ORDER : SANJAY PRASAD , J. 1. Heard Mr. Raunak Sahay, learned counsel for the petitioner-company, however, none appears for the State. 2. This writ petition has been filed on behalf of the petitioner-company for the following reliefs:- (i) For the issuance of an appropriate writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions or a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing the Notification of Reference dated 19.03.2025 (Annexure “9” to the writ application) whereby and whereunder the appropriate Government has referred the dispute with respect to the discharge of the Respondent Workman from service for adjudication before the learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur, although the said dispute is not maintainable and the reference is invalid in view of the fact that the dispute is hopelessly stale having been raised after a delay of over 10 years and thus, the Reference is not legal, valid and is not maintainable. And/Or (ii) For issuance of a further appropriate writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions to hold and declare that the dispute is hopelessly stale and is thus not maintainable and hence the reference is not valid in law And/Or (iii) During the pendency of the instant writ application, all further proceedings in Reference Case No. 05 of 2025 now pending in the Court of the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur, may kindly be stayed/kept in abeyance; And/Or (iv) For issuance of such other writ(s), order(s) or direction(s) as this Hon’ble Court may think just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case doing conscionable justice to the petitioner. 3. It reveals from the pleadings of this writ petition that the State Government has referred the industrial dispute, raised by the Workman, under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947). The Governor of Jharkhand has been pleased to refer the said dispute for adjudication to the learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur. In exercise of powers conferred under Sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the said Act the Governor of Jharkhand was further pleased to specify a period of three months from the date of receipt of the Reference within which the Labour Court, Jamshedpur shall submit its Award in the dispute to the State Government. 4. The Term of Reference is as follows:- “Whether, the termination of Shri Ramesh Kumar Roy (Ex P. No.-124160) by the management of M/s Tata Steel Ltd, Jamshedpur is justified? If not, what relief he would be entitled to”? 4. The Term of Reference is as follows:- “Whether, the termination of Shri Ramesh Kumar Roy (Ex P. No.-124160) by the management of M/s Tata Steel Ltd, Jamshedpur is justified? If not, what relief he would be entitled to”? 5. Thereafter, the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur has issued Notice (i.e. Annexure-10) to the petitioner-company to appear before the Court on 28.04.2025 to participate in the proceeding thereof otherwise the case will be heard ex-parte. 6. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition before this Court on 11.06.2025, which was registered on 20.06.2025. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner- company submitted that Reference made by the State Government, vide Notification dated 19.03.2025 as contained in Annexure-9, is illegal, arbitrary and not sustainable in law. It is submitted that the Reference is hopelessly barred by limitation and it has been referred after a delay of more than 10 years. It is submitted that the Respondent No.3-Workman was a habitual absentee and for which a domestic enquiry was conducted and he was held guilty of misconduct and he was dismissed/ removed from the services in the year 2013, however, the Workman- Respondent No.3 raised an Industrial Dispute vide letter dated 05.01.2024 (i.e. Annexure-2) after a delay of more than 10 years although the order of discharge was passed against him on 08.07.2013 (i.e. Annexure-1) by the petitioner-company. It is further submitted that the petitioner-company received Notice dated 03.02.2024 from the Deputy Labour Commissioner (in short to be referred to as the D.L.C.), Jamshedpur and for which the petitioner- company has also filed its reply dated 09.02.2024 (i.e. Annexure-5) and has pointed out that the Workman- Respondent No. 3 has raised Industrial Dispute after a lapse of Ten (10) years and the same is barred in the light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Needungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Maaun Kutty & Ors. , reported in (2000) 2 SCC 455 , however the appropriate Government has referred the matter for adjudication by Notification of Reference dated 19.03.2025 ( i.e. Annexure-9) issued under the signature of Under Secretary, Office of Labour Commissioner, Jharkhand. 8. , reported in (2000) 2 SCC 455 , however the appropriate Government has referred the matter for adjudication by Notification of Reference dated 19.03.2025 ( i.e. Annexure-9) issued under the signature of Under Secretary, Office of Labour Commissioner, Jharkhand. 8. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner-company has relied upon the certain judgments, which are as follows:- (i) Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Versus K.P. Madhavankutty and Others , reported in (2000) 2 SCC 455 , at Para 6, (ii) State of Karnataka and Another V. Ravi Kumar reported in (2009) 13 SCC 746 , at Para 6, 7 and 8, (iii) Prabhakar V. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Another , reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1, at Para 10 and 42 and (iv) The Order dated 18.12.2020 passed in W.P.(L) No. 5498 of 2016 by the Co-ordinate Bench (Justice Dr. S.N. Pathak, as his Lordship then was). In view of the above, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Reference dated 19.03.2025 (i.e. Annexure-9) referred by the State Government in exercise of power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is barred by limitation and is a stale one and hence, the Reference may be declared illegal and this writ petition may be allowed. 9. Perused the records and considered the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner-company. 10. It appears from the Letter dated 05.01.2024 (i.e. Annexure-2) sent by the Workman- Respondent No.3 to the Managing Director of the petitioner-company for his reinstatement in service stating that he was the permanent employee and was working as an ‘Attendant’ in Metal Recovery Plant for more than 21 years from the date of his appointment, i.e. 10.01.1992, however, he was discharged from his service on 08.07.2013. 11. This Court is not aware at this stage as to whether the Workman-Respondent No.3 had filed any representation in the meantime before the Management of the petitioner-company or any other appropriate authority or has raised industrial dispute. Even the petitioner-company has not clarified the averments made in letter dated 05.01.2024 (i.e. Annexure-2) by filing the instant writ petition and has merely stated that the Workman-Respondent No. 3 has raised Industrial Dispute after Ten (10) years of being discharged from the services of the petitioner-company. 12. Even the petitioner-company has not clarified the averments made in letter dated 05.01.2024 (i.e. Annexure-2) by filing the instant writ petition and has merely stated that the Workman-Respondent No. 3 has raised Industrial Dispute after Ten (10) years of being discharged from the services of the petitioner-company. 12. So far as judgment passed in the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Versus K.P. Madhavankutty and Others , reported in (2000) 2 SCC 455 is concerned, in the above case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also observed in Paragraph 6 that law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Reference was barred on the ground that the Workman had not taken the plea that his dismissal was illegal or irregular and hence the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the appropriate Government cannot, in a mechanical fashion, make reference of the alleged dispute terming it as an industrial dispute only on the ground that two other employees, who were dismissed from the services were reinstated and thereafter the Workman has raised the Industrial dispute. However, in the present case, from perusal of Letter dated 05.01.2024 (i.e. Annexure-2), it would appear that the Workman-Respondent No.3 has raised industrial dispute on the ground that his order of discharge was illegal, arbitrary, unjust and unfair and he had not been given the copy of enquiry proceeding and report till date. Thus, the aforesaid judgment does not apply on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case. 13. So far as judgment passed in the case of State of Karnataka and Another V. Ravi Kumar reported in (2009) 13 SCC 746 is concerned, in the above case the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Reference was not maintainable after a delay of 14 years on the ground that the Workman had raised Industrial Dispute only after some daily wagers had got some relief and then he belatedly approached the High Court in the year 1998 although he was discontinued from service from 14.11.1984. However, the above case is also not applicable on the facts and in the circumstances of this case as in the above case the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka has dismissed the writ petition filed by the Workman-petitioner as not maintainable with an observation that the Workman may give representation to the State Government and the State Government may consider whether the dispute should be referred under Section 10 (1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, in the present case, the workman has raised industrial dispute on the ground that his order of discharge was illegal, arbitrary, unjust and unfair and he had not been given the copy of enquiry proceeding and report till date. Thus, the aforesaid judgment does not apply on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case. 14. So far as judgment passed in the case of Prabhakar V. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Another , reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1 is concerned, Hon’ble Supreme Court has summarized the principles in Paragraph 42.1 to 42.6 and has also held that since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the Workman to raise dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists. Thus, the Workman has to show before the Labour Court that the dispute exists, however, in the instant case the petitioner-company has directly came before this Court without raising the plea before the learned Tribunal, where the dispute has been referred and even the Workman-Respondent No.3 is not aware. 15. So far as order dated 18.12.2020, passed in W.P.(L) No. 5498 of 2016 is concerned, this Court finds that the learned Single Judge has also relied upon the judgments passed in Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Versus K.P. Madhavankutty and Others , reported in (2000) 2 SCC 455, Prabhakar V. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Another , reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1 , however, this Court respectfully differs from the view taken by the learned Single Judge of this Court in view of the reasons mentioned in the preceding paragraphs of this order. 16. 16. So far as the present case is concerned, it would appear from Annexure-1, i.e. the order of discharge dated 08.07.2013 passed by the petitioner-company against the Workman-Respondent No.3 (which is in one page) that workman-Respondent No. 3 had been discharged/removed on the ground that the enquiry officer found him guilty of the charges. It is also stated that copy of the enquiry report for his comments/views were sent to the Workman vide letter dated 17.06.2013 and they had not received any representation with views/comments from the workman-Respondent No.3. Thus, it is not clear that Respondent No.3 was dismissed on the ground of habitual absenteeism or not. Although the learned counsel for the petitioner- company has taken a vague plea that the Respondent No.3 is a habitual absentee. 17. It is well settled that the question of limitation is a mixed question of facts and law. 18. Thus, it is well settled from the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and also from the judgment of the High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi that Industrial dispute can be raised at any point of time and it should not be dismissed on the ground of being barred by limitation. 19. It has been held by the Hon’ble Suprem Court in the case of Raghubir Singh Versus General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in (2014) 10 SCC 301 , at Para 14, 15, 16, 17, 20 and 34 as follows:- “Para 14:- Therefore, in our considered view, the observations made by this Court in Rajasthan State Agriculture Mktg. Board case upon which the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana has placed reliance cannot be applied to the fact situation of the case on hand, for the reason that the Labour Court has erroneously rejected the reference without judiciously considering all the relevant factors of the case particularly the points of dispute referred to it and answered the second issue regarding the reference being barred by limitation but not on the merits of the case. The said decision has no application to the fact situation and also for the reason the catena of decisions of this Court referred to supra, wherein this Court has categorically held that the provisions of the Limitation Act under Article 137 has no application to make reference by the appropriate Government to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute between workmen and the employer. Para 15:- In the case on hand, no doubt there is a delay in raising the dispute by the appellant; the Labour Court nevertheless has the power to mould the relief accordingly. At the time of adjudication, if the dispute referred to the Labour Court is not adjudicated by it, it does not mean that the dispute ceases to exist. The appropriate Government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Act can refer the industrial dispute, between the parties, at any time, to either the jurisdictional Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as interpreted by this Court in Avon Services case referred to supra. Therefore, the State Government has rightly exercised its power under b Section 10(1)(c) of the Act and referred the points of dispute to the Labour Court as the same are in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Avon Services and Sapan Kumar Pandit cases referred to supra. Para 16:- Further, the workman cannot be denied to seek relief only on the ground of delay in raising the dispute as held in S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom District Managers, it was held by this Court as follows:(SCC pp.39-40, para 17) "17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree….. In Ratan Chandra Sammanta v. Union of India it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself; lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants to any relief." (emphasis supplied) Para 17:- In view of the legal principles laid down by this Court in S.M. Nilajkar, the reference of the industrial dispute made in the case on hand by the State Government to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the workman was placed, firstly, as there was a criminal case pending against him and secondly, the respondent had assured the workman that he would be reinstated after his acquittal from the criminal case. Moreover, it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of the delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to the delay. Thus, we do not consider the delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication as gravely erroneous and it does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer. Para 20:- Further, the Labour Court on an erroneous assumption of law framed the additional issue regarding the limitation in raising the dispute and its reference by the State Government to the Labour Court. Thus, the Labour Court has ignored the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra. The award passed by the Labour Court was accepted erroneously by both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the civil writ petition and the letters patent appeal without examining the case in its proper perspective, keeping in view the power of the State Government under Section 10(1)(c) and the object and intendment of the Act. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in industrial jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large. Not adjudicating the existing industrial dispute on merits between the parties referred to it may lead to disruption of industrial peace and harmony, which is the foremost important aspect in industrial jurisprudence as the same would affect the public interest at large. Para 34:- The rejection of the reference by the Labour Court by answering the additional Issue 2 regarding the delay, laches and limitation without adjudicating the points of dispute referred to it on the merits amounts to failure to exercise its statutory power under Section 11-A of the Act. Therefore, we have to interfere with the impugned award of the Labour Court and the judgment and order of the High Court as it has erroneously confirmed the award of the Labour Court without examining the relevant provisions of the Act and decisions of this Court referred to supra on the relevant issue regarding the limitation.” 20. It has been held by the High Court of Jharkhand in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors V. Union of India & Anr. , reported in (2015) 3 AIR Jhar R 157 , at Para No. 4 (ix) as follows:- “Para4:- ………………………………………………….. (ix) It has been held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh v. Instrument Design Development & Facilities Centre as reported in (2010) 14 SCC 176 , at paragraph no. 30 and 31 as under: "30. In view of the above, law can be summarised that there is no prescribed time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is more so in view of the language used, namely, if any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the appropriate Government "at any time refer the dispute to a board or court for enquiry. The reference sought for by the workman cannot be said to be delaved or suffering from a lapse when law does not prescribe any period of limitation for raising a dispute under Section 10 of the Act. The real test for making a reference is whether at the time of the reference dispute exists or not and when it is made it is presumed that the State Government is satisfied with the ingredients of the provision, hence the Labour Court cannot go behind the reference………………………..” 21. The real test for making a reference is whether at the time of the reference dispute exists or not and when it is made it is presumed that the State Government is satisfied with the ingredients of the provision, hence the Labour Court cannot go behind the reference………………………..” 21. So far as the present case is concerned the learned Counsel for the petitioner-company has contended that the workman-Respondent No. 3 has raised Industrial Dispute on 05.01.2024, vide Annexure 2 and for which the petitioner-company had also received Notice dated 03.02.2024 (i.e. Annexure-4) from D.L.C., Jamshedpur. 22. It would also appear from the Letter dated 05.01.2024 (i.e. Annexure-2 of this writ petition) filed by the petitioner before the Managing Director, Tata Steel Limited that the Workman-Respondent No.3 had met with an accident and he was declared medically unfit from the Tata Main Hospital from 26.10.2012 to 16.11.2012 and thereafter, he had taken P.L. from 18.11.2012 to 20.11.2012 at his home for celebrating ‘CHHAT’ Puja. Before that he had taken permission from his superiors and had gone on leave for a few days in connection with treatment of his brother, but he was sent an advisory letter dated 15.10.2012 to resume duties by 22.10.2012 and he followed the advice of the Management and resumed his duties on 21.10.2012. However, the petitioner-company issued chargesheet to him on 20.11.2012 and he was finally discharged from the services of the company vide letter dated 08.07.2013. He has taken the plea that his discharge from the service of the petitioner company is illegal, unjust and unfair and he has also not been given a copy of the enquiry proceeding and enquiry report till date. He has also pointed out that he had represented to the Company-Management through their recognized Union, Tata Workers’ Union, Jamshedpur against his illegal and unfair discharge from service several times. 23. Thus, this Court is of the view that it will not be proper to decide the plea of the petitioner-Management at this stage. 24. Thus, it is well settled from the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that industrial dispute raised by the Workman-Respondent No.3 has to be adjudicated by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur on its own merit and the learned Court below has to see as to whether the industrial dispute exists or not and has to decide the case on its own merit. Therefore, this writ petition, i.e. W.P.(L) No.3175 of 2025 cannot be allowed at this stage and the Reference cannot be thrown out at this stage as being barred by limitation in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India passed in the case of Raghubir Singh Versus General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in (2014) 10 SCC 301 and also of this Court, passed in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors V. Union of India & Anr. , reported in (2015) 3 AIR Jhar R 157. 25. Accordingly, this writ petition, being W.P.(L) No. 3175 of 2025 is hereby dismissed with cost of Rs.10,000/- to be paid by the petitioner-company to the St. Michael’s Blind School, Gungu Toli, Bahubazar, Ranchi. 26. Let a copy of this order be sent to the learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur for the needful.