JUDGMENT : (Challa Gunaranjan, J.) Petitioners/Plaintiffs, being unsuccessful, preferred the present appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 of CPC aggrieved by the order, dated 19.04.2023, passed in I.A. No.419 of 2022 in O.S. No.35 of 2022 on the file of the Judge, Family Court-cum-VIII Additional District Judge, Ongole, Prakasam District, whereby the trial Court dismissed the petition filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of CPC for grant of temporary injunction restraining the respondents/defendants, their men, followers and associates from entering or interfering with the petitioners/plaintiffs’ peaceful possession and enjoyment of the petition schedule property. 2. The parties are hereinafter referred to as arrayed in the Suit and I.A. before the trial Court for the sake of convenience. 3. Initially, the 1 st plaintiff Devathu Musala Rao, claiming to be the adopted son of Devathu Sriranganadham, filed the present Suit in O.S.No.35 of 2022 on the file of the Judge, Family Court-cum-VIII Additional District Judge, Ongole, Prakasam District, for permanent injunction restraining the respondents/defendants, their men, followers, associates and relatives from interfering with the plaintiffs’ peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property, shown as A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-7 in the plaint plan. As per the schedule to the plaint, the subject property in issue, as mentioned, is an extent of Ac.0.46 cents out of Ac.1.44½ cents in Survey No.305 of Ongole Village and Town. Along with the Suit, the 1 st plaintiff also filed I.A. No.419 of 2022 under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC for grant of temporary injunction restraining the respondents from entering or interfering with the plaintiffs’ peaceful possession and enjoyment of plaint schedule property in any manner. As the sole plaintiff died intestate, the plaintiffs 2 to 5/petitioners 2 to 5 were added as legal heirs, by order, dated 17.11.2022, passed in I.A. No.1467 of 2022. 4. The facts relevant for disposal of present appeal are set out as under: It is stated that 1 st plaintiff was adopted by Devathu Sriranganatham. Initially, Devathu Musalaiah acquired an extent of Ac.0.90 cents in Survey No.305 of Ongole Village and Town under registered sale deed, dated 26.08.1904 vide document No.1777 of 1904. The said Devathu Musalaiah had three sons viz., Sreeramulu, Subbarayudu and Sriranganadham. Sriranganadham also purchased an extent of Ac.1.44½ cents in Survey No.305 of Ongole village and town, through a registered sale deed, dated 19.09.1931 vide document No.1145/1931. The said Devathu Musalaiah had three sons viz., Sreeramulu, Subbarayudu and Sriranganadham. Sriranganadham also purchased an extent of Ac.1.44½ cents in Survey No.305 of Ongole village and town, through a registered sale deed, dated 19.09.1931 vide document No.1145/1931. That, out of the total extent of Ac.5.78 cents of land in the aforesaid survey number, in view of the above acquisition of the aforesaid extents, the petitioners claimed to be the owners to an extent of Ac.2.34½ cents. Out of which, after the demise of Devathu Musalaiah, his sons and grandchildren alienated Ac.1.88 cents through various registered sale deeds, thereby left with an extent of Ac.0.46 cents as shown in the plaint schedule property. The particulars of sale deeds executed by the sons and grandchildren of Devathu Musalaiah are set out in the affidavit filed in support of the I.A. Further, it is stated that the aforesaid extent of Ac.1.88 cents covered the entire extent of Ac.0.90 cents which late Devathu Musalaiah acquired under registered sale deed, dated 26.08.1904 and the remaining extent of Ac.0.98 cents was covered under registered sale deed, dated 19.09.1931, through which Devathu Sriranganadham had acquired, thereby, it is stated that the remaining extent of Ac.0.46 cents corresponding to the balance extent of land traceable to the sale deed, dated 19.09.1931. That when Sriramulu, natural brother of the 1 st plaintiff, and others tried to encroach upon the remaining extent of Ac.0.46 cents, the 1 st plaintiff had filed O.S.No.38 of 2008 on the file of V Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Ongole, for declaration and for consequential permanent injunction which was decreed on 19.04.2011, therefore, the same would conclude the plaintiffs right, title, possession and enjoyment in respect of the suit schedule property. 5. It is stated that as the respondents tried to encroach upon the suit schedule property and started proclaiming that they would file Suit and will forcibly occupy the suit schedule land, which was just before a month, the 1 st plaintiff filed the present Suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men, associations and relatives from entering or interfering with the plaintiffs’ peaceful possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property. 6. In support of the petitioners' claim, they had got marked Exs.A-1 to A-30 of which Exs.A-2 to A-29 are the registered sale deeds through which the sons and grandchildren of Devathu Musalaiah had alienated various extents of lands. 6. In support of the petitioners' claim, they had got marked Exs.A-1 to A-30 of which Exs.A-2 to A-29 are the registered sale deeds through which the sons and grandchildren of Devathu Musalaiah had alienated various extents of lands. Exs.A-1 and A-30 are the registered General Power of Attorney and the copy of the caveat filed by them apprehending that the respondents/defendants would institute a Suit. 7. Four separate counters were filed by 1 st respondent; respondent Nos.2 and 3; respondent No.4 and respondent No.6 respectively. 8. In the counter filed by the 1 st respondent, the 1 st respondent claimed that he acquired an extent of 34 Gadis in Survey No.305 of Ongole village from Kata Sura Reddy under a registered sale deed, dated 30.11.2021 and that his vendor in turn purchased the same from Manchala Venkata Ramaiah and Manchala Ramesh Kumar through a registered sale deed, dated 02.09.1983, vide document No.3239/1983. In turn, Manchala Ramesh Kumar S/o.Manchala Venkata Ramaiah purchased the property through a registered sale deed, dated 14.05.1982 vide Document No.1877/1982 from Dande Venkateswarlu, GPA holder of Rangaiah. The extent acquired under the said document was Ac.0.75 cents from out of the total extent of Ac.5.78 cents in Survey No.305. It is further stated that Manchala Venkata Ramaiah also purchased an extent of Ac.0.75 cents through a registered sale deed, dated 01.10.1982, vide document No.2330/ 1982 from Dande Krishnaiah S/o.Rangaiah and likewise, an extent of Ac.0.60 cents through a registered sale deed, vide Document No.5447/1982, from Dande Narayanamma W/o.Rangaiah. 9. The respondents 2 and 3 claimed to have purchased an extent of 36 Gadis and 49 sq. ft. through registered sale deeds of even dated 29.12.2017, vide Document Nos.9531/2017 and 9532/ 2017 respectively from Ilavala Krishna Reddy, who in turn, purchased the same from Manchala Venkata Ramaiah and Manchala Ramesh Kumar, through registered sale deed, dated 02.09.1983 vide document No.3239 of 1983, who in turn, seems to have purchased from Dande Rangaiah’s family, as narrated above. 10. ft. through registered sale deeds of even dated 29.12.2017, vide Document Nos.9531/2017 and 9532/ 2017 respectively from Ilavala Krishna Reddy, who in turn, purchased the same from Manchala Venkata Ramaiah and Manchala Ramesh Kumar, through registered sale deed, dated 02.09.1983 vide document No.3239 of 1983, who in turn, seems to have purchased from Dande Rangaiah’s family, as narrated above. 10. The 4 th respondent, in the counter, stated that initially, Dande Narayanamma purchased an extent of Ac.1.00 cents from Ogirala Sundara Ramaiah S/o.Subbarayudu, through a registered sale deed, dated 02.03.1966, vide Document No.165/1966 and on the same day, acquired another extent of Ac.1.00 cents adjacent to the above mentioned land from Arigala Hanumantha Rao S/o.Jalaiah and Gajula Kotaiah S/o.Subbaiah, through a registered sale deed, dated 02.03.1966, vide Document No.166/1966, which were falling in Survey No.305 of Ongole Village and Town. Later, upon survey being conducted in the year 1977, the total extent of land in the possession of Dande Narayanamma found to be Ac.2.10 cents and the same was in turn divided into three portions and she had settled the same in favour of her sons Dande Venkateswarlu an extent of Ac.0.75 cents; Dande Krishnaiah an extent of Ac.0.75 cents and the remaining extent of Ac.0.60 cents was alienated to Manchala Venkata Ramaiah S/o. Hanumaiah, under a registered sale deed, dated 01.10.1982, vide document No.5447/1982. Manchala Venkata Ramaiah had further acquired an extent of Ac.0.75 cents from Dande Krishnaiah, vide document No.2330/1982 dated 31.05.1982 and his son Manchala Ramesh Kumar acquired an extent of Ac.0.75 cents from Dande Venkateswarlu through a registered sale deed, dated 14.05.1982, vide Document No.1877/1982, thereby, the total extent of Ac.2.10 cents, which was acquired by Dande Narayanamma has now been purchased and stood in the name of Manchala Venkata Ramaiah and his son Manchala Ramesh Kumar. It is stated that even before the settlement and sale by Dande Narayanamma, as mentioned above, the land was divided into 21 plots and that Plot No.3 for which GPA was issued by Manchala Venkata Ramaiah and his son Manchala Ramesh Kumar vide registered Document No.260/1983, dated 09.09.1983 in favour of Tippareddy Venkateswarlu S/o.Peri Reddy, who in turn, sold the same to the 4 th respondent through a registered sale deed, dated 29.01.2007, vide document No.983/2007. 11. 11. Similarly, 6 th respondent filed a counter in line with that of the 4 th respondent and claimed that he purchased plot No.5 from Kakarla Govindaiah S/o.Hanumaiah, through a registered sale deed, dated 26.04.2003, vide Document No.1572/2003 and that the said GPA holder, in turn, acquired the right pursuant to a sale deed, dated 23.04.2003, vide document No.31/BK.4/2003, from Ramachandruni Venkatrao S/o.Subba Rao, who had previously purchased the said plot from Manchala Venkata Ramaiah and Manchala Ramesh Kumar through a registered sale deed, dated 02.09.1983, vide Document No.3267/1983. The extent claimed under Plot No.5 was 40½ Gadis or 324 sq. yards. 12. Apart from that, the manner in which respondents acquired various extents of land, as mentioned in the counters above, all have taken a consistent stand that out of the total extent of Ac.5.78 cents in Survey No.305 of Ongole Village and Town, even as per the claim of the petitioners, Devathu Musalaiah and Devathu Sriranganadham purchased an extent of Ac.2.34½ cents and that the remaining extent of Ac.2.10 cents was acquired by Manchala Venkata Ramaiah and Manchala Ramesh Kumar from Dande Narayanamma and that as per the plea of petitioners, an extent of Ac.0.90 cents acquired by Devathu Musalaiah was sold away and as against the remaining extent of Ac.1.44½ cents, which was acquired by Devathu Sriranganadham, the petitioners laid an unapproved lay out to a large extent of Ac.1.88 cents by including a further extent of Ac.0.43½ cents, thereby, the land belonging to the respondents is sought to be claimed which is none other than the suit schedule property. Although the petitioners stated that the sons and grandchildren of Devathu Musalaiah alienated an extent of Ac.0.98 cents out of Ac.1.44 cents, neither the plaint nor the affidavit filed in support of the I.A. sets out the clear extents, details or boundaries to substantiate their claim that the suit schedule property constitutes the remaining extent of Ac.0.46 cents i.e., claimed out of Ac.1.44 cents. The petitioners further claimed that the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.38 of 2008 was collusive and, since the respondents were not parties to the said Suit, it is not binding upon them. 13. The petitioners further claimed that the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.38 of 2008 was collusive and, since the respondents were not parties to the said Suit, it is not binding upon them. 13. Lastly, it was stated that the claim made by the 1 st plaintiff, who is said to be the adoptive son of Devathu Sriranganadham, is not supported by any documentary evidence nor does the pleadings provide specifics and details of such adoption, even to consider that he, prima facie, was in adoption in the hands of Devathu Sriranganadham. Hence, the very basis of the institution of the Suit claiming the property from Devathu Sriranganadham is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. 14. No documents were marked on behalf of any of the respondents. 15. The trial Court based on the above pleadings and contentions framed the following issue: “Whether the petitioners are entitled for temporary injunction as prayed for? 16. Answering the same, the trial Court has taken into consideration Exs.A-1 to A-30, marked on behalf of the petitioners. A glance of exhibits marked in the impugned order indicates that Exs.A2 to A-29 relate to various sale deeds executed between 1982 and 2005, which are stated to be executed by the sons and grandchildren of Devathu Musalaiah. Exs.A1 and A30 are the extract of the registered GPA of the year 2020 and a copy of the caveat filed by the petitioners on 06.04.2022. The trial Court had come to the conclusion that these documents read with the averments in the plaint were insufficient to prima facie show that the petitioners were in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property as on the date of filing of the Suit. The trial Court also concluded that the decree in O.S.No.38 of 2008 by which the petitioners’ title in respect of the very same suit schedule property was confirmed and permanent injunction was granted utmost would only show their possession till the date of the decree and judgment i.e., 19.04.2011. The trial Court also concluded that the decree in O.S.No.38 of 2008 by which the petitioners’ title in respect of the very same suit schedule property was confirmed and permanent injunction was granted utmost would only show their possession till the date of the decree and judgment i.e., 19.04.2011. The trial Court also found that the suit schedule property is being claimed by both the petitioners as well as the respondents through their respective sources of title with reference to various sale deeds, therefore, the identity of the property was an issue in dispute and that until and unless the same is established, the petitioners cannot be said to have established the prima facie case and consequent balance of convenience. 17. So far as the aspect of adoption is concerned, the trial Court opined that the petitioners had not proved the adoption, and therefore, they were not entitled to the interim injunction. In the operative portion of the impugned order, the trial Court concludes that the petitioners are not entitled for permanent injunction. 18. Heard Sri Anup Koushik Karavadi, learned counsel for the appellants; Smt.Nimmagadda Revathi, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 4, 6 and 9, and Sri Javvaji Sarath Chandra, learned counsel for 5 th respondent. 19. Learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the trial Court, without proper appreciation of the pleadings and documentary evidence brought on record, recorded findings and concluded that the evidence brought on record was insufficient and that no iota of evidence was brought on record to show that they were in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property, which suffers from perversity. He would urge that the sale deeds, dated 26.08.1904 and 19.09.1931, through which Devathu Musalaiah and Devathu Sriranganadham acquired an extent of Ac.0.90 cents and Ac.1.44½ cents, respectively, which were not disputed and coupled with judgment and decree in O.S.No.38 of 2008, by which the petitioners’ title to the very same suit schedule property was declared and permanent injunction granted, clearly establishes very strong prima facie case in their favour for grant of a temporary injunction. He would contend that the findings recorded in paras.16, 22 and 27 of the impugned order were clearly perverse, in as much as the trial Court miserably failed to appreciate and examine the plea raised by them with reference to the documents exhibited in proper perspective. He would contend that the findings recorded in paras.16, 22 and 27 of the impugned order were clearly perverse, in as much as the trial Court miserably failed to appreciate and examine the plea raised by them with reference to the documents exhibited in proper perspective. He would further contend that the trial Court had miserably failed to record specific findings regarding prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, which are essential tests for deciding an application under Order 39, Rule 1 CPC when considering the grant of a temporary injunction. The trial Court instead of considering the prayer of the petitioners with reference to the above test, while referring to judgments in Murali Damodar Kanuri v. Dappu Laxmayya, 1998 (2) ALT 271 (AP) and Balakrishna Dattatraya Galande v. Balkrishna Rammharose Gupta, 2019 SCR 398 , which have no relation to the above aspect, concluded that the petitioners were not entitled to a permanent injunction, losing the sight of the fact that this was only an application for a temporary injunction. 20. Learned counsel for the appellants further contended that, in order to establish prima facie case, the pleadings in the plaint and the affidavit filed in support of the I.A., and the exhibits marked as Exs.A1 to A30, clearly demonstrate that they were in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property, whereas, though the respondents had pleaded tittle to the said property through various sale deeds, none of the documents were marked in support thereof. When the subject matter of property is a vacant site, it is his contention that one has to proceed on the basis that possession follows title. In support of the same, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by LRs ., (2008) 4 SCC 594 . 21. Further, learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the registered sale deed, dated 26.08.1904 vide document No.1777/ 1904 and the registered sale deed, dated 19.09.1931 vide document No.1145/1931, and the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.38 of 2008, by themselves establish title in favour of the petitioners and this would satisfy the requirement of prima facie case, in as much as they have made out a case for trial. When the case set up by the petitioners has merit for consideration, the same entitles them for grant of temporary injunction. When the case set up by the petitioners has merit for consideration, the same entitles them for grant of temporary injunction. In support of the same, reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in T.Bhoopal Reddy v. Smt.K.R. Laxmi Bai, 1997 SCC OnLine AP 848 = 1998 (1) APLJ 161 = 1998 (1) ALT 292 . 22. The learned counsel for the appellants also brought to the notice of this Court I.A.No.1 of 2024 by which it was brought on record that the 4 th respondent had executed a donation deed on 11.12.2024 vide document No.37162/2024, by which part of the plaint schedule property was donated in favour of proposed implead 9 th respondent, in as much as, the respondents are taking steps to create third party rights over the plaint schedule property, he pleaded that it is a fit case for granting temporary injunction as otherwise the very purpose of filing the Suit would get defeated. He also submitted that, initially, the trial Court had granted ad-interim temporary injunction on 05.05.2022, and the same is continued till 13.06.2022 and the same could not be extended due to the death of the 1 st plaintiff. 23. Smt.Nimmagadda Revathi, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 4, 6 and 9, while supporting the impugned order, contended that the petitioners though pleaded their right to the suit schedule property through 1 st plaintiff, who alleged to be the adoptive son of Devathu Sriranganadham, except an oral assertion, no documentary evidence or the details and specifics of such adoption have been pleaded, therefore, in the absence of which, the very basis for the institution of the Suit claiming right to the suit schedule property stands unestablished. Elaborating further, she contended that the averments made in the plaint and in the affidavit filed in support of the I.A. are silent about the other heirs of the remaining two sons of Devathu Musalaiah. Therefore, the 1 st plaintiff’s claim that he was adopted and in view of the death of Devathu Sriranganadham intestate, he acquired right to the property, has no legal basis. Therefore, the 1 st plaintiff’s claim that he was adopted and in view of the death of Devathu Sriranganadham intestate, he acquired right to the property, has no legal basis. It is further contended that the petitioners though traced their right and title from Devathu Musalaiah and Devathu Sriranganadham, who said to have purchased an extent of Ac.0.90 cents and Ac.1.44½ cents in Survey No.305 of Ongole Village and Town, under registered sale deeds dated 26.08.1904 vide document No.1777/1904 and registered sale deed, dated 19.09.1931 vide document No.1145/1931 respectively, the originals of those documents since are not filed and marked as exhibits, the contents of the same cannot be considered. The petitioners, therefore, cannot be said to have demonstrated their prima facie case basing on the pleadings and the documents in Exs.A1 to A30, and even the sale transactions reflected under the aforesaid exhibits were way back from the years 1983 to 2005, executed by sons and grandchildren of Devathu Musalaiah, but not the 1 st petitioner, therefore, the trial Court has rightly come to the conclusion that these documents shall not aid the claim of the petitioners. A further argument was made that the original owners, as mentioned above, have sold the entire land i.e., Ac.2.34½ cents by making plots with roads, therefore, nothing remains now further to claim from them. Lastly, it is contended that the judgment and decree passed in O.S. No.38 of 2008 was rightly not considered by the trial Court as the said judgment was based on admission of one of the defendants to the Suit and that the said judgment really does not deal with the matter on merits, by which, it can be inferred that the same was obtained in collusion. The trial Court, therefore, has clearly recorded findings on these aspects and held that the petitioners have not demonstrated any prima facie case and consequently, the balance of convenience and rejected the application refusing temporary injunction. As the said order clearly records the opinion of the trial Court regarding prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, which are essential ingredients for grant of temporary injunction, the view expressed by the trial Court has to be sustained and prays for dismissal of the present appeal. 24. Perused the record and considered the rival submissions. 25. As the said order clearly records the opinion of the trial Court regarding prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, which are essential ingredients for grant of temporary injunction, the view expressed by the trial Court has to be sustained and prays for dismissal of the present appeal. 24. Perused the record and considered the rival submissions. 25. It is well settled law that the grant of temporary injunction is discretionary in nature and the fundamental principle behind granting an injunction is to maintain the status quo and safeguard the plaintiffs from infringement of their rights. To that end, the Court has to consider the circumstances of each case and has no duty to issue an injunction just because a party asks for one. The three primary factors which the Courts are required to consider while determining whether to issue an interim injunction are that the plaintiffs must have a prima facie case i.e., a good case at the outset and an actual reasonable chance of success at trial, balance of convenience which demands the Court to weigh the possible harm to the plaintiffs if the injunction is refused against the probable harm to the defendants if it is issued, and that the Court will favour the party who is likely to experience more substantial harm if the injunction is not issued and finally, irreparable injury which the plaintiff has to demonstrate that the harm that would be suffered when the injunction is denied would not be financially or otherwise compensated. 26. The Apex Court in various judgments has considered the parameters and essential ingredients for grant of a temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC, in particular, in Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719 , has observed in paras. 4 and 5 as follows: “ 4. 26. The Apex Court in various judgments has considered the parameters and essential ingredients for grant of a temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC, in particular, in Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719 , has observed in paras. 4 and 5 as follows: “ 4. Order 39 Rule 1(c) provides that temporary injunction may be granted where, in any suit, it is proved by the affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit, the court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing … or dispossession of the plaintiff or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit as the court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. Pursuant to the recommendation of the Law Commission clause (c) was brought on statute by Section 86(i)(b) of the Amending Act 104 of 1976 with effect from February 1, 1977. Earlier thereto there was no express power except the inherent power under Section 151 CPC to grant ad interim injunction against dispossession. Rule 1 primarily concerned with the preservation of the property in dispute till legal rights are adjudicated. Injunction is a judicial process by which a party is required to do or to refrain from doing any particular act. It is in the nature of preventive relief to a litigant to prevent future possible injury. In other words, the court, on exercise of the power of granting ad interim injunction, is to preserve the subject matter of the suit in the status quo for the time being. It is settled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief. The exercise thereof is subject to the court satisfying that (1) there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the court, there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the plaintiff/defendant; (2) the court’s interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal right would be established at trial; and (3) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it. 5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is “a prima facie case” in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that “the balance of convenience” must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit.” 27. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit.” 27. Keeping in mind the aforesaid requirements one has to consider while granting a temporary injunction, the facts of the present case and findings recorded by trial Court are tested as under. The 1 st plaintiff claimed to be adopted son of Devathu Sriranganadham and that the suit schedule property originally belonged to Devathu Musalaiah and his son Devathu Sriranganadham, who are said to have purchased the same through registered sale deeds. Based on the said adoption, 1 st plaintiff claimed the alleged unsold or remaining extent of Ac.0.46 cents of land, which is the subject matter of the Suit. On the other hand, the respondents claimed that Survey No.305 of Ongole Village and town consists of Ac.5.78 cents, of which, Devathu Musalaiah and Devathu Sriranganadham owned an extent of Ac.2.34½ cents, while remaining Ac.2.10 cents was owned by Dande Narayanamma, who acquired the same from Ogirala Sundara Ramaiah S/o.Subbarayudu and Arigala Hanumantha Rao S/o.Jalaiah through registered sale deeds of even date 02.03.1966 vide Document Nos.165/1966 and 166/1966. The petitioners claim that out of the total extent of Ac.2.34½ cents, under Exs.A2 to A29, an extent of Ac.1.88 cents have already been alienated, leaving an extent of Ac.0.46 cents remaining, therefore, they assert that they are rightly claiming the suit schedule property. Whereas, the respondents contended that the original owners and their sons have alienated the entire land, to an extent of Ac.2.34½ cents, by making plots with roads and no land remains for them to alienate and that the suit schedule land, in fact, is the land belonging to them which was acquired by them through their respective sale deeds. The petitioners, to prove that they were in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property, relied on the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.38 of 2008 by which, the 1 st plaintiff was declared as rightful owner of the very same suit schedule property and was granted permanent injunction, therefore, pleaded to have, prima facie, established their right to the property and so also their possession over the plaint schedule property. 28. The 1 st plaintiff, claiming to be the adopted son of Devathu Sriranganadham, instituted the Suit claiming right to the suit schedule property, which is stated to have been purchased under a registered sale deed, dated 19.09.1931. The respondents have taken a specific plea that neither any documentary evidence in support of the alleged adoption, nor any details and specifics of such adoption have been pleaded, and in the absence of such evidence, a mere bald and vague statement would not amount to valid adoption, thereby, 1 st petitioner would acquire legal right to claim the suit schedule land from Devathu Sriranganadham and maintain the Suit. Though the trial Court had adverted to the rival contentions in this regard, no specific finding has been recorded and jumped to the conclusion that the petitioners failed to prove the adoption. The question of proving adoption does not arise at this stage, rather the Court should only satisfy whether prima facie the claim of the petitioners regarding adoption was made out or not. We find that the trial Court clearly committed an error in not recording such a finding on the aspect of adoption, which would be the main source to claim right over the suit schedule property through Devathu Sriranganadham. 29. Coming to the aspect of title to the suit schedule property, as claimed by the petitioners, it has been pleaded that the said property was initially purchased by Devathu Musalaiah and Devathu Sriranganadham under registered sale deeds, dated 29.08.1904 and 19.09.1931, of which, they had alienated an extent of Ac.1.88 cents, leaving the remaining extent of Ac.0.46 cents which is claimed to be the suit schedule property. There is specific plea and reference made to these two sale deeds, though they were not marked as exhibits in the I.A. The respondents raised an objection for consideration of these two sale deeds contending that as the original documents of the same were not filed along with the Suit, the contents of the same cannot be looked into. There is specific plea and reference made to these two sale deeds, though they were not marked as exhibits in the I.A. The respondents raised an objection for consideration of these two sale deeds contending that as the original documents of the same were not filed along with the Suit, the contents of the same cannot be looked into. However, in the counters filed by them, they admitted the execution of these two documents through which Devathu Musalaiah acquired an extent of Ac.0.90 cents and Devathu Sriranganadham acquired an extent of Ac.1.44½ cents, however, disputed that the schedule thereto did not mention the boundaries, therefore, the suit schedule land claimed does not fall under those documents, thereby the identity of the land has been seriously disputed. The said objection raised by the respondents has no basis, as in law, there is no such requirement of marking the documents as exhibits at the interlocutory stage of the matters. Rule 115 of Civil Rules of Practice only envisages marking of exhibits adduced in evidence as “A, B, C, and X” series, as the case may be, during the trial, but not for the interlocutory matters. Even the language employed in Rule 1 of Order 39 CPC prescribes that one seeking temporary injunction has to prove the injury by way of an affidavit or otherwise, which, therefore, mere pleading in affidavit would suffice for the Court to consider grant of temporary injunction and that marking of documents as exhibits is not mandatory rather it is only for the sake of convenience. Since the respondents have admitted the execution of sale deeds by which Devathu Musalaiah and Devathu Sriranganadham acquired an extent of Ac.2.34½ cents, mere non- exhibiting of the originals of the said two documents will not undermine the rights flowing from the said documents. Having said that, the trial Court while recording finding with respect to prima facie case has not considered the effect of the said documents on the ground that no other evidence has been brought on record other than Exs.A1 to A30, which implies that the trial Court has clearly omitted to consider the rights as claimed by the petitioners under the said two documents. In para 16 of the impugned order, the trial Court refers to Ex.A4 to be the judgment in O.S.No.38 of 2008, however, in the appendix of evidence appended to the impugned order, Ex.A4 as marked reflects to be the extract of registered sale deed, dated 26.09.1983 and that the judgment and decree referred above does not figure as an exhibit at all. The same goes to show that the trial Court has clearly omitted to consider certain evidence pleaded and placed on record or did not properly consider the evidence already brought on record in proper perspective and in the manner as to be considered for the purpose of recording satisfaction of prima facie case for grant of temporary injunction. 30. This Court finds that since the petitioners have laid their claim based on the documents as pleaded in the affidavit filed along with the I.A., and as referred in the plaint, and so also, the respondents have laid a claim based on various sale deeds, as referred in the counters, the least expected from the trial Court was to refer to the same and appreciate the respective claims for the purpose of formation of an opinion as to whether a prima facie case was made out or not, which is clearly lacking in the impugned order. The trial Court though rightly proceeded by stating that the burden is on the plaintiffs to establish a strong prima facie case by producing cogent evidence and in the process of considering such evidence, the Court should not conduct a mini trial, it later completely misdirected itself in appreciating the evidence and complying with the principles essential for granting a temporary injunction by recording specific findings on the prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. 31. In the matter of granting temporary injunction, it is the duty of the Court to take into consideration the evidence and relevant documents before it records a finding. Taking into consideration the documents does not mean mere referring the same in the judgment, but there must be some discussion about them before arriving a conclusion. The interim injunction is no doubt discretionary relief, but it has to be granted only after applying a judicious mind and on a proper discussion and appreciation of evidence on record. Taking into consideration the documents does not mean mere referring the same in the judgment, but there must be some discussion about them before arriving a conclusion. The interim injunction is no doubt discretionary relief, but it has to be granted only after applying a judicious mind and on a proper discussion and appreciation of evidence on record. From the impugned order passed by the trial Court, we are not able to find that on proper appreciation of all the documents and pleadings before it and giving due consideration to the same, the trial Court had recorded a specific finding with respect to prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss or injury and the trial Court has not recorded specific findings on all the above three considerations. 32. Though the learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anathula Sudhakar , to buttress his arguments that the principle of possession follows title should have been applied in as much as the petitioners have prima facie established their title through the registered sale deeds, dated 25.08.1904 and 19.09.1931 and that he referred to the other judgments in Parkash Singh v. State of Haryana, 2002 SCC OnLine P & H 61 ; T.Bhoopal Reddy ; Murali Damodar Kanuri and Balakrishna Dattatraya Galande , to buttress the argument that prima facie case does not mean that the petitioners have 100% case rather the contentions raised in the Suit even if qualify merit of consideration, the Court should consider grant of temporary injunction and that the prima facie case has to be looked from the perspective of both sides based on pleadings and documents exhibited, we are not expressing any opinion on merits as it is found that the trial Court has not recorded specific findings regarding prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. 33. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the matter is remanded to the trial Court for fresh consideration and the trial Court is directed to hear the parties and pass orders in the I.A. afresh within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, uninfluenced by any of the observations made in this judgment. No order as to costs. 34. No order as to costs. 34. This Court has passed an interim order on 27.12.2024, directing the parties to maintain the status quo in respect of the plaint schedule property, considering that ad-interim injunction continued until 13.06.2022, before the trial Court, which, we direct to continue till the disposal of the I.A. afresh by the trial Court. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending consideration, if any, in this case shall stand closed.