is to be accorded or not is a matter for the government to consider. The absolute power to accord or withhold sanction and foreign to the duty cast one the Court, which is the ascertainment of the true nature of the act.” 10. The aforesaid decision of the Constitutional Bench in the case of Matajog Dobey (supra) has been consistently followed. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of General Officer Commanding, Rashtriya Rifles Vs. CBI reported in (2012) 6 SCC 228 has laid down as follows: “50. In Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44 , the Constitution Bench of this Court held that requirement of sanction may arise at any stage of the proceedings as the complaint may not disclose all the facts to decide the question of immunity, but facts subsequently coming either to notice of the police or in judicial inquiry or even in the course of prosecution evidence may establish the necessity for sanction. The necessity for sanction may surface during the course of trial and it would be open to the accused to place the material on record for showing what his duty was and also the acts complained of were so inter-related or inseparably connected with his official duty so as to attract the protection accorded by law. The necessity for sanction may surface during the course of trial and it would be open to the accused to place the material on record for showing what his duty was and also the acts complained of were so inter-related or inseparably connected with his official duty so as to attract the protection accorded by law. The court further observed that difference between “acting or purporting to act” in the discharge of his official duty is merely of a language and not of substance.” 11. A bare perusal of the impugned order dated 23.02.2015 would show that the sanctioning authority namely, the Addl. Director General of Police (A), Assam had taken into consideration all the relevant facts. The aspect that the daughter of the petitioner, who was alleged to have been kidnapped has also made a statement under Section 164 Cr.PC in which she has not supported the case of the petitioner. The sanctioning authority has also taken the report of the investigating officer, who had recorded statement under Section 161 Cr.PC and had also taken cognizance of the report of the Superintendent of Police, Nalbari on the allegations made by the petitioner against the respondent nos. 7 & 8. It also appears that after a detail investigation, the investigating officer did not find any materials to proceed which led to laying of the Final Report on 22.12.2013. 12 . Though the learned CJM, Nalbari vide order dated 12.05.2014 appears to have taken a view that a case may be proceeded which however would require a sanction under Section 197 of the Cr.PC, the sanctioning authority, vide the impugned order has come to a conclusion that no case was made out for grant of such sanction. It is not in dispute that the allegation against the respondent nos. 7 & 8 were in connection of performance of their official duties. It is also not the case of the petitioner that the requirement of sanction under Section 197 Cr.PC would not arise in the present case and in any case, the order dated 12.05.2014 passed by the learned CJM, Nalbari is not the subject matter of challenge. 13 . This Court in exercising certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be primarily examining the decision making process. 13 . This Court in exercising certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be primarily examining the decision making process. In other words, the examination would be within the contours as to whether the relevant factors were taken into consideration or as to whether the impugned decision is based on irrelevant factors and extraneous consideration. In the considered opinion of this Court, the impugned order dated 23.02.2015 appears to be based on factors which are relevant and germane to reach a conclusion which has been done. 14 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after discussing the previous case laws on the jurisdiction of a Writ Court qua the writ of certiorari, in the case of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and Anr. Vs. Bikartan Das & Ors reported in 2023 INSC 733 has laid down as follows: “49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something important in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari. 50. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. 51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not.” 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case for interference is made out and accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. 16 . No order as to cost.